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The Imperial Command to form a new Cabinet was given on October 17 
(Japan time) to General Hideki Tojo, who not only became Premier but 
also took the portfolios of the War and Home Ministries.  In addition to 
having been War Minister in the preceding Cabinet of Premier Konoye, 
General Tojo was an Army officer on the active list. The same day, 
Premier Konoye's private secretary, Mr. Ushiba, called on Counselor 
Dooman at the American Embassy in Tokyo, and through him conveyed to 
Ambassador Grew from the Premier

"a very interesting explanation of the circumstances which had led to 
the fall of the cabinet and the successful efforts of the Prime Minister 
to ensure the appointment of a successor who would continue the 
conversations with the United States.  The circumstances were 
extraordinarily dramatic and constitute what may in future be regarded 
as one of the really big moments in Japanese history (ex. 30, p. 458)."

Mr. Ushiba also delivered to Ambassador Grew a letter from Prince Konoye 
in which he stated that he felt certain

"that the Cabinet which is to succeed mine will exert its utmost in 
continuing to a successful conclusion the conversations which we have 
been carrying on up till today (ex. 30, p. 457)."

The following week, a "reliable Japanese informant" gave Ambassador Grew 
the following account of the events leading up the resignation of the 
Konoye Cabinet:

"The informant called on me at his own request this evening. He told me 
that just prior to the fall of the Konoye Cabinet a conference of the 
leading members of the Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces 
had been summoned by the Emperor, who inquired if they were prepared to 
pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war with 
the United States. The representatives of the Army and Navy who attended 
this conference did not reply to the Emperor's question, whereupon the 
latter, with a reference to the progressive policy pursued by the 
Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented action ordered the 
armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor's definite stand 
necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a 
position effectively to control the Army, the ensuing resignation of 
Prince Konoye, and the appointment of General Tojo who, while remaining 
in the Army active list, is committed to a policy of attempting to 
conclude successfully the current Japanese-American conversations (ex. 
29, vol. II, p. 697)."

On October 16 (Washington time), in a conversation with Lord Halifax, 
the British Ambassador in the United States, Ambassador Nomura said:

"The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet was due to internal differences 
between on the one hand the Prime Minister and those who wished to reach 
agreement with the United States by not insisting on the third point 
mentioned above (the right to station troops in China), and on the other 
hand those who thought that not to insist on this point would involve 
too great a loss of face.

"But the Ambassador did not anticipate any sudden change of policy. The 
Emperor was in favor of peace, and even if a general were made Prime 
Minister, it was unlikely that the Emperor's wishes would be 
disregarded.

"The outburst of a Japanese Navy spokesman as reported in the United 
States press today was of no importance, and might be disregarded.

"Everybody in the Japanese Cabinet wanted understanding with the United 
States, and the only difference was as to the price that should be paid 
for it (ex. 158)."

Two days later, on October 18 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura 
cabled his congratulations to the new Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo, 
at the same time expressing his fear that he would not "be able to 
accomplish much in the future" and asking the new Foreign Minister's 
approval of his returning to Japan "in the near 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         Page 331

future so that I may personally report the situation here" (ex. 1, p. 
79). He expressed similar views in a message (ex. 1, p. 80) to the 
Japanese Navy Minister on October 20 (Washington time), and in a message 
to the new Foreign Minister 2 days later in which he said:

"I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. * * * Nor 
do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don't want to be the 
bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical 
existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee 
from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way 
that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return 
to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured 
your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my 
rudeness (ex. 1, p. 81)."

On October 23 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador 
Nomura that the outcome of the negotiations would "have a great bearing 
upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue," 
and expressed the hope that the Ambassador would see fit "to sacrifice 
all of (his) personal wishes and remain at (his) post" (ex. 1, p. 82). 
On November 4 (Japan time), the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador 
Nomura to "compose yourself and make up your mind to do your best." 
Finally, on November 5 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura cabled the 
Foreign Minister that after careful consideration "I have decided to 
continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be" (ex. 
1, p. 100).

THE TOJO CABINET FORMULATES ITS "ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL"

(November 5, 1941)

As the result of the Cabinet crisis in Japan, the State Department in 
Washington considered the dispatch of a personal message from President 
Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito urging Japan to join with the United 
States to preserve peace in the Pacific area, but stating that if Japan 
should start new military operations the United States "would have to 
seek, by taking any and all steps which it might deem necessary, to 
prevent any extension" of the war (ex. 20). Such a message was not sent, 
however, pending clarification of the situation in Japan and the 
policies of the new Japanese Government (ex. 20; tr. 4494-4501).

Commencing October 17 (Japan time) the Tojo Cabinet engaged in 
preparations for a formal determination of the policies it would follow, 
and such a determination was made at an Imperial Conference on November 
5 (Japan time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador 
Nomura received only general instructions from the Japanese Foreign 
Office concerning the course he should follow in further talks with the 
Americans. He was, however, advised on October 21 (Japan time) that

"the new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere 
desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our 
country has said practically l she can say in the way of expressing of 
opinions and setting forth our stands. *We feel that we have now reached 
a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to 
urge the United States to reconsider her views.*

"We urge therefore, that, choosing an opportune moment, either you or 
Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our 
country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this 
matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal 
United States counter proposal to our proposal of 27 September (ex. 1, 
p. 81)."

Page 332             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

These instructions were concurred in by the Japanese War and Navy 
Ministers (ex. 1, p. 84).

In accordance with the Foreign Minister's instructions, Minister 
Wakasugi called on Under Secretary Welles on October 24 (Washington 
time). The Minister told the Under Secretary that the new Japanese 
Government desired to follow the policy of the preceding Government and 
to continue the conversations without delay, adding that in his belief 
the new Government 

"had taken office under such circumstances and was pressed by tense 
public opinion to such an extent as to make it imminently desirable that 
the conversations be pressed to a satisfactory conclusion speedily (ex. 
29, vol. II, p. 693)."

He then asked whether the United States had as yet any counterproposals 
to make to the suggestions offered by the Japanese Government on 
September 27. In reply, Mr. Welles made it clear that the United States 
would be glad to continue the conversations, but suggested that recent 
belligerent public statements by high Japanese officials and the tone of 
the Japanese press were not helpful to the atmosphere in which the 
conversations would take place. When Minister Wakasugi pointed to a 
recent speech by Secretary of the Navy Knox in which Mr. Knox had said 
that a Japanese-American war was inevitable and that the United States 
Navy was on a "24-hour basis," Mr. Welles said that this simply showed 
the effect on the Navy of the statements being made in Japan. In reply 
to the Minister's inquiry regarding the possibility of counterproposals 
being submitted by the United States, Mr. Welles said that the United 
States position was fully set forth in its draft proposals of June 21 
and the statement delivered to Ambassador Nomura on October 2, and that 
for this reason he did not think any counterproposals by the United 
States were called for. The conversation concluded with a discussion of 
the possibility of taking up the three major points of disagreement in 
the following order: (1) Economic nondiscrimination, (2) Japan's status 
under the Tri-Partite Pact, and (3) the China question (ex. 29, vol. II, 
pp. 692-697). A full report on this conversation was immediately sent to 
Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 1, pp. 82-84).

Four days later Minister Wakasugi cabled his own lengthy appraisal of 
the general attitude of the United States (ex. 1, pp. 86-87). The basic 
United States policy, he said, was the crushing of the so-called 
Hitlerism, which he defined as "the establishment of a new order through 
the force of arms." Because the United States "presumed" that Japan 
intended to develop the French Indo-China and Thailand area "under the 
principle of our military's coprosperity sphere, in a monopolistic 
manner, and through the force of arms," as contrasted with America's 
principle of economic nondiscrimination, there had arisen "a clash of 
ideologies." He said that there was every indication that the United 
States Government was "anxious to adjust the relationship between the 
two nations," but that he doubted that it would make any concessions 
from its proposals of June 21 and October 2. He expressed the opinion 
that the United States had completed its preparations "in the event of 
the worst," and that "a course of economic pressure plus watchful 
waiting" had been decided on. He felt, however, that all was not 
hopeless and that by "good-naturedly" continuing the talks there would 
be opened up "ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use 
of world developments." He concluded his report by saying:

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             Page 333

"However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local 
differences by insisting upon our freedom of action (sic), we must have 
our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated, 
but that our national relations will be severed.

"The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the 
talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly 
formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that the new Cabinet 
establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay 
our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that 
would be to our best interest (ex. 1, p. 87)."

On October 30 (Japan time) in Tokyo the new Foreign Minister received 
the diplomatic corps individually, and during the course of his talk 
with Ambassador Grew he expressed his desire that the Japanese-American 
conversations be continued and be successfully brought to a conclusion 
without delay, and he asked Ambassador Grew's cooperation to that end 
(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 699-700). Ambassador Grew noted that, compared 
with Admiral Toyoda who had preceded him, the new Foreign Minister was 
"grim, unsmiling, and ultra-reserved" (ex. 30, p. 465). The Foreign 
Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura that he had told Ambassador Grew that 
Japanese-American relations got worse unfortunate results would ensue, a 
statement substantially similar to the statement he had made to Sir 
Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador, on October 26 (Japan time) (ex. 
1, p. 91).

The great activity in Tokyo during the period immediately after the 
formation of the Tojo Cabinet, and the attitude with which that Cabinet 
approached the continuance of the Japanese-American conversations, is 
illustrated by Foreign Minister Togo's message No. 725 of November 4 
(Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura:

"1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the 
edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever 
adjusting them.  In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, 
*the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some 
days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are 
at length able to bring forth a counterproposal for the resumption of 
Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the 
Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 and 727).* 
This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the 
conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

"2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no 
longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain 
pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States 
of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to 
gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, *but this is our 
last effort. Both in name and spirit this counterproposal of ours is, 
indeed, the last.* I want you to know that. *If through it we do not 
reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be 
ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the 
brink of chaos.* I0 mean that the success or failure of the pending 
discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of 
Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this 
die.*

"When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt 
that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some 
understanding we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and 
yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick 
and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with. 
Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of 
the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, 
our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, 
too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this 
to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who 
think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell 
you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our 
long-suffering. Nay, when it come to a question of our existence and our 
honor, when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost. 
If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this 
position of ours, 

Page 334             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. *This time we 
are showing the limit of our friendship; this time use are making our 
last possible bargain,* and I hope that we can thus settle all our 
troubles with the United States peaceably.

"3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward *to what may come 
at the end at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations* the 
Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much 
better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be 
for the whole world situation.

"4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is 
your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your 
being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you 
please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind 
to continue to do your best?  I hope you will. Now just as soon as the 
conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to 
go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to 
tell them *how determined we are* and try to get them to foster a speedy 
understanding.

"5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, 
so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in 
Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the consensus of the American 
officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these 
things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me 
know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting 
anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, *I want you to 
follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to 
know there will be no room for personal interpretation (ex. 1, pp. 92-
93).*"

The day the Foreign Minister sent the long message quoted above, he 
cabled Ambassador Nomura the substance of two Japanese counterproposals 
to be used in the conversations, if they should be approved at the 
Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time). The first proposal was 
designated "Proposal A," and was described as "*our revised ultimatum*"; 
its provisions were referred to as "*our demands*" (ex. 1, pp. 94-95). 
The second proposal, designated "Proposal B," was to be used in case of 
"remarkable" differences between the Japanese and American views, "since 
the situation does not permit of delays." It was advanced, the Foreign 
Minister said, with the idea of making "*a last effort to prevent 
something happening*" (ex. 1, p. 96-97).

At the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time), the 
counterproposals developed in the conferences and discussions which had 
gone before were taken up and approved in the form previously sent to 
Ambassador Nomura. Foreign Minister Togo immediately cabled the 
Ambassador that he should resume the conversations, and instructed him 
to submit "Proposal A" first.  The Foreign Minister told the Ambassador 
that if it should become apparent that an agreement based upon "Proposal 
A" could not be reached, "we intend to submit *our absolutely final 
proposal*, Proposal B." He continued:

"4. As stated in my previous message, *this is the Imperial Government's 
final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very 
critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted*. * * *

"5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time 
limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a 
friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept 
our proposal (ex. 1, p. 99)."

The intercepted messages show that the Japanese Government intended to 
insist not only on a written agreement signed by the United States but 
also to require the United States to "make Great Britain and the 
Netherlands sign those terms in which they are concerned" (ex. 1, pp. 
98-99). Although the Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Nomura to 
avoid giving the Americans the impression that "there is a time limit," 
he made it clear to the Ambassador (No. 736) that such a dead line had 
been fixed:

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            Page 335

"Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that 
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th 
of this month.* I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the 
circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this 
thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations 
*from falling into chaotic condition.* Do so with great determination 
and with unstinted effort, I beg of you (ex. 1, p. 100)."

The record before the Committee does not show whether or not the 
decision to submit the foregoing counterproposals was the only decision 
made at the Imperial Conference on November 5. It is now known, however, 
that on that date the Navy promulgated its "Combined Fleet Top Secret 
Operation Order No. 1" to all Japanese Fleet and task force commanders 
(tr. 482). The record does not show whether the issuance of this order 
was made known to the Japanese Foreign Office.

Order No. 1, itself, was brief:

"COMBINED FLEET ORDER

"Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT 
BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance with the 
Separate Volume (ex. 8)."

The separate volume, which was attached to Order No. 1, prescribed the 
operations to be conducted (a) in case war with the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands "begins during the China Operations," and 
(b) in case war with Russia "begins during the War with the United 
States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and China" (ex. 8). It stated: 
"The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great 
Britain and the Netherlands," and provided that, in such event, "In the 
east the American Fleet will be destroyed" (ex. 8).

Order No. 1 had been in course of preparation since the latter part of 
August. From September 2-13 (Japan time) a war plans conference had been 
held continuously at the Naval War College in Tokyo. It was during this 
same period, on September 6 (Japan time), that an Imperial Conference 
decided:

"If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having 
our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations * * *, we will 
immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America 
(England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)."

On September 13 (Japan time) an outline containing the essential points 
of Order No. 1 had been completed at the Naval War College, but the 
Order itself was not promulgated until immediately after the Imperial 
Conference on November 5 (Japan time) (ex. 8).

AMBASSADOR GREW WARNS THAT WAR WITH JAPAN MAY COME "WITH DRAMATIC AND 
DANGEROUS SUDDENNESS"

(November 3, 1941)

During the period which immediately preceded the Imperial Conference on 
November 5 (Japan time), Ambassador Grew was endeavoring to determine 
what the policies of the Tojo Government would be. Among the sources of 
his information was "a reliable Japanese informant" who called on the 
Ambassador on October 25 (Japan time) and again on November 3 (Japan 
time). On both occasions the information imparted by the informant fell 
short of disclosing to Ambassador Grew the actual decisions affecting 
the United States which were 

Page 336             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

being made by the Tojo Cabinet, as described above, but was sufficient 
to convince the Ambassador that the situation u-as approaching a crisis. 
He recorded that on November 3 he was told that the new Japanese 
Government "had reached a definite decision as to how far it was 
prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an 
adjustment of relations with the United States," and that "this 
information had been communicated by the Prime Minister to the Emperor 
on the afternoon of November 2" (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 701).  
In his testimony before the Committee, Ambassador Grew said, referring 
to the period immediately following the fall of the Konoye Cabinet:

"I took about two weeks to size up the new situation. I was not quite 
sure what Tojo's policy was going to be. I had been assured he was going 
to try to keep on the conversations, going to do his best to come to an 
agreement with us, and all the rest of it. Frankly, I had my fingers 
crossed. I was waiting to size it up, and after I had sized it up I sent 
the telegram of November 3 (tr. 1908)."

In the telegram of November 3 (Japan time) to which Mr. Grew referred, 
he warned Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles that 

"Japan's resort to measures which might (make) war with the United 
States inevitable may come *with dramatic and dangerous suddenness* (ex. 
15)."

The telegram summarized his opinions on the general situation in Japan. 
In it he noted that the strong policy which he had recommended in his 
telegram of September 12, 1940 (ex. 26), called the "green light" 
telegram because it gave the go-ahead signal for economic sanctions 
against Japan, together with the impact upon Japan of political 
developments abroad had brought the Japanese Government "to seek 
conciliation with the United States." If those efforts should fail, he 
foresaw a probable swing of the pendulum in Japan back once more to its 
former position "or still further back," leading 

"to what I have called an "all out, do or die" attempt to render Japan 
impervious to foreign economic embargoes, even risking national hara 
kiri rather than cede to foreign pressure. * * * such a contingency is 
not only possible but probable (ex. 15)."

Ambassador Grew went on to express his opinion that the view that the 
progressive imposition of drastic economic measures, while attended with 
some risk of war, would probably avert war, was

"a dangerously, uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the considered 
policy and measures of the United States (ex. 15)."

Conceding that in discussing the "grave and momentous" subject of 
whether American needs, policies, and objectives justified war with 
Japan if diplomacy should fail, he was "out of touch with the 
Administration's thoughts and intentions thereon," and that his purpose 
was only to "ensure against my country's getting into war with Japan 
through any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush 
headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States," he warned 
that 

"it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious preparations 
for a program to be implemented if her alternative program for peace 
should fail. It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on 
the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber 
rattling (for) the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's 
high pressure diplomacy. *Japan's resort to measures which might (make) 
war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and 
dangerous suddenness (ex. 15).*




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             Page 337

The State Department file copy of Ambassador Grew's telegram of November 
3 (Japan time) bears the following handwritten note:

"Paraphrase of this telegram in full given to Commander Watts, ONI, by 
telephone on November 8, 1941 (ex. 15)."

On November 17 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew cabled Secretary Hull and 
Under Secretary Welles as follows, referring specifically to the last 
sentence of his November 3 warning:

"In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval 
actions by Japan in areas not at present involved in the China conflict, 
7 am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese would 
exploit all available tactical advantages, including those of initiative 
and surprise.* It is important, however, that our Government not (repeat 
not) place upon us, including the military and naval attaches, major 
responsibility for giving prior warning."

[Discontinuous text]

"We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is 
to watch for premonitory indications of military or naval operations 
which might be forthcoming against such areas and we are taking every 
precaution to guard against surprise. However, our field of military and 
naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen 
with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that 
our Government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible 
the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning (ex. 15)."

Ambassador Grew testified that he had no knowledge or indication 
whatever of the assembling of the Japanese naval striking force for the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, or that at the war games conducted by Admiral 
Yamamoto at the Naval War College in Tokyo between September 2 and 13 
(Japan time) the final plans were being formulated for the attack (tr. 
1481). He further testified that although he knew that a meeting of the 
Japanese Cabinet took place on December 1, he "did not (know) and could 
not have guessed" that the Cabinet had discussed the attack on Pearl 
Harbor (tr. 1615), and that, with the single exception of the 
information upon which his message of January 27, 1941 (Japan time) (ex. 
15) was based, he had no information of any character prior to the 
attack on Pearl Harbor which indicated the possibility of such an attack 
by the Japanese (tr. 1477).

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK APPEALS TO GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED 
STATES FOR AID

(October 28-November 4, 1941)

During the latter part of October, the Japanese began extensive troop 
concentrations at Haiphong on the coast of northern French Indochina, 
and steady streams of Japanese military supplies and materials were 
reported arriving at Hainan (off the northern coast of French Indochina) 
and at Formosa. As a result of these and other Japanese military 
movements, which were interpreted in Chungking as foreshadowing an early 
invasion of Yunnan Province for the purpose of taking the city of 
Kunming and severing the Burma Road, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made 
strenuous efforts to obtain British and American air support for his 
ground forces in that area.

On October 28 at his first meeting in Chungking with General Magruder, 
the head of the recently arrived United States military mission to 
China, the Generalissimo asked General Magruder to 

[1] Ambassador Grew's message of January 27 1941 (Japan time) follows 
"My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from 
many sources including a Japanese sour e that the Japanese military 
forces planned in the event of trouble with the United States to attempt 
a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military 
facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact 
that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the 
information" (ex 15) Paraphrased copies were promptly sent by the State 
Department to Military Intelligence Division (Army) and Office of Naval 
Intelligence (Navy) (ex. 15).

Page 338             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

inform Washington at once of the threatening situation, and urged that 
President Roosevelt "intercede with London to make available the 
Singapore air forces to support his defense." He pled with General 
Magruder that the President "be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on 
Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an 
attack upon Kunming would be considered inimical to our interests." He 
insisted that if the Japanese should take Kunming and thus sever the 
Burma Road, Chinese resistance would end and a Japanese attack on the 
Malay Peninsula would inevitably follow. He believed his land forces 
could resist the anticipated attack only with air support, which he did 
not have and which only the British air forces at Singapore could 
furnish in time. General Magruder immediately radioed the 
Generalissimo's plea to Secretary Stimson and General Marshall, after 
discussing the interview with Ambassador Gauss (ex. 47).

In Washington, on the morning of October 30 (Washington time), Mr. T. V. 
Soong handed to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, a message from 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which repeated the substance of what the 
Generalissimo had said to General Magruder.  Chiang's message urged the 
United States "to use strong pressure on Britain to send Singapore Air 
Force to cooperate with Colonel Chennault in order to save democratic 
position in Far East" and stressed the critical nature of the situation 
(ex. 16-A). Secretary Morgenthau sent the Generalissimo's message to 
President Roosevelt on the same day, without written comment and the 
President forwarded it to Secretary Hull with this handwritten note:

"C. H. Can we do anything along these lines? How about telling Japan a 
move to close Burma Road would be inimical? F. D. R. (Ex. 16-A)."

On November 1 (Washington time), Secretary Hull called a conference at 
the State Department which was attended by, among others, the Secretary, 
Under Secretary Welles, and Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, for that 
Department, and by General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans 
Division, for the War Department and Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, Director 
of the Central Division, for the Navy Department.  The conference was 
called for the purpose of discussing what action should be taken in 
response to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's plea. Secretary Hull 
expressed the opinion that "there was no use to issue any additional 
warnings to Japan if we can't back them up," and the Secretary therefore 
desired to know whether "the military authorities would be prepared to 
support further warnings by the State Department." A second meeting in 
the same connection was held at the State Department the following day 
(ex. 16)."

General Gerow submitted a report on these meetings to General Marshall 
on November 3 (Washington time) in which he pointed out that the 
Military Intelligence Division's (G-2's) latest estimate did not support 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's conclusions as to the imminence of a 
Japanese move toward Kunming, though agreeing that the fall of Kunming 
would seriously affect Chinese resistance to Japan. After reviewing the 
strength of the United States forces in the Philippines and concluding 
that the dispatch of any considerable portion of the air garrison there 
would leave the island of Luzon open to serious risk of capture, General 
Gerow's report summarized certain "strong" opinions of the War Plans 
Division, which were stated as follows:

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK                 Page 339

"a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations 
remain sound; viz.:
    (1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.
    (2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of 
        the war.
    (3) Military counter action against Japan should be considered only 
        in case of any of the following actions by Japan (which were 
        then enumerated).

[Discontinuous text]

"d. *Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective 
to deter Japanese action
"e. * * * *Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from 
the military viewpoint, at the earliest, about the middle of December 
1941,* when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat 
to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to 
delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March 
1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected 
strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation. 
(ex. 16)."

The weekly meeting of the Army-Navy Joint Board scheduled for November 5 
(Washington time) was held on the afternoon of November 3 (Washington 
time). The question of aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek received 
more attention than any other item on the agenda (ex. 16). Admiral Royal 
E. Ingersoll presented the situation as the Navy saw it and General 
Marshall gave the Army's viewpoint.  Admiral Schuirmann reported on the 
two meetings at the State Department and read a memorandum (tr. 5520-
5523) prepared by Dr. Hornbeck in which the latter stated his personal 
opinion in favor of a firm representation to Japan, even though war 
might result.  Among other things, General Marshall said that it was his 
information that "the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide 
upon the national policy by November 5," apparently referring to the 
intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo regarding the 
Imperial Conference to be held in Tokyo on that date. He expressed the 
view that 

"Until powerful United States Forces had been built up in the Far East, 
it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. *It 
appeared that the basis of U. S. Policy should be to make certain minor 
concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These 
concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar 
trade restrictions (ex. 16).*"

Following these discussions the Joint Board decided that 

"War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a 
memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's 
proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take 
the following lines:
"Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan. 
"Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.
"Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. Military forces in support 
of Chiang Kai-shek.
"Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as 
long as possible.
"Suggest agreement with Japan to tide the situation over for the next 
several months.
"Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East 
would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided 
by the U. S.
"Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the 
U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive without the transfer of the 
major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
(ex. 16)."

That evening, November 3 (Washington time), the State Department 
received a telegram from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking to the effect 
that while it was not yet certain that Japan would undertake an invasion 
of Yunnan from Indochina, it was believed certain that in any case large 
Japanese air forces would operate against the