10 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The backdrop of activity by Japan's partners left little doubt as to the program and methods of the Axis: [26] On October 14,1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference coincidentally giving notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations. On October 3,1935, Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopia. In violation of the Locarno Pact Hitler proceeded in March of 1936 to occupy and fortify the demilitarized Rhineland. On March 11, 1938, German forces entered Austria and 2 days later proclaimed the union of Germany and Austria. At Munich on September 29, 1938, Hitler and Mussolini extorted a settlement by which Germany acquired the Sudetenland. In violation of pledges given at Munich, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia on March 14,1939. With further German aggression, war broke out in Europe on September 1, 1939, which as Secretary Hull stated "weakened the position of all countries. Including the United States, opposed to Japanese banditry in the Pacific." He presented the picture in the following terms: "In the early summer of 1940 France's effective resistance collapsed. Britain was virtually under siege. Germany's vast and powerful military machine remained intact. "Nazi submarines and long-range bombers were taking a heavy toll of ships and materials in the North Atlantic. Shipping was inadequate. The countries resisting aggression desperately needed supplies to increase their defenses. "It was clear that any aggravation of the situation in the Far East would have a serious effect on the already dangerous situation in Europe, while conversely, an easement of the Far Eastern tension would aid enormously the struggle against the Nazis in Europe." STEPS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO MEET THE THREAT OF AXIS AGGRESSION With each threatened "annexation" or "occupation" of countries bordering on Germany up to the invasion of Poland, President Roosevelt had made an appeal for the settlement of differences without recourse to force or the threat of force; but the United States in line with its traditional aloofness in European affairs had adopted no positive measures to deter Hitler's course of aggression. In the face of the inexorable trend of Axis militarism, however, progressive steps were taken by the Government of the United States to build our defenses and throw our weight on the side of France and Great Britain. For purposes of convenient reference it would be well to review briefly these steps. Addressing the Congress in extraordinary session on September 21, 1939, the President recommended that the arms embargo be repealed and that our citizens and our ships be restricted from dangerous areas in order to prevent controversies that might involve the United States in war. On November 4 the arms embargo was repealed, thereby permitting large shipments of aircraft and other implements of war, much of which had been ordered by Great Britain and France before the outbreak of war, to be shipped across the Atlantic for use in combating Nazi aggression. [27] [26] See committee record, pp. 1093-1095. [27] Peace and War, pp. 69, 70. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 11 In an address on June 10, 1940, at Charlottesville, Va., the President announced the policy of extending the material resources of the United States to the opponents of force. He said: "We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this Nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. [28]" With a view to strengthening the defenses of the Eastern Hemisphere an agreement was made on September 2, 1940, between the United States and Great Britain whereby the latter received 50 over-aged destroyers and the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, in British Guiana, and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua. Referring to this agreement, the President stated that the value to the Western Hemisphere "of these outposts of security is beyond calculation." He considered them essential to the protection of the Panama Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico, and our eastern and Gulf seaboards. [29] On September 16, 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act was enacted, marking another important step for national defense. The act included a provision that persons inducted into the land forces should not be employed beyond the Western Hemisphere except in United States Territories and possessions. It marked, for the first time in the history of the United States, the adoption of compulsory military training of manpower when the Nation was not at war. [30] President Roosevelt, in an address of December 29, 1940, observed that the Nazi masters of Germany had made it clear they intended not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country but also to enslave the whole of Europe and to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world. He pointed out that although some of our people liked to believe that wars in Europe and Asia were of no concern to us, it was a matter of most vital concern that European and Asiatic war makers should not gain control of the oceans which led to the Western Hemisphere. He pointed out that if Great Britain went down the Axis Powers would control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the high seas, and would then be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. Warning of the danger ahead, the President stated the Government was planning our defense with the utmost urgency and in it we must "integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations resisting aggression." Referring to the need for increased production, the President said we must have more ships, more guns, more planes; we must be the great "arsenal of democracy." [31] With the signature of the President on March 11, 1941, the lend-lease bill became law. This bill provided the machinery enabling the United States to make the most effective use of our resources for our own needs and for those whom, in our own self-defense, we were determined to aid. Secretary Hull expressed the belief that this act would make it possible for us to allocate our resources in ways best [28} Id., at p. 76. [29] Id., at p. 83. [30] Id., at p. 84. [31] Id., at pp. 86, 87. 12 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK calculated to provide for the security of the United States and of this continent. [32] On April 10, 1941, the Department of State announced an agreement regarding Greenland, recognizing that as a result of a European war there was danger that Greenland might be converted into a point of aggression against nations of the American Continent. This agreement accepted the responsibility on behalf of the United States of assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its existing status, and granted to the United States the right to locate and construct airplane landing fields and facilities for the defense of Greenland and this continent. [33] In an address on May 27, 1941, the President declared an "unlimited national emergency," stating that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been "based on a hard-headed concern for our own security and for the kind of safe and civilized world in which we wished to live." He stated that every dollar of material that we sent helped to keep the dictators away from our own hemisphere and every day they were held off gave us time in which to build more guns and tanks and planes and ships. [34] On July 7, 1941, the President announced that in accordance with an understanding reached with the Prime Minister of Iceland, forces had arrived in Iceland in order to supplement and eventually to replace the British forces which had been stationed there to insure the adequate defense of that country. The President pointed out that the United States could not permit the occupation by Germany of a strategic outpost in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere. [35] Subsequently there was instituted an escort to Iceland of United States and Iceland shipping. [36] In a joint declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, the principles of the Atlantic Charter were enunciated on August 14, 1941. [37] In a message of August 15, 1941, in which he was joined by Prime Minister Churchill, the President advised Premier Stalin that the United States and Great Britain had consulted together as to how best they could help the Soviet Union; that they were cooperating to provide the Soviet Union with the very maximum of supplies most urgently needed and that many shiploads had already left for the Soviet Union and more would leave in the immediate future. [38] On September 11, 1941, as a result of several incidents fully demonstrating a grave menace to the vital interests of the United States, the President warned that from that time forward, if German or Italian vessels of war entered the waters the protection of which was necessary for American defense, they would do so "at their own peril." [39] Despite the announcement of the "shooting orders", ships of the United States and other American Republics continued to be sunk in the Atlantic Ocean by Nazi submarines. In view of this situation and in view of the fact that the Neutrality Act of 1939 prohibited the arm- [32] Id., at p. 100. [33] Id., at pp. 103, 104. [34] Id., at p. 111. [35] Id., at p. 111. [36] See committee record, p. 6111. [37] "Peace and War," p. 111. [38] Id., at p. 113. [39] Id., at pp. 113-115. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 13 ing of United States merchant ships engaged in foreign commerce and prevented United States merchant ships from carrying cargoes to belligerent ports, it became increasingly difficult to obtain shipping for the cartage of lend-lease supplies to Great Britain and other nations whose defense was considered vital to the defense of the United States. Accordingly, on October 9, 1941, the President asked Congress to modify the Neutrality Act. On November 17, 1941, in a joint resolution of the Congress, sections of the act were repealed permitting United States vessels to be armed and to carry cargoes to belligerent ports anywhere. [40] In contrast with our historic aloofness in European affairs, it was the traditional policy of the United States, based upon territorial, commercial, and humanitarian interests, to maintain a concern in the Pacific. This policy had its inception in the enunciation of the Hay open-door policy toward China in 1899 which formed the cornerstone of the Nine-Power Treaty, adopted concurrently with the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. [41] To implement this policy Japan's course of aggression was countered by a series of deterrent measures in addition to those relating generally to the Axis or applying more specifically to the European situation. These measures included material aid to China, curtailment of trade with Japan, and basing of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii. INITIAL UNITED STATE-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, 1941 Admiral Nomura, the new Japanese Ambassador, was received by the President on February 14, 1941, at which time reference was made to the progressive deterioration of relations between Japan and the United States. President Roosevelt suggested that Ambassador Nomura might desire to reexamine and frankly discuss with the American Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations. Secretary Hull made the following observations concerning the initial conversations with the Japanese Ambassador: [42] "On March 8 (1941) in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims. "On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious concern and suspicion. "On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows: "(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; "(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; [40] Id., at pp. 115-117. [41] Id., at p. 168. [42] Committee record, pp. 1103, 1104. 14 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; "(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means. "I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with those principles." JAPANESE PROPOSAL OF MAY 12 The Japanese Ambassador on May 12 presented a proposal for a general settlement the essence of which was (1) that the United States should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan and, if the Generalissimo should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to the Chinese Government; (2) that normal trade relations between Japan and the United States should be resumed, and (3) that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources (including oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) in the Southwest Pacific area. [43] This proposal contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact with specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto *if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted*. In referring to the proposal Secretary Hull said: [44] "The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources, facilities, and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense against communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and inner Mongolia. "Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gage settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood." The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs advised Ambassador Grew on May 14, 1941, that he and Prince Konoye were determined that Japan's southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means "*unless circumstances render this impossible.*" Replying to the inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind the Foreign Minister referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When it was pointed out by Ambassador Grew that such measures were defensive in character, the Japanese Minister observed that the measures in question were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public which might bring pressure on the Government to act. [45] President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, as has been indicated, proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and declared in a radio address on the same day that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. [46] [43] There were also other provisions, which Japan eventually dropped. calling for joint guaranty of Philippine independence, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a nondiscriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe. [44] Committee record, pp. 1104-1106. [45] See committee record, pp. 1106, 1107. [46] Id., at p. 1107. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 15 Secretary Hull commented as follows with respect to preliminary conversations with Ambassador Nomura: [47] "During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of nondiscrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific; and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace. "The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles." JAPANESE REACTION TO GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA In violation of the August 23, 1939, nonaggression pact, Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The invasion of Russia removed the restraining influence on the western flank of Japan and the life-and-death struggle of the Soviet Union for existence was seized upon by the Government of Japan to realize its dreams of empire in the Far East. In an intercepted message of July 31, 1941, from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy the reaction of Japan to the war between Germany and Russia was unequivocally expressed: [48] "Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. The opportunist disposition of Japan was cogently expressed much earlier in a dispatch of September 12, 1940, from Ambassador Grew to the State Department: [49] "Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that *the army and other elements in the country see in the present world situation a golden opportunity to carry into effect their dreams of expansion*; the German victories have gone to their heads like strong wine; until recently they have believed implicitly in the defeat of Great Britain; they have argued that the war will probably (*) in a quick German victory and that it is well to consolidate Japan's position in greater East Asia while Germany is still acquiescent and before the eventual hypothetical strengthening of German naval power might rob Japan of far-flung control in the Far East; they have discounted effective opposition on the part of the United States although carefully watching our attitude. *The ability of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control these elements has been and is doubtful*. * * * "Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the tide. Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from attaining their objectives. Japan today is one of the predatory powers; *she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become frankly and unashamedly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the weakness of others*. Her policy of southward expansion [47] Id., at pp. 1108,1109. [48] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 9. [49] Committee exhibit No. 26. 16 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK is a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific. And is a thrust at the British Empire in the east. Following an Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2 at which "the fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was decided" Japan proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale. From one to two million reservists and conscripts were called to the colors. Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were suddenly recalled; restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan; strict censorship of mails and communications was effected; and conditions were generally imposed throughout the Empire presaging a major military effort. The Japanese press dwelt constantly on the theme that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never before approached in its history. The United States was charged with using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The Japanese press warned that if the United States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would face a final crisis. [50] This false propaganda was clearly designed to condition the Japanese public for further military aggression. In an intercepted dispatch of July 2, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin for the confidential information of the Japanese Ambassador and staff, the policy of Japan was expressed in the following terms: [51] "1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change. "2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China Incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection." In a second part of the same message Japan outlined the "principal points" upon which she proposed to proceed: "For the purpose of bringing the Chiang Regime to submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed*." TEMPORARY CESSATION OF NEGOTIATIONS During July of 1941 reports were received that a Japanese military movement into southern Indochina was imminent. The Government of the United States called to the attention of Japan the incompatibility of such reports with the conversations then under way looking to an agreement for peace in the Pacific. Asked concerning the facts of the situation, the Japanese Ambassador on July 23 explained the Japanese movement into southern as well as northern Indochina by observing that Japan feared, first, that vital supplies including rice, foodstuffs, and raw materials from Indochina might be cut off by [50] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 339, 340. [51] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 1, 2. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 17 de Gaullist French agents and Chinese agitators in southern Indochina and, second, that Japan believed certain foreign powers were determined to encircle Japan militarily and for that reason occupation of southern Indochina was undertaken purely as a precautionary measure. [52] The explanation of Ambassador Nomura is in interesting contrast with an intercepted dispatch of July 14, 1941, from Canton to Tokyo: [53] "Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches is as follows: "1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude. "2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two * * *." In commenting on the observations made by Ambassador Nomura, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Wells on July 23, 1941, pointed out that any agreement which might have been concluded between the French Government at Vichy and Japan could only have resulted from pressure exerted on Vichy by Germany; and in that consequence this agreement could only be looked upon as offering assistance to Germany's policy of world domination and conquest. He further observed that conclusion of the agreement under discussion by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Nomura would bring about a far greater measure of economic security to Japan than she could secure through occupation of Indochina; that the policy of the United States was the opposite of an encirclement policy or of any policy which would be a threat to Japan; that Japan was not menaced by the policy of Great Britain and if an agreement had been concluded, Great Britain, the British Dominions, China, and the Netherlands would have joined the United States and Japan in support of the underlying principles stood for by the United States. He pointed out that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy of force and conquest, and, since there was no apparent basis calling for filling Indochina with Japanese military and other forces as a measure for defending Japan, the United States must assume that Japan was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. Finally, the Acting Secretary said that in these circumstances the Secretary of State with whom he had talked a few minutes before could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations in which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been engaged. [54] On July 24 Mr. Welles made a statement to the press in which he characterized the Japanese action in Indochina in substantially the [52] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 340. [53] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2. [54] See Foreign Relations, vol., II, p. 341. 18 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK same terms as in his statement of the previous day to the Japanese Ambassador. He further pointed out that the actions of Japan endangered the use of the Pacific by peaceful nations; that these actions tended to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials such as tin and rubber, which were necessary in our defense program; and that the steps being taken by Japan endangered the safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands. [66] Also, on July 24, 1941, in the face of a progressive movement by Japan into southern Indochina, the President proposed to the Japanese Government that French Indochina be regarded as a "neutralized" country. This proposal contemplated that Japan would be given the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which on the basis of Japan's own representations she was seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government did not accept the President's proposal. The answer of Japan was characteristically pragmatic and well described in the following language: [56] "Large Japanese forces, however, soon were moved into southern Indochina. Japan's constant expansion of her military position in the southwest Pacific had already substantially imperiled the security of the United States along with that of other powers. By this further expansion in southern Indochina, Japan virtually completed the encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its armed forces within striking distance of vital trade routes. *This constituted an overt act directly menacing the security of the United States and other powers that were at peace with Japan*. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. No sooner were Japanese military forces moved into southern Indochina than there began to appear evidence that there was in progress a vigorous under-cover movement of Japanese infiltration into Thailand. With Japan's armed forces poised for further attacks the possibility of averting armed conflict lay only in the bare chance that there might be reached some agreement which would cause Japan to abandon her policy and procedure of aggression. Under those circumstances and in the light of those considerations, the Government of the United States decided at that point, as did certain other governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of trade with Japan had become an appropriate, warranted and necessary step as an open warning to Japan and as a measure of self-defense." With the unsuccessful attempt to bring to a halt Japanese aggression in Indochina no further conversations were held on the subject of an agreement until August of 1941. FREEZING OF ASSETS It was clear that positive action must be taken under the circumstances for reasons well expressed by Secretary Hull in his testimony: [57] "The hostilities between Japan and China had been in progress for four years. During those years the United States had continued to follow in its relations with Japan a policy of restraint and patience. It had done this notwithstanding constant violation by Japanese authorities or agents of American rights and legitimate interests in China, in neighboring areas, and even in Japan, and notwithstanding acts and statements by Japanese officials indicating a policy of widespread conquest by force and even threatening the United States. The American Government had sought, while protesting against Japanese acts and while wielding no rights, to make clear a willingness to work out with Japan by peaceful processes a basis for continuance of amiable relations with Japan. It had desired to give the Japanese every opportunity to turn of their own accord from their program of conquest toward peaceful policies. [55] Id. [56] Id., at p. 342. [57] Committee record, pp. 1111-1113. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 19 "The President and I, in our effort to bring about the conclusion of an agreement, had endeavored to present to the Japanese Government a feasible alternative to Japan's indicated program of conquest. We had made abundantly clear our willingness to cooperate with Japan in a program based upon peaceful principles. We had repeatedly indicated that if such a program were adopted for the Pacific, and if thereafter any countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, our Government would expect to cooperate with other governments in extending assistance to the region threatened. "While these discussions were going on in Washington, many responsible Japanese officials were affirming in Tokyo and elsewhere Japan's determination to pursue a policy of cooperation with her Axis allies. Both Mr. Matsuoka and his successor as Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared that the Three Power Pact stood and that Japanese policy was based upon that pact. Large-scale preparation by Japan for extension of her military activities was in progress, especially since early July. Notwithstanding our efforts expressly to impress upon the Japanese Government our Government's concern and our objection to movement by Japan with use or threat of force into Indochina, the Japanese Government had again obtained by duress from the Vichy Government an authorization and Japanese armed forces had moved into southern Indochina occupied bases there, and were consolidating themselves there for further southward movements." Confronted with the implacable attitude of Japan, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order on July 26, 1941, freezing Japanese assets in the United States. This order brought under control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests were involved. The effect of the order was to bring to virtual cessation trade between the United States and Japan. [58] It should be noted that shortly before large Japanese forces went into French Indochina, late in July, a change was effected in the Japanese Cabinet whereby Admiral Toyoda took over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs from Mr. Matsuoka. Thereafter the Japanese Prime Minister, the new Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Nomura made emphatic and repeated protestations of Japan's desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific problems. Despite these representations of peaceful intentions, the Japanese Government continued with mobilization in Japan, and dispatched increasing numbers of armed forces to Manchuria, Indochina, and south China. Bombing of American property in China continued, including bursts which damaged the American Embassy and the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking. [59] An intercepted message of July 19, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin presented a candid estimate of the change in the Japanese Cabinet: [60] "The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact" RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PROPOSED MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PREMIER KONOYE The Japanese Government did not reply to the President's proposal of July 24, but on August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which, so he stated, purported to be responsive to that of the President. This proposal provided among other things: (1) For removal of restrictions which the United States had imposed upon trade with Japan; [58] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 343. [59] Id., at p. 343 [60] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 3.