420 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to dispose of "all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents" at the time and in the manner "you deem most proper" (ex. 1, p. 215). This message was followed by a second message on December 4 (Japan time) which gave more detailed instructions concerning the burning of certain codes recently brought to Washington by a Japanese official from the Japanese Embassy in Mexico City, and directed that a certain code keying be kept in Ambassador Nomura's custody "until the last moment" (ex. 1, p. 231). Admiral Beardall, the Naval Aide to the President, testified that about the 4th or 5th of December, in connection with the delivery of "Magic" to the President, he called the President's particular attention to a message about the burning of codes. He testified that to the best of his recollection the gist of his conversation with the President was as follows: "I said, "Mr. President, this is a very significant dispatch," which he read very carefully, and he said "Well, when do you think it will happen?" I said, "Most any time" (tr. 14035-14036)." He testified that when the President said, "When do you think it sill happen," he understood the President to mean, "When is war going to break out, when are we going to be attacked, or something" (tr. 14037). A third intercepted message translated and available in Washington on December 4 (Washington time) was from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Foreign Office, in which the Ambassador said: "If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it I8 expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls (ex. 1, p. 227)." Also that day there was translated and available in Washington Foreign Minister Togo's reply, dated December 3 (Japan time), to Ambassador Nomura's report of his and Ambassador Kurusu's conference with Secretary Hull on December 1 (Washington time). In it, the Foreign Minister put forward arguments for the Ambassadors' use in their forthcoming meeting with Secretary Hull. The Foreign Minister claimed that the United States was using the recent statements of Japanese officials and the Japanese troop movements in the South "as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. Negotiations," and complained that Britain, the United States and others had been making military preparations against Japan "at an increasing tempo" and had been acting in a "more and more antagonistic manner of late. "We are insisting", the Foreign Minister said, "that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the instigation of the United States are launched" (ex. 1, pp. 225-226). On December 5 (Japan time) Ambassador Grew sent a rush telegram to Secretary Hull in which he stated: "You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal is being represented here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of "fanciful principles which ignore the realities of the situation", and that no intimation whatever has been given out that the proposal, if implemented would provide Japan by peaceful and orderly processes with that security political as well as economic which she affects to seek by exercise of force. The response of most Japanese to whom we have said that the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well- balanced, constructive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating order out of the disorders of the past, has been to express strong disappointment that the private individual PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 421 is not in a position to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a matter of such supreme importance, while some have said that if the American proposal is actually such as we have described it to be, an attitude of intransigence on the putt of the Japanese would be viewed with regret by the masses. "It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect publication of our proposal would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the proposal, notably complete evacuation of China. Would be strong and indeed might be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility of an agreement. However, there would seem to be even greater risks of the elimination of that possibility if the points at issue continue in Japan to be befogged by ignorance and misrepresentation. I feel sure that you will have considered the wisdom of publishing the proposal as soon as possible after consultation with the Japanese Government, but even without the latter's assent if that should not be forthcoming (tr. 1821- 1823)." THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ITS TROOP MOVEMENTS IN FRENCH INDOCHINA ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEFENSE AGAINST AN ATTACK BY THE CHINESE (December 5, 1941) In the meantime, on December 3 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Togo had sent Ambassador Nomura his message No. 875 containing the Japanese Government's formal reply to President Roosevelt's inquiry regarding the movement of additional Japanese troops into southern French Indochina (ex. 1, p. 224). This reply took the position that the Japanese reinforcements were a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory. Ambassador Nomura had regarded the reply as unsatisfactory, and had at once cabled the Foreign Minister: "I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to-even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once (ex. 1, pp. 227-228)." The Foreign Minister's reply to Ambassador Nomura had come back the next day: "What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875. I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message (ex. 1, p. 232)." Accordingly, on December 5 (Washington time), the Japanese Ambassadors called on Secretary Hull and presented their Government's reply to President Roosevelt's inquiry'(ex. 29, vol. II, pp. [1] It is significant that press reports which reached Washington early in the morning of December 5 (Washington time), stated that in Tokyo that day the authoritative Japanese news agency had announced that "Japan cannot accept" the provisions of the United States' note of November 26. Domei was reported to have said: "Such a document cannot serve as a basic datum in Japanese-American negotiations henceforth". These statements, together with Japanese comment critical of Secretary Hull's remarks at his press conference on December 3 (Washington time), were carried in morning newspapers in Washington on December 5 under such headlines as "JAPAN 'CAN'T ACCEPT' TERMS" and "JAPAN EXPECTED TO REJECT TERMS" (Washington Post December 5, 1941). Secretary Hull conferred for a short time with President Roosevelt before his meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors (Washington Post, December 6, 1941). 422 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 781-783). The Japanese reply as handed to the Secretary follows in full: Reference is made 1;e your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indochina. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows: As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-China bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indochina. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan std France (vol. II, p. 784). After reading the reply, Secretary Hull said: that he understood that Japan had been putting forces into northern Indochina for the purpose of attacking China from there. He said that he had never heard before that Japan's troop movements into northern Indochina were for the purpose of defense against Chinese attack. The Secretary added that it was the first time that he knew that Japan was on the defensive in Indochina (vol. II, p. 781). Ambassador Nomura then repeated to the Secretary the gist of the Foreign Minister's message of December 3 (Japan time) mentioned above, claiming that the Japanese were alarmed over increasing naval and military preparation of the "ABCD" powers in the southwest Pacific, and asserting that the Japanese Government was "very anxious" to reach an agreement with this Government and that the United States ought to be willing to agree to discontinue aid to China as soon as conversations between China and Japan were initiated. The remainder of the conversation consisted largely of a repetition of matters expressed many times before by both the Japanese. And the Secretary (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 781-783). That morning, December 5 (Washington time), President Roosevelt had received a memorandum from Under Secretary Welles passing on to him a suggestion from the Australian Prime Minister that if Sir. Wendell Willkie should visit Australia with the "imprimateur" of the President, his visit would be most welcome to the Australian Government. The President had immediately dictated a letter to Mr. Willkie regarding this, in which he said: "There is always the Japanese matter to consider. The situation is definitely serious and there might be an armed clash at any moment if the Japanese continued their forward progress against the Philippines, Dutch Indies or Malaya or Burma. Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matter (ex. 111). " Following his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors, Secretary Hull had lunch at 1 o'clock at the White House with President Roosevelt, after which both the President and the Secretary attended a full Cabinet meeting at 2 o'clock (ex. 58). That day the American Minister at Bangkok reported to the State Department that he had been informed by the Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Japanese Ambassador in Thailand had told the Minister that the Japanese forces in Indochina "definitely would not be used to invade Thailand and that they were concentrated for use against the Burma Road" (ex. 169, item 31). Also that day, Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, called on Secretary Hull, who recorded that the Ambassador "said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign Office, setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate cooperation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of course relates to the matter of defense against Japan. I expressed my appreciation (tr. 14,515)." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 423 The evening of December 5 (Washington time) the State Department sent a telegram to the American Embassy in Tokyo via Peiping by naval radio for the information of the American Embassy in Chungking and the American consul at Hong Kong containing instructions applicable to all offices in Japan Japanese-occupied areas in China, Hong Kong Indochina, and Thailand. Those instructions were "intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in case communications with the Department are delayed or severed, to take appropriate action concerning Government property, alien employees, archives, leases, the evacuation of the American members of the staff, et cetera (tr. 1967-A)." The telegram included the following paragraph concerning the destruction of codes: "It is of the utmost importance that all confidential files, seals, codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, et cetera, should be destroyed. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses whose affidavits should be obtained (tr. 1967-D)." It ended as follows: "The sending of this instruction is in the nature of a precautionary measure and the authority granted in the foregoing paragraphs is intended to enable the officers concerned to deal with a sudden emergency. The concerned officers should quietly formulate plans to deal with an emergency if and when it arises. It is highly desirable that discussion be kept to a minimum and that publicity be avoided (tr. 1967- E)." Previously, on November 27 (Washington time), the day after the delivery of the United States reply, the State Department had sent a telegram to Ambassador Grew which strongly suggested the probability that the Japanese-American conversations might "lapse" and result "in withdrawal of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan," and that he should quietly prepare for that eventuality (ex. 18). Also, on November 19 (Washington time), the State Department had sent a telegram to the American Embassy in Tokyo via Shanghai by naval radio for the information of the American Embassies at Chungking, Peiping, and the American consul at Hong Kong, in which it was stated that the Department desired that "the American diplomatic and consular officers concerned call to the attention of American citizens in the Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be possible to retain in the Pacific even the the [sic] present facilities (tr. 4508 4509)." The telegram of November 19 (Washington time) was the last of three major warnings sent by the State Department during 1940 and 1941 advising American nationals to leave the Orient, the other major warnings have been sent on October 6, 1940, and February 11, 1941 (tr. 4502-4508). On December 5 (Washington time), there was translated and available in Washington a message sent 2 days earlier by Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo in which the Ambassador said: "Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand (ex. 1, p. 227). At the Japanese Embassy in Washington that day, Councilor Iguchi cabled the Japanese Foreign Office, in response to its instruc- 424 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK tions to destroy one code machine unit and to burn all telegraphic codes except those used with the machine: "We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine (ex. 1, p. 236)." The Foreign Office promptly replied that its instructions regarding code machines were: "of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and *for the time being* to continue the use of the other (ex. 1, p. 237)." Both of these intercepted Japanese messages were translated and available in Washington the next day. THE LAST HOURS (December 6-8, 1941) The next day was Saturday, December 6 (Washington time). In the southwest Pacific, the Japanese naval and military forces whose movements in and toward French Indochina had commenced in earnest soon after the Imperial Conference in Tokyo on November 5 (Japan time) and had been observed both by British and American forces based in Malaya and in the Philippines, had begun their final dispositions. It is now known that at the same time, in the mid-Pacific some 6,000 miles away, the Japanese naval force that had left its rendezvous in northern Japan on November 25 (Washington time) still undiscovered and now almost within striking distance of the Hawaiian Islands was steaming at high speed toward its target, the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor. While reports of the final Japanese movements in the southwest Pacific began to reach Washington before noon on December 6 (Washington time), the record before the Committee conclusively shows that no one in the United States Government or in its military and naval forces, either in Washington or in the field, knew of the approach of the Japanese naval striking force to the Hawaiian Islands. That morning, at 10:40 o'clock, the State Department received the following telegram from Ambassador Winant in London, marked "Triple priority and most urgent" and "Personal and secret to the Secretary and the President": "British Admiralty reports that at 3 a. m. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers (ex. 21)." The State Department file copy of this message bears the stamp "Sent to the President," but does not indicate the hour when that action was taken. The same information had been received in Washington by the Navy Department earlier that morning in a message sent by Admiral Hart from Manila at 7:55 a. m. (Washington time) to Admiral Stark (tr. 4344, ex. 66). The information so received by the Navy Department was communicated to the State Department in a memorandum of December 6 signed by Admiral Schuirmann (ex. 66). Secretary Hull's engagement books for that day show that he had an appointment with Admiral Schuirmann at 1:50 p. m. (Tr. 1168), at which time the memorandum was presumably handed to the Secretary by Admiral Schuirmann. Similar information was received PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 425 in the State Department from the War-Department early the next morning (tr. 14,290). The record of outside telephone calls through the White House switchboard on December 6 shows that Secretary Hull was again called by Secretary Stimson at 12:58 p. m. and by Admiral Stark at 1:09 p. m. (Ex. 58; tr. 1168). At 3:05 p. m. that afternoon the State Department received a second message from Ambassador Winant, marked "Triple priority and most urgent" and "Personal and secret for the Secretary," containing additional information concerning the Ambassador's earlier message regarding the Japanese naval movement. The second message follows in full: "Again from Cadogan. Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties is Kra or Bangkok. Latter would not be reached before Monday. "Note a discrepancy in time reported by me and time reported in our naval despatch. Latter stating 3 a. m. Greenwich time, by despatch as given me 3 a. m. London time. Believe former correct. "British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax. "Leaving to spend evening with Eden in order to go over with him your number 5682, December 5 although I had previously pressed on him each of the points you outlined prior to reception your message with the exception of paragraph seven which I agree is not clear and which I will clear up with him this evening. I want you to know that I had nothing to do with the insertion of the reference to the I. L. O. "I am having lunch with the Prime Minister tomorrow at his usual place in the country and will be constantly in contact with the Embassy over private wires in ease you wish to communicate with me [1] (ex. 21). " At 5:15 o'clock that afternoon Secretary Hull again telephoned Admiral Stark (tr. 1168). That morning at 11 o'clock the State Department received the following telegram from Ambassador Gauss in Chungking: "The Chief of the Information Department of the Foreign Office informed a member of my staff yesterday that "the British wanted to move into Thailand but hesitated to do so in the absence of a clear indication of the American attitude." He said that this report came from a very reliable source in the United States. I attach no significance to the report except as indicative of an interesting and somewhat prevalent tendency to play up the situation (ex. 169, item 32)." At 6 p. m. that day the Department sent a telegram to the American Minister at Bangkok informing him that he might assure the Thai authorities that the extension of credit to Thailand for its current needs was fully agreed to in principle and that the Department expected no delay in working out the details with the appropriate lending agencies of the United States Government (ex. 169, item 33). In the meantime, both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull had given renewed attention to the proposal to send a message to Emperor Hirohito. It will be recalled that a draft of such a message had been prepared the preceding Saturday and probably discussed the next [1] Under Secretary Welles was questioned at length by Senator Ferguson regarding the "message transmitted by Welles to Halifax" referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram quoted above (tr. 1300-1316; 1337-1340). At Senator Ferguson's request, Mr. Welles undertook to make a special search for the message (tr. 1316), after which he reported to the Committee that it was his understanding that the message in question was the message from President Roosevelt which he communicated to the Japanese Ambassadors on December 2 (Washington time) and a copy of which he sent to the British Ambassador the same day (tr. 1338). The State Department advised Committee counsel that no written record of the message referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram could be found in its files, and that accordingly it must be assumed the message was oral (tr. 1300). See in this connection the discussion supra of Under Secretary Welles reported conference with Lord Halifax on December 1 (Washington time). Telegram number 5682 referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram appears in the record before this Committee as exhibit No. 166. It does not deal with the situation in the Far East in any way. 426 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Monday by the Secretary with the President upon his return from Warm Springs. The next day, Tuesday (December 2), Secretary Stimson had recorded in his notes: "The President is still deliberating the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, I think, that he will make a message to the Congress and will perhaps back that up with a speech to the country (tr. 14,427)." Secretary Hull testified that he was in consultation with President Roosevelt at all stages of the drafting of the President's message to the Emperor (tr. 14,297). The record contains a note in President Roosevelt's handwriting, undated but bearing a stamp showing that it was received in Secretary Hull's office on December 6, which reads: "DEAR CORDELL: Shoot this to Grew I think can go in grey code-saves time I don't mind if it gets picked up. "F. D. R. (ex. 20)." The message to Emperor Hirohito attached to the President's memorandum was returned to the President attached to a "Memorandum for the President," also dated December 6 and initialled by Secretary Hull, as follows: "There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page three of the message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I spoke to you on the telephone. "If you approve the draft as it now stands, we shall see that it gets off to Grew at once (ex. 20)." Beneath Secretary Hull's initials appears the following in President Roosevelt's handwriting: "C. H. O K send the amended p. 3 to the British Ambassador & send a copy to me. F. D. R. (ex. 20)." The amended page 3 bears the President's handwritten "O. K.," followed by his initials (ex. 20). There is no explanation in the record before the Committee of the reason for the President's instruction to send a copy of the amended page three to the British Ambassador. The first three and last paragraphs of the message as thus finally revised were substantially the same as those of the draft message attached to Secretary Hull's memorandum of November 29 to the President. The remainder of the message sent comprising the main part consisted of material that is not found in any of the drafts in evidence before the Committee. Secretary Hull testified that the message actually sent to the Emperor "was prepared in final form on December 6, and included contributions made in the White House as well as material contained in the drafts prepared in the State Department during the preceding weeks (tr. 14,264)." At 8 o'clock that evening (December 6), the State Department dispatched to Ambassador Grew a brief telegram stating that an important telegram to him was being encoded and that it contained the text of a message from President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito, to be communicated by Ambassador Grew to the Emperor at the "earliest possible moment" (ex. 20). Both messages were initialled for Secretary Hull by Dr. Hornbeck (ex. 20), which may indicate that after approving the message in final form the Secretary had left the Department for the day. The telegram containing President Roosevelt's PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 427 message to Emperor Hirohito was dispatched from the State Department at 9 o'clock that evening (ex. 20). The message follows in full: "Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped humanity. "Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation. "Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities. "The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. Vs e have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation. "I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives. "!More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement v I h the Vichy- Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saving that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated. "During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval, and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character. "Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions. "I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval, and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense. "It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable. "None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite. "There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom. "I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area. "I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world (vol. II, pp. 784-786)." 428 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Also at 9 o'clock that evening a telegram from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Gauss at Chungking was dispatched by the State Department, instructing the Ambassador to communicate to Generalissimo Chiang Kai- shek a copy of President Roosevelt's message to Emperor Hirohito, for the Generalissimo's confidential information. This telegram was also initialled for the Secretary by Dr. Hornbeck. After quoting the President's message in full, the telegram concluded: "In communicating copy of this message to Chiang Kai-shek, please state orally as from the President that the quoted message has already been sent by the President to the Emperor; that this message, as the situation now stands, would seem to represent very nearly the last diplomatic move that this Government can make toward causing Japan to desist from its present course; that if the slender chance of acceptance by Japan should materialize, a very effective measure would have been taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it is very much hoped that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in Chinese Government circles adverse comment (tr. 14,517)." The final comment may well have been intended to forestall comment such as the Generalissimo had made at the time the modus vivendi was under consideration. Ambassador Grew testified that he first learned of the President's message the evening of December 7 (Japan time) while listening to a radio broadcast from San Francisco (tr. 1501-1503; ex. 30, pp. 486-487). He immediately instructed Mr. Dooman, the Embassy Counselor, to stand by, and not long thereafter the first, short telegram from Secretary Hull was received. Although it showed on its face it had been received in Tokyo at 12 noon (Japan time), an hour after its dispatch from Washington at 11 a. m. (Japan time), the Secretary's second telegram containing President Roosevelt's message to the Emperor was not delivered at the Embassy until 10:30 p. m. "In other words," Ambassador Grew testified, "the telegram appears to have been delivered to the Japanese post office, which handled telegrams, 1 hour after its receipt, and they held it up throughout that day, from 12 noon until-10:30 p. m." (Japan time) (tr. 1501), or 8:30 a. m. December 7 (Washington time). Ambassador Grew saw Foreign Minister Togo at about a quarter past 12 that night. He read President Roosevelt's message aloud to the Foreign Minister, handed him a copy, and then requested an audience with the Emperor to present the President's message personally. Not until after Ambassador Grew had found it necessary to repeat his request did the Foreign Minister agree to present the matter to the Throne, (tr. 14,516). To return to events in Washington, President Roosevelt's appointments for Saturday, December 6, as shown by his engagement book were two, both at the White House and both in the morning. The first was at 10 o'clock with Justice William O. Douglas, and the second was at 11:15 o'clock with Budget Director Harold O. Smith (ex. 58). The President had no scheduled appointments that afternoon. That evening the President and Mrs. Roosevelt entertained at dinner at 8 o'clock at the White House (ex. 58). Apart from the evidence already mentioned of the President's activities that day in connection with his message to Emperor Hirohito, the only other evidence before the Committee affirmatively showing the President's activities before the White House dinner that evening is a statement contained in a letter dated May 22, 1946, from an official of the Australian Legation in Washington in answer to certain inquiries made by the Committee through the State Department (tr. 14,631-14,632). Referring to a telegram from the Australian Minister for PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 425 External Affairs in Canberra to the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom in London, a paraphrase of which is quoted below, that letter states: "The telegram contains the substance of a message which the Australian Minister for External Affairs had received from the Australian Minister- at Washington. This message was dispatched from Washington at 9:30 p. m. On December 6th, 1941. *The information contained therein regarding the procedure to be followed by the President had come orally from the President late in the afternoon of December 6th.*" (Tr. 14,631). The paraphrase of the Australian Minister for External Affairs' telegram is as follows: "Subject to conditions that President gives prior approval to text of warning as drafted and also gives signal for actual delivery of warning, we concur in draft as a joint communication from all His Majesty's Governments. I point out that message from Australian Minister at Washington just received notes that "1. President has decided to send message to Emperor. "2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by Monday evening "(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening, "(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, i. e., after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington (tr. 13, 741-13, 742)." It would seem clear that the "draft" referred to in the telegram quoted above was the document, a copy of which was obtained by the Committee from the files of President Roosevelt, attached to an unsigned memorandum dated December 7, 1941, on stationery bearing the official seal of the British Government (tr. 13,738). The memorandum was as follows: "The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the President may have on the attached draft of a declaration to the Japanese Government. "The Dominion Governments have yet to give their views on this text. They are being consulted urgently. "The Netherlands government have been given a copy of the draft (tr. 13,738)" The draft declaration to the Japanese Government which was attached to this memorandum was as follows: "YOUR EXCELLENCY: "I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed to make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government on behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. "His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa have followed closely in consultation with the United States Government the negotiations in which the latter have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a view to relieving the present tension in the Far East. His Majesty's Governments viewed with the same concern as the United States Government the rapidly growing concentration of Japanese forces in Indo-China which prompted the enquiry by the United States Government to the Japanese Government on December 2nd. They have found Japanese reply to that enquiry extremely disquieting. However valid the explanations in regard to North Indo-China as to which they expressly reserve their views the reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of Japanese forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and heavily augmented. "There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China and this concentration in South Indo-China is only explicable on the assumption that the Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive move directed against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand. "Relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the Netherlands Government are too well known for the Japanese Government to