410             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Imperial Government, now stand ruptured broken. (I am sending you an 
outline of developments in separate message #986.) In the face of this, 
our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will 
Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and 
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a 
summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the 
United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that 
they are planning to move military forces into various places in East 
Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. 
*Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may 
suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through 
some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war 
may come quicker than anyone dreams.*

*         *        *       *       *       *

"4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you 
about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified 
our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that 
by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure 
against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England 
and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to 
turn upon her with all our might; however right now, it is to our 
advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to 
refrain from any direct moves in the north. 

"5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must 
under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes 
without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and 
Italians how important secrecy is. 

"6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this 
to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier 
Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano. As soon as a date is set far a 
conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know. 

"Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the 
separate message (ex. 1, pp. 204-205)."

In the separate message (#986) referred to above, Foreign Minister Togo 
reviewed the course of the Japanese-American negotiations for Ambassador 
Oshima's benefit. He stated that during the 6 months of negotiations 

"the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tripartite Alliance as 
the cornerstone of the international policy regardless of the 
vicissitudes of the international situation, and that Japan had based 
her hopes for a solution between Japan and the United States definitely 
within the scope of that Alliance (ex. 1, p. 205)."

The Foreign Minister said that the American and Japanese views on the 
question of the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and French 
Indochina "were completely in opposition to each other." He said that 
the United States had taken the position that as long as the Imperial 
Government of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy there could 
be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United 
States, and that the United States had begun to demonstrate a tendency 
to demand the divorce of the Japanese Government from the Tripartite 
Alliance. "That is to say," the Foreign Minister continued, 

"it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial 
Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. 
It became clear, too, that a continuance of negotiations would 
inevitably be detrimental to our cause. 

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this 
attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting 
clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into 
with the third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing 
upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in 
the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that 
in ease the United States enters the European war at any time the 
Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and 
Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes 
it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for 
negotiations. What is 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         411

more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred 
with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China they did 80 
repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in 
collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan along with 
Germany and Italy, as an enemy (ex. 1, p. 206)."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT RETURNS TO WASHINGTON AS THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION 
MOVES RAPIDLY TOWARD A CLIMAX

(December 1, 1941)

When the two Japanese Ambassadors called on Secretary Hull on Monday 
morning, December 1 (Washington time), it was their first conference 
with the Secretary since their meeting with him and President Roosevelt 
5 days before. Ambassador Nomura's description of their arrival at the 
State Department shows that many assumed the Ambassadors had requested 
the meeting with the Secretary to present the Japanese Government's 
reply to the American note of November 26. Ambassador Nomura reported to 
Tokyo: 

"Upon our arrival at the State Department we found not only 
newspapermen, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding 
the corridors. Some of these spectators were of the opinion that the 
issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, 
the scene was highly dramatic (ex. 1, p. 210)."

At the start of the conference Ambassador Kurusu asked the reason for 
President Roosevelt's sudden return to Washington, and Secretary Hull 
indicated that one of the reasons was the recent "loud talk" of the 
Japanese Premier. The Ambassador endeavored to minimize the Premier's 
recent speech and stated, in accordance with the instructions he had 
received from Tokyo, that the American note of November 26 had been 
communicated to his Government and that within a few days the Japanese 
Government's observations concerning it would be presented to the 
Secretary. He said that his Government believed its proposals of 
November 20 to be equitable, and had found it difficult to understand 
the position taken by the United States Government. He had been 
directed, he said, to inquire what was the ultimate aim of the United 
States in the conversations and to request the United States Government 
to make "deep reflection of this matter." He said that the Japanese 
offer to withdraw its troops from southern French Indo-China still stood 
(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 772-774)

Secretary Hull replied that the United States Government had to take 
into account the "bellicose utterances emanating from Tokyo" and that 
there never would be possible any peaceful arrangements if such 
arrangements had to be based upon principles of force. Later, the 
Secretary called attention to reports received from the press and other 
sources  

"of heavy Japanese troop movements into Indochina and endeavored to make 
it clear that, when a large Japanese army is anywhere in Indochina, we 
have to give that situation all the more attention when Japanese 
statesmen say that they will drive us out of east Asia. He pointed out 
that we cannot be sure what the Japanese military leaders are likely to 
do, that we do not know where the Japanese Army intends to land its 
forces, and that for this reason we cannot sit still but will have to 
puzzle these things out in some way. The Secretary explained that this 
situation had been very painful to him and he did not know whether the 
Ambassador could do anything in the matter of influencing the Japanese 
Government. Mr. Kurusu said that he felt it was a shame that nothing 
should come 

412             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

out of the efforts which the conversations of several months had 
represented. He said he felt that the two sides had once been near an 
agreement except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals 
seem to carry the two sides further away than before. 

"The Secretary pointed out that every time we get started in the 
direction of progress the Japanese military does something to overturn 
us. The Secretary expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead 
in view of all the threats that had been made. He pointed out that the 
acts of the Japanese militarists had effectively tied the hands of the 
Ambassadors and he did not know whether the Ambassadors could succeed in 
having anything accomplished toward untying their hands. Mr. Kurusu 
brought up again his contention made on previous occasions that China 
had taken advantage of the Washington Conference treaties to flaunt 
Japan, and commented that if we don't look out China will sell both the 
United States and Japan down the river. The Secretary observed that he 
has been plowing through various contradictions in Japanese acts and 
utterances. He pointed out that the Japanese had been telling us that if 
something quick is not done something awful was about to happen; that 
they kept urging upon the Secretary the danger of delay, and kept 
pressing the Secretary to do something. He said that in view of all the 
confusion, threats and pressure, he had been brought to the stage where 
he felt that something must be done to clear the foggy atmosphere; that 
his conclusion was that he must bring us back to fundamentals, and that 
these fundamentals were embodied in the proposal which we had offered 
the Japanese on November 26. He said that we have stood from the first 
on the points involved in this proposal. He pointed out that everything 
that Japan was doing and saying was in precisely the opposite direction 
from the course we have been talking about in our conversations, and 
that these should be reversed by his government before we can further 
seriously talk peace (vol. II, pp. 775-776)."

The Secretary asked what possibility there was of peace-minded people 
coming out in Japan and expressing themselves, whether anybody in Japan 
would be free to speak unless he preached conquest. When the Ambassador 
commented that the Japanese People were not talking about conquest, 
Secretary Hull pointed out that everyone in America understood the 
implications of such terms as "New Order in East Asia" and "Co-
prosperity sphere". The Secretary went on to say: 

"that there was no reason for conflict between the United States and 
Japan, that there was no real clash of interests. He added that Japan 
does not have to use a sword to gain for herself a seat at the head of 
the table. He pointed out that equality of opportunity is in our opinion 
the key to the future peace and prosperity of all nations (ex. 29, vol. 
II, pp. 776-777)."

When Ambassador Kurusu, after remarking that war in the Pacific would be 
a tragedy, added that the Japanese people believed that the United 
States wanted to keep Japan fighting China, and to keep Japan strangled, 
and that they believed they were faced with the alternative of 
surrendering to the United States or fighting, Secretary Hull said that 
he had practically exhausted himself here, that the American people were 
going to assume that there was real danger to this country in the 
situation, and that there was nothing he could do to prevent it (ex. 29, 
vol. 2, p. 777). 

Ambassador Nomura reported to Foreign Minister Togo that during the 
conference Secretary Hull had emphasized: 

"The tone and trend of the 'Japanese Government's expressions and 
movements and that of the general public opinion organs, and the 
increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China (ex. 1, p. 
210)."

He reported that from the beginning of the conference the Secretary had 
worn "a deeply pained expression," but that during the course of their 
explanations the Secretary "showed visible signs of relief (ex. 1, p. 
210). 

President Roosevelt reached Washington from Warm Springs shortly before 
noon on Monday, December 1, and went directly to

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         413

the White House for his conference with Secretary Hull and Admiral 
Stark. [1] It will be recalled that in Secretary Hull's memorandum of 
his conversation with the British Ambassador the day before, the 
Secretary stated that he laid before President Roosevelt on Monday " all 
phases" of the matters he discussed with the British Ambassador, which 
had included the Ambassador's inquiry as to "what the United States 
would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to 
establish a base on the Kra Isthmus", and that "the President agreed to 
notify and see the Ambassador later with respect to his inquiry" (ex. 
21). Clearly, a further subject discussed at the White House conference 
was Secretary Hull's conversation that morning with the Japanese 
Ambassadors. It would also seem probable that at the conference the 
other events mentioned above that had occurred after the President's 
departure the preceding Friday were discussed. These included Secretary 
Hull's revised draft of the proposed message to Congress and the 
accompanying draft of a message to Hirohito; the significance of Premier 
Tojo's speech; the information received from the British Ambassador 
concerning a possible Japanese move into Thailand, which appeared to be 
confirmed that day by the intercepted Japanese message revealing the 
intrigues of the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand; Prime Minister 
Churchill's plea for similar or joint declarations by the United States 
and Great Britain that "any further act of aggression" would "lead 
immediately to the gravest consequence," at whatever moment the 
President should judge right "which may be very near"; and the 
intercepted Japanese messages showing that the Japanese Government was 
only making a pretense of continuing the conversations. In addition, the 
President, Secretary Hull, and Admiral Stark must be assumed to have 
seen either before or after the White House conference the exchange of 
messages between the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo and the Japanese 
Ambassador in Berlin showing the strong German pressure on Japan to make 
war on Great Britain and the United States and the Japanese reply that 
"*war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan * 
* * quicker than anyone dreams*." 

There is no evidence before the Committee of any meeting between 
President Roosevelt and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, during the 
period December 1-7 (Washington time), and no reference to such a 
meeting has been found in newspaper accounts of President Roosevelt's 
activities that week. However, the Washington Post reported on December 
2 that after the President's conference on December 1 with Secretary 
Hull and Admiral Stark, the President had a luncheon conference with Mr. 
Harry Hopkins, who had been driven to the White House from the Naval 
Hospital for that purpose, returning to the Naval Hospital after the 
conference; that thereafter 

[1] The next day referring to this meeting the Washington Post reported: 

"President Roosevelt yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and 
military moves relating to Japan as the lights of peace flickered low in 
the Orient and Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador told reporters 
that 'there must be wise statesmanship to save the situation.' 

"It was in a tense atmosphere that the President reached the White House 
from Warm Springs shortly before noon to receive a report from Secretary 
of State Hull on his conversation yesterday morning with official 
Japanese representatives and to confer with diplomatic, naval and 
personal advisers. 

"Washington reports indicate that Japan is massing troops in southern 
Indochina for a possible military move into Thailand which an 
authoritative statement made here last week indicated the United States 
could not tolerate. In Manila the leaves of United States naval and 
military forces have been canceled and London reports said military and 
air forces are being mobilized in the Netherlands East Indies 
(Washington Post December 2, 1941)."

414             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the President called Under Secretary Welles to the White House for a 
brief conference, after which the Under Secretary "on orders" conferred 
briefly with Lord Halifax; and that after the latter conference Sir. 
Welles returned to the White House for a further conference with the 
President that lasted an hour and a half. The record before the 
Committee does not show what matters were discussed at the conference 
between Under Secretary Welles and the British Ambassador. [1]

In the absence of other evidence concerning the subjects discussed at 
the White House conference that noon, the evidence before the Committee 
of action taken that evening and the next morning at the direction of 
President Roosevelt is important. Just before midnight that day, 
December 1 (Washington time), the Navy Department sent the following 
dispatch, marked priority, to Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief of the 
United States Asiatic Fleet: 

"President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and 
within two days if possible after receipt this dispatch. Charter 3 small 
vessels to form a "defensive information patrol."  Minimum requirements 
to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer 
and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews 
may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose 
which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China 
Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue, 
one vessel off the Indo-China coast between, Camranh Bay and Cape St. 
Jaques and one vessel off Pointe De Camau. Use of ISABEL authorized by 
President as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report 
measures taken to carry out President's views. At the same time inform 
me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at 
sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines 
and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures (ex. 
37)."

In Tokyo on December 1 (Japan time) the Japanese Cabinet met at the 
official residence of Premier Tojo. Domei, the authoritative Japanese 
news agency, issued a report stating that at the meeting the Japanese 
Cabinet had decided to continue negotiations with the United States, 
despite the divergence of views of the two Governments. In a telegram to 
Secretary Hull received the evening of December 1 (Washington time), 
Ambassador Grew reported that  

"Tonight s newspapers reported that the Cabinet at its meeting today, 
while realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of 
the two countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington 
conversations (ex. 25)."

As already noted, Ambassador Grew testified before the Committee that 
although he knew that the Cabinet meeting took place, he "did not (know) 
and could not have guessed" that the Cabinet had discussed the attack on 
Pearl Harbor (tr. 1615). 

[1] The record before the Committee does, however, contain the 
following: On December 6, 1941, Captain John Creighton, the United 
States Naval Attache at Singapore, sent a message to Admiral Hart, 
commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, at Manila which stated, among 
other things, that Brooke Popham (the British commander in chief at 
Singapore) received Saturday from War Department London quote: 'We have 
now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: 1. 
We are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of 
Kra or take action in reply to Nips Invasion any other part of Siam * * 
*.' " (tr. 13520-13521) Captain Creighton testified before the Committee 
that he did not know or recall who it was that gave him the information 
upon which this message was based, or where that person had obtained the 
information, and that it was really nothing more than rumor (tr. 13530). 
Upon receipt of this message, Admiral Hart, on December 6, 1941, sent 
the following message to Admiral Stark in Washington: "Learn from 
Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four 
eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you." 
(Ex. 40) Admiral (now Senator) Hart testified that he never received a 
reply to his message (tr. 12850-12851). In this connection see also the 
discussion infra of the second message received by the State Department 
on December 6 (Washington time) from Ambassador Winant in London 
regarding the two Japanese naval convoys moving toward the Kra Isthmus 
in which Ambassador Winant said. Among other things: "British feel 
pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand, fearing 
Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before 
British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out 
President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax" (ex. 21) 
and Under Secretary Welles testimony before the Committee in connection 
therewith. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            415

However, it is now known that at this meeting the Japanese Cabinet gave 
its formal approval to the commencement of hostilities against the 
United States, and that immediately thereafter an Imperial Naval Order 
was issued on instructions from the Imperial General Headquarters: 

"Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, 
has reached a position to declare war on the United States of America 
(tr. 438)."

By that time, the Japanese naval striking force which had left its 
rendezvous in northern Japan on November 25 (Washington time) had 
steamed nearly half the distance to Pearl Harbor. 

In Washington, however, Ambassador Nomura that day cabled the Foreign 
Minister there were indications that the United States desired to 
continue the negotiations "even if it is necessary to go beyond their 
stands on the so-called basic principles" (ex. 1, p. 213). 

He continued: 

"If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a 
leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a 
conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence 
(for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States 
and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the 
President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting 
could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and 
navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one 
final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their 
discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

"We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to 
war or peace (ex. 1, p. 213)"

It seems doubtful that Ambassador Nomura would have sent this message, 
if in fact he knew that that day the Tojo Cabinet had formally approved 
the commencement of hostilities against the United States. The Foreign 
Minister's message in reply to the Ambassador's suggestion, which was 
translated and available in Washington on December 3 (Washington time), 
avoided any reference to the Cabinet's action: 

"As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a 
meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but 
the proposals failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be 
inappropriate for us to propose such a meeting again at this time. 
Please be advised of this decision (ex. 1, p. 224)."

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ASKS THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO EXPLAIN ITS PURPOSE 
IN MOVING ADDITIONAL TROOPS INTO SOUTHERN INDO-CHINA

(December 2, 1941)

The next day, Tuesday, December 2 (Washington time), the two Japanese 
Ambassadors called on Under Secretary Welles at the latter's request, 
Secretary Hull being ill and absent from the State Department. Under 
Secretary Welles told the Ambassadors that he had been asked by 
President Roosevelt to communicate to them the following, which he then 
read and handed to Ambassador Nomura: 

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese 
troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very 
rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by 
Japan in Indochina. 

"It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement and 
there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement between 
Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of 
Japanese forces per-

416             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

mitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was 
very considerably less than the total amount of the forces already 
there. 

"The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would 
seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of 
further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly be 
required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could 
conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands 
of the East Indies; against Burma, against Malaya or either through 
coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of 
undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of 
course, be additional to the acts of aggression already undertaken 
against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been 
repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government. 

"Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador 
Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual 
reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is 
the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and 
rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in 
the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German 
Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon 
the territory and rights of free and independent peoples through the 
utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that 
reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I 
should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government (vol. II, 
p. 779)."

Ambassador Kurusu said that he was not informed by the Japanese 
Government of its intentions but that he would communicate the foregoing 
statement immediately to his Government. Then followed an inconclusive 
discussion of the general situation, during which Under Secretary Welles 
pointed out that the settlement which the United States was offering 
Japan in the United States note of November 26 (Washington time) was one 
which would assure Japan of peace and the satisfaction of Japanese 
economic needs much more certainly than any other alternative which 
Japan might feel was open to her. Ambassador Kurusu said that in view of 
the actual situation in the Far East there were points in the United 
States proposal of November 26 which the Japanese Government would find 
it difficult to accept. When asked by Under Secretary Welles whether a 
reply to the American proposal would be received from the Japanese 
Government, Ambassador Nomura answered in the affirmative, but said that 
it might take a few days in view of the important questions which it 
raised for the Japanese Government (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 778-781). 

In his report of this conversation to Foreign Minister Togo, Ambassador 
Nomura said: 

"Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my 
conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is 
anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am 
convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. 
Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of 
our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233 
(ex. 1, pp. 222-223)."

Soon after his meeting with the two Japanese Ambassadors, Under 
Secretary Welles attended a meeting at noon at the White House at which, 
in addition to President Roosevelt and Mr. Welles, only Secretary 
Stimson and Secretary Knox were present. Secretary Stimson described the 
meeting in his notes as follows: 

"I left for the White House conference at 12:00 o'clock and there were 
present there just Knox, Sumner Welles and myself, as Hull is laid up 
with a cold. The President went step by step over the situation and I 
think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has asked the Japanese 
through Sumner Welles what they intend by this new occupation of 
southern Indo-China just what they are going to do and has demanded a 
quick reply. The President is still deliberating the possibility of a 
message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against 
it, 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK       417

but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, and he will make a 
Message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to 
the country. He said that he was going to take the matters right up when 
he left us (tr. 14,427)." 

That afternoon, at his press conference, President Roosevelt was asked  

"if the Japanese marched into Thailand what would the United States 
Government do? The President evaded the question. Another correspondent 
asked if the President could give any indication of the nature of the 
information requested from the Japanese representatives this morning. 
The President said let us put it this way, and this answers again many 
questions at the same time. Since last April we have been discussing 
with the Japanese some method to arrive at an objective that is 
permanent peace in the whole area in the Pacific and at times it seemed 
that progress was being made. During the whole period up to the end of 
June we assumed that as both nations were negotiating toward that 
objective there would be no act contrary to the desired end of peace. We 
were therefore somewhat surprised when the Japanese Government sent 
troops to a specific over-all total into Indo-China after very brief 
negotiations with the Vichy Government at the conclusion of which the 
Vichy Government let it be understood clearly that they had agreed to 
this number of troops principally because they were powerless to do 
anything else. 

"Sometime later conversations were resumed with the United States and 
again we made it perfectly clear that the objective we were seeking 
meant the taking of no additional territory by anyone in the Pacific 
area. We received word the other day that there were large additional 
bodies of Japanese forces of various kinds, including troops, planes, 
war vessels, etc., in Indo-China and that other forces were on the way. 
Before these forces had arrived the number of forces already there had 
greatly exceeded the original amount agreed to by the French and the 
number on the way were much greater, and the question asked this morning 
very politely, at my request, was as to what the purpose and intention 
of the Japanese Government was as to the future, eliminating the 
necessity of policing Indochina which is a very peaceful spot and we 
hope to receive a reply in the near future. 

"In reply to a question as to whether any time for a reply had been set, 
the President said that there had naturally been no time limit set (ex. 
167)."

The same day Ambassador Nomura sent a special report to the Japanese 
Foreign Office concerning this press conference, as follows: 

"On the 2d in a press interview the President stated that he had sent us 
an inquiry that day concerning our increasing troops in French Indo-
China. Expressing his own views for the first time, he briefly stated 
that the trend of Japanese-American negotiations for the past few days 
and our rumored increasing of troops in southern French Indo-China had 
both thrown obstacles in the way of the progress of the negotiations 
(see special intelligence from Washington). This was the first interview 
since returning from Warm Springs, and particular attention is to be 
paid to the fact that he referred directly to negotiations (ex. 1, p. 
223)."

Also that day the first secretary of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Terasaki, 
called on officials of the State Department's Far Eastern Division and 
delivered a document in which it was denied that Premier Tojo had ever 
made the speech attributed to him on November 30. Mr. Terasaki claimed 
that when Ambassador Kurusu referred to the Premier's speech in his 
telephone conversation with Bureau Chief Yamamoto the preceding Sunday 
evening, Yamamoto had been nonplused and had asked "What speech?" (ex. 
29, vol. II, pp. 777-778). The record of that telephone conversation 
before the Committee shows no such statement by Yamamoto; on the 
contrary Yamamoto is shown to have taken no exception to Ambassador 
Kurusu's references to the Premier's speech (ex. 1, pp. 206-207). That 
day the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, delivered to the State 
Department a memorandum in further explanation of the position of the 
Chinese 

418             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Government on the modus vivendi, which ended by stating that the Chinese 
Foreign Minister had expressed  

"great gratification in the latest reply of the Secretary (Hull) to the 
Japanese envoys, which, he understands, reaffirms the fundamental 
principles repeatedly enunciated by the United States Government (ex. 
18)."

Two intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese-American relations 
generally were translated and available in Washington on Tuesday, 
December 2 (Washington time). One was a message sent from the Foreign 
Office in Tokyo to Washington on November 27 (Japan time), for 
retransmittal by Washington to Japanese diplomatic establishments in 
various North and South American cities. "With international relations 
becoming more strained," the message set up an emergency system of 
dispatches in hidden word codes to be used in communicating with those 
establishments. These emergency dispatches consisted of instructions 
regarding radio communications and the evacuation of Japanese Embassies, 
messages stating that relations between Japan and countries whose names 
were to be inserted were not in accordance with expectations or had been 
severed, and messages stating that Japan's armed forces had clashed with 
the armed forces of countries whose names were to be inserted or that 
Japan and countries whose names were to be inserted were entering a 
"full fledged general war" (ex. 1, pp. 186-188). The second message was 
from Hsinking to Tokyo, dated November 28, and contained the following: 

"In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent 
authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of 
British and American nationals in Manchukuo *in the event that war 
breaks out with England and the United States* are as outlined below. We 
are unanimously agreed on these matters. Should there be any questions 
regarding them, please wire me at once. 

"I. Policy. *On the outbreak of war with England and the United States*, 
after you have at the appropriate time gathered all these nationals 
together, they are to be returned each to his own homeland at as early a 
date as possible. However, until this return can be arranged, they are 
to be interned in places of concentration in Manchukuo. 

"The control of such property as they might leave behind will be 
administered by the Manchukuo Government (ex. 1, p. 198)."

On December 3 (Washington time) Secretary Hull held a press conference 
at which he repeated in large measure the statements he had made at his 
press conference on November 27 (Washington time), making it plain that 
at no time had the Japanese Government shown any disposition to modify 
its basic policies, which he described as at complete variance with 
those of the United States (tr. 1163). [1] That afternoon the Secretary 
had a telephone conversation with Admiral Stark at 4:45 o'clock (tr. 
1167). 

That day, and again the next day, the State Department received 
telegrams from the American Minister at Bangkok expressing the hope of 
the Thai Government  

"that the American and British Governments will issue public statements 
to the effect that Japan by invading Thailand would incur the enmity and 
armed resistance of those two countries in addition to Thailand (ex. 
169, item 30)."

Other than Ambassador Nomura's report on his and Ambassador Kurusu's 
conference with Under Secretary Welles on December 3, and Foreign 
Minister Togo's reply to Ambassador Nomura's suggestion regarding a 
"leaders conference", both of which have been mentioned above, there is 
no evidence before the Committee of other 

[1] Cf. Washington Post, December 4, 1941.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         419

intercepted Japanese messages bearing on Japanese-American relations 
generally that were translated and available in Washington on December 3 
(Washington time). 

The next morning, Thursday, December 4 (Washington time), six majority 
and minority leaders of the Senate and House met with President 
Roosevelt for 2 hours and thoroughly canvassed the Far Eastern situation 
"in connection with the defense of our own territories and vital 
interests in the Far East", and were reported to have left the White 
House "with the impression that the situation is critical, but will not 
necessarily come to a show-down with the presentation of Japan's reply" 
to the President's request for an accounting for the continued Japanese 
troop movements into southern French Indochina (Washington Post, 
December 5, 1941). That afternoon at 2:15 o'clock the President 
conferred for an hour with Secretary Knox (ex. 58). As he left the 
meeting Secretary Knox told reporters that, among other things, he knew 
definitely that there would be an investigation of the publication that 
day by the Chicago Tribune, practically in full, of a copy of United 
States plans for fighting a global war if it should eventuate, "the most 
highly secret paper in the possession of the Government" (tr. 14,411; 
Washington Post, December 5, 1941). At 3:30 o'clock, President Roosevelt 
conferred at the White House with Secretary Hull (ex. 58). That evening, 
according to a message dated December 6 (Washington time) from 
Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo  

"those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him 
against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at 
once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known 
what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the 
President is his usual attitude (ex. 1, p. 247)."

In explanation of this information, Ambassador Nomura told the Foreign 
Minister that- 

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and 
Hull we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members 
having close relations with the President and through individuals 
equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State 
Department, please keep this point strictly secret) (ex. 1, p. 247)."

That day, Thursday, December 4, there were translated and available in 
Washington the first intercepted Japanese messages from Tokyo directing 
the destruction of code machines and machine codes by the Japanese 
Embassy in Washington. As already noted, there had been translated and 
available in Washington on December 1 (Washington time) a message sent 
from Tokyo on December 1 (Japan time) which informed the Japanese 
Embassy in Washington that the Japanese diplomatic offices in London, 
Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila had been instructed to abandon the use 
of code machines and to "dispose of them." This message had specifically 
stated, however, that regardless of other instructions, "the U. S. 
(Office) retains the machines and the machine codes" (ex. 1, p. 209). 
However, on December 2 (Japan time), in one of the intercepted messages 
translated and available in Washington on December 4 (Washington time), 
the Japanese Foreign Office had instructed the Japanese Embassy in 
Washington to destroy one code machine unit completely, as well as to 
burn all telegraphic codes except "those now used with the machine," and 
the various other codes. The Embassy was also instructed