Page 300 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Except that President Roosevelt had left Washington for the Atlantic Conference meeting with Prime Minister Churchill before either of the two last-mentioned conferences, [1] the foregoing summarizes briefly the immediate background for that Conference so far as relations between the United States and Japan were concerned. The Japanese move into southern French Indochina while at the same time in Washington Ambassador Nomura was engaging in conversations with Secretary Hull looking toward a peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific, and the consequent breaking off of those conversations, together with the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States, had brought relations between the two countries to a critical stage. Moreover, French Indochina, where the Japanese forces were establishing themselves, was an area of great strategic importance. From it, those forces could strike in many directions, toward major objectives. To the east, across the South China Sea lay the Philippines. To the west and northwest, across Thailand and the Chinese province of Yunnan, lay Rangoon, Kunming, and the Burma Road, over which American supplies for China were moving. To the south, at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, lay the British naval base at Singapore. Beyond Singapore and the Philippines lay the Netherlands East Indies, with rubber, oil, and other materials needed by Japan for the purposes to which the Japanese Government was committed. When Under Secretary Welles informed Ambassador Nomura on July 23 (Washington time) that the conversations were at an end, he said that the United States could only assume, first- "that the occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice to the United States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy of force and of conquest, and, second, that in the light of these acts on the part of Japan, the United States, with regard to its own safety in the light of its own preparations for self-defense, must assume *that the Japanese Government was taking the last step before proceeding upon a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas and of conquest in the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that region* (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525). THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE (August 9-14, 1941) The meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, each accompanied by high officials of their respective Governments, took place at sea near Argentia, Newfoundland, during the second week in August 1941. At it the President and the Prime Minister agreed upon the joint declaration of principles which has since become known as the Atlantic Charter (tr. 1359-1364). Their conversations also dealt with steps which Great Britain and the United States were taking for their safety in the face of the policies of aggression of the German Government and other governments associated with the German Government. They discussed such matters as the proposed occupation of the Canary Islands by the British Government to guard the southern Atlantic convoy route into the [1] Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles testified, however, that he believed he (Welles) left Washington for the Atlantic Conference the evening of August 8 (Washington time) (tr. 1254). PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 301 British Isles, a proposal that the Portuguese Government request the Government of the United States for assistance in the defense of the Azores as a means of assurance that those islands would not be occupied by Germany, and the protection of the Cape Verde Islands against Axis aggressors (ex. 22-C). The President and the Prime Minister also discussed the situation in the Far East. During those discussions Mr. Churchill submitted a proposal for parallel declarations by the United States, British, and Dutch Governments warning Japan against new moves of military aggression. [1] This proposal also contemplated that the Russian Government would be kept fully informed of such steps (ex. 22). The final discussion of Mr. Churchill's proposal occurred on August 11 (ex. 22-C). According to Under Secretary Welles' record of that discussion "The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6. "The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unacceptable (ex. 22-C)." The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, and after expressing his strong feeling that "every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan," he stated the procedure with respect to Japan that he intended to follow upon his return to Washington. He told the Prime Minister that he would inform Ambassador Nomura that if the Japanese Government would give satisfactory assurances that it would not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina would be withdrawn, the United States Government-would-resume the informal conversations with the Japanese Government. He said that he would further state that if Japan should refuse to consider this procedure and should undertake further steps in the nature of military expansions, in his belief various steps would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding his realization that the taking of such measures might result in war between the United States and Japan (ex 22-C). Mr. Churchill immediately concurred in this procedure (ex 22-C). There was then discussed- "the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the Soviet Union (ex. 22-C)." Under Secretary Welles expressed the view that the real issue involved was whether or not Japan would continue its policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific and suggested that the statement which the President intended to make "might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the southwestern Pacific area (ex. 22 C). [1] The record before the Committee also shows that in February 1941, just before the Lend-Lease Act described by Prime Minister Churchill as "the Bill on which our hopes depend" was enacted by Congress, the Prime Minister and Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, had urged upon President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull their desire for some action by the United States "to deter the Japanese" (ex. 158). Page 302 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this, and "*it was decided that the step to be taken by the President* [1] would be taken in that sense" (ex. 22-C). Consideration was then given the question whether or not President Roosevelt should include in his statement to Ambassador Nomura a statement with respect to British policy concerning French Indochina and Thailand (ex. 22-C). However, since the statement ultimately made by the President to Ambassador Nomura did not mention British policy concerning those countries this latter proposal appears to have been dropped (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 554-559). Under Secretary Welles returned to Washington from Argentia several days before President Roosevelt, at the latter's request. Upon his arrival, he advised Secretary Hull of what had transpired there, and, at the President's further request, he prepared the initial draft (ex. 22) of the proposed warning to Japan from notes he had made of his final conversation with the President before leaving Argentia (tr. 1259). A revised draft was given to Secretary Hull by Mr. Welles on August 16, 1941 (ex. 22-A), and was further revised by the Secretary and his advisors on Far Eastern affairs before being communicated to Ambassador Nomura by the President (tr. 1272). PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WARNS JAPAN AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION AND AT THE SAME TIME OFFERS TO RESUME THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS (August 17, 1941) President Roosevelt returned to Washington Sunday morning, August 17 (Washington time) . Late that afternoon, Ambassador Nomura met with the President and Secretary Hull at the White House, at the President's request (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 554 et seq.; ex. 124). [2] Mr. Roosevelt read and then handed to Admiral Nomura the document [1] The evidence before the Committee is conflicting as to whether or not Prime Minister Churchill promised President Roosevelt that the British Government would take action parallel to that to be taken by the United States Government. The only contemporaneous records of the Atlantic Conference before the Committee are three memoranda prepared by Under Secretary Welles (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D). Those memoranda show that the procedure outlined by President Roosevelt differed substantially from that envisaged in Prime Minister Churchill's proposal. As there described by Mr. Welles, the President's procedure did not call for parallel action by either the British or Dutch Governments, or for keeping Russia informed, as Mr. Churchill had proposed. Nor, as is the case of Mr. Churchill's proposal, was the precise phraseology of the warning to Japan prescribed, it being left entirely up to the President. Mr. Welles testified that the promise given by the President to Mr. Churchill "was limited to the fact that a warning would be given" (tr. 1422) and that the only agreement reached between the President and the Prime Minister was "that the President made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning to the Japanese Government of the character which actually was made by the President on August 17" (tr. 1428). While it is true that Mr. Welles testified that the promise made by President Roosevelt was to "take parallel action with the British Government in warning the Japanese Government" (tr. 12354) and that he "took it for granted Mr. Churchill must have made that statement" (i. e. promised to make a parallel warning) to the President (tr. 1446), it is also true that when asked directly whether the President had told him that Mr. Churchill had promised to make a parallel warning, Mr. Welles said, "the President in his conversation with me, so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement" (tr. 1446). Moreover, as previously noted, the Welles' memoranda neither state nor indicate that any such promise was made by Mr. Churchill (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D), and there is no evidence before the Committee showing that action parallel to the President's warning to Japan was ever taken by the British Government. On the other hand both "Peace and War" {ex. 28, p. 129) and "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 345) refer to an "agreement" to take parallel action made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, though, of course, neither of these purports to be a contemporaneous account of the Atlantic Conference. Likewise, in his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull referred to such an "agreement." Though again Secretary Hull did not attend the Atlantic Conference (tr. 1116). [2] This discussion of the meeting referred to in the text, and the discussions in this appendix of other meetings in Washington or Tokyo between representatives of the United States Government and the Japanese Government, are based primarily upon the official State Department records of such meetings appearing in Volumes I and II of " Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29) and upon intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo reporting such meetings, the Committee exhibits in which such messages appear being indicated-in all eases. Reference is made to such records and reports, only the material portions of which have been quoted or summarized here. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 303 drafted by Mr. Welles and the Secretary. It noted that notwithstanding the protracted conversations engaged in by the United States and Japanese Governments looking toward a peaceful settlement in the Pacific and the President's suggestion on July 24, 1941, for the "neutralization" of French Indochina, the Japanese Government had continued to dispose its armed forces at various points in the Far East and had occupied French Indochina. Reading from the document, President Roosevelt said that the United States Government felt that at the present stage "nothing short of the most complete candor on its part in the light of the evidence and indications" in its possession would tend to further the objectives sought. He then warned Japan against further aggression, saying: "Such being the ease, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safe-guarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 556-557)." On behalf of his Government, Ambassador Nomura reasserted the sincerity of its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. He expressed his Government's desire to be advised as to the possibility of arranging a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye and of resuming the informal conversations which had been terminated by the United States in July because of the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina. He stated, however, that he felt no further explanations regarding his Government's actions in French Indochina, in addition to the views already expressed to Secretary Hull, were necessary. The President then read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a second document. It opened with a reference to the Japanese proposal of August 8 (Washington time) for a meeting between himself and Premier Konoye and to the Japanese desire for resumption of the informal conversations. The President said that the United States Government would be prepared to resume the conversations provided the Japanese Government felt that Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist activities, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program to which the United States was committed. His statement concluded: "the Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 559)." In Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo on this meeting, he emphasized the "graveness with which he (President Roosevelt) views Japanese-U. S. relations." The Ambassador expressed the view that the Japanese proposal for a "leaders' conference" between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye had "considerably eased" the attitude of the United States Government and that there was no room for doubt "that the President hopes that matters will take a turn for the better" (ex 124). Page 304 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The next day, August 18 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent a message to Prime Minister Churchill describing his meeting with Ambassador Nomura. This message indicates that the President did not learn until after his return to Washington of the Ambassador's request on August 16 (Washington time) for a resumption of the informal conversations. In his message, the President told Mr. Churchill that "I made to him (Admiral Nomura) a statement covering the position of this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed (ex. 70)." The evidence before the Committee does not show whether or not the British Government took "parallel action" to the warning given Japan by President Roosevelt. Under Secretary Welles testified before the Committee that he took it for granted that the British Government took such parallel action and that the records of the State Department would probably show that (tr. 1279), but Secretary Hull testified, and the State Department has advised the Committee, that its files contain no record of any such action (tr. 14, 306; 4480). Furthermore, as late as November 30 (Washington time), Prime Minister Churchill sent a message to the President saying that "one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. * * * We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration" (ex. 24); and the evidence further shows that on December 7 the Prime Minister submitted to President Roosevelt a draft of a proposed warning to Japan (tr. 13738-13740). On the other hand, on August 25, 1941, in an address reporting to Parliament on the Atlantic Conference, the Prime Minister said: "But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indo-China from the wretched Vichy French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine islands under the protection of the United States. "It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States (tr. 1355-1356; 4480- 4481)." While Secretary Hull testified that he knew of no parallel action taken by the British other than this address (tr. 14306), which was broadcast by radio, Under Secretary Welles testified that in his opinion this address did not constitute "parallel action" of the kind proposed by Mr. Churchill to the President, and that in Mr. Welles' PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 305 judgment such action would necessarily have had to have been in the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes (tr. 1356). [1] On August 21 (Washington time) President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress describing the meeting at Argentia (tr. 1359-1364). This message embodied the text of the "Atlantic Charter" and referred in general terms to other matters discussed at the meeting, but made no specific mention of the proposal to issue a warning to Japan. Under Secretary Welles testified that publication of the proposal to issue a warning to Japan or of the President's warning, itself, would not have been conducive to a successful result in attempting to find a peaceful solution, as it would have inflamed public opinion in Japan (tr. 1277). JAPAN PROTESTS UNITED STATES SHIPMENTS OF OIL TO RUSSIA (August 27, 1941) The Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's request on August 17 (Washington time) for a " clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans" was not received until August 28 (Washington time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador Nomura reported to the Japanese Foreign Office an increasing interest on the part of President Roosevelt in participating in the resumption of the Japanese-American negotiations and stated that, in his opinion, "the President is the one who shows the most interest in the 'leaders conference' " (ex. 124). About the same time the Ambassador received a report from Tokyo concerning the Foreign Minister's talk with Ambassador Grew on August 18 (Japan time) at which Ambassador Grew indicated that he would give the proposed meeting his personal support (ex. 124). On August 23 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura that "everything in our power" was being done " to rush our reply to the United States and at the same time to bring about the 'leaders conference' at an earlier date" (ex. 124). The next day Ambassador Nomura called of Secretary Hull and reported that his Government wanted the "leaders conference" to take place before October 15. The reason he gave for this was the fear in Tokyo that the impression would be created that Japan " had given in in the face of the threat of 'encirclement' " if the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should follow a reported British-U. S.-Soviet conference to be held at an earlier date (ex. 124; ex. 29, vol. II, p. 568). At about this time the German Ambassador in Japan, General Ott, received intelligence reports that the United States was preparing to ship oil to Russia via Vladivostok, that the first of the transporting vessels had already sailed, that they would soon sail in rapid succession, and that the oil would undoubtedly be used by Russia for an attack upon Japan. General Ott repeated this information to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs during an interview on August 19 (Japan time), and in reply the Vice Minister said that the problem of American oil was receiving very careful attention (ex. 132-A, item C). The nest day, and again on August 22 (Japan time), the Foreign [1] There is also before the Committee a memorandum of Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Political Advisor to Secretary Hull, dated, however, February 28, 1944, in which it is stated that toward the end of August 1941, the British and American Governments "served on Japan a strong warning" against further extending her courses of aggression (ex. 108). Page 306 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura requesting him to call the attention of the United States authorities to the fact that if it should become known in Japan that the United States was shipping iron, airplanes, and other materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters, this might have an adverse effect upon Japanese-American relations (ex. 1, p. 19; ex. 124). Ambassador Nomura told Secretary Hull during their conversation on August 23 (Washington time) that the shipment of oil by the United States to Russia through Japanese waters "would naturally give the Japanese real concern at an early date" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 566). A more urgent message concerning this matter was sent from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura on August 26 (Japan time) requesting him to "make representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general viewpoint of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations" (ex. 1, p. 21 ) . Representations of this nature were made to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo the next day (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 569), and on August 27 (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura orally protested to Secretary Hull against American shipments of oil to Russia through Japanese waters. Secretary Hull stated that only two tankers were involved and that the shipments were entirely valid under all the laws of commerce (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 570). PREMIER KONOYE SENDS A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT URGING THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE" (August 28, 1941) Premier Konoye replied to President Roosevelt's statement of August 17 (Washington time) in a personal message which Ambassador Nomura handed to the President at a conference at the White House on the morning of August 28 (Washington time). The Premier's message was accompanied by a statement which the Japanese Government intended to be responsive to the President's suggestion that it would be helpful if that Government would furnish a clearer statement of its present attitude and plans than had as yet been given (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 571-572). In his message to President Roosevelt, Premier Konoye urged that the meeting between himself and the President be arranged "as soon as possible." He said that while the preliminary informal negotiations that were terminated in July had been "quite appropriate both in spirit and content," nevertheless "the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments does not meet the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may produce unforeseen contingencies "I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary be left to negotiations between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 573)." The statement which accompanied Premier Konoye's message referred, among other things, to the- "principles and directives set forth in detail by the United States Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 307 and continued "The Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 575)." However, while the statement contained many assurances regarding Japan's peaceful intentions, the more important assurances were qualified or conditional. Thus, the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina, but only "as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia"; concerning Soviet- Japanese relations it was said that Japan would take no military action "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japanese Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty"; the Japanese Government had no intention, it was said, of using, "without provocation" military force against any neighboring nation (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 573-576). Ambassador Nomura reported to his Government that President Roosevelt " vas well pleased" with the Premier's message (ex. 124). The President had said, he cabled, "I am looking forward to having approximately three days talk with Prince Konoye", but that Hawaii was out of the question as a meeting place and that he would prefer Juneau, Alaska. The Ambassador quoted the President as having "smilingly and cynically" said during his reading of the message: "Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince Konoye, I wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those conversations just as an invasion of French Indo-China occurred during Secretary Hull's conversations with your Excellency (ex. 124)." The evening of the same day, August 28 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull and outlined to the Secretary his ideas concerning the arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting. During this conversation, the Secretary pointed out to Ambassador Nomura the desirability of there being reached in advance of the proposed meeting "an agreement in principle on the principal questions which were involved in a settlement of Pacific questions between the two nations." The Secretary said that if the proposed meeting should fail to result in an agreement, serious consequences from the point of view of both Governments would ensue. He expressed the view that therefore the purpose of the proposed meeting should be "the ratification of essential points agreed upon in principle" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 576-577). Ambassador Nomura concluded his report of this meeting to Tokyo with the comment: "In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious person. There are indications that he is considering this matter from many angles. I feel that unless we are in fairly close agreement the "leaders conference" will not materialize (ex. 124)." GERMANY SUSPECTS TREACHERY (August 29-30, 1941) It became known to the American press, soon after Ambassador Nomura left the White House following his conference with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull on August 28 (Washington time), that Page 308 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the Ambassador had delivered a personal message to the President from Premier Konoye. Whether this information was given out by Secretary Hull or by Ambassador Nomura is not clear from the record before the Committee (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 582-583; ex. 124); however, as a result of the disclosure, Foreign Minister Toyoda became greatly concerned that the proposed "leaders conference" should be kept absolutely secret, fearing the project would fail if news of it should leak out before a settlement was reached. The Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura twice on August 29 (Japan time) urging him "to take every precaution" to guard against leaks (ex. 124). This concern in Tokyo over the effect of publicity on the conversations and the proposed "leaders conference" was a major reason for calls by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office on Ambassador Grew on August 29 and September 3 (Japan time) and for a call by Ambassador Nomura on Secretary Hull on September 1 (Washington time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579-582, 586-587, 583-585). During his first conversation with Ambassador Grew, the Director, Mr. Terasaki, dwelt at some length on the unfortunate effects of the publicity in Washington about Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, and then communicated to the Ambassador an appeal from Foreign Minister Toyoda that (1) the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting be arranged without delay and (2) pending the outcome of the proposed meeting, the United States postpone the sending oil tankers to the Soviet Union and suspend the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. Ambassador Grew's memorandum of this meeting noted that he left Mr. Terasaki "under no illusion" that the United States Government would find it possible to agree to either of the "preposterous requests" contained in (2) above (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 582). Ambassador Nomura's conference with Secretary Hull on September 1 (Washington time) was concerned largely with discussion of the effect upon the conversations of the positions taken by the press in Japan and the United States. The Secretary took advantage of the occasion to ask the Ambassador what would happen if an agreement should not be reached at the proposed "leaders conference," and to repeat his suggestion that an effort be made to reach an agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 583-585). As a result of the fear in Tokyo of publicity, Ambassador Nomura wrote a brief note to Secretary Hull on August 29 (Washington time) requesting his cooperation in keeping the conversations secret. The Secretary replied on September 2 (Washington time) saying that he would "be glad to conform to the desires of yourself and your Government in the foregoing respect, to every extent practical" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579, 586). However, apparently believing that some official comment was needed in view of the rumors and speculation in Tokyo about Ambassador Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt, at 2:30 p. M. On August 29 (Japan time). The Japanese Foreign Office released an official statement that Ambassador Nomura had called on President Roosevelt on August 28 and had delivered to the President a message from Premier Konoye stating "Japan's view regarding Pacific problems which are pending between Japan and the United States" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579). Ambassador Grew advised Secretary Hull of this announcement later the same afternoon (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579). PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 309 Foreign Minister Toyoda feared publicity because of "the exceedingly complex domestic situation" and the consideration which had to be given to "our relations with Germany and Italy" (ex. 124). What the Foreign Minister had in mind in the first connection is indicated by his cable to Ambassador Nomura on September 3 (Japan time), in which he said: "Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner (ex. 1, p. 25)." In the second connection, it is now known from captured Japanese documents that less than 4 hours after the Tokyo announcement of Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, General Ott, the German Ambassador, called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau, and demanded to know whether the Premier's message departed from the policy determined at the Imperial Conference on July 2, which had been secretly communicated to the German Government, and whether the Cabinet was contemplating any change in that regard (ex. 132-A, item C). The Vice Minister replied that the message did not mean that there had been "a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating any change in our relations with the Axis." The reason for sending the message, he told the Ambassador, "was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific" and to attempt "to start conversations between the two parties." Ambassador Ott suggested that "precautions must be taken against America's scheme to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her advantage," to which the Vice Minister replied that "we have given the matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by Japan with America might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon Germany and Italy." "Our aim," he said, "is to keep her (America) from joining in the war." The German Ambassador then requested an interview with Foreign Minister Toyoda, which took place on the afternoon of August 30 (Japan time). At that interview General Ott again demanded to know whether the intentions of Japan were still as secretly communicated to Germany on July 2. The Foreign Minister denied that there had been any change in Japan's intentions, and stated that Japan's preparations to avail herself of any new developments "are now making headway." The German Ambassador said: "In Foreign Minister Matsuoka's time the Japanese government authorities thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an attitude in conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that is, to give up taking any positive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion might arise, and Germany is very grateful that at the time the Japanese government resolutely resisted these American designs, and we hope that it will continue to take that "line." I would like to ask what Your Excellency's views are concerning this point (ex. 132-A, item C)." Admiral Toyoda replied: "In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the same as in the past; nor will it change in the future (ex. 132-A, item C)." The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reported to Tokyo on October 1, 1941, that because of the Japanese-American negotiations everyone in the German Foreign Office was "thoroughly disgusted with Japan." He said that the fact that the feeling of German leaders and people in