390             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
 
directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to 
be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation 
to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He 
was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be 
shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.  
 
"3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of 
War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made 
(copy attached) (ex. 45)." 
 
In his prepared statement submitted to the Committee, Secretary Stimson 
stated that at the meeting with General Gerow and Admiral Stark,  
 
"I told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have time 
but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or 
of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on 
our part (tr. 14, 394)." 
 
General Marshall summed up his viewpoint and that of Secretary Stimson 
in his testimony before the committee:  
 
"He (Secretary Stimson) was very much afraid he feared that we would 
find ourselves involved in the developing situation where our 
disadvantages would be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when 
the Japanese actually broke peace.  
 
"He also felt very keenly that; and thought about this part a great deal 
more than I did because it was his particular phase of the matter, that 
we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature as to 
sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned about that.  
 
"My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistic. I 
was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did happen we 
would be better prepared than we were at that time, that particular 
time.  
 
"So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will 
say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure which 
allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would be in a 
hopeless situation before the peace was broken and mine, which as I say 
were much more materialistic, as I think they should have been, that we 
should get as much time as we could in order to make good the terrible 
deficiencies in our defensive arrangements (tr. 13,820-13,821)." 
 
The memorandum for President Roosevelt, although dated November 27 
(Washington time), was signed by General Marshall upon his return to 
Washington on November 28 (Washington time), with the minor changes 
suggested by Secretary Stimson, and was as follows:  
 
"Memorandum for the President  
 
"Subject: Far Eastern Situation.  
 
"If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: 
the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the 
Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces. 
 
"There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the 
Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent 
Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.  
 
"The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct 
attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat 
exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.  
 
"Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives 
involving less risk of major conflict than the others named, and clearly 
within the means available, if unopposed by major powers. Attack on the 
Burma Road would, however, be difficult and might fail. If successful, 
the Chinese Nationalist Government might collapse. Occupation of 
Thailand gains a limited strategic advantage as a preliminary to 
operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies; might relieve 
internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external economic 
pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road, 
Thailand, or the Philippines cannot now be forecast.  
 
"The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to 
gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to 
the  
 
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         391 
 
Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The 
process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate 
concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine 
Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 
are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is 
important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before 
hostilities commence.  
 
"Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long 
as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more 
positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval 
and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered 
and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. 
War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to 
Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.  
 
"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch 
military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military 
counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan 
attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the 
United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, 
or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100o east or 
south of 10o north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty 
Islands.  
 
"Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is 
advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of 
communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a 
Japanese advance to the west of 100o east or south of 10o north, 
immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent 
that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might 
lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.  
 
"It is recommended that:  
 
"prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military 
counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens 
United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;  
 
"*in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the 
United States, the British and the Dutch governments that advance beyond 
the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint 
military opposition be undertaken;*  
 
"*steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and 
Dutch for the issuance of such warning.* 
 
"[S] G. C. MARSHALL 
"[S] H. R. STARK (ex. 17)." 
 
Before the meeting at the White House at 2 p. M. On November 27 
(Washington time), Secretary Hull conferred briefly alone with President 
Roosevelt (ex. 58). When the two Japanese Ambassadors arrived, 
Ambassador Nomura seized the first opportunity to say that they were 
disappointed over the failure of any agreement for a modus vivendi. 
President Roosevelt expressed his grateful appreciation and that of the 
United States Government to the peace element in Japan which had worked 
hard in support of the movement for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific 
area, and made it clear that the United States was not overlooking what 
that element had done and was still ready to do. He added that most 
people in the United States wanted a peaceful solution of the Pacific 
problems, and that while he had not given up yet, the situation was 
serious and that fact should be recognized. He pointed out that the 
Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had had the effect of a cold 
bath on the people of the United States as well as on the United States 
Government, and intimated that a second such bath appeared to be in the 
offing. He said that throughout the conversations there had been no real 
indication of a desire for peace by any of Japan's leaders, and that 
this also had had its effect on the conversations. According to his 
memorandum of the meeting, Secretary Hull then  
 
"made it clear that unless the opposition to the peace element in 
control of the Government should make up its mind definitely to act and 
talk and move in a peaceful direction, no conversations could or would 
get anywhere as has been so  
 
392             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
 
clearly demonstrated; that everyone knows that the Japanese slogans of 
co-prosperity, new order in East Asia and a controlling influence in 
certain areas are all terms to express in a camouflaged manner the 
policy of force and conquest by Japan and the domination by military 
agencies of the political economic, social, and moral affairs of each of 
the populations conquered; and that so long as they move in that 
direction and continue to increase their cultural relations, military 
and otherwise with Hitler through such instruments as the Anti-Comintern 
Pact and the Tripartite Pact, et cetera, et cetera, there could not be 
any real progress made on a peaceful course (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 772)." 
 
During the conversation, Ambassador Kurusu suggested that the trouble 
was not with fundamentals so much as with their application. However, 
with reference to a recent remark of President Roosevelt about 
"introducing" Japan and China, when the Ambassador asked who would take 
such action and the President said "both sides" meaning Japan as well as 
China the Ambassador pointed out "that from a practical standpoint that 
would be very difficult to accomplish" (ex. 29, Vol. II, pp. 770-772).  
 
According to Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo, as the meeting ended, 
President Roosevelt told the Ambassadors that he was leaving the next 
day, Friday, for Warm Springs, Ga., for a rest and was planning to 
return the following Wednesday. He said that he would like to talk with 
the Ambassadors then and would be very gratified if some means of 
settlement could be discovered in the meantime (ex. 1, pp. 192-194). In 
addition to Ambassador Nomura's cabled report of the meeting, Ambassador 
Kurusu telephoned the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, using the voice 
code previously arranged, and said that in the conversation with the 
President "there wasn't much that was different from Hull's talks of 
yesterday." He asked how things were in Tokyo, and was told that a 
crisis appeared "imminent." The Ambassador reported that the United 
States wanted to continue the negotiations, but Bureau Chief Yamamoto 
said "we can't yield." The Ambassador concluded by saying that there was 
nothing of particular interest in the day's talk with President 
Roosevelt, except that the southward advance of Japanese troops was 
"having considerable effect" (ex. 1, pp. 188-191).  
 
The record shows that President Roosevelt had an appointment with 
Admiral Ernest J. King at 3:45 p. m. immediately after his conference 
with the two Japanese Ambassadors (ex. 58), and that at about 4:00 p. m. 
Secretary Stimson telephoned and talked with Secretary Hull (tr. 1167, 
5547). At 5:00 p. m. Secretary Hull telephoned Admiral Stark, but was 
unable to reach him and talked with Admiral Schuirmann instead (tr. 
5547).  
 
In addition to the conversations Secretary Hull had with officials of 
the United States Government on November 27 (Washington time), the 
Secretary and Under Secretary Welles also conferred that day with 
representatives of three of the governments that had been consulted in 
connection with the proposed modus vivendi. The Netherlands Minister 
called and handed Secretary Hull a memorandum of the same date in which 
the Netherlands Foreign Minister took the position that inasmuch as the 
modus vivendi proposal was only the beginning of negotiations, the 
military and economic concessions suggested therein as a start seemed to 
be "quite far reaching" and that it was "most unlikely" that Japan would 
at the present moment leave the Axis (ex. 18). The Australian Minister, 
Mr. Casey, also called on Secretary Hull and asked whether the  
 
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         393 
 
modus vivendi had been abandoned permanently. When Secretary Hull said 
he so considered it, Mr. Casey  
 
"expressed great concern and desired to know more about the movements of 
Chiang Kai-shek and others intended to discourage the further 
consideration of the modus vivendi. I referred to copies of British 
communications on the subject, adding that Ambassador Halifax was strong 
for the proposal all the way and that I sympathized with his situation 
but I did not feel that the communications from Churchill and Eden, with 
qualifications such as were in them, would be very helpful in a bitter 
fight that would be projected by Chiang Kai-shek and carried forward by 
all of the malcontents in the United States, although I felt 
unreservedly that Churchill and Eden, like the British Ambassador here, 
would be for whatever we might do, even though not entirely to their 
liking in every way. The Minister inquired whether I thought it would be 
feasible to take up this matter further with the Chinese, and I replied 
that I did not think so, so far as I am concerned. I thanked the 
Minister for his cooperation and that of his Government (ex. 18)." 
 
Also that morning the British Ambassador "urgently" called on Under 
Secretary Welles. The Under Secretary's memorandum of their conversation 
noted that Lord Halifax said that Secretary Hull had telephoned him the 
previous evening and told him the nature of the United States' reply to 
Japan, and continued:  
 
"The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear in his own mind as to 
the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese 
Government with a document other than the modus vivendi document which 
had so recently been under discussion.  
 
"I said that Secretary Hull had requested me to say to the Ambassador in 
this regard that one of the reasons for the determination reached was 
the half-hearted support given by the British Government to the earlier 
proposal which had been under discussion and the raising of repeated 
questions by the British Government in regard thereto.  
 
"Lord Halifax said he could not understand this inasmuch as he had 
communicated to Secretary Hull the full support of the British 
Government.  
 
"To that I replied that the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the 
President yesterday could hardly be regarded as "full support," but on 
the contrary, very grave questioning of the course then proposed.  
 
"Lord Halifax said that this message had been intended merely to express 
the objections on the part of the Chinese Government. He went on to say 
that he himself had been surprised by the vigor of the Chinese 
objections and that he had, in fact, stated to the Chinese Ambassador 
that in view of the fact that only ten days ago General Chiang Kai-shek 
was imploring the British and the United States Government to prevent 
the closing of the Burma Road, it would seem to him, Lord Halifax, that 
the course proposed by Secretary Hull gave positive assurances to the 
Chinese Government that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the 
modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated. He said that he 
felt that the attitude taken by the Chinese Government was based partly 
on faulty information and partly on the almost hysterical reaction 
because of the fear that any kind of an agreement reached between Japan 
and the United States at this time would result in a complete breakdown 
of Chinese morale. 
 
"I told Lord Halifax that information received this morning tended to 
show that Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already 
very active and that Japanese forces there were being quickly increased 
in number. I said these reports likewise indicated that the threat 
against Thailand was imminent. I said, in conclusion, that it was 
evident from the information received here that the Japanese were 
preparing to move immediately on a very large scale. The gravity of the 
situation, I thought, could not be exaggerated (ex. 18)." 
 
While on November 27 (Washington time) both Secretary Hull and Under 
Secretary Welles thus believed the situation could not be more serious, 
the record before the Committee indicates that the political adviser to 
the Secretary, Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, was less concerned. In a 
memorandum of that date entitled "Problem of Far Eastern relations 
Estimate of Situation and certain probabilities," Dr.  
 
394           PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
 
Hornbeck expressed the opinion that he did not believe the United States 
was "on the immediate verge of 'war' in the Pacific." He stated that in 
his opinion there was less reason on November 27 than there was a week 
before for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make war on 
the United States. "Were it a matter of placing bets," he wrote, "the 
undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and 
Japan will *not* be at 'war' on or before Decem-15 [sic]." (Tr. 5523-
5537). [Italics in original.]  
 
Apart from the remark of Bureau Chief Yamamoto during his telephone 
conversation with Ambassador Kurusu the evening of November 26 
(Washington time), when Yamamoto told the Ambassador that he had 
expected that the United States would not yield to the demands made by 
the Japanese Government in its note of November 20, and Yamamoto's 
remark the next day in his telephone conversation with the Ambassador 
that Japan "can't yield," there is no evidence before the Committee that 
the Japanese Foreign Office furnished the two Japanese Ambassadors any 
official comment or instructions as to their next step until November 28 
(Japan time). That day Foreign Minister Togo cabled the following 
instructions:  
 
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite 
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating 
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. *The 
Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations.* 
Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this 
American proposal which l will send you in two or three days, the 
negotiations *will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I 
do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken 
off.* Merely say to them that you awaiting instructions and that, 
although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to 
your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just 
claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the 
Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and 
conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States 
has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish 
negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man 
you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present 
circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. [1] From now on 
do the best you can (ex. 1, p. 195)." 
 
This message, in the above form, was available in Washington on November 
28 (Washington time) (ex. 1, p. 195), whether before or after the War 
Council meeting that day is not known definitely, although, as noted 
below, there is some indication that it was not available until 
afterward.  
 
The War Council met at noon at the White House, with President 
Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary 
of the Navy Knox, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark present. 
Secretary Hull repeated the comments he had made 3 days before, at the 
War Council meeting on November 25, emphasizing again that there was 
"practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan," 
that the Japanese were likely "to break out at any time with new acts of 
conquest," employing the element of surprise as "a central point in 
their strategy," and that the "safeguarding of our national security was 
in the hands of the Army and the Navy" (Tr. 1203). Earlier that day 
Secretary Stimson had received from the Military Intelligence Division 
(G-2) a summary of the available information regarding Japanese military 
and naval move- 
 
[1] This has reference to the suggestion made by the two Ambassadors on 
November 26 (Washington time) that they be permitted to propose to 
Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt send a personal message to 
Foreign Minister Togo (ex. 1, p. 180).  
 
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            395 
 
ments in the Far East, and had taken it to President Roosevelt and 
suggested that he read it before the War Council meeting, which the 
President had called. In his notes of the meeting, Secretary Stimson 
said:  
 
"When we got back there at 12:00 o'clock he had read the paper that I 
had left with him. The main point of the paper was a study of what the 
Expeditionary Force, which we know has left Shanghai and is headed 
South, is going to do. G-2 pointed out that it might develop into an 
attack on the Philippines or a landing of further troops in Indo-China, 
or an attack on Thailand or an attack on the Dutch Netherlands, or on 
Singapore. After the President had read these aloud, he pointed out that 
there was one more. It might, by attacking the Kra Isthmus, develop into 
an attack on Rangoon, which lies only a short distance beyond the Kra 
Isthmus and the taking of which by the Japanese would effectually stop 
the Burma Road at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good 
suggestion on his part and a very likely one. It was the consensus that 
the present move that there was an Expeditionary Force on the sea of 
about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere completely 
changing the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could 
address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already 
had on land in Indo-China. It was now the opinion of everyone that if 
this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-
China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or 
further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, 
Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. 
It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we 
discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into 
the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if 
the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that 
if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indo-
China, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of 
going. 
 
"It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the 
Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't 
think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the 
other, which we didn't think we could do; that the only thing for us to 
do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a 
certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The 
President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram from 
himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good results at 
the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this did not seem 
to me to be the right thing now and I pointed them out to the President. 
In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be 
couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One does not warn 
an Emperor. In the second place it would not indicate to the people of 
the United States what the real nature of the danger was. Consequently I 
said there ought to be a message by the President to the people of the 
United States and I thought that the best form of a message would be an 
address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have 
to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this ides of a 
message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of his 
letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not 
publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way; that he had better send 
his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, and 
then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more 
understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was the 
final decision at that time and the President asked Hull and Knox and 
myself to try to draft such papers (tr. 14,424-14,426)." 
 
Shortly after the meeting ended, President Roosevelt left for Warm 
Springs, Ga., telling reporters that the Japanese situation might 
require his return at any time. [1] 
 
Also on November 28, the Netherlands Minister called on Secretary Hull 
to inquire what reactions the Secretary had had from the Japanese 
situation. The Secretary recorded that he handed the Minister   
 
"three cables from Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina 
area indicating that tens of thousands of Japanese troops with 
equipment, vessels, trans- 
 
[1] Earlier that day he had informed the press that American merchant 
vessels sailing the Pacific would not be armed "under existing 
circumstances." When asked how long he expected the existing 
circumstances to prevail, the President had replied that that question 
"should be asked In Tokyo" (Washington Post, November 29, 1941).  
 
396             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
 
ports, et cetera, were proceeding to that area from the north. He 
examined the cables carefully and appeared much disturbed about the 
Japanese troop movements. The Minister stated that this presented a very 
serious situation.  
 
The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally 
in connection with the proposed modus vivendi arrangement which I 
abandoned on Tuesday evening. November twenty-fifth. Or practically 
abandoned when the Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true 
facts or waiting to ascertain them. I said that I had determined early 
Wednesday morning, November twenty-sixth, to present to the Japanese 
later ill the day the document containing a proposed draft of an 
agreement which set forth all of the basic principles for which this 
Government stands and has stood for, for many years. Especially 
including the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. I 
reminded the Minister that the central point in our plan w-as the 
continuance of the conversations with Japan looking toward the working 
out of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settlement in the 
Pacific area and that the so-called modus vivendi was really a part and 
parcel of these conversations and their objectives intended to 
facilitate and keep them alive and that, of course, there was nothing 
that in any way could be construed as a departure from the basic 
principles which were intended to go into the general peace agreement. 
The Minister said he understood the situation (tr. 4475-4476)." 
 
The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called on Dr. Hornbeck that 
day to inquire whether the Japanese-American negotiations had in fact 
"broken down" as, he said, was stated in a message the British armed 
authorities had received from the United States armed authorities. [2] 
Dr. Hornbeck told the Minister that so far as he was aware neither 
Government had "declared or indicated" that the negotiations were 
terminated, but that he was not in a position to confirm or deny the 
statement referred to by the Minister (ex. 18). At 7 o'clock that 
evening the State Department sent a telegram to Ambassador Gauss in 
Chungking which summarized the Japanese demands of November 20 and the 
terms of the proposed modus vivendi. The telegram briefly reviewed the 
circumstances which led to the decision to withhold the modus vivendi 
from the United States reply of November 26, concerning which Ambassador 
Gauss had been previously informed, describing in some detail for the 
Ambassador's information the position regarding the modus vivendi taken 
by the Chinese Government (ex. 18).  
 
According to Secretary Stimson, the rest of the week-end after the war 
council meeting on Friday "was largely taken up with preparing a 
suggested draft of a message for the President to deliver to Congress" 
(Tr. 14403). The record before the Committee shows that Friday afternoon 
Admiral Stark called Secretary Hull on the White House telephone at 2:49 
o'clock and talked with one of the officials of the State Department's 
Far Eastern Division, and that at 5:25 o'clock Secretary Stimson called 
Secretary Hull and talked with Dr. Hornbeck (Tr. 5548). The next day, 
Saturday, November 29 (Washington time), Secretary Stimson and Secretary 
Knox sent to Secretary Hull suggested drafts, which they had prepared, 
of the proposed message to Congress decided upon the day before (ex. 
161). In an attached note in his handwriting, Secretary Stimson 
described his suggestions as a "memo which may be helpful as to certain 
portions of the message to the Congress." Secretary Knox also forwarded 
a copy of his suggestions to President Roosevelt en route to Warm 
Springs, with an accompanying letter in which he said that he had had 
the assistance of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in preparing the 
summation of the military situation contained in his draft. He told the 
President:  
 
[2] The message referred to appears to have been the Navy "war warning" 
dispatch of November 27 (Washington time) to Admiral Hart and Admiral 
Kimmel, which was sent to the United States Naval Observer in London 
with instructions to "inform British" (ex. 37).  
 
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              397 
 
"The news this morning indicates the Japs are going to deliberately 
stall for two or three days, so unless this picture changes, I am 
extremely hopeful that you will get a two or three day respite down 
there and will come back feeling very fit (ex. 161)." 
 
It seems probable that Secretary Knox's information that the Japs were 
stalling "for two or three days" was based on Foreign Minister Togo's 
message quoted above, in which the Foreign Minister told Ambassador 
Nomura that with a report of his Government's views on the United 
States' reply of November 26 "which I will send you in two or three 
days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured" (ex. 1, p. 195). While 
this is not conclusive as to whether or not that message was available 
before the War Council meeting on November 28 (Washington time), it does 
indicate that, although the message was translated by the Navy on 
November 28 it was not seen by Secretary Knox until "this morning", i. 
e., November 29 (Washington time).  
 
The suggestions sent by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox to 
Secretary Hull were combined in a single draft (ex. 161-A), which then 
underwent extensive revision and modification. The revised draft was 
ready by noon the same day, Saturday, November 29 (Washington time), 
according to a handwritten note accompanying a copy of it which Dr. 
Hornbeck sent to Secretary Stimson the next day (ex. 161-A). It was 
accompanied by a draft of a proposed message to Emperor Hirohito and by 
the following memorandum for President Roosevelt dated November 29 
(Washington time):  
 
"MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 
 
"There is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress to which 
draft the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War made material 
contributions, and the officers of the Department made further 
contributions, which together comprise the draft of proposed message.  
 
"In order to get this to you today it has not been possible carefully to 
go over this draft a second time. In fact, I myself have not had time to 
read it at all critically, but expect to do so over the week end and 
give you the benefit of any further comment or suggestions.  
 
"I also enclose a draft by the Far Eastern officials of a possible 
message from you to the Emperor of Japan. My personal view continues as 
on yesterday to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy, except 
for the purpose of making a record. It might even cause such 
complications as Col. Stimson and I referred to on yesterday. 
 
"If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to 
defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the 
Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we agree that 
you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our 
relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached.  
 
"I think you will desire to have any message to the Emperor dispatched 
in code to Ambassador Grew for communication by him to the Emperor 
through appropriate channels (ex. 19)." 
 
The draft of a message to Emperor Hirohito was brief. In it, after 
referring to the long period of unbroken peace between the United States 
and Japan, the President was to state that he was addressing the Emperor 
"because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in 
formation." He was then to continue:  
 
"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to 
deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence 
of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain 
tragic possibilities.  
 
"The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which 
your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by their 
enlightened decisions  
 
398                     PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
 
and acts, arrested trends and directed national policies along new and 
better courses thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both 
countries and to the peoples of other lands.  
 
"Feeling deeply concerned over the present trend of events, I address 
myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your 
Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark 
clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of 
restoring and maintaining the traditional state of amity wherein both 
our people may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the 
Pacific area (ex. 19)." 
 
The draft of the proposed message to Congress was longer, a document of 
some twenty typewritten pages (ex. 19). It will be remembered that the 
War Council had decided on November 28 that the message was to be a 
message "to the people of the. United States" as well as "an address to 
Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the 
danger happened" (tr. 14426). If the President should send the message 
to Emperor Hirohito, that, the War Council had decided, was to be "one 
thing and a secret thing," as a message to an Emperor could not be 
publicized as a message to Congress could, and the President was to make 
his speech to Congress "as a separate and more understandable thing to 
the people of the United States" (tr. 14426). The proposed message began 
with these words:  
 
"GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: I come before you to report to you on 
serious danger which is threatening this country and its interests in 
the Far East. Relations between the United States and the Japanese 
Empire have reached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to lay 
before you the essential facts of the situation and their extremely 
serious implications (ex. 19)." 
 
It then briefly reviewed the development of American foreign policy in 
the Far East since 1833, discussing American relations with China, the 
acquisition by the United States of sovereignty over the Philippines 
with its attendant responsibilities, and the relations between the 
United States and Japan since 1908, including a brief discussion of the 
Nine Power Treaty of 1921. It considered the policy of aggression 
followed by the Japanese first in Manchuria commencing in 1931 and then 
in China, during the course of which American lives and property had 
been imperiled and damaged in disregard for American rights under 
existing treaties.  
 
The proposed message then took up the relationship of Japan to Germany 
and Italy in their scheme of world-wide conquest. It pointed out that in 
flat defiance of its covenants Japan had invaded and sought to overthrow 
the Government of China and that step by step the Japanese armed forces, 
passing through the China Sea in the immediate proximity of the 
Philippine Islands, had invaded and taken possession of French Indo-
China. It continued:  
 
"Today they are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into 
the territory of Thailand. That step, if taken, would place them where 
they would directly menace, to the North, the Burma Road, China's 
lifeline, and, to the South, the port and Straits of Singapore through 
which gateway runs the commerce of the world, including our own, between 
the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.  
 
"To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan has extended her threatening 
activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation 
of the mandate under which she received the custody of those islands, 
she has been secretly establishing naval and air bases and 
fortifications directly on the line between the United States and the 
Philippines.  
 
"By these steps Japan has enveloped with threatening forces the western, 
northern, and eastern approaches to the Philippines. Should this process 
go further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace vital 
interests of the United States.  
 
*               *                 *              *              * 
 
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            399 
 
This situation, precipitated solely by Japanese aggression, holds 
unmistakable threats to our interests, especially our interest in peace 
and in peaceful trade, and to our responsibility for the security of the 
Philippine Archipelago. The successful defense of the United States, in 
a military sense. Is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we 
import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit 
Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies 
of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in a manner 
and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go 
practical Japanese control of the Pacific.  
 
Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted and 
considerations of justice, humanity, and fair dealing are restored, we 
will witness in that region of the world precisely what has already 
transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler 
seeks dominion by ruthless force (ex. 19).  
 
It was then pointed out that throughout the period in which Japan had 
been making it clear that this was her program, the Government of the 
United States had endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that 
Japan's best interests lay in maintaining and cultivating friendly 
relations with the United States and other countries that believe in 
orderly and peaceful processes. Reference was made to the 8 months of 
conversations with the Japanese which had been carried on by the 
Secretary of State and the President for the purpose of arriving, if 
possible, at some understanding agreeable to both Governments, and the 
principles for which the United States had stood, as set forth in the 
United States note of November 26 to Japan, were summarized. It was 
stated that in this effort the United States Government had had the 
agreement and support of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, 
the Netherlands, and China. Every effort had been made, it was said, 
toward reaching a fair and workable agreement, and to commit Japan to 
practices in line with the principles advocated by the United States.  
 
These efforts, the proposed message continued, had failed, and Japan had 
refused to change her position or her practices, an(l relations between 
the two nations were threatened with rupture. The supreme question 
presented to the United States, it was said, was the question of self-
defense; the immediate question was whether the United States would, or 
would not, stand by while Japan went forward with a program of conquest. 
The effects of that program of conquest, if successful, on China and the 
Philippines were then described, and it was said that   
 
If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon, and 
were to succeed in conquering, the regions which they are menacing in 
the southwestern Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies 
and Malaya would be at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imports 
from those regions are of vital importance to us. We need those imports 
in time of peace. With the spirit of exploitation and destruction of 
commerce which prevails among the partners in the Axis Alliance, and 
with our needs what they are now in this period of emergency, an 
interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic (ex. 19).  
 
The proposed message then concluded by stating that the United States 
did not want war with Japan, but that if war should come, the fault and 
responsibility would be those of Japan, and that the primary cause would 
have been the pursuit by Japan of a policy of aggression. The policy of 
the United States and its relation with Japan should not be influenced 
by fear of what attacks, acting unlawfully and with resort to force, 
Japan might make upon the United States   
 
but by determination on our part to give the utmost support of which we 
are reasonably capable to the fundamental principles of order and 
security and