Page 370                PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above were contained in each draft and remained the 
same in substance throughout, with but few changes in text. In paragraph 
3, the final draft added the proviso contained in the second sentence 
and omitted specific mention of a limitation of 25,000 upon the total 
number of Japanese troops to remain in French Indochina, retaining from 
the prior drafts, however, the limitation expressed in terms of "the 
number there on July 26,1941." Paragraph 4 was the same in both the 
final draft and the draft of November 24, but differed from the 
corresponding provision in the November 22 draft, which had been as 
follows:

"The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to remove the 
freezing restrictions which were placed on Japanese assets in the United 
States on July 26 and the Japanese Government agrees simultaneously to 
remove the freezing measures which it imposed in regard to American 
assets in Japan. Exports from each country would thereafter remain 
subject to the respective export control measures which each country may 
have in effect for reasons of national defense (ex. 18)."

During the 5 days from November 22 to November 26, inclusive, the State 
Department was the focal point of great activity. After the preparation 
of the November 22 draft of the *modus vivendi* and in accordance with 
his conversations with the British Minister on November 18 and the 
Netherlands and Australian Ministers on November 19, on Saturday, 
November 22 (Washington time), Secretary Hull arranged a meeting at the 
State Department with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador; Dr. Hu Shih, 
the Chinese Ambassador; Dr. A. Loudon, the Netherlands Minister; and Mr. 
Richard G. Casey, the Australian Minister. His report of that meeting 
follows in full:

"The British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, and the Netherlands 
Minister called at my request, the Chinese Ambassador joining us later 
on. I enumerated the high points in the conversations which I have been 
carrying on with the Japanese officials here since the spring of this 
year. They are fully set forth in records of my conversations during 
that time and need not be repeated here.

"I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal for a *modus 
vivendi*, I showed it to them to read, with the exception of the Chinese 
Ambassador who had not yet arrived, and then proceeded to outline my 
proposed reply in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal. 
There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute was more 
desirable than a specific reply to the Japanese proposal, section for 
section. The substitute reply was substantially what is contained in the 
present final draft, which I am considering handing to the Japanese. 
Each of the gentlemen present seemed to be well pleased with this 
preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Ambassador, who was 
somewhat disturbed, as he always is when any question concerning China 
arises not entirely to his way of thinking. This reaction on his part is 
very natural. He did not show serious concern in view of the provision 
in our proposed *modus vivendi* which would block a Japanese attack on 
China in order to destroy the Burma Road. He inquired whether this would 
commit the Japanese not to further invade China during the coming three 
months, to which I replied in the negative, adding that this was a 
question to be decided under the permanent agreement now receiving 
attention. I made it clear that this proposal was made by the Japanese 
and that there was probably not one chance in three that they would 
accept our reply even though it does provide that this proposed 
temporary arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversations 
looking toward a general agreement on the basic questions (ex. 18)."

Secretary Hull's memoranda of his subsequent conversations with those 
who attended this meeting show that each of them immediately reported to 
their respective Governments, for comment, the terms of the Japanese 
note of November 20 to the United States and of the November 22 draft of 
the proposed *modus vivendi* (ex. 18)."

Later that day, November 22, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called on 
Secretary Hull. The Secretary told them that he had 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK               Page 371

talked with the representatives of the other Governments mentioned 
above, and

"that there had been a discussion of the question of whether things 
(meaning Japanese peaceful pledges, et cetera) could be developed in 
such a way that there could be a relaxation to some extent of freezing. 
The Secretary said that these representatives were interested in the 
suggestion and there was a general feeling that the matter could all be 
settled if the Japanese could give us some satisfactory evidences that 
their intentions were peaceful.

"The Secretary said that in discussing the situation with the 
representatives of these other countries he found that there had arisen 
in their minds the same kind of misgivings that had troubled him in the 
course of the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. He referred to 
the position in which the Japanese Government had left the Ambassador 
and the Secretary as they were talking of peace when it made its move 
last July into Indochina. He referred also to the mounting oil purchases 
by Japan last Spring when the conversations were in progress, to the 
fact that he had endured public criticism for permitting those shipments 
because he did not wish to prejudice a successful outcome to the 
conversations and to the fact that that oil was not used for normal 
civilian consumption.

"The Secretary went on to say that the Japanese press which is adopting 
a threatening tone gives him no encouragement and that no Japanese 
statesmen are talking about a peaceful course whereas in the American 
press advocacy of a peaceful course can always get a hearing. He asked 
why was there not some Japanese statesmen backing the two Ambassadors by 
preaching peace. The Secretary pointed out that if the United States and 
other countries should see Japan coming along a peaceful course there 
would be no question about Japan's obtaining all the materials she 
desired, that the Japanese Government knows that.

"The Secretary said that while no decisions were reached today in regard 
to the Japanese proposals he felt that we would consider helping Japan 
out on oil for civilian requirements only as soon as the Japanese 
Government could assert control of the situation in Japan as it relates 
to the policy of force and conquest. He said that if the Ambassador 
could give him any further assurances in regard to Japan's peaceful 
intentions it would help the Secretary in talking with senators and 
other persons in this country (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 757-758)."

Later, Secretary Hull commented that Japan made it very difficult by 
leaving troops in Indochina. Ambassador Kurusu replied-

"that the Japanese desired the troops in northern Indo-China in order to 
bring about a settlement with China. He said that after the settlement 
of the China affair Japan promised to bring the troops out of Indo-China 
altogether.

"The Secretary emphasized again that he could not consider this, that 
also uneasiness would prevail as long as the troops remained in Indo-
China, and commented that Japan wanted the United States to do all the 
pushing toward bringing about a peaceful settlement; that they should 
get out of Indo-China.

"Mr. Kurusu observed that the Japanese Foreign Minister had told 
Ambassador Grew that we seemed to expect that all the concessions should 
be made by the Japanese side (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 760)."

After further discussion of the troop situation in Indochina. Ambassador 
Nomura pressed Secretary Hull for an answer to the Japanese proposal of 
November 20. In reply, the Secretary said 

"that if the Japanese could not wait until Monday before having his 
answer there was nothing he could do about it as he was obliged to 
confer again with the representatives of the other governments concerned 
after they had had an opportunity to consult with their governments. He 
repeated that we were doing our best, but emphasized that unless the 
Japanese were able to do a little there was no use in talking (ex. 29, 
vol. II, p. 761)."

Ambassador Nomura "disclaimed any desire to press the Secretary too hard 
for an answer * * * and said that the Japanese would be quite ready to 
wait until Monday" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 761). Ambassador Nomura sent two 
reports of this meeting to Tokyo (ex. 1, pp. 167-169,170-171), in one of 
which he observed:

Page 372             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk, 
and at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was also the 
same (ex. 1, p. 171)."

The two Ambassadors did not meet with Secretary Hull again until 
Wednesday afternoon, November 26 (Washington time), when the Secretary 
gave them the United States reply (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-770) .

There is no evidence before the Committee of any meetings or conferences 
outside the State Department regarding the *modus vivendi* the next day, 
Sunday, November 23 (Washington time).  However, Monday, November 24 
(Washington time), like the preceding Saturday, was a day of great 
activity. A new draft of the entire counterproposal was completed in the 
Department over the weekend (ex. 18). During the early part of the 
afternoon Secretary Hull had telephone conversations with Secretary 
Stimson and Secretary Knox, as well as a conference with Admiral 
Schuirmann (tr. 1166). At 3:30 p. M., Secretary Hull had a conference at 
the State Department with General Marshall and Admiral Stark, at which 
the new draft was discussed in detail (tr. 1166; ex. 18). During this 
conference General Marshall expressed the opinion that 25,000 Japanese 
troops in French Indo-China, the maximum permitted under the current 
draft of the *modus vivendi*, would not be a menace (ex. 18). Following 
his conference with General Marshall and Admiral Stark at the State 
Department, Lord Halifax, Dr. Hu Shih, Dr. Loudon, and Mr. Casey called 
on Secretary Hull at his request, and to each of them he handed copies 
of the latest draft of the *modus vivendi*. The Secretary's memorandum 
of that meeting records that they spent an hour reading the draft and 
taking notes to send back to their Governments. The memorandum 
continues:

"The Chinese Ambassador objected to more than a maximum of 5,000 
Japanese troops being left in Indochina. I again stated that General 
Marshall had a few minutes before expressed to me his opinion that 
25,000 troops would be no menace and that, while this Government did not 
recognize the right of Japan to keep a single soldier in Indochina, we 
were striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily 
because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize to me that time 
is the all-important question for them, and that it is necessary to be 
more fully prepared to deal effectively with the situation in the 
Pacific area in case of an outbreak by Japan. I also emphasized the 
point that, even if we agree that the chances of such an outbreak are 
not great, it must be admitted that there are real possibilities that 
such an outbreak may soon occur any day after this week unless a 
temporary arrangement is effected that will cause the agitated state of 
public opinion to become more quiet and thereby make it much more 
practicable to continue the conversations relative to the general 
agreement.

"The Chinese Ambassador dwelt on the matter of reducing the proposed 
figure of 25,000 soldiers to remain in Indochina to 5,000. I pointed out 
and each of the representatives understood the great advantage it would 
be to our five countries to have Japan committed to a peaceful course 
for three months and set forth the advantages to each of having 
additional time in which to make further preparations, et ectera, et 
ectera. They seemed to be very much gratified. They seemed to be 
thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought 
of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered 
that none of their governments had given them instructions relative to 
this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands 
Minister, I remarked that each of their Governments was more interested 
in the defense of that area of the world than this country, and at the 
same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to 
be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the 
entire area. And yet I said their Governments, through some sort of 
preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about 
these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I 
was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the 
lack of interest and

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             Page 373

lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the 
Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his 
Government and that it would support the *modus vivendi* proposal. I 
then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the 
Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and 
attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion (ex. 
18)."

Later that day Secretary Hull sent to President Roosevelt a draft of a 
proposed message from the President to Prime Minister Churchill.  The 
proposed message summarized the Japanese note of November 20, saying 
that the Japanese Ambassador had "represented" that the conclusion of 
such a "modus vivendi" might give the Japanese Government opportunity to 
develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and 
comprehensive program of peace covering the Pacific area and that "the 
domestic political situation in Japan was so acute as to render urgent 
some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal."  The message pointed 
out that the Japanese proposal "would apparently not exclude advancement 
into China from Indo-China " It went on to say that the United States 
Government proposed to inform the Japanese Government that in its 
opinion the Japanese proposals contained features "not in harmony with 
the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general 
settlement" to which each Government had declared that it was committed, 
and then summarized the terms of the *modus vivendi* which was being 
considered by the United States Government as an alternative proposal. 
The message advised the Prime Minister that the British Ambassador in 
Washington had been informed and was informing the British Foreign 
Minister (ex. 18). President Roosevelt returned the draft message to 
Secretary Hull with the notation "O. K., see addition. F. D. R." (Ex. 
18). The "addition" referred to by the President was the following 
sentence which he had written in longhand for insertion at the end of 
the message:

"This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance 
or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not 
very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon 
(ex. 18)."

The message, with the sentence added by the President, was sent to the 
Prime Minister at 11 p. m. That evening, November 24 (Washington time), 
through Ambassador Winant in London (ex. 18).

The next day, Tuesday, November 25 (Washington time), the draft 
counterproposal was once more revised in the State Department. This was 
the final revision of the section containing the *modus vivendi*. At 
9:30 a. M. Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox met with Secretary Hull 
at the State Department for their "usual Tuesday morning meeting" (tr. 
14,390), which Secretary Stimson described in his notes:

"Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce, which he was 
going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately 
safeguarded all our interests, I thought as we read it, but I don't 
think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was 
so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to do; 
namely, to at once evacuate and at once to stop all preparations or 
threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her 
neighbors, etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient 
quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was 
particularly applicable to oil.  We had a long talk over the general 
situation (tr. 14,417-14,418)."

It is clear that Secretary Stimson's description of the *modus vivendi* 
as "so drastic" refers to the limited nature of the trade concessions to 
be made by the United States under it.

Page 374               PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

At noon that day the so-called "War Council" composed of President 
Roosevelt, Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox, and General Marshall and 
Admiral Stark met at the White House. The discussion centered on the 
Japanese situation. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the 
President

"brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as 
soon as) next .Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an 
attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The 
question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the 
first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. [1] It was a 
difficult proposition. Hull laid out his general broad propositions on 
which the thing should be rested the freedom of the seas and the fact 
that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy 
of world aggression. The others brought out the fact that any such 
expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely to take would be an 
encirclement of our interests in the Philippines and cutting into our 
vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed out to the President 
that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in 
notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border into 
Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to 
point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation 
of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing 
that (tr. 14,418-14,419)."

In addition to Secretary Hull's testimony regarding this meeting (tr. 
1144), the record before the Committee contains a copy of a letter 
written by the Secretary to the Roberts Commission a little over a month 
after the meeting. In that letter, after stating that at the meeting of 
the War Council on November 25, as well as the meeting on November 28, 
he had "emphasized the critical nature" of the relations between the 
United States and Japan, the Secretary continued:

"I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of 
an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese 
were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; 
and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the 
hands of the Army and the Navy.  At the conclusion I with due deference 
expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should 
include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of 
surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at 
various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of 
defense and of coordination for purposes thereof (ex. 174)."

General Marshall testified that he had "a very distinct recollection of 
Mr. Hull's saying at one of those meetings, one of the last, 'These 
fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared" (tr. 3079).

Admiral Stark, who attended the War Council meeting on November 25, 
added a postscript concerning it to a letter of that date which he sent 
to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. In the postscript, he described the 
comments of the President and the Secretary of State:

"I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. 
I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long 
talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing 
the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as 
did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise 
attack (ex. 100)."

After the meeting at the White House, Secretary Hull returned to the 
State Department and Secretary Stimson to the War Department.  Secretary 
Stimson recorded in his notes:

[1] With reference to this sentence in Secretary Stimson's notes, 
General Marshall testified: "* * * they were trying to arrange a 
diplomatic procedure, rather than firing of a gun, that would not only 
protect our interests, by arranging matters so that the Japanese 
couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but also anything they 
did do, they would be forced to take the offensive action, and what we 
were to do had to be prepared for the President by Mr. Hull. It was not 
a military order. It was not a military arrangement" (tr. 13801).

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             Page 375

"When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that an (a 
Japanese) expedition had started. Five Divisions have come down from 
Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships 30, 
40, or 50 ships-and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called 
up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the 
President of the menace from G-2 (tr. 14419)."

Secretary Hull's record of telephone calls shows a call on that day from 
Secretary Stimson at 4:30 p. m. (tr. 1166), and the record of outside 
telephone calls through the White House switchboard shows such a call at 
4:25 p. m. and that the call was completed (tr. 5545).  The latter 
record also shows that Postmaster General Walker telephoned Secretary 
Hull four times that afternoon (tr. 5545-5546). The first call was at 
12:27 p. M., while the meeting at the White House was in progress, and 
was not completed. The other calls, which were completed, were at 
3:30,4:05, and 5:30 p. m.

In the meantime reports were reaching Washington of the reactions of the 
Chinese, Dutch, and British Governments to the terms of the proposed 
*modus vivendi*. As noted above, the Netherlands Minister informed 
Secretary Hull at the conference on the afternoon of November 24 
(Washington time) that his Government would support the *modus vivendi* 
proposal. The next day the Minister formally transmitted to Secretary 
Hull his Government's comments on the Japanese note of November 20 and 
the proposed *modus vivendi* (tr. 4471-4474).  The comments of the 
British Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, were contained in a 
memorandum handed to Secretary Hull on the same day by Lord Halifax, the 
British Ambassador (ex. 18). That memorandum expressed the willingness 
of the British Foreign Office to leave to Secretary Hull the decision 
whether to reject the Japanese proposals or make a counterproposal. It 
took the position that the Japanese proposals should be regarded " as 
the opening movement in a process of bargaining," and suggested that if 
a counterproposal should be made, "our demands should be pitched high 
and our price low." On this basis it was suggested "for the 
consideration of the United States Government" that any counterproposal 

"should stipulate for the total withdrawal from Indo-China not merely of 
the Japanese "troops" as in the Japanese proposal but of Japanese naval, 
military and air forces with their equipment and for the *suspension of 
further military* advances in China in addition to satisfactory 
assurances regarding other areas in South East Asia, the Southern 
Pacific and Russia; the quid pro quo being legitimate relaxation of 
existing economic measures so as to allow the export of limited 
quantities of goods to ensure the welfare of the Japanese civilian 
population, but excluding goods of direct importance to the war 
potential, in particular oil, of which we know the Japanese have no 
shortage except for military purposes. These relaxations would of course 
only become effective as and when withdrawal of Japanese armed forces 
took place, and we should expect in return to receive goods of a similar 
nature from Japan if we required them.

"Mr. Hull has of course made it perfectly clear to the Japanese that any 
interim arrangement is only a first step in a wider settlement which 
must be in conformity with basic principles acceptable to the United 
States. We feel that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have 
to be made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional and 
is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate agreement on 
more fundamental issues satisfactory to all parties concerned (ex. 18). 
(Italics in original.)"

Prime Minister Churchill's reply to President Roosevelt's message of 
November 24 reached the State Department early on the morning of 
November 26 (ex. 23). In it the Prime Minister said:

"Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord 
Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which 
Foreign"

Page 376             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle 
this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is 
only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not 
having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse 
our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard 
of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We 
feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves (ex. 23)."

The views of the Chinese Government had already been made known to the 
United States Government. The Chinese Foreign Minister, to whom on 
November 22 the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had cabled the 
substance of the Japanese note of November 20 and the proposed *modus 
vivendi*, sent the following message to the Chinese Ambassador on 
November 24:

"After reading your telegram, the Generalissimo showed strong reaction. 
He got the impression that the United States Government has put aside 
the Chinese question in its conversations with Japan instead of seeking 
a solution, and is still inclined to appease Japan at the expense of 
China. * * * We are * * * firmly opposed to any measure which may have 
the effect of increasing China's difficulty in her war of resistance, or 
of strengthening Japan's power in her aggression against China. Please 
inform the Secretary of State (ex. 18)."

On November 25, Owen Lattimore, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's American 
advisor, cabled Lauchlin Currie, one of President Roosevelt's 
administrative assistants:

"After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's 
conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently 
advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have 
never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or 
unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in 
China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in 
China would dismay the Chinese. Any 'Modus Vivendi' now arrived at with 
Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to 
the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British 
prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the 
resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against 
occidental treachery.  It is doubtful whether either past assistance or 
increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at 
this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's 
fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the 
Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if 
the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of 
Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory (ex. 18)."

The same day, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek cabled Mr. T. V. Soong in 
Washington the following message, which the latter promptly delivered to 
Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox:

"I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram 
yesterday.  Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox 
and Stimson immediately.

"Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should 
relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if 
reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency, 
the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two 
months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November 
an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They 
have even come to a silent but nonetheless definite understanding with 
the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any 
relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of 
that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has 
been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the 
entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, 
and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most 
tragic epoch in the world will be opened.  The Chinese army will 
collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, 
so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the 
situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China 
alone.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             Page 377

"We could therefore only request the United States Government to be 
uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies 
from China, is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or 
freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American 
attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its 
fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the 
break-down of our resistance. Our more than four years of struggle with 
the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled 
in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our 
resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do 
not indeed know how history in future will record this episode (ex. 
18)."

The evening of November 25 (Washington time), Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese 
Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull and delivered to him a copy of the 
Chinese Foreign Minister's telegram quoted above. According to Secretary 
Hull's memorandum of the conversation, the Ambassador endeavored to 
explain Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's opposition to the *modus 
vivendi* on the ground that the Generalissimo was not thoroughly 
acquainted with the over-all international aspects of the Japanese 
situation, and viewed it only from his own situation in Chungking (ex. 
18). The Secretary's memorandum continued: 

"I replied that in the first place the official heads of our Army and 
Navy for some weeks have been most earnestly urging that we not get into 
war with Japan until they have had an opportunity to increase further 
their plans and methods and means of defense in the Pacific area. In the 
second place, at the request of the more peaceful elements in Japan for 
conversations with this Government looking toward a broad peaceful 
settlement for the entire Pacific area, we have been carrying on 
conversations and making some progress thus far, and the Japanese are 
urging the continuance of these general conversations for the purpose of 
a broad Pacific area settlement. The situation, therefore, is that the 
proposed *modus vivendi* is really a part and parcel of the efforts to 
carry forward these general conversations for the reasons that have been 
fully stated from time to time, and recently to the Chinese Ambassador 
and to others. 

"I said that very recently the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek 
almost flooded Washington with strong and lengthy cables telling us how 
extremely dangerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road 
through Indochina and appealing loudly for aid, whereas practically the 
first thing this present proposal of mine and the President does is to 
require the Japanese troops to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to 
protect the Burma Road from what Chiang Kai-shek said was an imminent 
danger. Now, I added, Chiang Kai-shek ignores that situation which we 
have taken care of for him and inveighs loudly about another matter 
relating to the release of certain commodities to Japan corresponding to 
the progress made with our conversations concerning a general peace 
agreement. He also overlooks the fact that our proposal would relieve 
the menace of Japan in Indochina to the whole South Pacific area, 
including Singapore the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, and also the 
United States, with the Philippines and the rubber and tin trade routes. 
All of this relief from menace to each of the countries would continue 
for ninety days. One of our leading admirals stated to me recently that 
the limited amount of more or less inferior oil products that we might 
let Japan have during that period would not to any appreciable extent 
increase Japanese war and naval preparations. I said that, of course, we 
can cancel this proposal but it must be with the understanding that we 
are not to be charged with failure to send our fleet into the area near 
Indochina and into Japanese waters, if by any chance Japan makes a 
military drive southward.

"The Ambassador was very insistent in the view that he would send back 
to his Government a fuller explanation which he hoped might relieve the 
situation more or less. Our conversation was, of course, in a friendly 
spirit (ex. 18)."

The same evening, whether before or after his talk with Secretary Hull 
is not clear from the record before the Committee, Dr. Hu Shih called on 
Dr. Stanley E. Hornbeck, political advisor to the Secretary. After 
expressing to Dr. Hornbeck his complete confidence that the United 
States "would yield nothing in the field of principles and pursue no 
course of 'appeasement' ", the Chinese Ambassador repeated what

Page 378             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

he had said at the conference the preceding day regarding the second and 
third points of the *modus vivendi*, evidencing the concern of his 
Government that point 2 would leave Japan free to continue operations 
against China and that point 3 would not sufficiently limit the number 
of Japanese troops in Indo-China to dispel the Japanese threat to the 
Burma Road. He expressed the hope that the *modus vivendi* would be made 
more restrictive (ex. 18).

In the meantime, other intercepted Japanese messages available to 
Secretary Hull before delivery of the United States reply on November 26 
(Washington time), in addition to the messages (ex. 1, pp. 155, 160) in 
which the Japanese Foreign Minister told Ambassador Nomura that a return 
to the status prior to the freezing orders was not enough and that it 
would be necessary to have a solution that would "come up to the B 
proposal," had indicated that the Japanese Government would accept 
nothing less than the terms of that proposal. Thus, on November 24 
(Japan time), the Japanese Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura:

"Our expectations, as I told you in my #798, go beyond the restoration 
of Japan-American trade and a return to the situation of the freezing 
legislation and require the realization of all points of Proposal B with 
the exception of clauses 6 and 7. (*Note*. Clauses 6 and 7 were not 
included in the Japanese proposal of November 20.) Therefore, our demand 
for a cessation of aid to Chiang (the acquisition of Netherlands Indies 
goods and at the same time the supply of American petroleum to Japan as 
well) is a most essential condition (ex. 1, p. 172)."

Again on November 26 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Togo cabled 
Ambassador Nomura that "our final proposal envisages an agreement on the 
basis of the 'B' proposal in toto" with the two exceptions already noted 
(ex. 1, p. 176). The same day the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador 
Nomura that as soon as he reached a settlement on the basis of the 
November 20 note 

"it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods 
in connection with clauses 2 and 3 (*Note*: clauses 3 and 4 of the 
November 20 note) of that proposal. Of these goods the acquisition of 
petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the 
Empire. Therefore, * * * prior to the signing of an understanding, and 
at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes 
known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following 
lines:

"4,000,000 tons per year from the United States (ex. 1, p. 177)."

On November 21 (Washington time) Ambassador Kurusu had called on 
Secretary Hull and handed him a letter which he proposed to sign as a 
clarification of Japan's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. The 
proposed letter asserted that the Pact did not in any way infringe the 
sovereign rights of Japan as an independent state; that Japan was free 
to make its own interpretation; that the Japanese Government would not 
become involved in war "at the behest of any foreign power"; and that it 
would " accept warfare only as the ultimate, inescapable necessity for 
the maintenance of its security and the preservation of its national 
life against active injustice" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 757). The record of 
the conversations shows that the substance of all of these assertions 
had been made by the Japanese many times before. Secretary Hull asked 
the Ambassador whether he had anything more to offer on the whole 
subject of a peaceful settlement, and Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not 
(ex. 29, vol. II, p. 756). Secretary Hull described this incident in his 
testimony:

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"The next morning, Kurusu came to my apartment in the hotel and was 
talking about the Tripartite Agreement, endeavoring to minimize that, 
and I suddenly inquired of him if his government had anything more to 
offer on the general peace situation, and he quickly said, 'No.'

"So there we had nailed down what he said was the last proposal and what 
their interceptions had informed us was very final in the matter (tr. 
1181)."

Secretary Hull had also received a report from Ambassador Grew of his 
talk with Foreign Minister Togo on November 24 (Japan time), during 
which the Foreign Minister stated that the withdrawal of the Japanese 
troops from southern to northern Indochina was the maximum concession 
Japan could make "in any event", and that Japan would be willing to have 
President Roosevelt act as "introducer" between Japan and China "with 
the understanding that then the United States would refrain from action 
prejudicial to restoring peace between China and Japan," I. E., cease 
all aid to China (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 762-763).

On Wednesday, November 26 (Washington time), Secretary Stimson talked 
with Secretary Hull at 9:15 a. M. And again at 9:50 a. m., according to 
the White House telephone records (tr. 5546). Mr. Stimson summarized the 
conversations in his notes:

"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up 
his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on 
the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over to tell 
them that he has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected 
to that proposition when he showed it to them; that is, to the 
proposition which he showed to Knox and me, because it involves giving 
to the Japanese the small modicum of oil for civilian use during the 
interval of the truce of the three months. Chiang Kai-shek had sent a 
special message to the effect that that would make a terrifically bad 
impression in China; that it would destroy all their courage and that 
they (it) would play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that 
the Japanese would use it. T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has 
asked to see me and I had called Hull up this morning to tell him so and 
ask him what he wanted me to do about it. He replied as I have just said 
above that he had about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in 
respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no 
further action to propose (tr. 14,420)."

On his return to the State Department from the War Council meeting the 
preceding day, Secretary Hull had been told by Secretary Stimson that 
the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of 30, 40, or 50 
ships at Shanghai and that this expedition was proceeding along the 
China coast south of Formosa. Secretary Stimson had also telephoned 
President Roosevelt about this, and had sent copies of the intelligence 
report to him. A few minutes after his telephone conversations with 
Secretary Hull on the morning of November 26, Secretary Stimson 
telephoned the President to inquire whether he had received the report 
on the Japanese expedition. According to Secretary Stimson's notes, the 
President 

"fairly blew up jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't 
seen it and that that changed the whole situation because it was an 
evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while they were 
negotiating for an entire truce-an entire withdrawal (from China) they 
should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-china, I told him 
that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2 and through the Navy 
Secret Service and I at once got another copy of the paper I had sent 
last night and sent it over to him by special messenger (tr. 14,420-
14,421)."

The record before the Committee contains the following "Memorandum for 
the President," dated November 26 (Washington time) and signed by 
Secretary Stimson: