Page 360               PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Kurusu with knowledge not only that Secretary Hull had agreed to discuss 
it with the British and the Dutch thus indicating, in the light of his 
prior statements, that he believed a basis for negotiations had been 
suggested by the two Ambassadors but with the further knowledge that 
practically the same suggestion had been made to Ambassadors Nomura and 
Kurusu by a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet.

The seriousness with which the Japanese Government regarded the stage 
that had now been reached in the negotiations is evidenced by the fact 
that on November 15 (Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Office sent out a 
circular message to its officials abroad, including those in Washington, 
prescribing "the order and method of destroying the code machines in the 
event of an emergency" (ex. 1, p. 137). Four days later the Foreign 
Office sent out circular messages establishing the so-called "winds 
code," to be used in case of an emergency and the cutting off of 
international communications. The receipt of a message implementing this 
code was to be the signal to "destroy all code papers, etc." (Ex. 1, pp. 
154-155). Those two messages were sent from Tokyo before Japan's 
"absolutely final proposal" was presented to Secretary Hull, and appear 
to have been the first Japanese messages intercepted which dealt with 
the destruction of codes, code machines, et cetera.

JAPAN DELIVERS ITS ABSOLUTELY FINAL PROPOSAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND 
DEMANDS AN AGREEMENT ON THAT BASIS

(November 20, 1941)

On November 20 (Washington time), Thanksgiving Day, Ambassadors Nomura 
and Kurusu called at the State Department. Ambassador Kurusu told 
Secretary Hull that they had referred to their Government the suggestion 
Ambassador Nomura had made at the meeting 2 days before for a return to 
the status which prevailed prior to the Japanese move into southern 
French Indochina in July. He said that both he and Ambassador Nomura had 
anticipated that the Japanese Government might perceive difficulty in 
moving troops out of Indochina in short order, but that nevertheless the 
Japanese Government was now prepared to offer a proposal "on that 
basis." He said that the Japanese proposal represented an amplification 
of the suggestion Ambassador Nomura had made (ex. 29 vol. II, p. 753).

The proposal which Ambassador Kurusu then read and handed to Secretary 
Hull was the second formula, proposal "B," approved at the Imperial 
Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) as a "last effort to 
prevent something happening." In his messages to Ambassador Nomura, 
Foreign Minister Togo had described it as "an ultimatum" (ex. 1, p. 99), 
as "our absolutely final proposal" (ex. 1, p. 99), and as "our last 
possible bargain" (ex. 1, p. 93). As originally drawn up and approved, 
proposal "B" had consisted of four provisions, each of which was 
contained in the Japanese proposal of November 20 (ex. 1, pp. 97,99; ex. 
29, vol. II, pp. 755-756). "If necessary," those four provisions were to 
be supplemented by others dealing with the three points previously at 
issue in the conversations i. e., the evacuation of troops from China 
and French Indochina, the Tripartite Pact, and nondiscrimination in 
international trade. In the English text of proposal "B" cabled to 
Ambassador Nomura on November 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             Page 361

14 (Japan time), specific provisions covering those three points were 
added to the original four provisions (ex. 1, p. 126). However, the 
Foreign Minister's instructions to Ambassador Nomura on November 19 
(Japan time) to present proposal "B" had also directed him to delete the 
provisions dealing with nondiscrimination in international trade and the 
Tripartite Pact, leaving only the provision relating to evacuation of 
troops in addition to the four provisions approved on November 5 (Japan 
time) (ex. 1, p. 156). But whereas the formula concerning the evacuation 
of troops which Ambassador Nomura had presented to Secretary Hull on 
November 7 (Washington time) had covered the evacuation of Japanese 
troops from both China and French Indochina, the provision contained in 
the Japanese proposal of November 20 covered the evacuation of Japanese 
troops from French Indochina only. To this, possibly with an eye to the 
suggestion made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on November 18, 
the Japanese Government had added a provision for the transfer of their 
troops from southern French Indochina to northern French Indochina "upon 
the conclusion of the present arrangement." [1]

As read and delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Kurusu, the 
Japanese proposal follows in full:

"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to 
make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern 
Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-
China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present

"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now 
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration (If peace 
between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in 
the Pacific area.
"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to 
remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of 
the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final 
agreement.

"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a 
view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which 
the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to 
restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the 
freezing of the assets.
"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required 
quantity of oil.

"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such 
measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the 
restoration of general peace between Japan and China (ex. 29, vol. II, 
pp. 755-756).

When Ambassador Kurusu handed the Japanese proposal to him Secretary 
Hull said that he would examine and study it sympathetically. Secretary 
Hull referred to the fact that the United States was supplying aid to 
both Great Britain and China, and indicated that until Japan made it 
perfectly clear that her policy was one of peace it would be impossible 
to cease aiding China. However Ambassador Kurusu observed in connection 
with paragraph 5 of the proposal that it "might be interpreted to mean 
that American aid to China would be discontinued as from the time that 
negotiations were started."  (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 753-755.)

In his testimony before the Committee Secretary Hull summarized the 
Japanese note of November 20 in these words:

[1] Secretary Hull testified that the conditional offer of the Japanese 
"to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina was 
meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern 
Indochina within a day or two and furthermore they placed no limit on 
the number of troops they might continue to send there." (Tr. ;4261.)

Page 362                   PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to 
Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing 
measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China and 
for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese 
government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed 
forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no 
limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send into 
Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until 
after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the 
establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there 
were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into 
southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there 
were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh 
Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to 
the north of Indochina for example, China and the Soviet Union. The 
proposal contained no Provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and 
to revert to peaceful courses (tr. 1137-38)."

It is now known that the Japanese note of November 20, was in fact, a 
restatement in more peremptory terms of Japan's "minimum demands" 
determined at the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on September 6 (Japan 
time). As applied to the United States, the three major Japanese 
"demands" decided upon at that Imperial Conference were, that the United 
States would not "intervene in or obstruct a settlement by Japan of the 
China Incident", i. e., would cease all aid to China; that the United 
States would "take no action in the Far East which offers a threat to 
the defense of the Empire"; and that the United States would " cooperate 
with Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials" (ex. 179, 
Konoye Memoirs, pp. 77-78). In an intercepted message to Ambassador 
Nomura which was translated and available in Washington on November 24 
(Washington time), Foreign Minister Togo said:

"our demand for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of 
Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply of American 
petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p. 
172)."

Secretary Hull testified that the Japanese must have known that their 
proposal was 

"an utterly impossible proposal for us, in the light of our 4 or 5 years 
exploration of each others situations and attitudes (tr. 1181)."

He continued 

"To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly 
unthinkable.  It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in 
Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with 
Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the 
United States abandon its principles and policies.  It would have meant 
abject surrender of our position under intimidation (tr. 1140)."

Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, as well as other high officials 
of the Government, not only knew from the intercepted Japanese messages 
already mentioned that the note the Japanese delivered on Thanksgiving 
Day, November 20, was their "absolutely final proposal," they also knew 
from the same source that the Japanese Government had fixed November 25 
(Japan time) as the dead line by which the written agreement of the 
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to its demands were to 
be obtained. On November 22 (Washington time), the following intercepted 
message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura was translated 
and available in Washington:

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my 
#736 (November 25). You should know this, however, I know you are 
working hard. Stick"

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         Page 363

"to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to 
bring about the solution we desire. *There are reasons beyond your 
ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by 
the 26th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your 
conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 
29th, (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes 
can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and 
the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have 
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it that the dead line 
absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going 
to happen.* Please take this into your careful consideration and work 
harder than you ever have before (ex. 1, p. 165)."

Even with four added days of grace, the situation was, Secretary Hull 
testified,

"critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired 
to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution 
and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this 
country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need for time to 
prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a show-
down.

"There the situation stood the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in 
their demands and we standing firmly for our principles.

"The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically 
vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws (tr. 1140)."

Neither Secretary Hull nor President Roosevelt, nor any of their 
advisors, knew, however, that almost simultaneously with the delivery in 
Washington of the Japanese ultimatum of November 20, the Imperial 
Japanese General Headquarters in Tokyo had ordered the commander in 
chief of the Japanese combined fleet to direct the Japanese naval 
striking force, already assembling in a harbor in northern Japan, to 
"advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness" for the 
attack on Pearl Harbor (tr. 437).

THE UNITED STATES REPLIES

(November 26, 1941)

The United States reply was handed to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in 
the late afternoon on November 26 (Washington time), 6 days after the 
delivery of the Japanese ultimatum (tr. 1147). Those 6 days were a 
period of intense activity, involving not only the highest officials in 
the United States Government but also the highest officials of the 
British, Dutch, Australian, and Chinese Governments.

From time to time Secretary Hull had told the Japanese Ambassadors that 
when his conversations with them got beyond the exploratory stage he 
would talk with the representatives of the British, Dutch, and Chinese 
Governments. On November 18 (Washington time), after the Japanese 
Ambassadors suggested a return to the status prior to the freezing 
orders in July, Secretary Hull told them he would consult the British 
and the Dutch to see what their attitude would be (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 
750). Immediately after that conference, Secretary Hull requested the 
British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, to call on him. Secretary Hull's 
memorandum of his conversation with the Minister is as follows:

"I said that I had engaged in a lengthy conference with the two ranking 
Japanese representatives, including Mr. Kurusu, who is here for the 
purpose of carrying on conversations with this Government. I added that 
the conversation related to the question of a proposed peaceful 
settlement for the Pacific area. I stated that nothing was agreed upon 
at this meeting and that the discussion included the subject of two 
opposing policies of conquest by force on the one hand and a

364             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

policy of peace, law, and order on the other. I went on to say that the 
three main points on which we have encountered serious difficulties in 
former conversations with Ambassador Nomura, namely, the bringing of 
Japanese troops out of China, the Tripartite Pact and certain phases of 
commercial policy, were discussed at length; but that the Japanese made 
no concessions on the troop matter or on the matter of the Tripartite 
Pact. I told the Minister that the Japanese finally inquired whether a 
brief temporary partial arrangement could not be worked out that would 
enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along the lines of 
peace rather than of military action. This would also include the idea 
of Japan's coming out of China. They said while the United States and 
maybe Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should be 
so disposed on consultation, would to a partial extent relax embargoes 
on exports to Japan, Japan on its part would correspondingly take steps 
in the direction of a peaceful policy and in organizing and educating 
its public opinion in support of such a policy during the next few 
months. The Japanese suggested further that the whole question of a 
general peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be gradually 
developed and public opinion in Japan would enable them to meet us more 
satisfactorily themselves, and presumably satisfactorily to us, on the 
more difficult questions such as removing their troops from China and 
the Tripartite Pact. They did not, however, make any definite 
commitments as to just how far they could comply with our position with 
respect to these two points."

"I said to the British Minister that I had made it clear to the Japanese 
that if their Government cared to present something on this point. I 
would give it consideration in the event it appeared to be feasible of 
consideration, but that I could make no promise, and that if it should 
be deemed feasible, I would confer with the British, the Dutch, the 
Chinese and the Australians about any phase of the matter in which they 
would be interested to which they would give consideration. I also said 
to the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan decides on a peaceful 
policy rather than a policy of force and conquest, we could not get far 
in any kind of discussion but that I could understand why they might 
need a little time to educate public opinion, as stated (ex. 168)."

The next day the Australian and Netherlands Ministers called separately 
on Secretary Hull, at his request, and to each he gave the substance of 
his talk with the British Minister (ex. 168).

Before turning to a discussion of the preparation of the United States' 
reply to the Japanese note of November 20, it is important to recall 
briefly the evidence before the Committee of the consideration given 
earlier in November to-

"the possibility of reaching some stop-gap arrangement with the Japanese 
to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to prevent a 
breakdown in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a 
subsequent general agreement (Hull, tr. 1128)."

At the Joint Board meeting on November 3 (Washington time) which 
followed the conferences called by Secretary Hull to determine whether 
"the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings" 
by the United States to Japan as urged by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 
General Marshall had expressed the view that 

"the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions 
which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be 
a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions (ex. 
16)."

The Joint Board had decided that the War and Navy Departments would 
prepare a memorandum for President Roosevelt which would, among other 
things, oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan as urged by the 
Generalissimo advocate State Department action to put off hostilities 
with Japan as long as possible, and suggest that an agreement be made 
with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months. 
However, the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark 
actually submitted to President Roosevelt on November 5 contained only 
the first of the Joint Board's

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         Page 365

recommendations; no reference was made in the memorandum to the second 
or third points recommended by the Board and mentioned above (ex. 16).

The day after the Marshall-Stark joint memorandum was given to President 
Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson 

"had an hour's talk alone with the President with regard to the Far 
Eastern situation and his approaching conference with Kurusu, who was 
coming from Japan.  The thing uppermost in his mind was how to gain more 
time (tr. 14386-14387)."

In his notes of that talk with the President, Mr. Stimson recorded:

"The President outlined what he thought he might say. *He was trying to 
think of something which would give us further time.* He suggested that 
he might propose a truce in which there would be no movement of armament 
for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their 
arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis (tr.; 
14414)."

At the Cabinet meeting the next day, November 7, the President had heard 
Secretary Hull's estimate of the situation in the Far East and had 
polled the Cabinet as already described (tr. 14415). On November 10, 
during his talk with Ambassador Nomura, the President had made reference 
to a "*modus vivendi*," and after this meeting, in his report to Tokyo, 
Ambassador Nomura had said he intended to find out whether the President 
referred to "possibly, a provisional agreement" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 
718; ex. 1, p. 11G).  Again, in his report to Tokyo of the meeting with 
President Roosevelt on November 17, Ambassador Nomura had commented 
that, in connection with a remark by the President that the United 
States desired to preserve peace in the Pacific,

"I could see that he was outlining some formula in his mind (ex. 1, p. 
139)."

It was on the evening of the same day that the two Japanese Ambassadors 
had called on a member of the President's Cabinet and had been told that 
the President "was very desirous of an understanding between Japan and 
the United States," and if Japan would do something real to show her 
peaceful intent, "such as evacuating French Indo-China," the way would 
be open "for us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to 
the re-establishment of normal trade relations" (ex. 1, p. 154).

Exhibit 18 before the Committee includes the following undated, penciled 
memorandum in President Roosevelt's handwriting:

"6 months

"1. U. S. To resume economic relations some oil and rice now more later.

"2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or 
any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).

"3 Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact if U. S. gets into 
European war.

"4 U. S. to *introduce* Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U. S. to 
take no part in their conversations.

"Later on Pacific agreements. (Ex. 18). [Italics in original.]"

Attached to the President's memorandum, which was obtained from the 
files of the State Department, is a cover sheet on which appears the 
following typewritten note: "Pencilled memorandum given by the President 
to the Secretary of State (not dated but probably written shortly after 
November 20, 1941)" (ex. 18). However, the fact that the memorandum 
suggests only that Japan should not be permitted to send "more troops to 
Indochina or Manchurian Border," whereas by November 18 the Japanese 
Ambassadors were suggesting to Secre-

Page 366             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

tary Hull the withdrawal of Japanese troops from at least southern 
French Indochina, would seem to indicate that the memorandum may have 
been written by the President before the latter date.

Likewise, since early in November the State Department had been giving 
intensive study to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement, 
knowing that 

"The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to 
keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to 
prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We 
considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or 
keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the 
integrity of American principles (Hull, tr. 1128)."

Two of those suggestions were used in preparing the United States' reply 
to the Japanese note of November 20. On November 11 (Washington time), 
the Far Eastern Division of the State Department had submitted to 
Secretary Hull a draft of a proposal intended to serve as a 

"transitional arrangement the very discussion of which might serve not 
only to continue the conversations pending the advent of a more 
favorable situation, even if the proposal is not eventually agreed to, 
but also to provide the entering wedge toward a comprehensive settlement 
of the nature sought providing the proposal is accepted by Japan and 
provided further that China is able to obtain satisfactory terms from 
Japan (ex. 18)."

This draft proposal consisted of two parts, the first of which contained 
a statement of principles and mutual pledges with respect to economic 
relations which followed closelythe lines of the counterproposals made 
to the Japanese on several prior occasions beginning in April. The
second part contemplated immediate Japanese-Chinese negotiations during 
which there would be an armistice between those countries and the United 
States would hold in abeyance the shipment of supplies of a military 
character to China and Japan would not increase or supply its military 
forces in China and French Indochina. Upon the conclusion of a peace 
settlement between Japan and China the United States was to negotiate 
with both China and Japan for the resumption of normal trade relations 
(ex. 18).

On November 18 (Washington time), Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau 
sent to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull a draft of a proposed 
comprehensive settlement between Japan and the United States (ex. 168). 
This draft was revised in the Far Eastern Division of the State 
Department the same day and copies of the revised draft entitled 
"Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and 
Japan," were sent at once to General Marshall and Admiral Stark for 
their consideration (ex. 18). As revised, the proposal set forth in 
summary form various steps "proposed" to be taken by the United States 
and Japanese Governments, respectively (ex. 18). The evidence before the 
Committee shows that on the same day, November 19, Secretary Hull had 
two meetings with Admiral Schuirmann, through whom the State Department 
maintained liaison with the Navy Department (tr. 1173), and that a 
conference attended by Admiral Stark for the Navy Department and by 
General Gerow for the War Department (General Marshall was out of town) 
was held at the State Department on the morning of November 21 
(Washington time) at which the "Outline" was discussed. At that 
conference Secretary Hull requested both Admiral Stark and General Gerow 
to

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         Page 367

submit their comments on the "Outline" from the military and navaI 
standpoint (ex. 18).

This they did the afternoon of the same day, November 21 
(Washington.time). In his memorandum General Gerow said that he believed 
General Marshall would concur in the views which he expressed concerning 
the "Outline" and advised Secretary Hull that on the basis of a hasty 
study War Plans Division saw "no objection to its use as a basis for 
discussion." He said that 

"the adoption of its provisions would attain *one of our present major 
objectives-the avoidance of war with Japan.* Even a temporary peaee in 
the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the 
Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material 
assistanee to the British both of which are highly important.

"The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to 
all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. *War Plans 
Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the suceess of 
our war effort in Europe that we reach a *modus vivendi* with Japan* 
(ex. 18)."

General Gerow suggested the deletion from the "Outline" of a provision 
which would require Japan to withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria 
except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided Russia 
withdrew all her troops from her far eastern front except for an 
equivalent remainder, on the ground that such a provision would probably 
be unacceptable to Russia. He requested that the War Department be given 
an opportunity to consider the military aspects of any major changes 
that might be made in the proposal (ex. 18).

In his memorandum, Admiral Stark objected to provisions in the "Outline" 
which would place limitations on American naval forces in Pacific 
waters, commit the United States to use its influence toward causing 
Great Britain to cede Hong Kong to China, and require Japan to sell to 
the United States a specified tonnage of merchant vessels. He agreed 
with General Gerow that the provision concerning the withdrawal of 
Japanese troops in Manchuria should be deleted. He made several 
suggestions regarding the phrasing of other provisions, and ended his 
memorandum with the comment that while the provisions of the "Outline" 
might be assumed to abrogate the Tripartite Pact on the part of Japan, 
it would be helpful if that could be specifically stated (ex. 18).

The following day, November 22 (Washington time), there was completed in 
the State Department the first draft of a counterproposal in reply to 
the Japanese note of November 20. This draft counterproposal was in two 
sections. The first section contained a proposed *modus vivendi*. As an 
alternative to the Japanese proposals of November 20, and was prefaced 
by a brief statement of the circumstances leading to its preparation. 
Revised drafts of this section were prepared on November 24 and 25. From 
November 22 to November 26 the *modus vivendi* project was discussed and 
given intensive consideration within the State Department, by President 
Roosevelt and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy, including 
Secretaries Stimson and Knox and General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The 
*modus vivendi* was also discussed with the British, Australian, 
Chinese, and Dutch Governments, principally through their diplomatic 
representatives in Washington. Such revisions as were made in the 
original draft of this section are discussed 

Page 368             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

in connection with the final draft of November 25, which is set forth in 
full below.

The second section of the November 22 draft consisted of two parts. The 
first part contained the statement of principles and mutual pledges with 
respect to economic relations which had been prepared by the State 
Department's Far Eastern Division on November 11.  The second part was 
based primarily upon the "Outline" sent by the State Department to the 
War and Navy Departments on November 19, modified, however, in 
accordance with the suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Gerow 
in their memoranda of November 21 to Secretary Hull mentioned above. The 
changes made in this section in the succeeding drafts of November 24 and 
November 25 were few in number and, as so modified, this section became 
the reply to the Japanese note of November 20 which was handed by 
Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassadors on November 26 (Washington 
time).  Secretary Hull testified that all who saw the *modus vivendi* 
section also saw the section which became the United States reply of 
November 26 (tr. 14363).

The final, November 25 (Washington time), draft of the *modus vivendi* 
section was as follows:

"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the 
Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months 
informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a 
settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area 
based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing 
among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability 
of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the 
principle of non interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial 
opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon 
international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and 
pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international 
conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in 
reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a 
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the 
Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous 
of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and 
peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward 
creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the 
conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be 
in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in 
the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such 
*modus vivendi* include as one of its provisions some initial and 
temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and 
normal intercourse between Japan and the United States.

"*On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary 
of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken 
respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the 
United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to 
accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain 
features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the 
fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under 
consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is 
committed.*

"The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute 
to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to 
afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the 
Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of 
peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the 
Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the 
Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary *modus 
vivendi*, as follows: 

"MODUS VIVENDI

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, 
both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their 
national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace 
throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs 
therein.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             Page 369

"2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they 
have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force 
into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern 
or the northern Pacific area.

"3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its armed 
forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace 
those forces; to reduce the total of its forces in French Indochina to 
the number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval, 
land or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

"The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the 
position of the Government of the United States with regard to the 
presence of foreign troops in that area.

"4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify 
the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the 
extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the 
United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their 
peoples:

"(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the 
sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the 
purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at 
Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese 
obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds 
in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk.  It is 
understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan the movement of 
which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the 
adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United 
States. 

"(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:
    (i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here 
        provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades 
        as the two Governments may agree
   (ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such 
        limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in 
        respect of commodities in short supply in the United States.
  (iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in 
        value per month.
   (iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations 
        as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of 
        commodities in short supply in the United States.
    (v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of 
        petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon 
        a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of 
        petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs 
        will be determined after consultation with the British and the 
        Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in 
        Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing 
        industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial 
        and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.
   (vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and 
        additional commodities added by agreement between the two 
        governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this 
        agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of 
        outstanding problems in the Pacific area.

"5. The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the 
application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the 
extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the 
United States as provided for in paragraph four above.

"6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach 
the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to those  
Governments' taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph 
four above.

"7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, 
the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in 
reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the 
Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions 
and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and 
exemplify the fundamental principles of peace, law, order and justice, 
which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between 
the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and 
which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

"8. This *modus vivendi* shall remain in force for a period of three 
months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the 
instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a 
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an 
extension of the *modus vivendi* for a further period (Ex. 18.)"

Comparison of this final draft of the *modus vivendi* section and the 
prior drafts of November 22 and November 24 shows that paragraphs