120 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Within 30 minutes of receiving this dispatch and after consulting only with his chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, [216] General Short replied to the War Department as follows: [217] "Reurad four seven two 27th. Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. SHORT." As a result of the November 27 dispatch General Short decided to institute alert No. 1, the lowest of three alerts provided for the Hawaiian Department. The three alerts were: [218] No. 1. Defense against sabotage and uprisings. *No threat from without*. No. 2. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to No. 1. No. 3. Requires occupation of all field positions by all units, pre- pared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands. At the same time that he ordered alert No. 1, the commanding general directed that the Interceptor Command, including the Aircraft Warning Service (Radar) and Information Center, should operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. daily. In addition, it should be noted that the six mobile radar stations operated daily except Sunday from 7 a. m. to 11 a. m. for routine training and daily, except Saturday and Sunday, from 12 noon until 4 p. m. for training and maintenance work. [210] In explaining his reasons and the considerations responsible for his instituting an alert against sabotage only, General Short has stated: (1) That the message of November 27 contained nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii; [220] (2) that he received other messages after the November 27 dispatch emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive activities; [221] (3) that the dispatch was a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as an overt act; [222] (4) that he was looking to the Navy to provide him adequate warning of the approach of a hostile force, particularly through distant reconnaissance which was a Navy responsibility; [223] and (5) that instituting alerts 2 or 3 would have seriously interfered with the training mission of the Hawaiian Department. [224] NO WARNING OF ATTACK ON HAWAII The first statement by General Short that there was nothing directing him to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii will be considered. Implicit in this contention is the assumption that, despite the known imminence of war between the United States and Japan and the fact that he commanded a Pacific outpost, [216] Colonel Walter C. Phillips. See committee record, pp. 7945, 7946. [217] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12. [218] See committee exhibit No. 44. See also testimony of General Short, committee record pp. 7944, 7945. [219] Testimony of General Short, committee record, p. 7946. [220] General Short said, "There was nothing in the message directing me to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack." Committee record, p. 7929. [221] Committee record, p. 7929. [222] Id., at p. 7927. [223] Id., at p. 7946 et seq. [224] Id., at pp. 7948-7951. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 121 it was not his duty to be on the alert against a threat from without. This assumption does not appear to be supported by military doctrine or the logic of the Hawaiian situation prior to the attack. [225] The wording of the November 27 dispatch indicated the possibility of an attack from without in ordering General Short to undertake reconnaissance. The only conceivable reconnaissance which could have been undertaken by the Army was through employment of aircraft or radar, either or both of which would be in contemplation of an attack from without. General Marshall had told the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department much earlier, with emphasis and clarity, that the function of the Army in Hawaii was to defend the fleet base. Despite this fact, when warned that Japan's future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment and when his attention was called to the necessity for reconnaissance, General Short proceeded to institute an alert against sabotage only. This was done although there had not been one single act of sabotage on the islands up to that time; for that matter, there were no acts of sabotage thereafter, although this danger in Hawaii had been recognized by both the Hawaiian Department and Washington. [225a]. However, in all of General Short's correspondence with General Marshall the subject of sabotage was not emphasized and scarcely discussed. Quite to the contrary, the letters referred repeatedly to aircraft and antiaircraft defense. DISPATCHES INDICATING THREAT OF SABOTAGE We will now consider the contention made by General Short that he received other messages emphasizing measures against sabotage and subversive activities, which to his mind confirmed the accuracy of his judgment in instituting an alert against sabotage only. All of these messages, however, were received after the warning dispatch of November 27 and after he had replied thereto. [226] They could not, therefore, have influenced in any way his decision to institute an alert against sabotage only. The first of the messages concerning possible subversive activities was signed by General Miles and was dated November 27. It pointed out that hostilities may ensue and that subversive activities may be expected. This message made definitely clear that subversive activities and sabotage were not all that might be expected but hostilities as well. In this connection, however, General Short has referred to the fact that sabotage was a form of hostile action. [227] On November 28 the Hawaiian Department received two dispatches from the War Department specifically warning of the danger of sabotage and subversive activities. [228] To the first of these dispatches which was signed by General Adams, the Adjutant General, the [225] As expressed by Secretary Stimson in his statement submitted for the committee's consideration: "The outpost commander is like a sentinel on duty in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. He must assume that the enemy will attack at his particular post; and that the enemy will attack at the time and in the way in which it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied ." Committee record, pp. 14405, 14406. [225a] See in this connection an aide memoire concerning "Defense of Hawaii" prepared by the War Department and presented to the President by General Marshall in May of 1941. Part IV, Note 42, infra. [226] Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 10,13, and 34. [227] General Short said: " 'Hostile action at any moment' meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile action." Committee record, p. 7929. [228] For the full text of these two dispatches see pages 102 and 103, supra. 122 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK following reply (directed to the Adjutant General) was made on November 29: [229] "Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five) and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish him and to continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the commanding general Hawaiian Department, to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters." The reply (directed to General Arnold) to the second dispatch was not received in the War Department until December 10, 1941. [230] General Short, as heretofore indicated, has referred to the two dispatches from the War Department of November 28 warning of the danger of sabotage and subversive activities as confirming his original decision to institute an alert against sabotage only. It is significant, however, that the army commanders at Panama, on the West Coast, and in the Philippines received these same dispatches warning of subversive activities that were received by the Hawaiian commander. [230a] They did not deter the commanders at these other places from taking full and complete measures to alert their commands or convey to their minds that defense against sabotage was the only action required. [230b] The November 27 warning to General Short concerning possible hostile action at any moment was signed by General Marshall a command directive whereas the dispatches relating to sabotage and subversive activities were signed by subordinate officials of the War Department. Inasmuch as General Marshall's message contained no reference to sabotage whatever, it would seem fair to suggest that upon receiving subsequent dispatches from subordinate War Department officials warnings of this danger there should have been aroused in the Commanding General's mind the thought that perhaps he had misjudged the purport of the original warning. The evidence reflects that any reference to sabotage or subversive activities was deliberately omitted from the warning message sent General Short (and the commanders at Panama, on the West Coast, and in the Philippines) on November 27 in order "that this message could be interpreted only as [229] Committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 17, 18. [230] Id, at pp. 19, 20. [231] See Committee exhibit No. 35, p. 2. [230b] For dispatches reflecting the full and complete measures taken by these commanders (Panama, West Coast, the Philippines) see Committee exhibit No. 32 pp. 11,15,15a, 16,18, 18a, and 18b. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 123 warning the commanding general in Hawaii against an attack from without. [230c] General Short stated that he assumed the Navy would conduct distant reconnaissance [230d] and that he was relying on the Navy to give him timely warning of an attack, indicating thereby that he realized the warning messages required precautionary measures against all possible contingencies. It naturally follows that his failure to take the action required by the November 27 warning was not due to the subsequent emphasis on the specific danger of subversive activities but rather by reason of his failure to institute liaison with the Navy failure to determine what the Navy was really doing as he advised the War Department he had done, and his unwarranted assumption that even though he did not himself institute precautionary measures against the danger of an air attacks, the Navy would do so. "DO-DON'T" CHARACTER OF THE NOVEMBER 27 DISPATCH AND AVOIDANCE OF WAR As earlier indicated, General Short has referred to the November 27 dispatch as a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as all overt act to test the merits of this contention it is necessary to aline the directives and intelligence beside the prohibitions and admonitions: Negotiations with the Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest pos- sibilities that the Japanese Govern- ment might come back and offer to con- tinue. Japanese future action unpre- dictable but hostile action possible at any moment. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary Report measures taken. Should hos- tilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. But these measures should be car- ried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Limit the dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. The first admonition appearing in the foregoing dispatch is a statement of traditional American policy against the initiation of war *if hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires the prospective enemy to commit the first overt act*. This General Short already knew. Certainly he did not have in mind committing an overt act against Japan. There was nothing here to restrict the commanding general's [230c] See testimony of General Gerow, Committee record, pp. 2696-2698. [230d] See committee record, p. 7927. 124 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK contemplated plan of action. Indeed, the dispatch itself clearly pointed out that the policy should not be construed as restricting General Short to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. [231] The very fact that Japan must commit the first overt act emphasized the need for greater vigilance and defensive effort. The prohibition in the dispatch was that reconnaissance and "other measures" should not be carried out so as to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. This was incorporated in the message because of the large number of Japanese inhabitants and it was felt that nothing should be done, unless necessary to defense, to alarm the civil population and thus possibly precipitate an incident which would give Japan an excuse to go to war saying we had committed the first overt act. [232] No one appreciated more than General Short the abnormally large percentage of Japanese among the population of Hawaii. He knew that 37 percent or approximately 160,000 of the population were of Japanese descent, some 35,000 being aliens. This was one of the principal reasons for the alert against sabotage. [233] The civil population was inured to Army and Navy maneuvers which were going on continuously. [234] To have taken any of the logical steps to defend Oahu reconnaissance, 24 hour operation of radar, effecting a high state of aircraft and anti-aircraft readiness would not have alarmed a population accustomed to simulated conditions of warfare. [235] In this respect the November 27 dispatch from the War Department interjected no deterrent to full and adequate defensive measures. The admonition to limit dissemination of the information in the dispatch to minimum essential officers was within the complete discretion of the Commanding General. Dissemination of the information was to follow and not precede the selection of the proper alert; and there were no restrictions in the November 27 warning which should have precluded General Short's instituting an alert commen- [231] Mr. Stimson stated: "When General Short was informed on November 27 that 'Japanese action unpredictable' and that 'hostile action possible at any moment,' and that the policy directed 'should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense,' we had a right to assume that he would competently perform this paramount duty entrusted to him " Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record, pp. 14397, 14398. [232] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14397. This admonition was not included in the message to General MacArthur but was contained in the message to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command. See committee exhibit No. 32, pp. 8, 9. [233] It is to be noted that one of the best criterions that General Short possessed to determine what might alarm the civil population was the so-called Herron Alert during the summer of 1940. This was an all- out alert with complete dispersal of planes and troops with ammunition at the guns and reconnaissance being conducted. There was no disturbance of the civil population resulting from this action. See in this connection Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2738, 2772, 2772, 3096, 3097. [234] *General Maxwell Murray testified that the action required by Alert No. 1 taking over water, lights, gas and oil utilities, patrols all over, all important bridges guarded,-was just as much of an alarm to the people that something was anticipated "as if they had gone to the beaches" all out alert*. See Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 3096, 3097. [235] Before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel testified: "I discussed the question of air attack on Pearl Harbor with the commanding general on various occasions. We simulated such attack; we sent planes in to attack Pearl Harbor, I don't know how many times, but several times, during the year I was out there, and we put the defending planes or other elements into operation." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1131. Testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked whether there were any drills furthering joint Army-Navy exercises. He replied: "Yes. Air raid drills for several months were conducted each week. For about 2 to 3 months prior to December 7,1941, we conducted the drills once every 2 weeks This was in order to insure the participation of all elements in each drill as held, and when the drills were held weekly there were too many people excused due to overhauling a plane or some work that they considered essential and more important than taking part in drills." Navy Court of Inquiry Record, P. 296. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 125 surate with the warning and orders contained therein. [235] Perhaps, after the event the warning message could be improved upon. It nevertheless was adequate and its orders should have been carried out with an appreciation of the implications of the warning it conveyed. COMMANDING GENERAL'S RELIANCE ON THE NAVY It is apparent from the evidence that General Short was depending on the Navy to give him timely and adequate warning of any enemy force approaching Hawaii. He stated that from repeated conversations with the Navy he knew that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be either in their home ports or proceeding south; that he knew the Navy had task forces at sea with reconnaissance from Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands, which would render an air attack highly improbable; that the War Plans Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff, Admiral McMorris, had stated that there was no chance of a surprise attack on Oahu; that it was only through the Navy that he could obtain information concerning the movement of Japanese vessels; and that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility. [237] General Short's unfortunate predicament on the morning of December 7 was occasioned to a degree by reason of his reliance on the Navy to provide him timely warning. However, the fact that he was relying on the Navy does not excuse General Short for his failure to determine whether his assumptions with respect to what the Navy was doing were correct. He assumed operations of the task forces rendered an air attack highly improbable; he assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance from Oahu; he assumed the Navy would advise him of the location and movement of Japanese warships. Yet a simple inquiry by General Short would have revealed that the task forces effected no coverage of the dangerous northern approaches to Oahu; that the Navy was not conducting distant reconnaissance; and that the Navy did not know where the Japanese carrier strength was for over a week prior to December 7. We can understand General Short's dependence on the Navy, but we cannot overlook the fact that he made these assumptions with no attempt to verify their correctness. INTERFERENCE WITH TRAINING General Short has pointed out that the factor of training was considered in selecting Alert No. 1; that the use of Alerts 2 or 3 would [236] In commenting concerning the November 27 warning sent General Short, Secretary Stimson said: "This message has been characterized as ambiguous and described as a 'do-don't' message. The fact is that it presented with the utmost precision the situation with which we were all confronted and in the light of which all our commanding officers, as well as we ourselves in Washington, had to govern our conduct. The situation was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand, in view of the fact that we wanted more time, we did not want to precipitate war at this moment if it could be avoided. If there was to be war, moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan was the first consideration. In Hawaii, because of the large numbers of Japanese inhabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing would be done, unless necessary to the defense, to alarm the civil population and this possibly to precipitate an incident and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act." Further: "*All these considerations were placed before the commanding officers of their respective areas, and it was because they were thought competent to act in a situation of delicacy requiring judgment and skill that they had been placed in these high posts of command.*" Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record, pp. 14396, 14397. [237] Committee record, page 7946 et seq. 126 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK have seriously interfered with his training mission. He observed that the soldiers and officers of his command were in large part relatively new to the Army and to their specialized tasks and that regular training was essential. He stated that the War Department dispatch of November 27 "had not indicated in any way that our training mission was modified, suspended or abolished, and that all troops were to go immediately into tactical status." [238] General Short has pointed out that the Hawaiian Air Force had the particular mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17's to the Philippine Islands. He recalled that on September 8, 1941, 9 trained combat teams were sent to the Philippines; that before November 27, 18 trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland and 17 more teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes; and that 12 more combat crews had to be trained for planes expected to arrive at an early date. He observed that only 6 of his 12 Flying Fortresses were in condition and available for the training and that it was imperative General Martin make maximum use of these planes for training. He felt that if war were momentarily expected in the Hawaiian coastal frontier, the training considerations would give way but that every indication was that the War Department expected the war to break out, if at all, only in the far Pacific and not at Hawaii. [239] As has been earlier indicated, however, the very fact of having suggested to General Short that he undertake reconnaissance was an indication of the possibility of an attack on Hawaii from without. This committee believes that the warning dispatch of November 27 was ample notice to a general in the field that his training was now secondary that his primary mission had become execution of the orders contained in the dispatch and the effecting of maximum defensive security. THE ORDER TO UNDERTAKE RECONNAISSANCE The very fact that General Short noted the order with respect to undertaking reconnaissance contained in the dispatch of November 27 and thereafter instituted an alert against sabotage only demonstrates a failure to grasp the serious circumstances confronting his command. It is to be recalled in this connection that Army commanders in the Philippines, at Panama, and on the West Coast, upon receiving the dispatch of November 27 in substantially the same terms as General Short, instituted full measures adequately to alert their commands. [240] The observation has been made by General Short that he presumed the man who prepared the message of November 27 ordering him to undertake reconnaissance was unfamiliar with the fact that the Navy [238] Id., at pp. 7948, 7949. [239] Id. [240] See Committee Exhibit No. 32, pp. 11, 15 16 and 18 for replies, pursuant to the warning messages of November 27, from General MacArthur in the Philippines, General DeWitt on the West Coast, and General Andrews at Panama. General MacArthur replied under date of November 28: "Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four, air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Around security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy." A significant portion of the reply from General Andrews follows: "In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District, does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 127 was responsible for distant reconnaissance. [241] It is inconceivable, however, that in the face of a specific directive with respect to reconnaissance General Short should not have requested clarification from the War Department in the event he felt the latter did not mean what it had unequivocally said and had failed to take into consideration the Navy's responsibility for reconnaissance. This fact takes on added importance when it is realized that the November 27 dispatch was the first and only dispatch General Short had received signed by General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, since becoming commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. It was a *command directive* which should have received the closest scrutiny and consideration by the Hawaiian general. Certainly the least that General Short could have done was to advise Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch and consult with them at once concerning the fact that he had been directed to undertake reconnaissance if he presumed the Navy was to perform this function. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the very document wherein the Navy assumed responsibility for distant reconnaissance, contained in an annex thereto provision for joint operations *when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer agree that a threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent*. The failure to appreciate the necessity for following through on an order to undertake reconnaissance is not in keeping with the good judgment expected from the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. It is further to be borne in mind that General Short had six mobile radar units which were available for reconnaissance use. He ordered their operations from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m., in addition to the normal training operation of radar during the day, but failed to provide the necessary officers handling the equipment with the knowledge that war was at hand in order that they would intelligently attach significance to information which the radar might develop. In testifying before the committee concerning the operation of radar, General Short said: [241a] "That (the radar) was put into alert during what I considered the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock a. m. daily." The very fact that radar was ordered operated at all was in recognition of the danger of a threat from without; indeed it was only in contemplation of such a threat that General Short would have been supplied radar at all. [242] [241] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 4436, 4437. [241a] Committee record, p. 8054. [242] In a statement submitted for the committee's consideration, Mr. Stimson said: "You will notice that this message of November 27th specifically mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to my mind was a very important part of the message, not only because of its obvious desirability but also because we had provided the Hawaiian Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of reconnaissance against air attack and one to which I had personally devoted a great deal of attention during the preceding months. I refer to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was then provided. This equipment permitted approaching planes to be seen at distances of approximately 100 miles, and to do so in darkness and storm as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 I had taken up earnestly the matter of securing such radar equipment for aircraft protection. I knew, although it was not then generally known that radar had proved of the utmost importance to the British in the Battle of Britain, and I felt in the beginning of 1941 that we were not getting this into production and to the troops as quickly as we should, and put on all the pressure I could to speed up its acquisition. By the autumn of 1941 we had got some of this equipment out to Hawaii, and only a few days before this I had received a report of the tests which had been made of this equipment in Hawaii on November 19th, which indicated very satisfactory results in detecting approaching airplanes. I testified at considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (A. P. H. B. 4064, et seq.). When we specifically directed the commanding officer at Hawaii, who had been warned that war was likely at any moment, to make reconnaissance, I assumed that *all means of reconnaissance available to both the Army and Navy would be employed*. On the same day a war warning was dispatched to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations. The standing instructions to the theatre commanders were that all messages of this character were to be exchanged between the Army and Navy commands. Committee record, pp. 14398, 14399. 128 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK THE SHORT REPORT It is recalled that the dispatch of November 27, No. 472, carried instructions to report measures taken and that General Short, referring to the dispatch by number, advised that the Hawaiian Department was "alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy." As paraphrased and reviewed in the War Department, this reply read: "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad four seven two twenty seven." [243] No action was taken by the War Department following receipt of this reply. General Short has stated that the silence and failure of the War Department to reply to his report of measures taken constituted reasonable grounds for his belief that his action was exactly what the War Department desired. He has pointed out that if the action taken by him was not consistent with the desires of the War Department it should have informed him of that fact. [244] The question at this point, however, is not whether Washington should have replied to General Short's dispatch but whether the commanding general was entitled to believe that his reply had adequately informed Washington that he had or had not carried out the orders contained in General Marshall's warning of November 27. [245] General Gerow has already assumed full responsibility for failure to follow up to insure that the alert to prevent sabotage was not the only step taken by the Hawaiian Department under the circumstances. No one in Washington appears to have been impressed with or caught the fact that General Short's report of measures taken was inadequate and not sufficiently responsive to the directive. This failure of supervision cannot be condoned. However, a reasonable inference from the statement "liaison with Navy" was that through liaison with the Navy he had taken the necessary steps to implement the War Department warning, including the undertaking of reconnaissance. This was clearly recognized by General Short. In testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board he was asked the question: [246] "In your message of November 27, you say, 'Liaison with the Navy.' Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?" "General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing." "Question. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance? "General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not it would have affected it, because they signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff." [243] See committee exhibit No. 32, p. 12. [244] Committee record, p. 7965 et seq. [245] Referring to General Short's reply, Secretary Stimson said: "* * * he then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had faded to do and which was susceptible of being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the main warning from Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly gave me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being 'alerted to prevent sabotage' was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert against an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's statement in his message that 'liaison' was being carried out with the Navy, coupled with the fact that our message of November 27th had specifically directed reconnaissance, naturally gave the impression that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert was in effect." Committee record pp. 14408, 11409. [248] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 380. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 129 General Short was not entitled to presume that his responsibilities as Commander of the Hawaiian Department had been discharged or shifted to the War Department through dispatch of his reply. [247] This conclusion is most fully appreciated when he admittedly was not clear concerning the order to undertake reconnaissance. [248] The War Department was entitled to expect the commanding general had carried out the order to effect reconnaissance or in the alternative that he would have requested clarifying instructions. Conceding that General Short presumed the War Department would correct him if he was in error, the fact that supplemental instructions were not issued does not serve to remove that error. Had he made no report whatever the situation in Hawaii on the morning of December 7 would have been the same. Although General Short specifically advised the War Department on November 27 that he was maintaining "liaison with Navy" the evidence is unmistakably clear, as will subsequently appear, that he did not establish liaison with the Navy concerning the action to be taken pursuant to the Department's warning message. ACTION WHICH WAS NOT TAKEN UPON RECEIPT OF THE NOVEMBER 27 DISPATCH Apart from instituting an alert against sabotage and ordering the operation of radar from 4 to 7 a. m. no other appreciable steps were taken by the commanding general to prepare his command for defense against possible hostilities. [249] No change was made in the state of readiness of aircraft which were on four hours' notice. There was therefore no integration of aircraft and radar, even in the latter's limited operation from 4 to 7 a. m. The maximum distance radar could pick up approaching planes was approximately 130 miles. With the Army aircraft on 4 hours' notice a warning from the radar information center would have been of little avail. Operation of radar was not instituted on a 24-hour basis. It was so operated immediately after the attack, although as a matter of fact it was not until December 17 that the aircraft warning service was placed under complete control Of the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, handling the training phases, removed from the picture. [250] No action was taken with a view to tightening up the antiaircraft defenses. [251] The ammunition for the 60 mobile antiaircraft guns was [247] See committee record, pp. 4420, 4421 [248] Referring to the testimony of General Gerow to the effect that the commanding general's report would have been perfectly clear if he had indicated he was alerted against sabotage only (see note 247, supra) General Short commented that General Gerow "was unwilling to read my message and admit it meant what it said, no more and no less". Yet General Short failed to accord the war Department the same privilege he was taking; that is, that the order to undertake reconnaissance *meant what it said, no more and no less*. See committee record, pp. 7967, 7968. [249] Referring to the action taken by General Short, Secretary Stimson stated: "* * * to cluster his airplanes in such groups and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft ammunition so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and to use his best reconnaissance system, the radar, only for a very small fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception of his real duty which was almost beyond belief." See statement Of Secretary Stimson submitted for the committees consideration; committee record, p. 14408. [250] committee record, p. 8379. [251] In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel was asked which service was charged with repulsing enemy aircraft by antiaircraft fire on December 7, 1941. He replied: "The Army, I should say, had the prime responsibility. The plans that we had provided for the Navy rendering every possible assistance to the Army. It provided for the use of all guns, including 30 calibers and even shoulder rifles by the marines in the navy yard, and by the crews of the flying field. In addition, it provided that the batteries of all ships should take part in shooting down the planes." Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 295.