380 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK JAPANESE CONVOY MOVEMENT TOWARDS INDO-CHINA "About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move approximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by previous agreement. "Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great as 50,000 but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concentration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel contained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is already under way and ships leave been seen south of Formosa. "The officers concerned in the Military Intelligence Division feel that unless we receive other information, this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government. "I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field (ex. 98)." At 6:54 p. M. That day the following priority message was dispatched from the Navy Department: "From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines "Admiral Hart will deliver to you a copy of a despatch which with my approval the CNO and the COS addressed to the senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines. In addition you are advised that the Japanese are strongly reinforcing their garrisons and naval forces on the Mandates in a manner which indicates they are preparing this region as quickly as possible against a possible attack on them by US Forces. However, I am more particularly concerned over increasing opposition of Japanese leaders and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai and Japan to the Formosa area. Preparations are becoming apparent in China, Formosa, and Indo China for an early aggressive movement of some character although as yet there are no clear indications as to its strength or whether it will be directed against the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines. Advance against Thailand seems the most probable. I consider it possible that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U. S. and Japan. I desire that after further informing yourself as to the situation and the general outlines of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people. Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding public pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more difficult. Roosevelt (tr. 13,861-13,862)." The evidence before the Committee shows that at about 1:20 p. m. that day, November 26, Secretary Hull telephoned n Stark (tr. 1166, 5546), that Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull at 2:35 p. m. after attempting to telephone General Marshall (who was out of town) at 1:28 (tr. 5546), and that late that afternoon Secretary Hull conferred at the White House with President Roosevelt (tr. 1147). The Secretary was preceded at the White House by the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, and Mr. T. V. Soong (ex. 179). Secretary Hull testified that on November 26 he recommended to President Roosevelt and that the President approved the Secretary's calling in the two Japanese Ambassadors and handing them the proposals contained in the second section of the counterproposal that had been under consideration at the State Department, while withholding the modus vivendi plan (tr. 1147). President Roosevelt was, Secretary Hull testified, "thoroughly familiar" with both sections of the counterproposal (tr. 14, 312). The record before the Committee contains the following memorandum dated November 26 (Washington time) from Secretary Hull for President Roosevelt: PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 381 "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT "With reference to our two proposals prepared for submission to the Japanese Government, namely: "(1) A proposal in the way of a draft agreement for a broad, basic, peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, which is henceforth to be made a part of the general conversations now going on and to be carried on, if agreeable to both Governments, with a view to a general agreement on this subject. "(2) The second proposal is really closely connected with the conversations looking toward a general agreement, which is in the nature of a modus vivendi intended to make more feasible the continuance of the conversations. "In view of the opposition of the Chinese Government and either the half-hearted support or the actual opposition of the British, the Netherlands, and the Australian Governments, and in view of the wide publicity of the opposition and of the additional opposition that will naturally follow through utter lack of an understanding of the vast importance and value otherwise of the modus vivendi, without in any way departing from my views about the wisdom and the benefit of this step to all of the countries opposed to the aggressor nations who are interested in the Pacific area, I desire very earnestly to recommend that at this time I call in the Japanese Ambassadors and hand to them a copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement, and at the same time withhold the modus vivendi proposal. "/S/ CORDELL HULL (ex. 18)." In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull gave a more detailed statement of the considerations which led to his recommendation to the President: "I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for acceptance by our Government of their extreme last-word proposal of November 20. "It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote. "So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese, it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding. "It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible. "The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement (tr. 114S1147). " Upon his return to the State Department from his conference with President Roosevelt, at 5 p. M. Secretary Hull met with Ambassadors 382 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Nomura and Kurusu at the Department and handed them, in reply to the Japanese note of November 20, the second section of the counterproposal which had been under consideration since November 22, together with an explanatory statement. The explanatory statement was the first section of that counterproposal as quoted herein (pp. 70-71) modified by the deletion of the modus vivendi and with further changes made necessary thereby. It reviewed briefly the objectives sought in the exploratory conversations, and stated that it was believed that some progress had been made with respect to the general principles involved. Note was taken of the recent statements of the Japanese Ambassadors that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to that successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon, to be in effect while the conversations looking toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area were continuing. It was stated that the United States Government most earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of the discussions to this end. The statement continued: "The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned. "With this object in view *the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.* "The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941. and the Japanese draft of September 25, by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. *This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worth-while international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 767)." The outline of a proposed basis for agreement which Secretary Hull handed to the Japanese Ambassadors follows, in full: "Strictly Confidential, Tentative and Without Commitment. "WASHINGTON, November 26, 1941. "OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOB AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN "SECTION I "*Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy* "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based: "(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 383 "(2) The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. "(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment." "(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. "The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples: "(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. "(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions. "(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies. "(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements. "(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries. "SECTION II "Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows: "1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British Empire China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and The united States. "2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland, and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina. "3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indochina. "4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support militarily, politically, economically any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking. "5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. "Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in international settlement's and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. "6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list. "7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan. "8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States. 384 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. "10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement (ex. 167; ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 768-770)." Ambassador Grew was fully informed the same evening of the sub-stance of the United States' reply. (Tr. 4513-4522; ex. 75.) The record before the Committee shows that, commencing with the first draft of an American counterproposal on November 22 (Washington time), all the officials of the United States Government who were consulted by Secretary Hull regarding the proposed modus vivendi necessarily saw and considered the successive drafts of the foregoing so-called "Ten Point" note, since from the outset the provisions which, as revised, became the "Ten Point" note had constituted the second section of the counterproposal and had been attached to the first section containing the modus vivendi. The record also shows that the provisions of the "Ten Point" note probably received more attention from the high officers of the Army and Navy than did the terms of the modus vivendi, since the part containing the so-called "Ten Points" was based primarily upon the State Department's revision of the Morgenthau suggestions of November 18. It will be recalled that that revision was sent to the Army and Navy for comment on November 19, and was the subject of the conference at the State Department on November 21 attended by General Gerow and Admiral Stark, who thereafter submitted their comments and suggestions to Secretary Hull in memoranda of the same date. As has already been pointed out, the first section of the "Ten Point" note was based almost entirely upon the statement of principles contained in the draft proposal submitted by the State Department's Far Eastern Division to Secretary Hull on November 11, which in turn had been frequently discussed with the Japanese during the six months since the conversations began in the spring of 1941. Returning to Secretary Hull's meeting with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, after the Japanese had read the documents handed them by the Secretary, Ambassador Kurusu asked whether this was the United States reply to their proposal. "The Secretary replied that we had to treat the proposal as we did, as there was so much turmoil and confusion among the public both in the United States and in Japan. He reminded the Japanese that in the United States we have a political situation-to deal with just as does the Japanese Government, and he referred to the fire-eating statements which have been recently coming out of Tokyo, which he said had been causing a natural reaction among the public in this country. *He said that our proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation, to which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this might give rise to misunderstanding.* He also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations acquainted the Ambassador of the ambition that had been his *of settling the immigration question* but that the situation had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 764). Ambassador Kurusu then commented adversely on various provisions of the American note, saying among other things that he did not see how his Government could consider paragraphs (3) and (4), and that if this represented the idea of the American Government he did not see how any agreement was possible. He said that when they reported the United States' answer to their Government "it would be PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 385 likely to throw up its hands". He suggested that it might be better if they did not refer it to their Government before discussing its contents further informally in Washington. Later, he said that he felt the reply could be interpreted "as tantamount to meaning the end." He asked whether the United States was interested in a modus vivendi. Secretary Hull replied that he had explored that and that he had done his best in the way of exploration (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 764-766). In reply to Ambassador Kurusu's suggestion that the document should be discussed informally before reporting it to Tokyo "The Secretary suggested that they might wish to study the documents carefully before discussing them further. He repeated that we were trying to do our best to keep the public from becoming uneasy as a result of their being harangued. He explained that in the light of all that has been said in the press, our proposal was as far as we would go at this time in reference to the Japanese proposal; that there was so much confusion among the public that it was necessary to bring about some clarification; that we have reached a stage when the public has lost its perspective and that it was therefore necessary to draw up a document which would present a complete picture of our position by making provision for each essential point involved. "The Secretary then referred to the oil question. He said that public feeling was so acute on that question that he might almost be lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan. He pointed out that if Japan should fill Indochina with troops our people would not know what lies ahead in the way of a menace to the countries to the south and west. He reminded the Japanese that they did not know what tremendous injury they were doing to us by keeping immobilized so many forces in countries neighboring Indochina. He explained that we are primarily out for our permanent futures, and the question of Japanese troops in Indochina affects our direct interests (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 765)." At the conclusion of the meeting, Ambassador Nomura asked whether the two Ambassadors could see President Roosevelt, and Secretary Hull replied that he had no doubt the President would be glad to see them at any time. The Ambassador also said that he would like to have the counselor of the Japanese Embassy call on Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, one of the Secretary's principal advisors on Far Eastern affairs, the next day "to discuss further details" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 766). Secretary Hull testified: "The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's foreign policy. The practical application of those principles to the situation in the Far East as embodied in the ten points contained in the document, was along lines which had been under discussion with the Japanese representatives in the course of the in-formal exploratory conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country and was coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis for further conversations. * * * * * "Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer. We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the conversations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task of statesmanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no matter how slight. It was in this spirit that the November 26 document was given to the Japanese Government (tr. 1151-1152)." *Before their meeting with Secretary Hull late in the afternoon of November 26 (Washington time)*, the two Japanese Ambassadors had sent a joint telegram to Foreign Minister Togo in which they recognized, *even before Secretary Hull delivered the " Ten Point" note to them,* 386 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK that the negotiations were for all practical purposes at an end. They told the Foreign Minister: "As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, *if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete* (ex. 1, p. 180)." They then asked the approval of the Foreign Minister of the only remaining suggestion they had to offer, as a device to obtain more time. The Ambassadors suggested, with "grave misgivings," that they be permitted to propose to Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt wire Foreign Minister Togo (not Emperor Hirohito) that "for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will co-operate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific * * * and that you in return reply with a cordial message." The Ambassadors asked that their request be shown to the Navy Minister (ex. 1. p. 189). While Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu were meeting with Secretary Hull at the State Department, and at their direction, the counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Wakasugi, using the trans-Pacific telephone, informed the Foreign Office in Tokyo that the meeting was in progress and that "the future of the present talks would be decided during the course of today's conversation" (ex. 1, p. 179). In making this call, Mr. Wakasugi used a telephone code established earlier that day in a message from the Foreign Minister which said "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long" (ex. 1, p. 178). There is no evidence before the Committee of the use of a trans- Pacific telephone code in connection with the negotiations prior to the establishment of this code by the Japanese Foreign Office before the American note was delivered on November 26 (Washington time). Almost immediately upon his return to the Japanese Embassy, Ambassador Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the trans- Pacific telephone. He told the Chief of the American Division, Kumaicho Yamamoto: "I have made all efforts, *but they will not yield*. I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. [1] The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it (ex. 1, p. 179)." He continued "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome (ex. 1, p. 180)." To which Bureau Chief Yamamoto replied: "Yes, I had expected it, but I wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished (ex. 1, p. 180)." That evening Ambassador Nomura cabled three reports to the Foreign Minister of the Ambassadors' meeting with Secretary Hull. The first was a brief resume of the "Ten Point" note, accompanied by this comment: "In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have [1] The message referred to above in which the Ambassadors said "Our failure and humiliation are complete". PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 387 been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so (ex. 1, p. 182)." The third telegram was a detailed account of the meeting (ex. 1, pp. 183-185). The second telegram consisted of general comments on the situation (ex. 1, pp. 182-183). In it Ambassador Nomura showed great concern lest some "independent action" taken by Japan *while the negotiations were continuing* should place upon Japan the responsibility "for the rupture of the negotiations." He pointed out that "up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention!" Recognizing that "such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret," the Ambassador recommended: "consequently, *I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.* I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time (ex. 1, p. 183)." THE TOJO CABINET MAKES A PRETENSE OF CONTINUING THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS AND AT THE SAME TIME MOVES ADDITIONAL JAPANESE TROOPS INTO SOUTHERN INDOCHINA (November 27-December 7, 1941) The record before the Committee thus shows that there was little hope or expectation in Washington on November 27, either among those in the United States Government who were familiar with the Japanese-American conversations or on the part of the two Japanese Ambassadors, that the Tojo Government in Tokyo would continue the conversations. Nevertheless, as requested by Ambassador Kurusu the day before, a meeting with President Roosevelt was arranged for 2:30 p. m. on November 27 (Washington time) at the White House. That morning, before the White House conference, Secretary Hull held a "special and lengthy" press conference at which he reviewed the Far Eastern situation and particularly the state of the Japanese-American conversations in much greater detail than had been true of the statement made to the press late the preceding afternoon, following his conference with the two Japanese Ambassadors (tr. 1154-1161). That statement had said only that the Japanese Ambassadors had been handed for their consideration a document that was the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks, and that it was unnecessary to repeat what had been said so often in the past that it rested on certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions (ex. 167). At Secretary Hull's press conference on the morning of November 27, he emphasized that from the beginning he had kept in mind that the groups in Japan led by the military leaders had a plan to conquer by force half of the earth with half its population; that this movement had started in earnest in 1937, and carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of conduct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of justice or fair play. The Secretary said that from the beginning, as the world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy, the United States had sought to keep 388 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK alive the basic philosophy and principles governing the opposing viewpoint in international relations, but that it was no easy under- taking. He then briefly reviewed the nature of the conversations he had had with the Japanese, commencing in the spring of 1941, to determine whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire Pacific area might not be possible. He said that while the conversations during the preceding several months had been purely exploratory, for the past 10 days or so all phases of the basic questions presented and of suggestions or ideas or methods of bringing Japan and the United States as close together as possible had been explored, on the theory there might thus be reached the beginning of some peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and other nations in the Pacific area, including the United States. He said that during the conversations it had been necessary to keep in mind not only the political situation in Japan but also the activities of the Japanese Army and Navy, and he cited the fact: "that we had known for some days * * * that the Japanese were pouring men and materials and boats and all kinds of equipment into Indo-China. * * * There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make attacks some-where there around Siam, any time within a few days (tr. 1156-1157)." He said that if the Japanese established themselves in Indochina in adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they would have a base not only for operations against China but the whole South Sea area. The Secretary said that the United States Government had exhausted all its efforts to work out phases of this matter with the Japanese; and that those efforts had been put forth to facilitate the making of a general agreement. On November 26, he continued, because he had found there was so much confusion and so many collateral manners brought in, while at the same time high Japanese officials in Tokyo continued to proclaim their old doctrine of force he had thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspective by restating the fundamental principles to which the United States was committed and at the same time show how those principles could be applied to a number of specific conditions which would logically be a part of a broad basic settlement in the entire Pacific area. When he was asked whether he expected the Japanese to come back and talk further on the basis of what he had given them on November 26, Secretary Hull replied that he did not know, but that the Japanese might not do that. In reply to a question whether it could be assumed there was not much hope that the Japanese would accept the principles to which he had referred and go far enough to afford a basis for continuing the conversations, the Secretary said there was always a possibility but that he would not say how much probability there might be. Secretary Hull's press conference took place at about 10 o'clock that morning. Both before and after it, at 9:17 and 11 o'clock, the Secretary talked with Secretary Stimson regarding the state of the negotiations; he also talked with Admiral Stark that morning (tr. 1167, 5547). Secretary Stimson's notes for that day (November 27) describe his two conversations with Secretary Hull: "A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and movement south by the Japanese of a large Expeditionary Force moving south from Shanghai and evidently headed towards Indo-China with a possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but prob- PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 389 ably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives. The first thing in the morning I call up Hull to find out what his finale has been with the Japanese whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told me now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox the Army and the Navy." I then called up the President. The President gave me a little different view. He said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards that this was not a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular position. "General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands and these planes can fly high over them, beyond the reach of their pursuit planes and take photographs. "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was glad to have time but I didn't want it at any cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show a weakness on our part. The main question has been over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi alert, or the first signal for an alert, and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert; namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally got it in shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull, I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was (tr. 14,421- 14,423)." Because of its relationship to events which followed, it is necessary here to refer briefly to the background of Secretary Stimson's observation in his notes that General Gerow and Admiral Stark desired "to seek for more time." It will be recalled that on November 5, in connection with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for British and American aid, General Marshall and Admiral Stark had concluded that "war between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance (ex. 16)." As has been seen, one of the major considerations in the modus vivendi proposal was the desire of the military and naval authorities "for more time." However, at the War Council meeting on November 25 attended by General Marshall and Admiral Stark, Secretary Hull stated that there was "practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan" (ex. 174, Item 13). The next day, at an Army-Navy Joint Board meeting, General Marshall and Admiral Stark directed the preparation of a memorandum to President Roosevelt regarding what steps should be taken if the negotiations with Japan should end without agreement. The meeting on November 27 described by Secretary Stimson in his notes for that day was also described in a memorandum for General Marshall prepared the same day by General Gerow: "2. Later in the morning I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark