PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 477 6. The winds execute message Safford alleges he saw on the morning of December 4, bore the "negative form for war with Russia" and mixed up the plain language broadcast with the Morse broadcast. [37] It is thus clear that the alleged winds execute of December 4 was not responsive to the establishing winds code. Captain Kramer, it should be noted, testified before the joint committee that had the "negative form" been employed with respect to Russia, he would have regarded such fact as nullifying any credence to be placed in a broadcast purporting to be a winds execute message. It would appear agreed that the implementation of an establishing code must conform in meticulous detail to the code as originally established. 7. Referring to Captain Safford's statement, the following matters appear to be subject to serious question: A. Safford relies on Cincaf 281430 [38] as basis for evaluation of a winds execute message to mean war, pointing out that this dispatch contained the statement "Nishi nishi England *including occupation of Thai or Invasion of Malay and N. E. I.*" It should be noted, however, that Cincaf 281430 indicates the winds code would be employed "if diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed." In any event the interpretation of Cincaf 281430 as relied upon by Safford while possibly indicating war with England does not by any reasonable construction indicate war with the United States. [38a] B. Safford's reliance in his statement on Cincaf 281430 as providing basis for evaluating a winds execute as meaning war is in contradiction of his testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry where reliance was placed on the Thorpe and Foote dispatches. [39] While denied by Safford, the suggestion was made by counsel before the committee that Safford may have shifted reliance on the Thorpe and Foote dispatches to Cincaf 281430 by reason of the fact that he had learned that both the Thorpe and Foote dispatches were not available to the Navy Department until after the morning of December 4. [40] C. Safford seeks to bring out that the alleged winds execute was intended for the Japanese London Embassy inasmuch as the latter had destroyed its codes 3 days previously and a winds message was the only way that Tokyo could get news to its London Ambassador secretly. [41] This statement is not true insofar as it implies that no other means of communication between Tokyo and London was available. By Circular 2409 of November 27, 1941, [42] the Japanese established the "hidden word" code and by Circular 2461 [43] instructed that this code be kept [37] That is, Circular 2363 with Circular 2354. [38] Set forth, supra. [38a] See committee record, p. 9670. [39] Navy Court of Inquiry (top secret) record, p. 748, see also committee record, p. 9667 [40] Committee record, pp. 9667, 9668. [41] Id., at p. 9639. [42] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 186. [43] Id., at p. 226. 478 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK until the last moment. This code system of communication was clearly available to the Japanese in communicating with their London Ambassador and was in fact employed on December 7 in Circular 2494. [44] Safford admitted in his testimony before the joint committee the availability in the London Embassy of the hidden word code. Furthermore, in Circular 2443, dated December 1, [45] to London instructions were issued to discontinue use of the code machine and to dispose of it immediately. Ostensibly other code systems were still available after destruction of the code machine and it is known that coded traffic in the system referred to as PA-K2 passed from the Japanese London Embassy to Tokyo December 6, 1941. [46] D. By way of lending credence to his assertion that a winds execute was received, Safford has testified that McCollum's dispatch of December 4 (not sent) was predicated on such a winds execute and mentioned the execute in the last portion. [47] McCollum definitely contradicted this in testifying before the committee, asserting that his dispatch was based on a memorandum he, McCollum, had prepared under, date of December 1 [48] and bore no relationship to a winds execute message; that he neither saw nor received knowledge of a true winds execute prior to December 7. [49] E. In further substantiation of his allegation that a winds execute was received on the morning of December 4, Safford has referred to the fact that the dispatches from OpNav to our own establishments to destroy their codes was based on a winds execute. This assertion is diametrically contrary to testimony of Noyes [50] and Kramer [51] who declared that OpNav instructions to our establishments to destroy their codes was based on instructions sent out by the Japanese [52] to their diplomatic establishments to destroy codes, and bore no relationship to a winds execute. The testimony of McCollum and Ingersoll tends to confirm the foregoing. F. Safford points out that the individual smooth translations of the alleged winds execute for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with standard operating procedure. [53] Kramer, in testifying before the joint committee, categorically denied that any copies of a winds execute message were prepared for distribution by his section, it [44] Id., at p. 251 [45] Id., at p. 209. [46] Committee record, p. 9740. [47] See pt. IV, this report, for discussion of so-called McCollum dispatch. [48] Committee exhibit No. 81. [49] Committee record pp. 9124-9134. [50] Id., at p. 12623. [51] Id., at p. 10504. [52] Committee exhibit No. 1. [53] Committee record, pp. 9763 et seq. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 479 being noted that it was the responsibility of Kramer to prepare and distribute the smooth translations. [54] G. Captain Safford has pointed out that a winds-execute was dispatched in Morse code. Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Communications Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor in December of l941, testified that all of the broadcast schedules giving the various frequencies furnished by Washington were all voice frequencies; that to him the very setting up of the winds code implied "voice"; that if an execute message were sent in Morse code it would have meant that every Japanese Embassy (and consulate) in every Japanese location throughout the world for whom the message was intended by the Japanese Government would "have had to maintain Morse code operators, people capable of receiving Morse code. I do not think so." [55] Rochefort further testified that they were monitoring for a winds execute message at Honolulu and continued to do so until after the attack; that four of his best language officers were on a 24-hour watch for an execute; that no winds implementing message was intercepted. [56] H. Admiral Noyes testified that he would not have regarded the message which Safford alleges was received as an authentic execute message inasmuch as (1) Morse code was allegedly used and in consequence not responsive to Circular 2353; (2) no provision was made in the winds code for a "negative form" with respect to Russia; (3) an execute message would not have been interpreted to mean war; and (4) no reference is made in Circular 2353 to N. E. I., although the alleged execute was responsive to Circular 2353 and Safford indicates reference was made to. N. E. I. [57] 8. Safford, in testifying before the joint committee, placed emphasis on the fact that the winds code provided for destruction of all codes (Circular 2353) and by reason thereof a winds execute message would have more significance than the intercepts contained in committee exhibit 1 which gave instructions with respect to destruction of particular codes. [58] If a winds execute message was dispatched for the Japanese London Embassy on December 4, as alleged by Safford, it would necessarily [54] Committee record, p. 10496. [55] Id., at p. 12548. [56] Id., at pp. 12532-12534. [57] Id., at pp. 12614, 126l5. [58] When asked what there was in the winds execute message alleged by him to have been received which indicated *war*, Captain Safford testified: "For one thing there is instruction to destroy all code papers. If that is regarded as synonymous with the outbreak of war, as I have heard testified in this room, that by itself means something more than the wording of these three paragraphs above * * *. Tokyo had sent out instructions to various people telling them to burn their most important codes but to leave two codes open. One was the so-called PA-K2 code and the other was the LA code. Now, with those two exceptions all codes had been burnt, but this said, '*Please destroy all code papers*,' and so forth. In other words, there was no exceptions in this one." Committee record, p. 9778. In marked contradiction of the foregoing testimony is the explanation of Captain Safford as to the reason for Japan's London Embassy having the PA-K2 code system after the alleged winds execute message was received. He stated: "There were two systems that were exempt from destruction. One was PA-K2, and the other was LA, neither of which were considered by ourselves as secret, and we presumed the Japanese did not consider them secret." Committee record, p. 9741. It is to be noted, however, that the Honolulu consulate, as well as Tokyo, used the PA-K2 system for some of the most vital messages shortly before December 7 (see committee exhibit No. 2). While this was virtually the only system left after the messages ordering the destruction of various codes, the PA-K2 system was employed for the sending of messages which would probably have tipped off the attack on Pearl Harbor, had it not been for the fact they were not translated until after the attack. 480 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK mean that *all* codes were to be destroyed by Japan's London Ambassador. It is definitely known, as earlier indicated, that London sent a dispatch to Tokyo in the system known as PA-K2 on December 6, 1941. Such fact would indicate strongly that no winds execute was dispatched on December 4 with consequent destruction of all codes. [59] 9. It appears clear that both the Navy and Army were still looking for a winds execute message after the morning of December 4, based on records of the Federal Communications Commission. [60] In this connection at 7:50 p. m. on December 5, 1941, the watch officer of FCC phoned Colonel Bratton of the Army with respect to a false winds message received from the FCC Portland monitoring station. The FCC watch officer submitted the following memorandum for his superior with respect to Bratton's remarks: "Remarks by Col. Bratton: "Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No, I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard." The foregoing would indicate that the Army had received no genuine winds execute message by 7:50 p. m., December 5. The FCC night watch log for December 4, 1941, [61] contains the notation that at 9:32 p. m. "Lt. Brotherhood called to inquire if any other reference to weather was made previously in program intercepted by Portland. Informed him that no other reference was made." There is manifested here an interest by the Navy in the nature of a winds message on the evening of December 4 which is hardly likely if a true execute was received on the morning of December 4. Further, it would appear logical that had a true winds execute been received on the morning of December 4 the FCC would have been requested to discontinue its monitoring activities. This, however, was not done and the FCC was still monitoring for a winds execute and actually intercepted such an execute (with respect to England) after the Pearl Harbor attack. [62] 10. Collateral considerations tending to minimize likelihood that implementing winds message was dispatched from Tokyo. A. Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4,63 Safford testified before Admiral Hewitt [64] that this was the "false" message which appeared on this surface to use the "winds" code relating to Russia but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, Safford said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later *Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket*. He testified that this message was received * * * 12 hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message." [59] Committee record, p. 9740. [60] Committee exhibit No. 142-A. [61] Id. [62] See also testimony of Colonel Bratton, committee record, p. 12074. [63] Committee exhibit No. 142, see. 3. [64] Hewitt inquiry record, p. 113. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 481 Query: Why would Kramer be "wanting" a winds execute message 12 hours after Safford alleges Kramer had an execute message and had noted thereon "War with England, War with U. S., peace with Russia"? B. In testifying before the committee, Justice Roberts stated he had no knowledge of the winds matter and no access to Magic. This would appear to be partially at least in contradiction of Safford's testimony that he last saw the winds execute among material assembled for the Roberts Commission. Further, Admiral Noyes testified that he was directed to prepare a folder for the Roberts Commission, but it did not include a winds execute message and the folder was in fact supposed to contain no magic nor any reference to it. [65] C. Safford's detailed recollection of the winds matter, as set forth in his statement, is in sharp conflict with his indefinite and somewhat nebulous memory as reflected by his testimony and the letters directed to Kramer during December 1943, and January 1944. It should be noted in this connection that Safford testified before Admiral Hart [66] that the winds implementing message came in on the evening of December 3 and Kramer went down to get it. From all of the testimony it appears that Safford's position before the committee was assumed after a process of elimination of possibilities and reconstruction of a situation concerning which he had only a partially independent recollection. D. Considering the tight reign maintained by the military in Japan and particularly the desire to clothe the movement against Pearl Harbor with utmost secrecy, it would seem highly improbable that the Japanese would tip off her war decision in a news broadcast by advising her London Ambassador of such decision 3 days before Pearl Harbor. E. If a true winds execute was received and distributed on December 4 it would appear reasonable to assume that some record of the message could be found in the War or Navy Departments. Yet despite repeated searches there is no record whatever in either department of such a message. In this connection Safford has suggested that intercept No. JD-7001, marked "canceled" in the Navy file of intercepts, may have been the missing winds execute. Such a premise, of course, presupposes a deliberate abstraction by someone of an official record from the Navy Department. In evaluation of Safford's suggestion with respect to No. JD-7001, it should be noted that the file of JD intercepts was maintained by Kramer who has emphatically testified that no winds execute came into his section or was distributed by him. Further, Kramer has pointed out that there are several examples of canceled JD numbers in the file [67] and presented several reasons in testi- [65] Committee record. P. 12620. [66] Hart inquiry record, p. 361. [67] This appears to be borne out by the record. See committee exhibit No. 142, sec. 6. 482 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK fying before the committee why a JD number might be canceled. Significantly, a check of the Army file of intercepts for the period December 3-5, 1941, reflected that the Navy file contains all intercepts that are in the Army file. [68] Conceding for purposes of discussion that a winds execute message was received in the form alleged by Safford, it will be noted that such message would not indicate where or when Japan would strike but merely her possible purpose to go to war. Bearing in mind the rather frank admission by Army and Navy officials that they knew war was imminent in the days before December 7, credence could scarcely be placed in the theory that the message was deliberately destroyed when it contained no information that was not admittedly already possessed. Admiral Ingersoll, for example, testified before the committee that had a true winds execute message been received it would have been regarded as merely confirmatory of the implications contained in Japanese instructions to destroy codes contained in committee exhibit 1, inasmuch as instructions to destroy codes, particularly in the consulates, meant war. The testimony of several other witnesses, including Admiral Noyes and Colonel Bratton, is to the same effect. 11. The testimony of Col. Robert E. Schukraft, assigned to the office of the chief signal officer at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, before the committee on February 19, 1946, is of particular pertinence to the testimony of Captain Kramer, set forth under section 3, supra. Schukraft testified that 2 or 3 days prior to Pearl Harbor Col. Rex Minckler brought to Schukraft's office a piece of yellow teletype paper (the carbon copy) which contained what appeared to be a winds execute message but that the message upon examination was obviously not a true winds execute. Further, Schukraft testified Colonel Minckler had indicated that the Navy had thought the message a true winds execute, Captain Kramer having seen the message and so thinking. He stated that he concluded very positively that the message was not a true execute of the Winds Code. [69] 12. The following officers have stated they have no knowledge of a message in execution of the Winds code prior to December 7, 1941: Navy Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. [70] Admiral Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Communications. [71] Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence. [72] Capt. Arthur N. McCollum, in charge, Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence. [73] Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Assistant Director of Naval Communications. [74] [68] See Army liaison memorandum dated January 26, 1946. Committee record, pp. 8965, 8966. [69] Committee record pp. 13093-13096. [70] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 783 872. Confirmed in testimony before the committee. [71] Committee record, pp. 12605-12620. [72] Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 398-401. [73] Committee record, pp. 9124-9134. [74] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1103. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 483 Lt. Comdr. George W. Linn, GY watch officer. [75] Lt. Comdr. Alfred V. Pering, GY watch officer. [76] Lt. Comdr. Allan A. Murray, GY watch officer. [77] Lt. Frederick L. Freeman, assigned to section disseminating to ONI intelligence received from radio intelligence units. [78] Capt. Redfield Mason, fleet intelligence officer, Asiatic Fleet. [79] Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor. [80] Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer. [81] Capt. Joseph John Rochefort, in charge, Communications Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor. [82] Army Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff. [83] Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans. [84] Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2. [85] Col. Rufus W. Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section of G-2. [86] Col. Robert E. Schukraft, Chief, Radio Interception for SIS. [87] Col. Rex W. Minckler, Chief, SIS. [88] Brig. Gen. Thomas J; Betts, executive assistant to the Chief of Intelligence Branch MID. [89] Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett, prior to Pearl Harbor attack a civilian technical assistant to the officer of the Cryptoanalytic unit, SIS. [90] William F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of War Department. [91] Over-all observations with respect to Captain Safford's testimony: 13. As previously indicated Captain Safford has rather consistently testified that a true winds execute message was received prior to December 7. However, there are certain discrepancies in his testimony tending to show particularly that his recollection of the incident attending receipt of such an execute has not been definite and has been developed through a process of elimination. A. The following testimony, in relation to a winds execute, of Captain Safford before Admiral Hewitt reflects rather clearly his indefinite recollection of the winds matter and his efforts to reconstruct a "vague memory": [92] "Captain SAFFORD. In the fall of l943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony ready for it. I realized I would be one of the important witnesses that, my memory was very vague, and I began looking around to get everything that I could to prepare a written statement which I could follow as testimony. That was the time when I studied the Robert's Report carefully for the first [75] Hewitt Inquiry record pp. 140-142. [76] Id., at p. 148. [77] Id., at pp. 433-441. [78] Id., at pp. 149, 150. [79] Id., at pp. 73, 78. [80] Id., at pp. 73, 78. [81] Id., at pp. 269-271. [82] Id., at pp. 46, 48. [83] See Army Pearl Harbor Board (Top secret) record pp. 35-39. Confirmed in testimony before the committee. [84] Committee record. p. 4302. [85] See Clausen investigation record pp. 214, 215. Confirmed In testimony before the committee. [86] Committee record pp. 12068-12077. [87] Id., at pp. 13093-13096. [88] Clausen Investigation record p. 217. [89] Id., at p. 194. [90] Id., at pp. 225, 226. [91] Hewitt Inquiry record pp. 515-520. [92] Id., at pp. 112, 113. 484 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK time and noted no reference to the winds message or to the message which McCollum had written and which I had seen and I thought had been sent. And then I began talking to everybody who had been around at the time and who I knew had been mixed up in it to see what they could remember to straighten me out on the thing and give me leads to follow down to where I could put my hands on official messages and things so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. I also talked the thing over with whatever Army people were still around at the time and had anything in this thing, and bit by bit these facts appeared to come together. The investigation was conducted, if you call it that, for the purpose of preparing myself to take the stand as a witness in a prospective court martial of Admiral Kimmel." E. The letters directed to Captain Kramer by Safford and incorporated in the committee transcript also indicate an indefinite recollection of events prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. [93] C. In testifying before Admiral Hart, Safford stated: [94] "The "Winds Message" was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the "Winds Message" was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units, not hearing the "Winds Message" themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the "Winds Message" had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department failed to send out information that the "Winds Message" had been sent by Tokyo. The "Winds Message" was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (j. g.) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer who came down that evening and identified that message as the 'Winds Message" we had been looking for." Yet in his statement and in testifying before the committee Safford has the message coming in on the morning of December 4, 1941, it being brought to him by Lt. A. A. Murray. D. In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry Safford said: [95] "22. Q. Captain, in a previous answer you stated that the copy of the intercept using the winds code which you saw on the morning of 4 December 1941 indicated a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan and Japan and Great Britain, and war between these nations. Was there anything in the establishment of the code originally which would indicate that a use of that code would indicate war as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations? "A. The Dutch translation said "war." The Japanese language is very vague and you can put a number of constructions or interpretations or translations on the same message. In very important documents it was customary for the Army and Navy to make independent translations and the differences were sometimes surprising; that [93] See testimony of Captains Kramer and Safford before the committee. [94] Hart inquiry record, p. 361. [95] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 748. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 485 is, a difference in degree. The general facts would be alike. However, the people in Communication Intelligence and the people in Signal Intelligence Service and the people in the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, as well as the Director of Naval Intelligence, considered that meant war and it was a signal of execute for the Japanese war plans. "23. Q. Captain, I call your attention again to Document 3 in Exhibit 64 which is an English-language translation of the Dutch intercept. Was this your only source of information that the use of this code would indicate "a war decision" which is the wording used by the attach in Batavia? "A. Mr. Foote's message to the State Department was even more specific. It said, "When crises leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end of weather reports. 1. *East wind rain* war with United States. 2. *North wind cloudy* war with Russia. 3. *West wind clear*-war with Britain, including an attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch East Indies." This was apparently a verbatim quotation from the Dutch translation." Significantly, in testifying before the committee Safford relies on Cincaf 281430 as the dispatch serving as basis for interpreting a winds execute message to mean war. It has now been conclusively shown that neither the Foote nor Thorpe dispatches were available in the Navy Department at the time Safford alleges an execute was received and interpreted to mean war; i. e. The morning of December 4, 1941. [96] E. The testimony of Captain Safford taken in its entirety reflects substantial discrepancies as to where the alleged execute message was received. It was only at the time of submitting his statement to the committee that Safford stated definitely the message came in at the Navy's Cheltenham station. 14. Because of substantial discrepancies in testimony given in prior proceedings with respect to the question of whether a winds execute message was received in the War or Navy Department, the inquiry conducted by Admiral Hewitt went fully into the matter, among others, of determining if such a message was intercepted prior to December 7, 1941. Admiral Hewitt found: [97] "The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have. "No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition [96] See in this connection, committee record, pp. 9667, 9668. [97] For Hewitt Inquiry report, see committee exhibit No. 157. 486 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op 2O-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message." CONCLUSION: From consideration of all evidence relating to the winds code, it is concluded that no genuine message, in execution of the code and applying to the United States, was received in the War or Navy Department prior to December 7, 1941. It appears, however, that messages were received which were initially thought possibly to be in execution of the code but were determined not to be execute messages. In view of the preponderate weight of evidence to the contrary, it is believed that Captain Safford is honestly mistaken when he insists that an execute message was received prior to December 7, 1941. Considering the period of time that has elapsed, this mistaken impression is understandable. Granting for purposes of discussion that a genuine execute message applying to the winds code was intercepted before December 7, it is concluded that such fact would have added nothing to what was already known concerning the critical character of our relations with the Empire of Japan.