40               PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"SECTION II-STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose 
to take steps as follows: 

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will 
endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British 
Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and 
the United States. 

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, 
British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands, and Thai Governments an 
agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to 
respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event 
that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of 
Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking 
such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the 
threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the 
Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential 
treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would 
use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of 
treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina. 

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and 
police forces from China and from Indochina. 

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will 
not support militarily, politically, economically any government or 
regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of 
China with capital temporarily at Chungking. 

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, 
including rights and interests in and with regard to international 
settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 
1901. 

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British 
and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, 
including rights in international settlements and in concessions and 
under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. 

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will 
enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and 
Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation 
treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including 
an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list. 

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will 
respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the 
unite States and on American funds in Japan. 

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the 
dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, 
half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States. 

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has 
concluded with any third power or powers shall he interpreted by it in 
such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this 
agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the 
Pacific area. 

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other 
governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic 
political and economic principles set forth in this agreement."

The foregoing reply was clearly not an ultimatum from the standpoint of 
the Government of the United States. On the contrary it was an admirable 
statement of every honorable principle for which the United States has 
stood for many years in the Orient. Ambassador Grew characterized the 
November 26 note of Secretary Hull as follows: [98]              

"NOVEMBER 29, 1941. 

"Our Government has handed to the Japanese a 10-point draft proposal for 
adjusting the whole situation in the Far East. It is a broad-gauge 
objective, and statesmanlike document, offering to Japan practically 
everything that she has ostensibly been fighting for if she will simply 
stop her aggressive policy. By adopting such a program she would be 
offered free access to needed raw materials, free trade and commerce, 
financial cooperation and support, withdrawal of the freezing orders, 
and an opportunity to negotiate a new treaty of commerce with us. If she 
wants a political and economic stranglehold on the countries of East 
Asia (euphemistically called the New Order in East Asia and the East 
Asia 

[98] Grew, Ten Years in Japan (1944), pp. 482, 483.  Committee exhibit 
No. 30.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK         41

Co-Prosperity Sphere)-which most of her extremists do want-and if she 
pursues her southward advance by force, she will soon be at war with all 
of the A B C D powers and will unquestionably be defeated and reduced to 
the status of a third-rate power. But if she plays her cards wisely, she 
can obtain without further fighting all of the desiderata for which she 
allegedly started fighting strategic, economic, financial, and social 
security."

Referring to the November 26 note Secretary Stimson said: [99]

"I personally was relieved that we had not backed down on any of the 
fundamental principles on which we had stood for so long and which *I 
felt we could not give up without the sacrifice of our national honor 
and prestige in the world*. I submit, however, that no impartial reading 
of this document can characterize it as being couched in the terms of an 
ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course only too quick to seize 
upon it and give that designation for their own purposes."

As suggested by Mr. Stimson, Japan did choose to regard it as an 
ultimatum consistent with her purposes. Her note of November 20, it is 
apparent, was the final diplomatic move and failing to secure the 
concessions demanded the November 26 reply of the United States was 
seized upon by the war lords of Japan in subsequent propaganda as their 
excuse for the attack on Pearl Harbor which they had planned for many 
weeks. It is to be noted in this connection that the Japanese task force 
was enroute for its attack on Pearl Harbor before the American note of 
November 26 was delivered to the Government of Japan. At the time of 
receiving the note from Secretary Hull, Kurusu stated the Japanese 
Government would be likely "to throw up its hands" when it received the 
proposal; that he felt the response which had thus been given to the 
Japanese proposal of November 20 could be interpreted as tantamount to 
meaning the end of the conversations. [100] A dispatch from Ambassador 
Grew to the State Department on December 5 reflected the strong reaction 
in Japan. [101] 

Secretary Hull said: 102 

"It is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan 
had begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give false 
meaning to our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an 
"ultimatum." This was in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic 
of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts to delude their people 
and gain their support for militaristic depredations and 
aggrandizement."

In press conferences on November 26 and 27, Secretary Hull outlined the 
status of American-Japanese relations. [103] 

The decision to stand by basic American principles was the only 
honorable position under the circumstances. [104] To have acceded to the 
Japanese ultimatum of November 20 would have been indefensible. Firmness 
was the only language Japan understood. As Ambassador Grew had stated in 
his celebrated "green light" dispatch of September 12, 1940, to the 
State Department: [105] 

"Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers (including 
Japan) from attaining their objectives * * *. 

"If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until 
and if Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan 
will be faced with a situation which will make it impossible for the 
present opportunist philosophy to maintain the upper hand * * *. 

"In the present situation and outlook I believe that the time has come 
when continued patience and restraint on the part of the United States 
may and probably will lead to developments which will render Japanese-
American relations progressively precarious."

[99] See committee reeord, p. 14393
[100] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 375.
[101] Committee Record, p. 1821-24.
[102] Committee Record, p, 1153.
[103] See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1153 et 
seq.
[104] Id., p. 1155.
[105] Committee exhibit No. 26. 

42              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

That firmness, the only language the Japanese understood, failed to 
dissuade them cannot redound to our regret but only to the ignominy of 
the Empire of Japan. 

FRAUDULENT NATURE OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY NOVEMBER 28 TO DECEMBER 7

An intercepted dispatch NO. 844 from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy on 
November 28 left little doubt of the fraudulent character of the 
negotiations thereafter and is a classic example of Japanese deceit and 
duplicity: [106]

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite 
of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating 
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The 
Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. 
Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this 
American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the 
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I 
do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken 
off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, 
although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to 
your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just 
claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the 
Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and 
conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States 
has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish 
negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man 
you told me to in your #1180 [107] and he said that under the present 
circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do 
the best you can."

The following dispatch, while the attack force was en route to Pearl 
Harbor, was sent from Tokyo to Washington on December 1: [108]

"The date (November 29) set in my message #812 [109] has come and gone, 
and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to 
prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been 
advising the press and others that though there are some wide 
differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are 
continuing. (The above is for only your information) * * *"

After November 26 Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu conferred with the 
President and Secretary Hull on several occasions but with nothing new 
being developed looking to a peaceful settlement. 

On the morning of December 6 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was 
intercepted advising that the Japanese reply to the American note of 
November 26 was being transmitted: 

"I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it 
tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, 
and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time 
being."

This dispatch indicated that subsequent instructions would be 
forthcoming concerning the time for presenting the reply to the 
Government of the United States. By approximately 7 p. m. on the evening 
of December 6 the first 13 parts of the 14-part Japanese memorandum had 
been intercepted, decoded, and made ready for distribution to authorized 
recipients by our military. These 13 parts were a long recapitulation of 
the negotiations with the purposes of Japan colored with pious hue and 
those of the United States perverted into a base and ulterior scheme 
"for the extension of the war." The thirteenth part concluded on the 
note that  

"therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that 
it cannot accept the proposal (American proposal of November 26) as a 
basis of negotiations."

[106] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195. 
[107] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181. 
[108] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 208. 
[109] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 165, setting the date November 29 
as the deadline for effecting an understanding. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             43

The fourteenth part was intercepted early on the morning of December 7 
and was available for distribution at approximately 8 a. m. It stated 
that- [110] 

"obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire 
with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts 
toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in 
East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and 
interests by keeping Japan and China at war."

With the observation that this intention had been revealed during the 
course of the negotiations and the "earnest hope of the Japanese 
Government * * * to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific 
through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost", 
the Japanese memorandum closed with the statement: 

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American 
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it 
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through 
further negotiations."

Nowhere in the memorandum was there any indication or intimation of an 
intention to attack the United States nor, indeed, that formal 
diplomatic relations were to be broken merely that it was impossible to 
reach an agreement through the then current negotiations. Coincident 
with the receipt of the full reply, instructions were issued to Japan's 
representatives for its delivery to the American Government at an hour 
keyed to the time set for the assault on Pearl Harbor. On the previous 
evening, President Roosevelt had dispatched an earnest appeal to the 
Emperor of Japan for the preservation of peace in the Pacific. [111] The 
infamous character of the Japanese reply was voiced by Secretary Hull to 
the Japanese ambassadors who were making delivery 1 hour after [112] the 
first bombs had fallen on Pearl Harbor: [113] 

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese 
ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of 
untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty 
years of public service I have never seen a document that was more 
crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions infamous falsehoods and 
distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that 
any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY LIAISON IN WASHINGTON

With a view to effecting the fullest liaison between the diplomatic and 
military arms of the Government, there was created in the light of the 
approaching emergency a body familiarly referred to as the War Council. 
This Council consisted of the President, the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Army Chief of Staff, the 
Chief of Naval Operations, and, on occasion, the Chief of the Army Air 
Forces. [114] It met at the call of the President, and during the fall 
of 1941 it was in frequent session. Secretary Hull said: 

[110] See committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 239-245. 
[111] See Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 784-786. Several hours after 
the Pearl Harbor attack had begun Ambassador Grew was informed by the 
Japanese Foreign Minister that the Japanese 14-part memorandum replying 
to the American note of November 26 was to be regarded as the Emperor's 
reply to the President's appeal. See Peace and War, p. 148. 
[112] The Japanese Ambassadors were instructed to deliver the Japanese 
note to the American Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on Sunday December 7. 
They made the appointment pursuant to the instruction; however, they 
later postponed for 1 hour their previous appointment, stating the delay 
was due to the need of more time to decode the message they were to 
deliver. 
[113] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 787. 
[114] For a rather full discussion of liaison between the various 
departments, see testimony of Secretary Stimson, Army Pearl Harbor Board 
Record, p. 4041 et seq. 

44             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of 
State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval 
Operations, was a sort of clearing house for all the information and 
views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts 
and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a 
particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings." [116] 

In addition to the War Council, another liaison body, consisting of the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy, was 
created during 1940, with a view to holding weekly meetings, which were 
scheduled for 9:30 each Tuesday morning. Secretary Stimson said: [116]

"They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were 
very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and * * * just before 
Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting 
on the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took 
place in the State Department, Mr. Hull's office, and during that time 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Navy, and myself were in 
constant contact."

And again: [117]

"During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch with Mr. 
Hull and Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings with the 
President."

During 1941 Rear Adm. R. E. Schuirmann was the Director of the Central 
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and had as one of his 
duties liaison with the State Department. He made the following 
observations concerning State Department liaison: [118] 

"A "Liaison Committee" consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up 
while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was 
mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally 
questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of 
May 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the 
discussion was commenced; prior to that time I would take notes of the 
meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required 
action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the 
meetings. At times there were "off the record" discussions at these 
liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these "off the 
record" discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, 
Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy 
Department, and I maintained liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton 
of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by 
telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and 
discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central 
Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the 
possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State 
Department representatives may have made notes of some of these meetings 
and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department 
officials."

Admiral R. W. Turner, Director of War Plans Division in the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations, summarized the liaison with the State-
Department as follows: [119]

"The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the 
Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. *He consulted them 
frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making 
any particular diplomatic move*. In the Office of Naval Operations, the 
Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the 
State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems 
with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State 
Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, 
usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of 
the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War 

[115] Committee record, p. 1144.
[116] Roberts record, pp. 4051-4053, 4078-4079.
[117] Committee record, p. 14386.
[118] Hart record. p. 405. 
[119] Id., at p. 257.              

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             45

Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of 
Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans 
Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The 
matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western 
Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the 
Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent 
missions to those countries and at the meetings with the Under Secretary 
it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, 
possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference 
with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these 
meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to 
time the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Wavy 
Departments to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were 
other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy 
Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time 
to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the 
State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State 
and the Chief of Naval Operations. *I would say that relations between 
the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and 
were characterized by good feeling.*"

At a regular Cabinet meeting on November 7 the President inquired of 
Secretary Hull as to whether he had anything in mind. In replying 
Secretary Hull testified: [120]

"I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the 
international situation. I went over fully developments in the 
conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations 
were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a 
military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished the 
President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the 
dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical 
situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country 
would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. [121]" 

Secretary Stimson stated: [122]

"On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far 
Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed 
as that relations had become extremely critical and that we should be on 
the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time. [123]"

At a meeting of the war council on November 25 Secretary Hull pointed 
out that the leaders of Japan were determined and desperate, and, in his 
opinion, the Japanese military was already poised for attack; that they 
might attack at ally time and at any place. He emphasized the probable 
element of surprise in Japanese plans, that "virtually the last stage 
had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was 
in the hands of the Army and Navy." [124]

At the same meeting of the council the President warned that we here 
likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as the following Monday, or "the 
Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning." [125]

On the morning of November 26, Secretary Hull advised Secretary Stimson 
that he had about decided not to make the proposition of the 3-month 
truce, the modus vivendi, that he had discussed with Secretaries Knox 
and Stimson on November 25 "the Chinese, for 

[120] Committee record, p. 1131.
[121] In an address delivered on November 11, 1941, Secretary Knox 
warned that the Nation was confronted not only by the necessity for 
extreme measures or self-defense in the Atlantic but was "likewise faced 
with grim possibilities on the other side of the world on the far side 
of the Pacific." See committee record at pp. 1131, 1132.
[122] Committee record, pp. 14387, 14388.
[123] In an address on November 11, Under Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror 
had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the 
Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all 
nations bordering on the Pacific. He said at the waves of world conquest 
were "breaking high both in the East and in the West" and were 
threatening "to engulf our own shores"; that the United States was in 
far greater peril than in 1317 and at any "at any moment war may be 
forced upon us." See committee record, p. 1132.
[124] Id., at p. 1144 See also statement of Mr. Stimson, committee 
record, p. 14390.
[125] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390. 

46             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

one thing, had pointed out strong objections to the proposal, 
particularly the effect on the morale of their own people." [126] 
Secretary Stimson said: [127]

"Early that morning (November 27) I had called up Mr. Hull to find out 
what is final word had been with the Japanese-whether he had handed them 
the proposal for three months' truce, or whether he had told them he had 
no other proposition to make. He told me that he had broken the whole 
matter off. His words were: "*I have washed my hands of it, and it is 
now in the hands of you and Knox the Army and the Navy.*" I then called 
up the President, who gave me a little different view. He said that it 
was true that the talks had been called off, but that they had ended up 
with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards 
that this was the fact and that the statement contained a reaffirmation 
of our constant and regular position without the suggestion of a threat 
of any kind."

With reference to his remarks before the War Council on November 28, 
Secretary Hull stated: [128]

" * * * I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the 
Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of 
an agreement being achieved with Japan. *I emphasized that in my opinion 
the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of 
conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was 
in the hands of the Army and the Navy*. With due deference I expressed 
my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an 
assumption that the Japanese might make *the element of surprise a 
central point in their strategy* and also might attack at various points 
simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of 
coordination."

Addressing a public rally in Japan on November 30, Premier Tojo stated: 
[129]

"The fact that Chiang-Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, 
America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young 
men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of 
Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East 
Asia by putting [pitting?] the East Asiatic peoples against each other 
and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of 
Britain and the United States.

"For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice 
from East Asia with a vengeance."

Following a conference with military leaders concerning the Japanese 
Premier's address, Secretary Hull called the President at Warm Springs, 
Ga., urging him to advance the date set for his return to Washington. 
The President accordingly returned to Washington on December 1. [130] 

In testifying before the Navy inquiry conducted by Admiral Hart, Admiral 
Schuirmann stated in reply to a query as to whether the State 
Department's estimate of the situation vis-a-vis Japan as conveyed to 
the Navy Department was in accord with the statements contained "on page 
138 of the book *Peace and War*": [131] 

"I was not present at any meeting that I recall where the Secretary 
expressed the element of surprise so strongly or if at all, or the 
probability of attack at various points. However, the particular 
meetings which he mentioned, I do not know if I was present. I cannot 
make any positive statement that he did not make such a statement. 
However, on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor Secretary Hull 
phoned me saying in effect, "*I know you Navy fellows are always ahead 
of me but I want you to know that I don't seem to be able to do anything 
more with these Japanese and they are liable to run loose like a mad dog 
and bite anyone.*" I assured him that a war warning had been sent out. I 
reported the conversation to Admiral Stark."

[126] Committee record, pp. 14391,14392. 
[127] Id., at pp. 14392, 14393. 
[128] Committee record, pp. 1160, 1161.
[129] See committee record, p. 1162
[130] Id., at p. 1163.
[131] Hart record, p. 412,

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             47

Referring to a meeting at the State Department on the morning of 
December 7, Mr. Stimson said: [132] 

"On December 7, 1941, Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at ten-
thirty and we talked the whole matter over. *Hull is very certain that 
the Japs are planning some deviltry, and we are all wondering where the 
blow will strike*. We three stayed together in conference until 
lunchtime, going over the plans for what should be said and done."

Considering all of the observations made by Secretary Hull to Army and 
Navy Officials in the days before December 7, 1941, it is difficult to 
imagine how he could have more clearly and forcefully depicted the 
manner in which relations between the United States and Japan had passed 
beyond the realm of diplomacy and become a matter of cold military 
reality. [133] This thought was expressed by General Marshall when he 
testified to a distinct recollection of Mr. Hull's saying: "*These 
fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared.*" [133a] 

That there was the fullest exchange of information between the 
diplomatic and military arms of the Government is further indicated by 
the manner in which intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages 
were distributed. These messages, familiarly referred to as "Magic" and 
discussed in detail elsewhere in this report, contained detailed 
instructions and proposals from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy and the 
comments concerning and contents of American proposals as forwarded to 
Tokyo by its ambassadors. This materials not only indicated what Japan 
and her ambassadors were saying but literally what they were *thinking*. 
This material was available to the Secretaries of War and Navy, the 
Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Directors of War 
Plans in both the Army and Navy, and the heads of the intelligence 
branches of both the services, among others.

CONCLUSIONS

Beginning in 1931 Japan embarked on a career of conquest no less 
ambitious nor avowed than that of the Nazis. Despite American protests 
she overran and subjugated Manchuria. In 1937, bulwarked b her Anti- 
Comintern Pact with Germany of the preceding year, she invaded China. In 
1940 she seized upon the struggle for survival of the western powers 
against Hitler's war machine to conclude an ironclad alliance with 
Germany and Italy aimed directly at the United States. Thereupon she set 
about to drive the "barbarians" from the Orient and to engulf the Far 
East in her Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere which was to be her 
bastion for world conquest. As early as January of 1941 the dominating 
military clique prepared for war on the United States and conceived the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Hailing the German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, as a divine 
wind" securing her northern flank, Japan within a period of 2O days 
adopted a crucial policy followed by an all-out mobilization for war 
Almost immediately thereafter she invaded Southern French Indochina for 
the purpose "when the international situation is suitable, to launch 
therefrom a rapid attack." She boldly declared in an intercepted 
dispatch of July 14, 1941: 

[132] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 4081. See also committee 
record, p, 14428.
[133] For a record of Mr. Hull's conferences, consultations, and 
telephone conversations (as entered in engagement books) with 
representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 
7, 1941, and arrangements for contacts between the Departments of State, 
War, and navy in 1940 and 1941, see committee record, pp. 1166-1176.  
See also committee record, p. 1180.
[132a] Committee record, p. 3079.

48             PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"After the occupation of French Indochina, next on our schedule is the 
sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of 
Singapore the Navy will play the principal part."

The invasion of southern Indochina resulted in the freezing of asset and 
virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

On November 20, 1941, the Empire of Japan delivered all ultimatum to the 
Government of the United States. It required that the United States 
supply Japan as much oil as she might require; that we discontinue aid 
to China, withdrawing moral and material support from the recognized 
Chinese Government. It contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon 
aggression and to resort to peaceful methods. The ultimatum contained no 
tenable basis for an agreement, a fact well known to and contemplated by 
the Tojo Cabinet.

During all of the negotiations, Japan qualified and restricted every 
intimation of her peaceful purposes. With each succeeding proposal it 
became abundantly apparent that she did not intend to compromise in any 
measure the bellicose utterances and plans of conquest of her military 
masters. She uniformly declared her purpose to fulfill her obligations 
under the Tripartite Pact-aimed directly at the United States. She 
refused to relinquish the preferential commercial position in the Orient 
which she had arrogated to herself. She demanded a victor's peace in 
China and would give no effective recognition to the principle of 
noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Her clear 
purpose was to maintain a military and economic overlordship of China. 

The story of our negotiations with the Empire of Japan during the year 
1941 epitomizes the traditional purpose of the United States to seek 
peace where compatible with national honor. Conversations were carried 
forward with the representatives of that nation in the hope of bringing 
to an end the frightful aggression that had brought sorrow, death, and 
degradation to the Orient for almost a decade. At the same time it was 
realistically recognized that the negotiations afforded precious time to 
improve our own capacity for self-defense, the appalling need for which 
was becoming daily more apparent as the Axis dreams of world conquest 
pushed relentlessly toward realization. 

That there were elements in Japan who desired peace is unquestioned. But 
for many years the Government of that nation had be divided into two 
schools of thought, the one conceivably disposed to think in terms of 
international good will with the other dominated by the militarism of 
the war lords who had always ultimately resolved Japanese policy. [134] 
It was this monstrous condition which, from the time of Japan's 
emergence as a power in world affairs, resulted in her military acts 
invariably belying her diplomatic promises. The United States therefore 
in looking to any final settlement had properly before it the 
substantial question of whether those in Japan who might wish peace 
possessed the capacity and power to enter a binding and effective 
agreement reasonably designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East. 
It was for this reason that our Government insisted Japan offer some 
tangible proof of her honest purpose to abandon a policy of aggression. 
No such proof or disposition to provide it was at any time forthcoming. 

[134] See testimony of Mr. Hull, committee record, p, 1120. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

49

In considering the negotiations in their entirety the conclusion is 
inescapable that Japan had no concessions to make and that her program 
of aggression was immutable. When the Konoye Cabinet could not secure an 
agreement giving Japan an unrestrained hand in he Orient it was replaced 
by a Cabinet headed by General Tojo. Tojo made one gesture in the form 
of an ultimatum to realize Japan's ambitions without fighting for them. 
When he realized such a price or peace was too high even for the United 
States, his Government launched the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor 
while instructing her ambassadors in characteristic duplicity to 
maintain the pretense of continuing negotiations. [135] 

It is concluded that the diplomatic actions of the United States 
provided no provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on Pearl 
Harbor. It is further concluded that the Secretary of State fully 
informed both the War and Navy Departments of diplomatic developments 
and that he in a timely and forceful manner clearly pointed out to these 
Departments that relations between the United States and Japan had 
passed beyond the stage of diplomacy and were the hands of the military. 

[135] The Japanese force to strike Pearl Harbor actually left Hitokappu 
Bay for the attack at 7 p.m., November 25, Washington time, before the 
United states note in reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20 was 
delivered to Japan's ambassadors on November 26.