100 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK On December 3, 1941, Admiral Kimmel was supplied the following information for action: [101] "HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, MANILA, WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS." And, again, on December 3, 1941, he received the following message for his information: [102] "CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FOUR FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON, HONGKONG, SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY MACHINE. BATAVIA MACHINE ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO. DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY, ALL BUT ONE COPY OF OTHER SYSTEMS, AND ALL SECRET DOCUMENTS. BRITISH ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED." On December 4, 1941, a dispatch [103] was supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, for his information, instructing Guam to destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter. A dispatch to Admiral Kimmel of December 6 [104] for action stated that "in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands" he was authorized to order the destruction in such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency." It was pointed out that means of communication to support "our current operations an special intelligence" should be maintained until the last moment. From a review of dispatches and correspondence sent Admiral Kimmel it is concluded that he was fully informed concerning the progressive deterioration of relations with Japan and was amply warned of the imminence of war with that nation. INFORMATION SUPPLIED GENERAL SHORT BY WASHINGTON INDICATING THE IMMINENCE OF WAR The accepted practice in the Navy whereby the Chief of Naval Operations supplemented official dispatches by personal correspondence does not appear to have been followed by the War Department. The letters sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short, heretofore discussed, related largely to the latter's responsibility, steps necessary to improve the Army defenses in Hawaii, and suggestions and comments with respect thereto. It does not appear that such correspondence was employed to acquaint the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department with the international situation generally nor to convey the personal estimates and impressions of the Chief of Staff. The [101] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. This dispatch was also sent for action to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts. [102] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. This dispatch was sent for action to the commander in chief Asiatic Fleet and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District. [103] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 44. [104] Id., at p. 45. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 101 evidence indicates that the Army did not forward the substance of any intercepted Japanese dispatches to field commanders because of the feeling that the Army codes were generally not so secure as those of the Navy. [105] General Short, however, was supplied either directly from the War Department or by reference from his naval opposites in Hawaii adequate information concerning the critical international situation and the impending likelihood of war with Japan. The dispatch of July 3, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, advising among other things that the unmistakable deduction from information received from numerous sources was to the effect that Japan was agreed on a policy involving war in the near future, carried instructions to advise General Short. [106] Admiral Kimmel was instructed to supply General Short the information contained in the dispatch of July 25 advising of economic sanctions against Japan and possible Japanese reaction. [107] The following Navy message of October 16, 1941, was received by General Short through reference from Admiral Kimmel: [108] "THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE C. N. O. WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU. QUOTE: "JAPANESE CABINET RESIGNATION CREATES A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE ANTI-AMERICAN AND EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES. EITHER WAY HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE STRONGLY POSSIBLE. SINCE BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST JAPAN." " In a radiogram of October 20 signed "Adams" [109] the War Department advised the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of its estimate of the situation in the following terms: "TENSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REMAINS STRAINED BUT NO ABRUPT CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY APPEARS IMMINENT. [110]" Admiral Kimmel was instructed to advise General Short concerning the dispatch of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations [111] advising, among other things, that "chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful" and movements of Japanese forces "indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." General Short expressed the belief that he had seen this dispatch. [112] [105] See committee record, pp. 2220-2222. [106] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 4; also, No. 32, p. 1. [107] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 14; also No. 32, p. 2. [108] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18; also, No. 32, p. 3. See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 279. [109] Maj. Gen. Emory S. Adams, Adjutant General. [110] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 4. See also Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258. [111] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 5 [112] See Army Pearl Harbor board record, p. 4258. 102 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK A dispatch of November 26 signed "Adams" was sent General Short reading in part as follows: [113] "* * * IT IS DESIRED THAT THE PILOTS BE INSTRUCTED TO PHOTOGRAPH TRUK ISLAND IN THE CAROLINE GROUP JALUIT IN THE MARSHALL GROUP. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE SHOULD BE MADE SIMULTANEOUSLY. INFORMATION DESIRED AS TO THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF NAVAL VESSELS INCLUDING SUBMARINES * * * INSURE THAT BOTH B-TWENTY FOUR AIR PLANES ARE FULLY EQUIPPED WITH GUN AMMUNITION UPON DEPARTURE FROM HONOLULU. [114]" The November 27 dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel beginning "This despatch is to be considered a war warning" [115] contained instructions that General Short be informed and he did in fact see this warning. On November 27 the following dispatch signed "Marshall" [116] was sent General Short by the War Department: [117] "NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE. JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT *HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT*. IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT, REPEAT CANNOT, BE AVOIDED THE *UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT*. THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE. PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION *YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY* BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN. SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN. LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS." The following dispatch signed 'Miles', [118] and also dated November 27, was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department: [119] "JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL STALEMATE *HOSTILITIES MAY ENSUE*. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY BE EXPECTED. INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEF OF STAFF ONLY." On November 28 a dispatch signed "Adams" was directed to General Short, as follows: [120] "CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SC THIRTY FORTY FIVE). ALSO [113] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 6. [114] This reconnaissance was not flown inasmuch as the Army planes were not made ready prior to the December 7 attack. [115] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36. [116] Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff. [117] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 7. [118] Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2, Army Intelligence. [119] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10. [120] Id., at p. 13. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 103 DESIRED THAT YOU INITIATE FORTHWITH ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS, PROPERTY, AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABOTAGE, PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED. PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY, AVOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM. TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION IDENTICAL TELEGRAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS. [120a]" Again on November 28 another dispatch from the War Department was sent the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, as follows: [121] "ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE. THAT INSTRUCTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND UNITS UNDER YOUR CONTROL AND COMMAND IS DESIRED: AGAINST THOSE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH THREE MID SR 30 45) THE PRESENT CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN AT ONCE. IT IS DESIRED ALSO THAT ALL ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY BE INITIATED BY YOU IMMEDIATELY TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING: PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE, AND PROTECTION AGAINST SABOTAGE OF YOUR EQUIPMENT, PROPERTY AND ESTABLISHMENTS. THIS DOES NOT REPEAT NOT AUTHORIZE ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES. AVOIDING UNNECESSARY ALARM AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY. "IT IS ALSO DESIRED THAT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER FIVE THIS YEAR REPORTS BE SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEF ARMY AIR FORCES OF ALL STEPS INITIATED BY YOU TO COMPLY WITH THESE INSTRUCTIONS. SIGNED ARNOLD." A dispatch dated December 5 and signed "Miles", [122] was sent the assistant chief of staff headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, to "CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THROUGH COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKYO REFERENCE WEATHER. [123]" ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL PURSUANT TO WARNINGS AND ORDERS FROM WASHINGTON DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS In the dispatch of October 16 [124] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation; [120a] For the reply of General Short to this message from the Adjutant General, see committee exhibit No. 32, p. 17. [121] Id., at p. 14. This message was also signed "Adams." [122] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 20. [123] This dispatch refers to the so-called winds code which will be found discussed in detail in Part IV, infra, this report. [124] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 18. 104 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK that there was a strong possibility of hostilities between Japan and Russia and there also was a possibility Japan might attack the United States and Great Britain; and that he should "take due precautions including such *preparatory deployments* [126] as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan." Pursuant to the order Admiral Kimmel ordered submarines to assume a "war patrol" off both Wake and Midway; he reinforced Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition, and stores and also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island; he ordered the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to direct an alert status in the outlying islands; he placed on 12 hours' notice certain vessels of the fleet which were in west-coast ports, held 6 submarines in readiness to depart for Japan, and delayed the sailing of 1 battleship which was scheduled to visit a west-coast navy yard; he dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway with orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the island and placed in effect additional security measures in the fleet operating areas. [126] On October 22, Admiral Kimmel reported by letter [127] these dispositions to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. By letter dated November 7 Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet: [128] "OK on the disposition which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is what next?" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 24 FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS In the dispatch of November 24 [129] Admiral Kimmel was advised that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that the movements of Japanese naval and military forces "indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." This dispatch carried no orders for the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet [130] and would appear designed to acquaint him with the mounting tenseness of the situation as well as to supply him with an estimate of probable Japanese action. [131] No action appears to have been taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to this dispatch and he has stated that he felt the message required no action other than that which he had already taken. [132] "WAR WARNING" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27 The dispatch of November 27 began with the words: [133] "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." [134] It stated that negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the [125] Admiral Kimmel said: "The term 'preparatory deployments' used in this dispatch is nontechnical. It has no especial significance other than its natural meaning." Committee record, pp. 6708, 6709. [126] See testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6709. [127] Committee exhibit No. 106. [128] Id. [129] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 32. [130] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 50-53. [131] Admiral Turner testified: "The dispatch of the 24th we did not consider required any immediate action, except to get ready plans for putting into effect when we gave them another warning." Committee record, p. 5159. [132] See Navy court of inquiry record, pp. 298, 299. [133] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36. [134] Admiral Kimmel observed: "The phrase 'war warning' cannot be made a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may suggest. It is a characterization of the specific information which the dispatch contained." Committee record, p. 6717. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 105 Pacific had ceased and "an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days," and that "the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo." Admiral Kimmel was ordered "to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46." After receiving this warning Admiral Kimmel made the deliberate decision not to institute long-range reconnaissance from Pearl Harbor against possible air attacks for reasons which will subsequently appear. [135] Between the warning and the attack on December 7 the following deployments were made and action taken: 1. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor en route to Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of the carrier Enterprise, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. He carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles for any sign of hostile shipping. [136] The sending of this force to Wake was pursuant to a dispatch dated November 26 to Admiral Kimmel stating, in part "in order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use OpNav [137] has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this is feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. [135]" Admiral Halsey knew of the war warning dispatch and held a lengthy conference with Admiral Kimmel and other officers on November 27. He stated that when he prepared to depart with the task force for Wake Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far the latter wanted him to go; that Admiral Kimmel replied "Use your common sense." [139] Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the Enterprise, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces, to which Admiral Kimmel replied he should use his own discretion. Admiral Smith stated that Admiral Halsey commented these were the best orders he had received and that if he found even Japanese sampan he would sink it. [140] 2. On December 5, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor en route to Midway in command of Task Force 2, consisting of the carrier Lexington, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers. Like Halsey, Newton conducted scouting flights with his planes to cover his advance [141] despite the fact, however, that Admiral Newton was leaving Pearl Harbor with some of the most powerful and valuable units of the Pacific fleet he was not even shown the war warning, had no knowledge of it, and indeed had no knowledge of the dispatches of October [135] The Navy court of inquiry found: "It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The commander in chief Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in ease of emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved." Navy court of inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157. [136] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750. See also testimony of Admiral Halsey, Hart inquiry record, p. 299. [137] Office of Naval Operations. [138] Dispatch from Chief of Naval Operations to commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, No. 270038, dated November 26, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 112. See also committee record, pp. 1614, 1615; also Hart inquiry record, p. 299. [139] Hart inquiry record, pp. 297, 298. [140] Id., at p. 43. [141] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6750: see also testimony of Admiral Newton, Hart inquiry record. p. 318. 106 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 16 and November 24 or the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes to which reference will hereafter be made Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton received no information concerning the increasing danger of our relations with Japan. He was given no special orders and regarded his departure from Hawaii as a mission with no special significance other than to proceed to Midway for the purpose of flying off the Lexington a squadron of planes for the reinforcement of the island. In consequence, no special orders were given for the arming of planes or making preparation for war apart from ordinary routine. [142] The failure to supply Admiral Newton any orders or information is in marked contrast with the "free hand" orders given Admiral Halsey. In his testimony Admiral Kimmel stated that Admiral Newton's orders and information would have come through Admiral Brown, who was Newton's superior. [142a] 3. Admiral Wilson Brown on December 5 left Pearl Harbor en route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conduct landing exercises. [143] 4. On November 28, orders were issued to bomb unidentified submarines found in the operating sea areas around Oahu. Full security was invoked for the ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts. [144] However, no change was made in the condition of readiness in port except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they began sweeping the harbor channel and approaches. [145] 5. Upon receipt of the war warning Admiral Kimmel ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceed from Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas en route. While at Wake and Midway on December 2 and 3 they searched to a distance of 525 miles. [146] 6. A squadron of patrol planes from Pearl Harbor was ordered to replace the squadron which went from Midway to Wake. This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor on November 30. It proceeded from Johnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance sweep on the way. Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrol planes conducted distant searches of not less than 500 miles of varying sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5, and 6. On December 7, five of these Midway based patrol planes were searching the sector 120 to 170 from Midway, to a distance of 450 miles. An additional two patrol planes of the Midway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the Lexington at a point 400 miles from Midway. Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loaded with bombs, were on 10-minute notice as a ready striking force. [147] Admiral McMorris, Director of War Plans under Admiral Kimmel, testified before the Hewitt inquiry with respect to what defensive deployment was executed, stating "there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movement of certain aircraft to Midway and [142] See Hart inquiry record, pp. 316 318. [142a] In this regard, the testimony of Admiral Brown indicates that he was not shown the "war warning". See testimony of Rear Admiral Brown before the Roberts Commission, Committee exhibit No. 143. [143] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751 [144] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 299, 300; see also committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96. 115 [145] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 395. [146] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6751. [147] See Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, page 6752; also testimony of Admiral Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 684. It should be noted that Admiral Inglis stated, "*There is no written record available of any searches having be made on December 6, either from the Hawaiian area or from Midway*." For further testimony of Adm. Inglis concerning the matter of reconnaissance see committee record, pp. 70-73. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 107 Wake and of the carriers with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft. [148]" While the dispatch of the three task forces does not appear to have been primarily made by Admiral Kimmel as a result of the implications of the war warning, [149] this action combined with the other steps above- mentioned had the effect of providing reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol-plane squadrons moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Midway; from Wake to Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor covering a distance of nearly 5,000 miles. Each squadron as it proceeded would cover a 400-mile strand of ocean along its path, bring under the coverage of air search about 2,000,000 square miles of- ocean area. In addition, submarines of the Fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously. [150] The southwest approaches to Hawaii were thereby to a degree effectively screened by reconnaissance from a raiding force bent on attacking Pearl Harbor by surprise. [151] *Nothing was done, however, to detect an approaching hostile force coming from the north and northwest, recognized as the most dangerous sector, and it is into the justification for this non-action that we shall inquire*. [152] EVALUATION OF THE WAR WARNING DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27, ON WHERE THE ATTACK MIGHT COME Admiral Kimmel stated that the war warning dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area nor did it state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. [153] The warning dispatch did not, it is true, mention Pearl Harbor as a specific point of attack, and gave the estimate that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. [153a] It is to be recalled in this connection, however, that the November 24 dispatch [153b] to Admiral Kimmel warned of "*a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or (Guam is a possibility*". The latter dispatch while indicating that an attack would possibly come in the vicinity of the Philippines or Guam did nevertheless indicate, by use of the words "*in any direction*," that just where the attack might come could not be predicted. [154] [148] Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 321, 322. [149] See committee record, pp. 9312, 9313. [150] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, p. 6752. [151] In this connection, see testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9321, 9324. [152] See testimony of Admiral Bellinger, committee record, pp. 9324, 9325, also 9436, 9437. [153] Admiral Kimmel testified: "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch of November 27 did not warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area. It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack in the Hawaiian area was imminent or probable." Committee record, p 6715. For a detailed statement by Admiral Kimmel concerning where the attack might come based on the "war warning," see Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 301. [153a] For the full text of the "war warning" dispatch, see p. 98, supra. [153b For the full text of the November 24 dispatch, see p. 98, supra. [154] Admiral Kimmel stated that in the November 24 dispatch the words "in any direction" did include so far as his estimate was concerned, a possible submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands but not an air attack. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 299. It has been pointed out that the estimate of enemy action referred to in the "war warning" *an amphibious operation to the South* is to be distinguished from *a surprise aggressive movement in any direction* mentioned in the November 24 warning; that the distinction between an amphibious expedition and a surprise aggressive movement is such that a war warning in making reference to such an expedition in no way superseded the estimate of surprise aggressive action mentioned in the November 24 dispatch. See in this regard the testimony of Admiral Turner, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 997, 1020. 108 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The fact that Admiral Kimmel was ordered to take "an appropriate *defensive deployment* preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46" indicated that his situation was subject to possible danger requiring such action. [155] It was Washington's responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel its best estimate of where the major strategic enemy effort would come. [156] It was Admiral Kimmel's responsibility as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet to be prepared for the worst contingency, and when he was warned of war and ordered to execute a defensive deployment it was necessarily in contemplation that such action would be against all possible dangers with which the Hawaiian situation was fraught. [157] OTHER DISPATCHES RECEIVED ON NOVEMBER 27 Admiral Kimmel stated that two other dispatches which he received on November 27 were affirmative evidence that the War or Navy Departments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harbor imminent or probable. [158] The first of these dispatches read: [159] "Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament." The second read: [160] "*In order to keep the planes of the second marine aircraft wing available for expeditionary use Op Nav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats; essential spare parts, tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Naval supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations? Confer with commanding general and advise as soon as practicable." Both of these dispatches, however, were dated November 26, the day before the war warning dispatch. The latter dispatch was not to be controlled by messages which antedated it. The reinforcing of Wake and Midway was left up entirely to Admiral Kimmel both as to feasibility and desirability. [161] The fact that other outposts needed reinforcements and steps were outlined in that direction did not elim [155] In this connection it is to be noted that the "war warning" dispatch was directed for action to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet (committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36). This would appear to be an indication to Admiral Kimmel that the same defensive action was expected of him as of Admiral Hart in the Philippine area who was located in the path of the Japanese move to the south: that the message of November 27 placed in the same category exposed to the same perils and requiring the same action the Asiatic and the Pacific Fleets. [156] See testimony of Admiral Ingersoll, Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 839-842. [157] See discussion regarding "Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack " Part III p. 75 et seq., supra. [158] Testimony of Admiral Kimmel, committee record, pp. 6716, 6717. [159] Committee exhibit No. 112, p. 54. [160] Id., at p. 55. [161] Admiral Kimmel testified before the Nay Court of Inquiry that he regarded the proposal from the Chief of Naval Operations to transfer Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake in order to conserve the marine planes for expeditionary duty as a suggestion and not a directive. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 307. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 109 inate the necessity for the defense of Hawaii, the best-equipped outpost the United States possessed, nor remove it as a possible point of attack. The same is true with respect to the use of Hawaii as a crossroads for dispositions going to the Philippines or elsewhere; Hawaii was the only point we controlled in the Pacific which had adequate facilities to be such a crossroads. "PSYCHOLOGICAL HANDICAPS" INDICATED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL In his testimony Admiral Kimmel has suggested that one can appreciate the "psychological handicaps" that dispatches he received placed upon the Navy in Hawaii. He stated: "In effect, I was told: "Do take precautions" [162] "Do not alarm civilians" [163] "Do take a preparatory deployment" [164] "Do not disclose intent" [165] "Do take a defensive deployment" [166] "Do not commit the first overt act." [167] In this connection, however, it is to be noted that the only cautions mentioned, which were contained largely in Army messages, were not to alarm civilians, not to disclose intent, and not to commit the first overt act. To have deployed the fleet; to have instituted distant reconnaissance; to have effected a higher degree of readiness, on a maneuver basis if necessary none of these steps would have alarmed the civilian population of Hawaii, [168] have disclosed intent, or have constituted an overt act against Japan. Admiral Kimmel's contention must be judged in light of the fact that on November 28 on his own responsibility, [169] he instructed the fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas. [170] The Office of Naval Operations acquiesced in this order to depth bomb submarine contacts. Admiral Halsey, prior to departing for Wake Island on November 28, received orders from Admiral Kimmel which he interpreted as permitting him to sink "even a Japanese sampan" if he found it. [171] Asked by Admiral Halsey as to how far he "should go" Admiral Kimmel replied, "Use your common sense." [172] [162] Referring to the dispatch of October 16 advising of the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and stating in part, "You will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan." See committee exhibit No. 37. [163] Referring to a portion of the dispatch of November 28 sent Admiral Kimmel for information and incorporating a portion of an Army message sent the commanding general of the Western Defense Command, which latter message stated in part, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act * * *. Measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." See committee exhibit No. 37. [164] Referring to the dispatch of October 16, note 162, supra. [165] Referring to the dispatches of October 16 and November 28, notes 162 and 163, supra. [166] Referring to the "war warning" dispatch of November 27. Committee exhibit No. 37. [167] Referring to the dispatch of November 28, note 163, supra. [168] There had been air raid drills at Pearl Harbor on April 24, May 12, 13; June 19; July 10, 26; August 1, 20; September 5, 27; October 13, 27; and November 12, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 120. [169] As stated by the Navy court of inquiry: "* * * he (Admiral Kimmel) has issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and *ran the risk of committing an overt act against Japan*, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule 'shoot first and explain afterwards'." See Navy Court of Inquiry report, committee exhibit No. 157. [170] See dispatch No. 280355 from Admiral Kimmel to the Pacific Fleet with a copy for information to the Office of Naval Operations; committee exhibit No. 112, p. 96. For a description of the fleet operating sea areas, see committee exhibit No. 6, Item 3. [171] See Hart inquiry record, p. 43. [172] Id., at pp. 297, 298.