PART I

DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK                1

JAPANESE RECORD OF DECEIT AND AGGRESSION

For several months prior to December 7, 1941, the Governments of the 
United States and Japan had been engaged in conversations with a view to 
settlement of fundamental differences existing in the Far East. To 
appreciate the realistic basis upon which the Government of the United 
States participated in the negotiations it is necessary to consider 
briefly the course of modern Japanese history in order to gauge her 
diplomatic and military purposes. These purposes become apparent through 
an outline review of Japanese aggression: [1]

Upon the conclusion of a successful war against China in 1895 Japan 
annexed Formosa and indicated her purpose, not then realized, of 
establishing herself in China. 

Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan in 1905 effected a foothold in 
Manchuria through acquisition of a lease of the Kwantung territory and 
ownership of the South Manchuria Railway, at the same time acquiring 
southern Sakhalin. 

In 1910, after many years of encroachment, Japan annexed Korea. (In 1904 
she had guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity.) 

In the midst of the First World War Japan in 1915 took advantage of the 
situation to present to China her notorious Twenty-one Demands. 

In 1918 Japan entered into an inter-Allied plan whereby not exceeding 
some 7,000 troops of any one power were to be sent to Siberia to guard 
military stores which might subsequently be needed by Russian forces, to 
assist in organizing Russian self-defense, and to aid in evacuating 
Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. Seizing upon this opportunity the 
Japanese conceived the idea of annexing eastern Siberia, in which she 
was unsuccessful, and sent more than 70,000 troops. 

Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a 
party to the agreements concluded. One of these agreements was the Nine 
Power Treaty which was designed to provide for China full opportunity to 
develop and maintain a stable government. Japan pledged herself to the 
principles and policies of self-restraint toward China which was the 
cornerstone of the Nine Power Treaty. Japan agreed to respect the 
sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity 
of China, and agreed to use her influence to establish the principle of 
equal opportunity in that country. Following the advent of the Cabinet 
of General Tanaka in 1927 Japan adopted a positive policy toward China 
and manifested an increasing disposition to interfere in Chinese 
internal affairs. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, subsequently 
establishing the puppet regime of Manchukuo. (This action was a flagrant 
violation of her agreements 

SEE APPENDIX D FOR A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE THROUGH 
DECEMBER 8,1941 

[1] See committee record, pp. 1076-1085. Committee record references 
throughout this report are to page numbers of the official transcript of 
testimony, which are represented in the printed Hearings of the 
Committee by italic numerals enclosed in brackets.

2              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

at the Washington Conference and was in complete disregard of her 
obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 for the renunciation 
of war as an instrument of national policy.) [2] The Japanese delegate 
to the League of Nations had stated on November 91, 1931: " We want no 
more territory." The end of 1932 saw Japanese occupying the whole of 
Manchuria. Later they moved southward and westward occupying vast areas 
of China. When the League of Nations adopted the report of the Lytton 
Commission appointed by the League to investigate the Manchurian 
situation, Japan walked out of the Assembly on February 24, 1933. On 
March 27 of the same year Japan gave notice of her intention to withdraw 
from the League. [3] 

On February 21,1934 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs dispatched 
a note to the American Secretary of State expressing the conviction that 
no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is 
fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". [4] Yet on April 17, 1934 
a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office issued the "hands off China" 
statement making clear a purpose to compel China to follow the dictates 
of Japan and to permit only such relations with China by other countries 
as the Japanese Government saw fit. 

In a formal declaration Japan on December 29,1934 announced her purpose 
to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed 
at Washington on February 6, 1922. [5] Thereafter she prepared her 
armaments with a view to launching the invasion of China. 

Conversations between Japan and Nazi Germany culminated in the Anti-
Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, to which Italy adhered in 1937. The 
pact marked the genesis of the "Axis." Thus the parallel courses of 
aggression being followed by these countries blended in an expression of 
their common designs in foreign policy. [6] 

Seizing upon the negligible Marco Polo Bridge incident between Japanese 
and Chinese forces near Peiping, Japan in July of 1937 began wholesale 
invasion of China. The lawless acts of the Japanese military in carrying 
forward the invasion was a disgusting and degrading episode of rape, 
theft, and murder. In the outrages attending the occupation of Nanking 
on December 13, 1937, the Japanese military wrote a particularly ignoble 
pages in history. Yet on July 27, 1937, the Japanese Premier, Prince 
Konoye, stated, "In sending troops to North China, of course, the 
Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent 
statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." Again on October 
28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said: "Japan never looks upon the 
Chinese people as an enemy." As observed by Secretary Hull: "Japan 
showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian 
populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese 
homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by 
acts of horror and cruelty." 

[2] Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy. 1931-41 (State 
Department publication), p. 4. committee exhibit No. 28.
[3] Id., at p. 7.
[4] Id., at p. 18.
[5] Id., at p. 12.
[6] Id., at p. 41. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              3

On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U. S. S. 
Panay in the Yangtze River. [7] 

(A proposal made by the Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Hiranuma, on May 
18, 1939 to the Secretary of State, contained the thesis that world 
peace could only be obtained through assuring to nations their "proper 
places in the world". It was suggested subsequently that Hiranuma was 
prepared to sound out Germany and Italy with regard to the holding of a 
conference if the President were prepared at the same time to sound out 
Great Britain and France on the settling of European problems. [7a] The 
proposal was received by the American Government with interest. The 
suggestion was made that Japan could assist in attaining the objective 
of world peace by settling the "armed conflict and consequent political 
disturbances in the Far East today." This suggestion reminded the 
Japanese Government of "the methods of Japan in relations with China", 
which perturbed American opinion. In consequence, the proposal of 
Hiranuma withered with the Japanese refusal to settle her "incident" 
with China, and to indicate her good faith in proposing a search for 
world peace.) 

On April 15, 1940, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that 
the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any 
development * * * that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East 
Indies." But following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany, 
Japan sent a commercial commission to the Indies asking far-reaching 
concessions, the effect of which, if acceded to, would have made the 
Indies a virtual Japanese colony. In August and September of 1940 with 
German assistance Japan extorted from Vichy France an agreement whereby 
Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina. 

On September 27, 1940, Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact along with 
Germany and Italy an alliance pointed directly at the United States. [8] 
As stated by Secretary Hull: "It was designed to discourage the United 
States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan 
and Germany had completed their program of conquest in Asia and Europe, 
when they could turn on the United States then standing alone." 
Commenting on the Tripartite Pact, Premier Konoye was quoted in the 
press of October 1940, as having said: 

"If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of 
Japan, Germany, and Italy and continues persistently its challenging 
attitude and acts * * * those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan 
is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic 
relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan 
and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to induce 
Russia, Britain, and the United States to suspend their operations in 
assisting the Chiang regime."

On July 30, 1941 Japanese aircraft bombed the U. S. S. Tutuila at 
Chungking and struck within 400 yards of the American Embassy at that 
place. On the following day Japan assured the Government of the United 
States that her military would discontinue bombing the city area of 
Chungking. Yet only 11 days later on August 11 the American Embassy 
reported that during 

[7] Id., at pp. 52 53.
[7a] Committee exhibit No. 177. 
[8] The pact provided that Germany Italy and Japan would assist one 
another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the 
powers was attacked *by a power not then involved in the European war or 
in the Chinese-Japanese conflict*. Peace and War p. 84.

[NOTE: Italics in the original text have been marked with asterisks in 
the plain text version. LWJ] 

4                      PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the preceding 4 days Chungking had been delivered unusually heavy and 
prolonged Japanese air raids. Repeatedly Japan gave assurances that 
American lives and property in China would be respected. Despite her 
pledges ever increasing numbers of cases were reported of bombing of 
American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives. 
Secretary Hull summarized the picture in the following words: "Time and 
again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China 
would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put 
into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, 
discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, 
and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily 
detained, and subjected to indignities." 

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND JAPANESE POLICIES

The bold aggression launched by Japan in 1931 in complete violation and 
disregard of treaty obligations stands in irreconcilable conflict with 
the policy [9] voiced by the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, on January 
17, 1933: 

"I am * * * wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign 
policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the 
cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest."

In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt dedicated 
the Nation to the policy of the good neighbor: 

"* * * the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does 
so, respects the rights of others the neighbors who respects his 
obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a 
world of neighbors."

From that time forward, despite repeated efforts and discussions on the 
part of the Government of the United States to incline the Government of 
Japan to a peaceful policy in the Orient, she proceeded in July of 1937 
to invade China. In consequence of this policy of aggression by the 
Empire of Japan, the Secretary of State made public a statement of 
fundamental principles of international policy with a view to rallying 
all countries to the support of peaceful processes. The Secretary said 
on July 16, 1937: [10]

"I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions 
arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the world. 

"Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains 
which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but 
which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world. 
Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are 
threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations 
either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no serious 
hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another 
affect interests or rights or obligations of this country. I therefore 
feel warranted in making in fact, I feel it a duty to make a statement 
of this Government's position in regard to international problems and 
situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern. 

"This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of 
peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We 
advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of 
policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. 
We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by 
processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advo-

[9] Committee record, pp. 1084-1094. 
[10] Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-41. (State 
Department publication), vol. 1, pp. 325-326.  Committee exhibit No. 29.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              5

cate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the 
principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of 
provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes 
carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We 
believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and 
performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for 
revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps 
toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We 
advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international 
trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge 
upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. 
We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the 
necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, 
we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in 
proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid 
entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in 
cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the 
principles hereinbefore stated."

The principles announced in the statement of July 16, 1937, were given 
express application to the Chinese situation in a statement of the 
Secretary of State on August 23, 1937: [11]

"The situation in Shanghai is in many ways unique. Shanghai is a great 
cosmopolitan center, with a population of over three million, a port 
which has been developed by the nationals of many countries, at which 
there have prevailed mutually advantageous contacts of all types and 
varieties between and among the Chinese and people of almost all other 
countries of the world. At Shanghai there exists a multiplicity of 
rights and interests which are of inevitable concern to many countries, 
including the United States. 

"In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in 
facilitating in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of 
American citizens from areas where there is special danger. Further, it 
is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals 
appropriate protection primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled 
elements. For that purpose it has for many years maintained small 
detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending 
the present small reinforcement. These armed forces there have no 
mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance toward 
maintenance of order and security. It has been the desire and the 
intention of the American Government to remove these forces when 
performance of their function of protection is no longer called for, and 
such remains its desire and expectation. 

"The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the 
present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate 
question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United 
States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately 
connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the 
general principles of policy to which attention was called in the 
statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval 
from more than 50 governments. This Government is firmly of the opinion 
that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively 
govern international relationships. 

"When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or 
the existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all 
nations. Without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the 
controversy, we appeal to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We 
urge that they settle their differences in accordance with principles 
which, in the opinion not alone of our people but of most of the world, 
should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable 
throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles 
set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is 
comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many 
treaties; including the Washington Conference treaties and the Kellogg-
Briand Pact of Paris. 

"From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East we have 
been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the 
important of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We 
have been participating constantly in consultation with interested 
governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. The Government does not 
believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in 
extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the 
purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those 
objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our 
well-

[11] Id., at pp. 355-356.

6               PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

defined attitude and policies, and within the range thereof, this 
Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far 
Eastern situation, toward safeguarding the lives and welfare of our 
people and making effective the policies especially the policy of peace 
in which this country believes and to which it is committed."

On October 6, 1937, a release by the Department of State stated among 
other things: [12]

"The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to 
Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee 
of the League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's 
examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the 
treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the 
Department that this report was adopted and approved by the Assembly of 
the League of Nations today, October 6. 

"Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far Fast the 
Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the 
Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities and has offered 
to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both 
parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation 
in the Far Fast. 

"The Secretary of State, in statements made public on July 16 and August 
23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in 
regard to international problems and international relationships 
throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities 
which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan. 
Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the 
United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to 
be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in 
the pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of 
other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by 
process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations 
for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established 
obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of 
treaties. 

"On October 6 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, 
emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation 
pointed out that there can be no stability or peace either within 
nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered 
to by all, that international anarchy destroys every foundation for 
peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security 
of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital 
interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for 
treaties and international morality be restored. 

"In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the 
Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that 
the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which 
should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the 
provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding 
principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and 
to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the 
conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in 
general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations."

Pursuant to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, the United 
States in November of 1937 with 18 other nations participated in a 
conference convened at Brussels with a view to "study peaceable means of 
hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far 
East. The Government of Japan refused repeatedly to participate in the 
conference which prevented bringing the conflict in China to an end and 
resulted in the conference suspending its work on November 24. [13]

The President late in 1937, exercising the discretion provided by law, 
refrained from applying the provisions of the Neutrality Act to the 
conflict between China and Japan. This position was assumed in 
recognition of the fact that the arms-embargo provisions of the act 
worked to the detriment of China and to the benefit of Japan. [14] 

[12] Id., at pp. 396-397.
[13] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1087, 1088; 
also Peace, and War, pp. 51, 52.
[14] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, p. 1088. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              7

On July 26, 1939, the following notification was given the Japanese 
Ambassador by the Secretary of State: [15] 

"EXCELLENCY: During recent years the Government of the United States has 
been examining the treaties of commerce and navigation in force between 
the United States and foreign countries with a view to determining what 
changes may need to be made toward better serving the purpose for which 
such treaties are concluded. In the course of this survey, the 
Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan 
which was signed at Washington on February 21, 1911, contains provisions 
which need new consideration. Toward preparing the way for such 
consideration and with a view to better safeguarding and promoting 
American interests as new developments may require, the Government of 
the United States, acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in 
Article XVII of the treaty under reference, gives notice hereby of its 
desire that this treaty be terminated, and, having thus given notice, 
will expect the treaty, together with its accompanying protocol, to 
expire six months from this date."

In explaining the foregoing action Secretary Hull testified [16] that 
the Treaty of commerce and Navigation was not affording adequate 
protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese-occupied 
portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most-
favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of 
retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. With the termination of 
the treaty on January 26, 1940, the legal impediment to placing 
restrictions upon trade with Japan was removed. 

In the face of widespread bombings of Chinese civilians by the Japanese, 
the Government of the United States placed into effect "moral 
embargoes," adopted on the basis of humanitarian considerations. [17] On 
July 1, 1938, the Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers 
and exporters that the United States Government was strongly opposed to 
the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries whose 
armed forces were using airplanes for attack on civilian populations. In 
1939 the "moral embargo" was extended to materials essential to airplane 
manufacture and to facilities for production of high-quality gasoline. 
[18] Following passage of the act of July 2, 1941, restrictions were 
imposed in the interests of national defense on an ever-increasing 
number of exports of strategic materials. These measures had the 
additional purpose of deterring and expressing the opposition of the 
United States to Japanese aggression. [19] 

On April 15, 1940, when questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's 
position with regard to possible involvement of the Netherlands in the 
European war and its repercussion in the Netherlands East Indies, the 
Japanese Foreign Minister replied: 20 

"With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies, 
Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in 
ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East 
Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to 
say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing 
to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence. 

"Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce 
repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not 
only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-
mentioned relations of economic interdependence and of coexistence and 
co-prosperity, but would also give rise to an undesirable situation from 
the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these 
considerations, the Japanese Government cannot 

[15] Foreign Relations. Vol. II, p. 189; also committee record. p. 1088.
[16] Committee record, p. 1088.
[17] Id. 
[18] Peace and War, p. 89
[19] See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1088,1089.
[20] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 281. 

8               PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation 
of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands 
East Indies."

Referring to the foregoing statement the Secretary of State made the 
following comments on April 17, 1940: 21 

"I have noted with interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese 
Government for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands 
Indies. 

"Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly 
affect the interests of many countries. 

"The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international 
relationships of the whole Pacific Ocean. The islands themselves extend 
for a distance of approximately 3,200 miles east and west astride of the 
Equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on 
the east. They are also an important factor in the commerce of the whole 
world They produce considerable portions of the word's supplies of 
important essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, copra, et 
cetera. Many countries, including the United States, depend 
substantially upon them for some of these commodities. 

"Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any 
alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be 
prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in 
the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. 

"This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application 
and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in 
notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and 
Japan in which each of the two Governments stated that its policy was 
directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of 
the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United 
States, the British Empire, France and Japan as parties to the treaty 
signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular 
possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific 
Ocean sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which 
each of those Governments declared that "it is firmly resolved to 
respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular 
possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." 

"All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestly urging 
that policies of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the 
basis of fundamental principles, among which are respect by every nation 
for the rights of other nations and nonintervention in their domestic 
affairs, the according of equality of fair and just treatment, and the 
faithful observance of treaty pledges, with modification thereof, when 
needful, by orderly processes. 

"It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States as it is 
no doubt that of all peacefully inclined governments that the attitudes 
and policies of all governments will be based upon these principles and 
that these principles will be applied not only in every part of the 
Pacific area, but also in every part of the world."

The situation existing during 1940 was summarized by Secretary Hull in 
his testimony before the committee: [22]

"Throughout this period the united States increasingly followed a policy 
of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This 
took several different forms, including diplomatic actions in protest of 
Japan's aggression against China and of Japan's violation of American 
rights. Loans and credits aggregating some $200,000,000 were extended in 
order to bolster China's economic structure and to facilitate the 
acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-lease and other 
military supplies were sent to be used in China's resistance against 
Japan. 

"During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind, 
and I was explaining to Members of Congress and other Americans with 
whom I came in contact, that it was apparent that the Japanese military 
leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific 
area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South 
Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration 
with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had 
the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order 
in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves. 

[21] Id., at p. 282. 
[22] Committee Record, pp. 1089-92. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              9

"I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced 
a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations 
with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to 
find any new way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon 
this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider 
their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social 
aspects. The people of China were living on a very low standard. Japan, 
if it should conquer China, would keep China bled white and would not 
have the capital to aid in restoring purchasing power and social 
welfare. It meant everything for the development of that half of the 
world's population to use the capital of all nations, such as the United 
States and other countries, in helping China, for example, to develop 
internal improvements and increase its purchasing power. We had reminded 
the Japanese of our traditional friendship and our mutually profitable 
relations. 

"During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines 
and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at 
all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that I had 
always felt that if a government makes a  threat it ought to be ready to 
back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful as 
possible. 

"I was pointing out in these conversations that if we had not, by 
previously modifying our neutrality Act, been in a position to send 
military aid to Great Britain in the early summer of 1940 there might 
well have been a different story. Our aid assisted Britain to hold back 
the invaders for 7 months, while we had that 7 months in which to arm, 
and everybody knew that no country ever needed time in which to arm more 
than we did in the face of the world situation."

In his address to Congress on January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt 
declared [23] that "at no previous time has American security been as 
seriously threatened from without as it is today." He observed that the 
pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number 
of independent nations with the aggressors still on the march 
threatening other nations, great and small. The national policy of the 
Government of the United States was outlined by the President as 
committed to an all-inclusive national defense, to full support of 
resolute peoples everywhere who were resisting aggression and thereby 
were keeping war away from our hemisphere, and to the proposition that 
principles of morality and considerations for our own security would 
"never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors. " 

In a statement on January 15, 1941, in support of the Lend-Lease Act 
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, 
Secretary Hull said: [24] 

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the 
start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a 
dominant position in the entire region of the Eastern Pacific. Her 
leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain 
that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an 
area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. 
As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade 
routes in that region."

As Secretary Hull testified [25]-

"I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, 
ruthless, and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests and 
that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the 
security of the Western Hemisphere." "
 
The hope of the United States, therefore, for mediation and conciliation 
based on peaceful processes was overshadowed by an uncompromising and 
relentless aggressor who had cast her lot with the Axis in the 
Tripartite Pact of September 1940 and voiced her slogan of domination by 
force in the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." 

[23] See Committee record pp. 1092, 1093. 
[24] Committee record, p, 1093. 
[25] Id.