20 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (2) For "suspension of its (the United States') military measures in the southwest Pacific area"; (3) For the exercise of good offices by the United States for the initiation of direct negotiations between Japan and China; (4) For withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indochina after a settlement between Japan and China; (5) For recognition by the United States of Japan's special position in Indochina even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Throughout the negotiations it had been specified or implied that Japan would expect the United States, in the proposed exercise of its good offices between China and Japan, to discontinue aid to China. The Japanese proposal of August 6 completely ignored the proposal of the President to which it was allegedly responsive. It asked either expressly or by implication that the United States remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; discontinue furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the arming of their far eastern possessions; discontinue aid to the Chinese Government; and acquiesce in Japan's assertion and exercise of a special military position and a permanent preferential political and economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was committed. The Japanese Government in return offered not to station Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the southwestern Pacific area. On August 8 Secretary Hull informed Japan's Ambassador that the Japanese proposal was not responsive to the President's proposal of July 24. Ambassador Nomura thereupon inquired whether it might be possible for President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye to meet with a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views between the two Governments. [61] This suggestion was made pursuant to a dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura which related in pertinent part: [62] "We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to determine a way out of the present situation. "In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt. "Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific." The sincerity of Japan's desire for peace and the appraisal of any hopes for a satisfactory settlement from such n meeting necessarily had to be viewed in the light of a statement only 7 days earlier in an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura: [63] [61] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p, 344. [62] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 12 [63] Id., at p. 10. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 21 "Thus, *all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact*. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action." On August 18, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs orally observed to Ambassador Grew that the only way to prevent the strained relations between the United States and Japan from further deterioration would be through a meeting of President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime Minister. Strict secrecy concerning the proposal was urged upon our Ambassador for the reason that premature announcement of the meeting would result in the project being "torpedoed" by certain elements in Japan. The Japanese Government's concern for preserving the secrecy of the proposed meeting between the President and Premier Konoye is fully evinced in an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on September 3, 1941: [64] "Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, *that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner*. "In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher's story in the Herald- Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well imagine. "The government is not afraid of the above-mentioned confusion; nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this ease. "Because of the circumstances being what they are we would like to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our approval.) "Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of this plan." The fact that the Konoye Cabinet desired the suggested meeting between the President and the Japanese Premier to be strictly secret for the reason that premature disclosure would result in frustration of the move by hostile elements in Japan would indicate beyond doubt that there existed in Japan a formidable opposition to efforts designed to achieve an improvement in relations with the United States. [65] Further, secrecy with respect to such a meeting would accomplish the additional purpose from the Japanese viewpoint of disguising from her Axis partners, Germany and Italy, the fact that steps might be undertaken which would in any way compromise Japan's commitments under the Tripartite Pact. [*There will be found in Appendix D a detailed and comprehensive review of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and related matters, during the critical period from the Atlantic Conference through December 8, 1941, in the light of the facts made public by this committee, to which reference is hereby made.*] In connection with the proposed meeting it should be noted that President Roosevelt returned to Washington on August 17 from the [64] Id., at p. 25. [65] See Memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, committee exhibit No. 173. 22 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Atlantic Conference at which the far eastern situation had been discussed with Mr. Churchill. It had been agreed by both the President and Prime Minister Churchill that more time was needed by both the United States and Britain to prepare their defenses against Japanese attack in the Far East. It was further agreed that steps should be taken to warn Japan against new moves of aggression. The President and Mr. Churchill were in agreement that this Government should be prepared to continue its conversations with the Government of Japan and thereby leave open to her a reasonable and just alternative to the aggressive course which she had mapped out for herself. Upon his return to Washington from the Atlantic Conference, the President on August 17 handed the Japanese Ambassador two documents, one pointing out that the principles and policies under discussion in conversations between the two Governments precluded expansion by force or threat of force and that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward insuring the security of the United States. [66] In the second document reference was made to the desire expressed earlier in August by the Japanese Government to resume conversations and to the Ambassador's suggestion of August 8 that President Roosevelt and the Japanese Minister meet with a view to discussing means for adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan. Reaffirmation was made of this Government's intention not to consider any proposals affecting the rights of either country except as such proposals might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States had long been committed and of its intention to continue to follow its policy of aiding nations resisting aggression. It was pointed out that informal conversations with the Japanese Government relative to a peaceful settlement would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program involving the application to the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to raw materials and other essential commodities; and that such a program would contemplate cooperation by all nations of the Pacific toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill and economic leadership toward building up the economies of each country and toward increasing the purchasing power and raising the standards of living of the nations and peoples concerned. The opinion was expressed that if Japan was seeking what it affirmed to be its objectives the program outlined was one that could be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with a far greater measure of certainty than could any other program. The statement was made that, in case Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States was committed, the Government of the United States was prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to [66] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 656. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 23 exchange news. It was also stated that, before renewal of the conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the two Governments, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given of its present attitude and plans. If the Japanese Government continued its movement of force and conquest, "we could not," the President said to the Ambassador, "think of reopening the conversations." On August 28 the Japanese Ambassador handed the President a message from Premier Konoye urging a meeting between the heads of the Governments of the United States and Japan to discuss all important problems in the Pacific. This message was accompanied by a statement of the Japanese Government in which assurances were given, with several qualifications, of Japan's peaceful intentions and her desire to seek a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the United States had long been committed. The qualifications were voiced in the following terms: the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina "as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is established in east Asia"; Japan would take no military action against the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Union remained faithful to the Soviet Japanese neutrality treaty and did "not menace Japan or Manchukuo or undertake any action contrary to the spirit of said treaty"; the Japanese Government had no intention of using "without provocation" military force against any neighboring nation. [67] On September 3 the President handed the Japanese Ambassador the following "oral statement." [68] "Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a meeting between the responsible heads of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States to discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister of the readiness of the Government of the United States to move as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and suggested that there be held preliminary discussion of important questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In further explanation of the views of the Government of the United States in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as follows: "On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State referred to four fundamental principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which all relations between nations should properly rest. These four fundamental principles are as follows: "1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations. "2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. "3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity. "4. Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means. "In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to make it clear that in the opinion of the Government of the United States Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be assured access to the raw materials and markets which Japan needs and ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States and other countries, and that only upon [67] Id., at pp. 346, 347. [68] Id., at pp. 589-59l. 24 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area. "The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which was communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28 there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the informal conversations already referred to. The Government of the United States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political expansion or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages, or preferences by force. "The Government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government has made reference. The Government of the United States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be taken to insure the success of any efforts which the Governments of Japan and of the United States might mate to collaborate toward a peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the conversations to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked "Oral, Unofficial, and Without Commitment" which contained a redraft of the Japanese Government's proposal of May 12, 1941. It will be recalled further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there were certain fundamental questions with respect to which there were divergences of view between the two Governments, and which remained unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July. The Government of the United States desires to facilitate progress toward a conclusive discussion, but believes that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above-mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under reference. "It goes without saying that each Government in reaching decisions on policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country and the attitude of public opinion therein. The Government of Japan will surely recognize that the Government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the principles in which the American people in fact all nations that prefer peaceful methods to methods of force believe. "The Government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of the Japanese Government on the matters above set forth." The formal reply of the President to the Japanese Prime Minister was handed Ambassador Nomura on September 3, and follows: [69] "I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27, which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura. "I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations. "I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish to assure you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries. "In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed, and it was declared that the Japanese Government "considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world" and that "such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself." "I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if [69] Id., at pp. 591, 592. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 25 widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that *we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement*. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this suggestion." The decision to defer any meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister pending preliminary discussions of fundamental and essential questions was deliberate and well considered. Secretary Hull testified fully concerning the considerations attending the decision: [70] "A meeting between the President and Prince Konoe [70a] would have been a significant step. Decision whether it should be undertaken by our Government involved several important considerations. "We knew that *Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous*. We asked ourselves whether the military element in Japan would permit the civilian element, even if so disposed, to stop Japan's course of expansion by force and to revert to peaceful courses. Time and again the civilian leaders gave assurances; time and again the military took aggressive action in direct violation of those assurances. Japan's past and contemporary record was replete with instances of military aggression and expansion by force. *Since 1931 and especially since 1937 the military in Japan exercised a controlling voice in Japan's national policy*. "Japan's formal partnership with Nazi Germany in the Tripartite Alliance was a hard and inescapable fact. The Japanese had been consistently unwilling in the conversations to pledge their Government to renounce Japan's commitments in the alliance. They would not state that Japan would refrain from attacking this country if it became involved through self-defense in the European war. *They held on to the threat against the United States implicit in the alliance*. "Our Government could not ignore the fact that throughout the conversations the Japanese spokesmen had made a *practice of offering general formulas* and, when pressed for explanation of the meaning, had consistently narrowed and made more rigid their application. This suggested that when military leaders became aware of the generalized formulas they insisted upon introducing conditions which watered down the general assurances. "A meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister would have had important psychological results. "It would have had a *critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese*. "If the proposed meeting should merely endorse general principles, the Japanese in the light of their past practice could have been expected to utilize such general principles in support of any interpretation which Japan might choose to place upon them. "*If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the Japanese military leaders would then have been in a position to declare that the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting.* "The Japanese had already refused to agree to any preliminary steps toward reversion to peaceful courses, as, for example, adopting the President's proposal of July 24 regarding the neutralization of Indochina. Instead they steadily moved on with their program of establishing themselves more firmly in Indochina. "It was clear to us that *unless the meeting produced concrete and clear-cut commitments toward peace, the Japanese would have distorted the significance of the meeting in such a way as to weaken greatly this country's moral position and to facilitate their aggressive course.* "The acts of Japan under Konoe's Prime Ministership could not be overlooked. "He had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China and when huge Japanese armies poured into that country and occupied its principal cities and industrial regions. "He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces attacked the U. S. S. Panay on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937. [70] Committee record, pp. 1120-1124. For a thoroughgoing discussion of events and circumstances attending the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, see Appendix D. [70a] It is to be noted that except in those instances where the name appears in direct quotations, the Japanese Prime Minister's name is spelled Konoye, rather than Konoe. 26 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces committed notorious outrages in Nanking in 1937. "He as Prime Minister had proclaimed in 1938 the basic principles upon which the Japanese Government, even throughout the 1941 conversations, stated that it would insist in any peace agreement with China. Those principles in application included stationing large bodies of Japanese troops in North China. They would have enabled Japan to retain a permanent stranglehold on China. "He had been Prime Minister when the Japanese Government concluded in 1940 with the Chinese Quisling regime at Nanking a "treaty" embodying the stranglehold principles mentioned in the preceding paragraph. "Prince Konoe had been Japanese Prime Minster when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940. "As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese over a period of months, in which they showed no disposition to abandon their course of conquest, *we were thoroughly satisfied that a meeting with Konoe could only result either in another Munich or in nothing at all, unless Japan was ready to give some clear evidence of a purpose to move in a peaceful direction*. I was opposed to the first Munich and still more opposed to a second Munich. "Our Government ardently desired peace. It could not brush away the realities in the situation. "Although the President would, as he said, "have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan," it was felt that in view of the factors mentioned the President could go to such a meeting only if there were first obtained tentative commitments offering some assurance that the meeting could accomplish good. Neither Prince Konoe nor any of Japan's spokesmen provided anything tangible. [71]" JAPANESE PROPOSALS OF SEPTEMBER 6 AND 27 On September 6 Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull the following proposal: {72] "The Government of Japan undertakes: "(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations; "(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indochina against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan; "(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self- defense, and, in ease the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided; "(d) that Japan will endeavour to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China; "(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis; [71] The Konoye Memoirs reflect that the Japanese Navy approved the idea of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister whereas the Army viewed such a meeting as of questioned desirability. After outlining his ideas with respect to such a meeting Prince Konoye observed: "Both the War and Navy Ministers listened to me intently. Neither could give me an immediate reply but before the day (August 4, 1941) was over, the Navy expressed complete accord and, moreover, anticipated the success of the conference. The War Minister's reply came in writing, as follows: " 'If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created. For these reasons the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The attempt to surmount the present artificial situation by the Prime Minister's offering his personal services is viewed with sincere respect and admiration. *If, therefore it is the Prime Minister's intention to attend such a meeting with determination to firmly support the basic principles embodied in the Empire's revised plan to the N plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even after this final effort is made the army is not necessarily in disagreement.* " 'However (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if, after making preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with someone other than the President such as Secretary Hull or one in a lesser capacity; (2) *you shall not resign your post as a result of the meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war againat America.'* "The War Minister was of the opinion that 'failure of this meeting is the greater likelihood.' " See committee exhibit No. 173, pp. 30, 31. [72] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 608, 609. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 27 "(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it needs; "(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with the above mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity. "The Government of the United States undertakes: " "(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavour by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair; " "(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (f) referred to above; " "(e) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area; " "(d) that the United States will immediately [upon settlement] reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal." " Secretary Hull made the following comments with respect to the foregoing Japanese proposal: [73] "On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of proposals. These proposals were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort to military action against any region south of Japan. No commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula contained in the draft that "the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted *so long as pursued* on an equitable basis" [italics added] clearly implied a concept that the conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan. [74]" From time to time during September of 1941 discussions were held between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador. On September 27, Ambassador Nomura presented a complete redraft of the Japanese proposals of September 6, following the form of the American proposals of June 21. On October 2, Secretary Hull replied to the proposals made by the Japanese Ambassador during September, handing the Ambassador an "oral statement" reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining our Government's attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which our Government did not consider consistent with the principles to which this country was committed. He said: [75] "Disappointment was expressed over the narrow character of the outstanding Japanese proposals, and questions were raised in regard to Japan's intentions regarding the indefinite stationing of Japanese troops in wide areas of China and regarding Japan's relationship to the Axis Powers. While welcoming the Japanese suggestion of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime [73] Committee record, pp. 1118,1119. [74] The Konoye Memoirs reveal that on September 6 an imperial conference was held at which were determined the basic principles of the Japanese Empire's national policy. Among these principles was the understanding that in case there was no way found for attainment of Japanese demands by early in October of 1941 the Empire should at once determine to make up its mind to get ready for war against the United States Great Britain and the Netherlands. Committee exhibit No. 173. [75] Committee record, pp. 1124-1126. 28 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Minister, we proposed, in order to lay a firm foundation for such a meeting, that renewed consideration be given to fundamental principles so as to reach a meeting of minds on essential questions. It was stated in conclusion that the subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought had engaged the close and active interest of the President and that it was the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that such a meeting could be held. "During this period there was a further advance of Japanese armed forces in Indochina, Japanese military preparations at home were increased and speeded up, and there continued Japanese bombing of Chinese civilian populations, constant agitation in the Japanese press in support of extremist policies, and the unconciliatory and bellicose utterances of Japanese leaders. For example, Captain Hideo Hiraide, director of the naval intelligence section of Imperial Headquarters, was quoted on October 16 as having declared in a public speech: " "America, feeling her insecurity * * * , is carrying out naval expansion on a large scale. But at present America is unable to carry out naval operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously. " "*The imperial navy is prepared for the worst and has completed all necessary preparations. In fact, the imperial navy is itching for action, when needed.* " "In spite of strenuous efforts by the government, the situation is now approaching a final parting of the ways. The fate of our empire depends upon how we act at this moment. It is certain that at such a moment our Navy should set about on its primary mission." " It is of interest to note the Japanese estimate of Secretary Hull's position in the negotiations, reflected in an intercepted message of September 15 from Nomura to Tokyo: [76] "Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as "two in one." " ADVENT OF THE TOJO CABINET The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, and was replaced on the following day by a new cabinet headed by General Hideki Tojo. On October 17 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted manifesting a disposition by the Tojo Cabinet to continue the negotiations: [77] "The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts you have made. "The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect. "Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.' The situation existing from the advent of the Tojo Cabinet to the arrival of Saburo Kurusu in Washington on November 15 to assist Ambassador Nomura in the conversations was depicted by Secretary Hull as follows. [78] "On October 17 the American press carried the following statement by Maj. Gen. Kiyofuku Okamoto: " "Despite the different views advanced on the Japanese-American question, our national policy for solution of the China affair and establishment of a common coprosperity sphere in East Asia remains unaltered. [76] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 27. [76a] For a complete discussion of the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, see Appendix D. [77] Id., at p. 76. [78] Committee record, pp. 1127-34. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 29 " "For fulfillment of this national policy, this country has sought to reach an agreement of views with the U. S. by means of diplomatic means. There is, however, a limit to our concessions, and the negotiations may end in a break with the worst possible situation following. The people must therefore be resolved to cope with such a situation." "Clearly the Japanese war lords expected to clinch their policy of aggrandizement and have the United States make all the concessions. "On October 30, the Japanese Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired that the conversations be concluded successfully without delay and he said that "in order to make progress, the United States should face certain realities and facts," and here thereupon cited the stationing in China of Japanese armed forces. "The general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. From here on for some weeks especially intensive study was given in the Department of State to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement with the Japanese so as to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to prevent a break-down in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a subsequent general agreement. The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the integrity of American principles. "In the last part of October and early November messages came to this Government from United States Army and Navy officers in China and from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he believed that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent. The Generalissimo requested that the United States send air units to China to defeat this threat. He made a similar request of the British Government. He also asked that the United States issue a warning to Japan. "At this time the Chinese had been resisting the Japanese invaders for 4 years. China sorely needed equipment. Its economic and financial situations were very bad. Morale was naturally low. In view of this, even though a Chinese request might contain points with which we could not comply, we dealt with any such request in a spirit of utmost consideration befitting the gravity of the situation confronting our hard-pressed Chinese friends. "I suggested that the War and Navy Departments study this Chinese appeal. In response, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations sent a memorandum of November 5 to the President giving an estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation. At the conclusion of this estimate the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations recommended: " "That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved. " "That material aid to China be accelerated constant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces. " "That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent. " "That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." "I was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American foreign policy considerations were involved that material aid to China should be accelerated as much as feasible, and that aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally, I concurred completely in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been striving for months to avoid a show-down with Japan, and to explore every possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President and I were putting forth with our utmost patience. "On November 14 the President replied to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in line with the estimate and recommendations contained in the memorandum of November 5 of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Generalissimo was told that from our information it did not appear that a Japanese land campaign against Kunming was immediately imminent. It was indicated that American air units could not be sent and that the United States would not issue a warning but there were outlined ways, mentioned in the memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, in which the United States would continue to assist China.