Page 350             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Upon receipt of Ambassador Nomura's report, Foreign Minister Togo cabled 
the Ambassador that there were 

"indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the 
exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that 
the date set forth in my message No. 736 is absolutely immovable under 
present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore it is 
essential that settlement be realized by about that time.* The session 
of Parliament opens on the 15th * * *. The government must have a clear 
picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You 
can see, therefore, *that the situation is nearing a climax and that 
time is indeed becoming short.*

"I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in 
view of the above-mentioned situation, will you redouble them? When 
talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to 
them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. 
attitude in the minimum of time.  At the same time do everything in your 
power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

"We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not 
they will accept our final proposal A (ex. 1, pp. 116-117)."

Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister that Secretary 
Hull had agreed to study the Japanese proposals the following day, 
Armistice Day, and that his next meeting with the Secretary was 
scheduled for the afternoon of November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 
118).

On November 11 (Japan time), as the result of statements made by Foreign 
Minister Togo to him on October 26 (Japan time) (ex. 1, p; 91), the 
British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, called on the Foreign 
Minister upon instructions from the British Foreign Office and urged the 
desirability of a supreme effort to reach an agreement with the United 
States, saying that when the point of actual negotiations was reached 
the British Government would be ready to join in seeking an agreement 
(ex. 1, pp. 117-118; ex. 158). Secretary Hull was informed of the 
instructions to the British Ambassador in Tokyo during a conversation 
with Lord Halifax on November 12 (Washington time) (ex. 158). During the 
conversation between Foreign Minister Togo and Sir Robert Craigie, the 
Foreign Minister went to great lengths to convince the British 
Ambassador how critical the situation was, saying that in the view of 
the Japanese Government the negotiations had reached the final phase, 
that the Imperial Government had made its " maximum concessions," and 
that if the United States refused to accept those terms and sign the 
agreement "within a week to ten days," it would be "useless" to continue 
the negotiations, as the Japanese domestic political situation would 
permit "no further delays in reaching a decision." He emphasized this 
latter point in his report of the conversation to Ambassador Nomura, 
saving that it was "absolutely impossible that there be any further 
delays," that while there were indications that the United States 
Government was "still under the impression that the negotiations are in 
the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging 
opinions," as far as Tokyo was concerned, "this is the final phase," and 
expressed the "fervent" hope that Ambassador Nomura would do- 

"everything in (his) power to make them realize this fact and bring 
about an agreement at the earliest possible moment (ex. 1, p. 119)."

At the meeting between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura on November 
12 (Washington time), the Ambassador said that his new Government had 
asked him to emphasize its desire to expedite a 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         Page 351

settlement because the internal situation in Japan was difficult, people 
were becoming impatient and a session of the Diet was impending. He 
expressed the hope that "within a week or ten days" some agreement could 
be reached. Secretary Hull commented that the matters submitted on 
November 10 were being worked on as rapidly as possible, and that as 
soon as a good basis had been reached in the exploratory conversations 
the United States could then approach the Chinese Government and sound 
out their attitude. He had previously handed to the Ambassador a 
document setting forth his general ideas relating to mutual conciliation 
between Japan and China. In response to a question from Minister 
Wakasugi, who was also present, Secretary Hull hinted that Japan and 
China might be "brought together" by the United States, but did not say 
in so many words that the United States would mediate between them. The 
conversation ended with Secretary Hull expressing the hope that he might 
have something by way of comment on the Japanese proposals on November 
14 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 722-726). According to Ambassador Nomura's 
report to Tokyo, Secretary Hull also indicated that the British and the 
Dutch were being informed generally of the nature of the conversations, 
and that if a basis for negotiations should be worked out, it was 
possible that they might sign with the United States, although the 
Secretary "could not guarantee this" (ex. 1, p. 120). Ambassador Nomura 
told the Foreign Minister he was not "satisfied with their attitude 
toward taking up negotiations," and he sent Minister Wakasugi to see one 
of Mr. Hull's advisors the following day to press for an early decision. 
During that conversation, Mr. Wakusugi said that the public in Japan was 
becoming impatient "and almost desperate," and that he hoped for a 
clear-cut answer the next day as to whether the United States would 
accept or not the Japanese proposal of September 25 as modified through 
November 10, or desired changes therein, or whether the United States' 
proposal of June 21 was its final proposal (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 729-
731; ex. 1, pp. 123-125). Similar representations concerning the need 
for immediate agreement were made to Ambassador Grew on November 12 
(Japan time), including statements that the negotiations had reached 
their final phase, that Japan had made the greatest possible 
concessions, and that "a very critical and dangerous state of affairs 
will result should any appreciable delay be encountered in successfully 
concluding the negotiations" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 719-722).

Secretary Hull testified that:

"during those early days in October, it looked more and more like they 
were prepared to, and were intending to, adhere to their policies * * * 
the situation floated along until Tojo's government came into power, 
about the 16th, I think, of October * * * and the Konoye Government 
fell.

"While they started out with a professed disposition to keep up the 
conversations, we could detect circumstances and facts indicative of 
duplicity and double dealing, and the real purpose was to go forward 
more energetically with their plans, as was indicated by numerous 
demands on us to make haste, and statements that this matter could not 
go on without something serious happening.

[Discontinuous text]

The impression we received, at least myself, and some others, was that 
during those months they tried to prevail on this Government by 
persuasion and threats and other methods to yield its basic principles, 
so that Japan could maintain intact her policy and her continued course 
of aggression and conquest (tr. 1178-1179) .

 
Page 352             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

On November 14 (Japan time), although he knew that Ambassador Nomura had 
scheduled a meeting with Secretary Hull for November 15 (Washington 
time) at which proposal "A" would be further discussed Foreign Minister 
Togo cabled the Ambassador the English text to be used in presenting 
proposal "B", and told the Ambassador he would be notified when to 
present that "absolutely final proposal" to the United States Government 
(ex. 1, pp. 125-126). This message was translated and available in 
Washington on November 14 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 126). The same 
day Ambassador Nomura cabled the Foreign Minister a long report (No. 
1090) in which, although he realized he would be "harshly criticized," 
he cautioned against precipitate action:

"I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.

"I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, 
and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite 
patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must 
tell you the following:

"1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American 
Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part 
either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their 
command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are 
contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of 
preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward; 
they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather 
than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they 
believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It 
is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich 
conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be 
such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been 
passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate 
peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in 
evidence.

"3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China, 
and insofar as possible she is assisting Chiang. For the sake of peace 
in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of 
China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to 
the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the 
United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.

"4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese 
Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are 
regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any 
case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers 
are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and 
closer with the Axis.

"5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence 
and our lives it naturally follows that we will have to fight England 
and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will 
participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central 
America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those 
of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for 
their economic existence on the United States, and must maintain a 
neutrality partial thereto.

"6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory 
or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do 
not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out 
till the end will be the victor.

"7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and 
deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and 
as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength 
to the Pacific.

"Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German 
and Italian Navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength 
into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that 
should the United States start warlike activities in the Atlantic, there 
would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there 
has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now 
many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal 
questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the 
Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be 
carried out through the Pacific area.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             353

"8. *Though I cannot be a hundred percent sure of the present situation 
in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition 
must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding 
that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am 
going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be 
harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan 
permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order 
to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be 
the best plan (ex. 1, pp. 127-129).*"

The Foreign Minister's reply came back promptly and unequivocally:

"For your Honor's own information.

1." I have read your #1090, and you may be sure that you have all my 
gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but *the fate of our 
Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days*, so please fight 
harder than you ever did before.

"2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so 
and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only 
to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you 
please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait 
and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, *I am 
awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the 
question.* I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in 
my #736, and there *will be no change.* Please try to understand that. 
You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States 
to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a 
solution *on the basis of our proposals*, and do your best to bring 
about an immediate solution (ex. 1 p. 137-8).*

The next day, November 15 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura called on 
Secretary Hull and the Secretary handed the Ambassador a statement, in 
writing, regarding the formula proposed by the Japanese Government on 
November 10 (Washington time) for dealing with the question of 
nondiscrimination in international trade. After noting that in its 
proposal, the Japanese Government recognized

"the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial 
relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, 
*on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied 
uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well* (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 
734),"

the statement suggested that the meaning of the condition attached by 
the Japanese was not entirely clear. It was assumed that the Japanese 
Government did not intend to ask the United States Government to accept 
responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside its 
sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with 
the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the 
consent and cooperation of all other governments. The statement then 
reviewed the efforts of the United States over recent gears to reduce 
tariff barriers, and suggested that similar action by Japan would be a 
"long forward step" toward the objective set forth in the Japanese 
proposal. The need for the proviso noted above was then questioned, and 
it was suggested that the proviso might well be omitted. The statement 
was accompanied by a draft of a proposed joint United States-Japanese 
declaration on economic policy, which Secretary Hull told Minister 
Wakasugi constituted the United States reply to the Japanese proposal on 
the question of nondiscrimination in international trade (ex. 29, vol. 
II, pp. 731-737).

Ambassador Nomura then stated that his Government regarded the 
conversations as having progressed to the stage of formal negotiations. 
In reply to this, Secretary Hull said that until the conversations had 
reached a point where he could call in the British, the Chinese, and the 
Dutch and say that there was a basis for negotiation, the conversations 
were exploratory. He pointed out that whereas the United States proposal 
of June 21 made it clear that the settlement under discussion related to 
the entire Pacific area, the proposal the

Page 354             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

previous Japanese Government had submitted on September 27 narrowed the 
application of the proposals regarding economic nondiscrimination and 
peaceful intent to the southwestern Pacific, and he then requested that 
the new Japanese Government give assurances on that point. He said that 
it would be difficult for him to go to the British and the Dutch and say 
that Japan was willing to enter upon a peaceful program but at the same 
time desired to adhere to a fighting alliance with Germany. The 
Secretary said that if the United States made an agreement with Japan 
while Japan had an outstanding obligation to Germany which might call 
upon Japan to go to war with us, this would cause "so much turmoil in 
the country that he might be lynched." He asked the Ambassador whether 
the United States Government could assume that if the Japanese 
Government entered into an agreement with it the Tripartite Pact would 
become a "dead letter." When Mr. Wakasugi inquired whether this was an 
answer to the Japanese proposal on the question of Japan's relations 
under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull said the United States would 
be better able to reply after receiving an answer to the question he had 
just raised. Ambassador Nomura said he was afraid the American 
Government did not trust the Japanese Government, though there was no 
material difference between the policies of the new Government and the 
previous Government. Secretary Hull said that the new Japanese 
Government seemed to be taking the attitude that the United States 
Government must reply "at once" to their points, and that he did not 
think that his Government 

"should be receiving ultimatums of such a character from the Japanese 
Government under circumstances where the United States had been pursuing 
peaceful courses throughout and the Japanese Government had been 
violating law and order (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 734)."

He concluded by saying that when he had heard further from the new 
Japanese Government regarding its peaceful intentions, and when the 
question of nondiscrimination could be cleared up as suggested in the 
proposals he had handed to Ambassador Nomura during the meeting, and 
also in regard to the Tripartite Pact, he believed that some solution 
could be reached on the question of stationing troops in China. The 
Secretary emphasized at the same time that he did not desire any delay 
and that he was working as hard as he could to bring about a wholly 
satisfactory and broad settlement. It was agreed that there should be a 
further meeting after Ambassador Nomura had received instructions from 
his Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 731-734; ex. 1, p. 132).

In his report of this meeting to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura said that he 
had told Mr. Hull he felt his Government would be "very disappointed" 
over these replies. He continued:    -1

"Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did 
clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, 
although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They 
harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and 
apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion 
(ex. 1, p. 137)."

There is no evidence before the Committee indicating that at that time 
Ambassador Nomura had any knowledge that the Japanese naval striking 
force had already started assembling for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              Page 355

THE TOJO CABINET REFUSES TO CONSIDER ANY SUGGESTION LESS FAVORABLE TO 
JAPAN THAN ITS "ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL"

(November 18-19,1941)

Ambassador Kurusu reached Washington on November 15 (Washington time) 
(tr. 1133). On the morning of November 17 (Washington time), with 
Ambassador Nomura, he called on Secretary Hull prior to their meeting 
with President Roosevelt. After he had been  introduced, Ambassador 
Kurusu said, among other things, that he was fully assured of Premier 
Tojo's desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the United States, and 
that Premier Tojo was optimistic regarding the possibility of settling 
the differences in respect to nondiscrimination in international trade 
and Japan's attitude toward the European war, but felt that there were 
greater difficulties in the question of withdrawing Japanese troops from 
China. Before the meeting with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura 
handed Secretary Hull two documents which he said the Japanese 
Government was submitting in response to the questions that had been 
raised at the conference on November 12 regarding Japan's peaceful 
intentions and the scope of the proposed understanding between the two 
Governments (ex. 29, vol. It, pp. 738-739).

At the meeting at the White House, Ambassador Kurusu was formally 
received by President Roosevelt. The conversation was largely devoted to 
a discussion of the relation of Japan and the United States to the war 
in Europe and to the China problem. Concerning the latter the President 
said that at a suitable stage the United States would, so to speak, 
"introduce" Japan and China to each other and tell them to proceed with 
the remaining adjustments, the Pacific questions having already been 
determined. Secretary Hull explained at length that America's military 
preparations were for defense before it was too late, that the United 
States was on the defense in the present Pacific situation and that 
Japan was the aggressor. The conference ended with the understanding 
that both Ambassadors would see Secretary Hull the next morning (ex. 29, 
vol. II, pp. 740-743).

At that meeting at the White House no effort was made by either side to 
solve the three major points of difference between the two countries, 
and there is no evidence before the Committee of any contact between 
representatives of the two Governments on the afternoon of November 17 
(Washington time). However, as Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo the 
next day (No. 1135), that evening the two Japanese Ambassadors "went to 
call on a certain Cabinet member." "This," they cabled the Foreign 
Minister, "is what he told us":

"The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and 
the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no 
ill will towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. Now the 
great majority of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, in principle 
approve of a Japanese American understanding. If Japan would now do 
something real, such as evacuating French Indo-China, showing her 
peaceful intentions, the way would be open for us to furnish you with 
oil and it would probably lead to the re-establishment of normal trade 
relations. The Secretary of State cannot bring public opinion in line so 
long as you do not take some real and definite steps to reassure the 
Americans (ex. 1, p. 154)."

 
356             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

There are indications in the record before the Committee that this
meeting between the two Japanese Ambassadors and a member of
President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening before their meeting
with Secretary Hull was more than a coincidence. Under Secretary
Welles testified before the Committee in another connection that he
had been told by Secretary Hull "and other individuals" that Mr.
Frank Walker, then Postmaster General and as such a member of
President Roosevelt's Cabinet, was "negotiating" with the Japanese
and that he thought Mr. Walker "had conversations both with Admiral
Nomura and later, when Kurusu was here, with him, as well" (tr.
1319-1320). Furthermore, the record of outside telephone calls
through the White House switchboard shows that at 6:25 p. m. on
November 17, before the meeting of the two Japanese Ambassadors
with the "certain Cabinet member," Postmaster General Walker
talked with Secretary Hull, and that he also talked with Secretary
Hull at 9:22 o'clock the next morning, November 18 (Washington
time), before Secretary Hull's conference at 10:30 o'clock with the
two Ambassadors (ex. 179).

The suggestion made that evening by the Cabinet member that
some action by Japan to show her peaceful intentions, "such as 
evacuating French Indochina," would open the way for the United States 
to
relax its freezing orders was substantially the proposal made by the
two Ambassadors to Secretary Hull at their meeting with him at 10:30
the next morning. While at that meeting the greatest emphasis was
placed on the question of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite
Pact, during the discussion of this subject, after Secretary Hull had
pointed out that the American public would never understand an
agreement between Japan and the United States if Japan continued
to adhere to the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura said that the
situation in the southwest Pacific was now critical, with the United
States and Great Britain reinforcing their armed forces in Singapore
and the Philippine Islands to counter Japan's sending troops to
French Indochina. He suggested that if this situation could now be
checked, if the tension could be relaxed, an atmosphere could be
created in which the talks could continue. Ambassador Kurusu then
said that the freezing regulations had caused impatience in Japan and
a feeling that Japan had to fight while it could; he said that what was
needed now was to do something to enable Japan to change its course.
Secretary Hull asked to what extent a relaxation of freezing would
enable ,Japan to adopt peaceful policies. He explained that 

"what he had in mind was to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get 
control of the situation in Japan and to assert their influence."

Ambassador Nomura then asked whether there was any hope of a
solution some small beginning toward the realization of "our high
ideals" and continued by suggesting:

"*the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the 
date in July when following the Japanese move into southern French 
Indochina, our freezing measures were put into effect.* [1] The 
Secretary said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo 
on the strength of a step by Japan such as the Ambassador had
mentioned we do not know whether the troops which have been withdrawn 
from
French Indochina will be diverted to some equally objectionable movement
elsewhere. The Ambassador said that what he had in mind was simply some
move toward arresting the dangerous trend in our relations. *The 
Secretary said

[1] While the Japanese move that precipitated the United States freezing 
order was into *southern* French Indochina, Japanese troops had moved 
into northern French Indochina in 1940.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         Page 357

that it would be difficult for him to get this Government to go a long 
way in removing the embargo unless this Government believed that Japan 
was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes 
of conquest.* The Ambassador said that the Japanese were tired of 
fighting China and that Japan would go as far as it could along a first 
step. The Secretary said that he would consult with the British and the 
Dutch to see what their attitude would be toward the suggestion offered 
by the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 750)."

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu pursued their suggestion further
at a conference with Secretary Hull the next day, November 19
(Washington time). Ambassador Nomura told the Secretary that
they had reported to their Government the conversation of the
preceding day and were momentarily expecting instructions.

"The Secretary then asked how the Ambassador (Nomura) felt about the 
possibilities. *The Ambassador said that yesterday he had made the 
suggestion in regard to a restoration of the status which prevailed 
before the Japanese moved into south Indochina in the latter part of 
July because he felt that, as this action had precipitated our freezing 
measures which in turn had reacted in Japan to increase the tension, if 
something could be done on his suggestion, it could serve to relieve 
that tension and tend to create a better atmosphere in our relations.* 
The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador contemplated that if a 
proposal such as the Ambassador had suggested were carried out we would 
go on with the conversations. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative. 
The Secretary expressed the view that this might enable the leaders in 
Japan to hold their ground and organize public opinion in favor of a 
peaceful course. He said that he recognized that this might take some 
time.

"The Ambassador said that what was in his mind was that both sides now 
appeared to be preparing for eventualities and that nevertheless the 
Japanese desired a quick settlement, especially in view of our freezing 
measures. The Secretary said that he presumed that the Ambassador had in 
mind, in connection with the continuation of our conversations, further 
efforts to iron out the important points on which our views had not so 
far diverged. The Ambassador agreed (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 751)."

In reporting to Tokyo on November 18 (Washington time) the
substance of their conversation with Secretary Hull on that day, the
two Japanese Ambassadors had, in fact, dispatched four separate
telegrams (ex. 1, pp. 146, 149, 151, 152), each of which outlined the
suggestion they had made, thereby indicating the importance the two
Ambassadors attached to it. The sending of four telegrams may also
have reflected the fact that they had already received from the Foreign
Minister the English text of proposal "B", which was far more drastic
than their suggestion and was, they knew, regarded in Tokyo as
Japan's "absolutely final proposal." Furthermore, they had been
told by the Foreign Minister that they would be notified when to
present it to Secretary Hull. The two final telegrams show that both
Japanese Ambassadors regarded a return to the status prior to freezing
as the only means to success in the negotiations. In his message
(No. 1133) Ambassador Kurusu said:

"In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think 
there will be difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in 
harmony with the wishes of the Americans, I feel that *as a stopgap for 
the present, we should ask them to consider our strong desires for a 
"time limit" in connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese-
American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present deadlock, 
ask them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also for 
assurance regarding imports of a specified amount of oil.*

"*In the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I suggested 
the resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July*, but in view of the 
progress of negotiations thus far, the Americans will likely not consent 
to this merely for our agreeing to not forcefully invade any territory 
aside from French Indo-China as per Proposal "B" or for our promise in 
vague terms of evacuation of troops from French Indo-China * * * Please 
have your mind made up to this. I desire instructions re "time limit" 
and * * * as we desire to press for a

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at 
once (ex. 1, pp. 151-152)."

In his message (No. 1134) to the Foreign Minister Ambassador Nomura 
outlined at greater length what he and Ambassador Kurusu had in mind:

"In our conversations of today, *as a practical means of alleviating the 
ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful 
situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing 
before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the 
evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French 
Indo-China.

"Hull, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan had clearly 
demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain, 
the Netherlands and other interested powers."

"In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the 
American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in 
China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal 
situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the 
Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the 
Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather, 
exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans 
insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to 
other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to 
bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. 
In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of 
successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B" 
immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if 
we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". *Therefore, looking at 
it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to 
presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a 
practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of 
goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in 
Proposal "B", and then to try to proceed with the solution of other 
questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced 
that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.*

[Discontinuous text]

"The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not 
interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises 
in effect. *It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to 
withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and 
materials are made available to us.*"

"Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message #1133 
(ex. 1, pp. 152-3)."

The temporary arrangement suggested by the two Japanese Ambassadors was 
summarily rejected by the Japanese Government in Tokyo. On November 19 
(Japan time), in a message in which he referred to the Ambassadors' 
messages No. 1133 and No. 1134 above, Foreign Minister Togo emphasized 
that in the negotiations consent could be given only "within the scope 
of the instructions of this office." He told Ambassador Nomura that 

"the internal situation in our country is such *that it would be 
difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-
China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act 
will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that 
would come up to the B proposal.* With the situation as urgent as it is 
now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the 
amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your 
message, then to push on for an understanding.

"*The Ambassador (Kurusu) did not arrange this with us beforehand, but 
made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting 
the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result 
in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, 
having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797, 800 
and 801) will please present our B proposal of the Imperial Government, 
and no further concessions can be made.*

*If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will 
have to be broken off*; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth 
your very best efforts (ex. 1, p. 155).

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            Page 359

Ambassador Nomura immediately cabled the Foreign Minister in Tokyo his 
astonishment at the Japanese Government's unwillingness to consider 
seriously the suggestion he and Ambassador Kurusu had made. His message 
(No. 1136), dated November 19 (Washington time) follows in full:

"I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the 
Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation 
and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and 
the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality. 
There are now three ways which the Empire might take

"(1) Maintain the status quo.
"(2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of arms.
"(3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggression 
     arrangement.

"No. 1 would mean that both sides would continue to increase war 
preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about a 
state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. In 
other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it differs 
from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time involved.

"No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which the 
present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining our 
objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. *My #1134 of 
yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The displeasure felt by 
the government is beyond my power of comprehension*, but as I view it, 
the present, after exhausting our strength by four years of the China 
incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an 
opportune time for venturing upon another long drawn out warfare on a 
large scale. *I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary 
"truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude 
to greater achievements to come later.*

"I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supplementary 
to my message of yesterday (ex. 1, p. 158)."

In a separate message Ambassador Nomura requested the Foreign Minister 
to "convey the above (message) to the Prime Minister" (ex. 1, p. 158).

In reply to this Foreign Minister Togo cabled Ambassador Nomura
on November 20 (Japan time) that:

"under the circumstances here, we regret that *the plan suggested by 
you, as we have stated in our message, would not suffice for saving the 
present situation.*"

"We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock *except for you to push 
negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our 
#798.* Please understand this.  *The Premier also is absolutely in 
accord with this opinion* (ex. 1, p. 160)."

Message No. 798 referred to in the next preceding paragraph was the 
message the Foreign Minister had sent on November 19 (Japan time) which 
rejected Ambassador Nomura's suggestion for a "provisional arrangement" 
and instructed him to present proposal "B," the Japanese Government's 
"absolutely final proposal."

Foreign Minister Togo's message of November 20 (Japan time), which thus 
finally and conclusively rejected the suggestion made by Ambassadors 
Nomura and Kurusu, was sent not only after the Foreign Minister had 
received the Ambassadors' four telegrams of November 18 (Washington 
time), including No. 1133 and No. 1134 quoted in part above, but also 
after the Foreign Minister had received Ambassador Nomura's message No. 
1135 of the same date, reporting on the meeting of the two Ambassadors 
with the member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet on the evening of 
November 17 (Washington time). Consequently, the record before the 
committee shows that the Japanese Government, including Premier Tojo, 
refused to consider the provisional arrangement suggested by Ambassadors 
Nomura and