Page 340 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Burma Road and any volunteer air forces in China, and that accordingly, if Anglo-American air units were sent into Yunnan, they should be in sufficient force to maintain themselves against heavy Japanese air concentrations. "Half or token measures " the Ambassador advised, "would prove dangerous" (ex. 47). The next morning, November 4 (Washington time), the State Department received from the Chinese Embassy a personal message to President Roosevelt from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (ex. 47). This message quoted a lengthy message which the Generalissimo had sent directly to Prime Minister Churchill, in which the Generalissimo expressed substantially the same views as those he had communicated to General Magruder, and urged that the British air force in Malaya, "with American cooperation," be sent to his assistance to resist the anticipated assault on Yunnan and Kunming. The Generalissimo then urged the United States "to draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation," saying that "unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately and in her own time (ex. 47)." Neither the Generalissimo's message addressed to the Prime Minister nor his message addressed to the President made any further reference to the proposal that a warning to Japan be issued by Britain or the United States. On the 4th Secretary Hull held separate conferences at the State Department with Secretary Knox, and with General Marshall and Admiral Ingersoll (tr. 1171, 1173). The next day, November 5 (Washington time), President Roosevelt received the following message from Prime Minister Churchill: "I have received Chiang Kai-shek's attached appeal addressed to us both for air assistance. You know how we are placed for air strength at Singapore. Nonetheless, I should be prepared to send pilots and even some planes if they could arrive in time. "What we need now is a deterrent of the most general and formidable character. The Japanese have as yet taken no final decision, and the Emperor appears to be exercising restraint. When we talked about this at Argentia you spoke of gaining time, and this policy has been brilliantly successful so far. But our joint embargo is steadily forcing the Japanese to decisions for peace or war. "It now looks as if they would go into Yunnan cutting the Burma Road with disastrous consequence for Chiang Kai-shek. The collapse of his resistance would not only be a world tragedy in itself, but it would leave the Japanese with large forces to attack north or south. "The Chinese have appealed to us, as I believe they have to you, to warn the Japanese against an attack on Yunnan. I hope you might remind them that such an attack, aimed at China from a region in which we have never recognized that the Japanese have any right to maintain forces, would be in open disregard of the clearly indicated attitude of the United States Government. We should, of course, be ready to make a similar communication. "No independent action by ourselves will deter Japan because we are so much tied up elsewhere. But of course we will stand with you and do our utmost to back you in whatever course you choose. I think myself, that Japan is more likely to drift into war than to plunge in. Please let me know what you think (ex. 158)." President Roosevelt did not reply to Prime Minister Churchill until 2 days later. In the meantime, General Marshall and Admiral Stark submitted to him, under date of November 5 (Washington time), a joint memorandum (ex. 16) pursuant to the action of the Joint Board referred to above. In their joint memorandum PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 341 General Marshall and Admiral Stark referred to the various communications from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which have been mentioned above, and to Secretary Hull's request for advice "as to the attitude which this Government should take" toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road, and stated that the question they had considered was "whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. Forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, how-ever well disguised, would lead to war." In answering this question, General Marshall and Admiral Stark then advised the President: "At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future. "The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions. "Until such a time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang Kai-shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group. "The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions: "(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy. "(b) *War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance.* Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies: " (1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies; " (2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100 East or south of 10 North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or Loyalty Islands. "(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position. Page 342 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand, except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan. "(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government "(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies. "The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions. "Specifically, they recommend: "That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved. "That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces. "That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent. "*That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan (ex. 16).* Secretary Hull testified that he "was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American foreign policy considerations were involved that material to China should be accelerated as much as feasible and that aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally *I concurred completely in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been striving for months to avoid a showdown with Japan, and to explore every possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.* (tr. 1130)." On November 7 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent the following reply, prepared in the State Department, to Prime Minister Churchill's message of the 5th: "We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek's appeal is addressed. While we feel that it would be a serious error to underestimate the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we doubt whether preparations for a Japanese land campaign against Kunming have advanced to a point which would warrant an advance by the Japanese against Yunnan in the immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase and expedite lend lease aid to China and to facilitate the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We have noted that you would be prepared to send pilots and some planes to China. "We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in mind along the lines we are taking, together with continuing efforts to strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's hesitation, whereas in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal warning or remonstrances might have, with at least even chance, an opposite effect. "This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention, study, and effort. "I shall probably not, repeat not, make express reply to Chiang Kai-shek before the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your close official circle that I have said above (ex. 16-B)." The record shows that on November 8, Secretary Hull conferred at the State Department with General Miles, head of the Military Intelligence Division (G-2), General Staff (tr. 1173), and on November 10 with Secretary Knox (tr. 1171). On the latter date he sent to President Roosevelt a draft of a proposed reply to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The next day the President dictated the following brief note to his aide, General Watson, which was attached to the Secretary's draft and read: PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 343 "I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday, and give this to me when he comes (ex. 16)." Written on the same sheet of paper, below the typewritten note to General Watson and apparently after the conference with Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador, appears the following, in the President's handwriting: "C. H. O. K. to send. F. D. R. (EX. 16)." The draft was then returned to the State Department, where the message in final form was handed to Dr. Hu Shih late in the afternoon of November 14 (Washington time) for transmittal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In it President Roosevelt described briefly the intensive consideration that had been given to the Generalissimo's appeal, and continued: "Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military, and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American Volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union, and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In-addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible. "I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indochina, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south. "This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of aggression and conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on every appropriate occasion (ex. 16)." In accordance with the joint recommendation that had been made by General Marshall and Admiral Stark, no warning was delivered to Japan as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had urged. It is clear that the movement of additional Japanese troops into northern French Indochina had a twofold purpose. On the one hand he troops were an immediate threat to China by their proximity to Yunnan Province, the Burma Road, and Kunming on the north and northwest. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid recognized the immediacy of that threat. On the other hand, the additional Japanese forces increased the potential threat to the British Malay States and Singapore, and to the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. The price the Japanese Government hoped to exact from the United States and Great Britain for the removal of this latter threat had been determined at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time). The subsequent fall of the Konoye Page 344 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Cabinet and accession of General Tojo in October had only increased Japan's determination to use this potential threat to blackmail the United States, if possible, into (1) ceasing all aid to China, (2) accepting a military and naval status in the Far East inferior to that of Japan, and (3) furnishing all possible material aid to Japan. Furthermore, since the Japanese Army at no time evidenced a willingness to withdraw its troops from China, or to agree not to use northern French Indo-China as a base for operations against China it would seem clear that the Japanese strategy was not only to blackmail the United States into granting those ".minimum demands" but also, having accomplished that, to turn on China from northern French Indochina and thus to expedite the liquidation of the "China Incident" and the establishment of a Japanese " just peace" in the Far East. JAPAN DELIVERS ITS NEXT-TO-LAST PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES (November 10, 1941) After the Imperial Conference on November 5 (Japan time) the Japanese- American conversations were "on the last lap" as far as the Japanese Government was concerned (ex. 1, p. 101). Immediately after that conference the final Japanese diplomatic, naval, and military maneuvers began. The instructions Foreign Minister Togo sent to Ambassador Nomura to resume the talks and to present proposal "A" to the United States Government had their counterparts in operational orders issued to the Japanese Navy and, without doubt, to the Japanese Army as well. Those orders contemplated naval, air; and troop dispositions which were commenced immediately. Many of those dispositions were detected and observed by the United States, Great Britain, or the Netherlands, but the major Japanese naval movement was successfully kept secret by the Japanese until the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, 1941. It is imperative to an accurate appraisal of this closing period of the Japanese-American conversations to keep in mind those Japanese military and naval dispositions. Reports of the military movements toward the south and alarms about Japanese naval movements (except the one toward Pearl Harbor) reached Washington and the State Department during November as the Japanese Ambassadors were presenting their final proposals, and again, as in July, discredited the intentions of the Japanese Government. Commencing in the middle of November the American consuls at Hanoi and Saigon in north and south French Indochina reported extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina (tr. 1138). About November 21 (Washington time) the State Department received word that the Dutch had information that a Japanese naval force had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese mandated islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies (ex. 21; tr. 1138). It is now known that at the same time a powerful Japanese naval striking force, its formation and purpose successfully kept secret, was assembling in a northern Japanese harbor for the attack on the United States Pacific Fleet, under orders issued on or about November 14 (Japan time). On November 21 (Japan time) the commander in chief of the combined Japanese fleet was directed to order his forces PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 345 to advance to the area in which they were to wait in readiness and to station them in such positions that "in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet the situation promptly (tr. 43S7)." On November 25 (Japan time) the commander in chief issued an order which directed the naval striking force to "advance into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities * * * attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow" (tr. 437). The order provided, however, that "Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases (tr. 437)." The striking force sailed from Hitokappu Bay in northern Japan at 9 a. m. November 26 (Japan time), or about 7 p. m. on November 25 (Washington time) (tr. 450). In the meantime, it had been decided in Tokyo to send Saburu Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, to Washington to assist Ambassador Nomura. On the evening of November 4 (Japan time) Mr. Kurusu told Ambassador Grew that the mission had been broached to him "only yesterday afternoon" (ex. 3O, p. 471), although it appears from the comments made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew on October 10 (Japan time) that the matter had been under consideration for some time. Arrangements were made by the State Department for the Pan- American Clipper to be held in Hong Kong for 2 days to permit Mr. Kurusu to travel on that plane, and he left Tokyo early on November 5 (Japan time). Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura on November 4 (Japan time) of this development, saying that Ambassador Kurusu was being sent to assist Ambassador Nomura and to be his "right-hand man" in view of "the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request on instructions from me" (ex. 1, p. 97). Two days later the Foreign Minister cabled that the reason for Ambassador Kurusu's dispatch "so quickly" was "to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to follow." The officials of the Japanese Army and Navy, the Foreign Minister said, were "pleased with the special dispatch of the Ambassador" (ex. 1, p. 101). In Washington, as soon as he received Foreign Minister Togo's instructions to resume the conversations, Ambassador Nomura arranged a meeting with Secretary Hull. At that meeting, which took place on the morning of November 7 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura informed the Secretary that he had now received instructions from the new Japanese Government, and that he wished to resume the conversations. He then said that the new Japanese Cabinet had deliberated on the various questions at issue between the two Governments "with a view to making the utmost concessions that they could make, having due regard for the situation in the Far East and the attitude of public opinion in Japan (vol. II, p. 707)." He said that of the three principal questions on which there were divergent views, he thought that it would not be difficult to reconcile the views of the two Governments on two, namely, nondiscrimination in international trade and Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Page 346 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Pact. He realized that the difficulties of reaching an agreement on the third, the China question, were greater. So saying, he handed to Secretary Hull a document (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 709-710) containing formulae relating to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and to nondiscrimination in international trade. This document was, he said, to be taken in conjunction with the United States proposals of June 21 and October 2 and the Japanese proposal delivered to the Secretary on September 27. It embodied the substance of the provisions of proposal "A" regarding those two points, but was silent regarding the question of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Secretary Hull expressed the hope that some concrete statement concerning the latter point could be worked out that would be of help, but Ambassador Nomura said it did not seem to him any further statement was necessary than had already been made, considering the attitude of the Japanese Government which "manifestly desired to maintain peace in the Pacific." During the conversation Secretary Hull again mentioned that before entering into any formal negotiations he intended to discuss the matter with the Chinese, the British, and the Dutch (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 708). Ambassador Nomura requested a meeting with President Roosevelt, which was subsequently arranged for November 10 (Washington time). The afternoon of November 7 (Washington time), Secretary Hull attended a Cabinet meeting at the White House. The situation in the Far East appears to have been uppermost in the minds of those present; especially the President, Secretary Hull, and Secretary Stimson. Secretary Stimson had had a conference with the President the day before, November 6 (Washington time), and had recorded in his daily notes that he and the President had talked "about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the messenger who is coming from Japan. The President outlined what he thought he might say. *He was trying to think of something which would save us further time.* He suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw two great objections to that; first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally important that we should go on completing our reinforcement of the Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feel that any such arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has always been our historic policy since the Washington conference not to leave the Chinese and Japanese alone together, because the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the Chinese know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse to go into such an arrangement (tr. 14414-14415)." The morning of the next day, November 7 (Washington time), Admiral John R. Beardall, President Roosevelt's naval aide, at the President's direction, requested the appropriate officers in the Navy Department to arrange for the delivery to the President of complete translations of the intercepted Japanese messages, rather than memoranda briefly summarizing the messages as had been delivered theretofore under the existing agreement between the Army and the Navy in that connection. Such arrangements were made and, commencing November 12 (Washington time), complete translations were delivered each day to Admiral Beardall for delivery to President Roosevelt. According to reported statements made by Admiral Beardall at the time, the President told him that he (the President) "was in fact either seeing or being told about the material through Hull" (tr. 14525-14526). PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 347 According to Secretary Stimson's notes of the Cabinet meeting on November 7 (Washington time), President Roosevelt took- "what be said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East-whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be. It was a very interesting talk the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there. He went around the table first Hull and then myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us. He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down into a following-up the steps which had been done to show what needed to be done in the future. The thing would have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known and they did not know except in the case of Hull and the President what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in (tr. 14415-14416)." Secretary Hull testified that at this Cabinet meeting after President Roosevelt turned to him and asked whether he had anything in mind " thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and *emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time*. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. *All concurred in my estimate of the dangers.* It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. "accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were " likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world on the far side of the Pacific"; and the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense. "On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the West," he said, and were threatening more and more with each passing day "to engulf our own shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us" (tr. 1131-1132)." Statements which were made by Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo 3 days later, on November 10 (Japan time), show the attitude with which the Japanese Foreign Office was approaching the conversations during this period immediately following the Imperial Conference on November 5. After informing the Ambassador that new proposals had been sent to Ambassador Nomura for presentation to the United States Government, the Foreign Minister urged the necessity of a speedy settlement, saying that national sentiment would "not tolerate further protracted delay in arriving at some conclusion" and that the position was "daily becoming more pressing." He said that the new proposals represented the "maximum possible concessions by Japan," and handed to the Ambassador the texts of the two documents submitted to Secretary Hull on November 7. During the Foreign Minister's comments on these documents, he expressed the desire that the British Government should conclude an agreement with Japan simultaneously with the United States, in view of Great Britain's interests in the Pacific. The Foreign Minister told Ambassador Grew that he felt that the United States did not adequately appreciate the realities of the situation in the Far East. Referring to the steadily increasing population of Japan, he stated it Page 348 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK was necessary to assure the raw materials necessary for the existence of that population and that unless the United States realized this fact as among the realities of the situation, a successful conclusion to the conversations would be difficult. Ambassador Grew told the Minister that his statements penetrated to the heart of the whole problem, since one of the fundamental purposes of the conversations was to open a way for Japan to obtain such necessary supplies, together with a full flow of trade and commerce and market for her industries, but by peaceful means as opposed to the use of force. In reply to this the Minister said, as reported by Ambassador Grew, that "He did not wish to go into the fundamentals of the question, but he thought that he could advert briefly to the importance of commercial and economic relations between the United States and Japan. The freezing by the United States of Japanese assets had stopped supplies of many important raw materials to Japan. Economic pressure of this character is capable of menacing national existence to a greater degree than the direct use of force. He hoped that the American Government would take into consideration circumstances of this character and realize the possibility that the Japanese people, if exposed to continued economic pressure, might eventually feel obliged resolutely to resort to measures of self-defense (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 714)." The Minister saw no inconsistency between insisting that Japan would not give up the fruits of 4 years of hostilities in China and at the same time accepting the principle of refraining from aggression and the use of force (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 710-714; ex. 1, pp. 109-111). Ambassador Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt took place at the White House on the morning of November 10 (Washington time), with Secretary Hull and Minister Wakasugi present. At this meeting the Ambassador read from a prepared document an explanation of the proposals he had been instructed by his Government to present (i. e., proposal "A"), the substance of which (except as regards the Tripartite Pact) he had already communicated to Secretary Hull on November 7. Regarding the first question, the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in international trade, he said that his Government had now decided to accept its application in all Pacific areas, including China, upon the understanding that the principle would be applied uniformly to the rest of the world as well. As to the second question, the attitude of the two Governments toward the European war, he stated that his Government was not prepared to go further in black and white than the language contained in its proposal of September 27, which was: "Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of world peace. "With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration of world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 638)." He added that if the United States was in a position to give assurance that it had no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on the term "protection and self-defense," his Government would be prepared to reciprocate. Concerning the third question, the stationing and withdrawal of troops from China and French Indochina, Ambassador Nomura submitted the following formula: PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 349 "With regard to the Japanese forces which have been dispatched to China in connection with the China Affair, those forces in specified areas of North China and Mengchiang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain required duration after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as general peace is restored between Japan and China and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order. "The Japanese Government undertake to respect the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled or an equitable peace is established in East Asia (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 716)." The Ambassador said that this formula clearly indicated that the stationing of Japanese troops in China was not of a permanent nature, and that however desirable the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China might be, it was "impracticable under the present circumstances." In a written statement, which he then read, Ambassador Nomura said that as viewed from the Japanese side it seemed that the United States had remained adamant in its position and had shown little sign of reciprocation to "concessions" by the Japanese with the result that "in certain quarters in my country some skepticism has arisen as to the true intention of the United States Government." He continued: "People in my country take the freezing of the assets as an economic blockade and they go even so far as to contend that the means of modern warfare are not limited to shooting. No nation can live without the supply of materials vital to its industries. Reports reaching me from home indicate that the situation is serious and pressing and the only way of preserving peace is to reach some kind of amicable and satisfactory understanding with the United States without any unnecessary loss of time. In the face of these mounting difficulties, the Japanese Government bent all its efforts to continue the conversations and bring about a satisfactory understanding solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific. *My Government therefore is now submitting certain proposals as its utmost effort* for that purpose, and I shall feel very grateful if I can have the views of your Government on them at the earliest possible opportunity (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 717)." In reply, President Roosevelt read a brief statement which concluded: "We hope that our exploratory conversations will achieve favorable results in the way of providing a basis for negotiations. We shall continue to do our best to expedite the conversations just as we understand that the Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that the Japanese Government will make it clear that it intends to pursue peaceful courses instead of opposite courses, as such clarification should afford a way for arriving at the results which we seek (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 718)." The President referred to the improvement of American relations with the South American countries under the "good neighbor policy" as compared to the policy of force that had been employed by the United States in some cases. Then, according to Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo the same day "Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a modus vivendi if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this expression should be translated as "method of living" (ex. 1, p. 116)." Ambassador Nomura reported that it was not clear to him what the phrase "modus vivendi" really meant, and that he intended to ascertain whether the President was referring to, possibly, "a provisional agreement" (ex. 1, p. 116).