130 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK located in Aliamanu Crater, between 2 and 3 miles from Fort Shafter. [252] The crews of the antiaircraft guns were not alerted in such manner as to provide effective defense even with maximum warning from the radar information center. As in the case of Admiral Kimmel, no effective action was taken with a view to integration and coordination of Army-Navy facilities for defense. THE "CODE DESTRUCTION" INTELLIGENCE As has been seen, Admiral Kimmel was advised "for action" on December 3 of information received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent on December 2 to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, *Manila, Washington*, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents. [253] Testifying with respect to the foregoing intelligence, Admiral Kimmel stated that both he and his staff noted that *most* of the codes and ciphers *not all* were to be destroyed and that this information appeared to fit in with the information "we had received about a Japanese movement in South East Asia." He commented that Japan would naturally take precautions to prevent the compromise of her communication system in the event her action in southeast Asia caused Britain and the United States to declare war, and take over diplomatic residences. [254] Admiral Kimmel did not supply General Short the information he had received concerning the orders from Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential documents. He testified: "I didn't consider that of any vital importance when I received it * * * ." [255] General Short, on the other hand, has complained that he was not provided this intelligence and has indicated it would have been of the greatest significance to him. Referring to the intelligence concerning the fact that Washington had been ordered to destroy its code machine [256] General Short said: "The one thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact they had ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing: that they are going into an entirely new phase and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of three or four days * * *." [257] He further testified that had the Navy given him any of the dispatches received concerning the destruction of codes he would have gone into a more serious alert. [258] In strange contrast with the view of the code burning intelligence taken by Admiral Kimmel, virtually all witnesses have agreed that this was the most significant information received between November 27 and December 6 with respect to the imminence of war. Indeed, the overwhelming weight of the testimony is to effect that orders to [252] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 2604-2697. [253] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 40. On the same day Admiral Kimmel was advised for his information of the substance of an intercepted Tokyo dispatch of December 1 ordering London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy (their code) machine. It was stated that the Batavia (code) machine had already been sent to Tokyo and on December 2 Washington was also directed to destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents, that the British Admiralty had reported London Embassy had complied. Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 41. [254] Committee record, p. 6723. [255] Id., at p. 7477. [256] This advice was contained in a December 7 dispatch from the War Department which was not received by General Short until after the attack. This dispatch will be found discussed in detail, Part IV, infra. [257] Roberts Commission record, p. 1620. [258] Committee record, p. 8397. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 131 destroy codes mean from a military standpoint only one thing war within a very few days. [259] It is concluded that the failure of Admiral Kimmel to supply this intelligence to General Short was inexcusable and that the purport of this information was to advise the commander in chief within reasonably narrow limits of time as to when Japan might be expected to strike. While orders to burn codes may not always mean war in the diplomatic sense, it very definitely meant war and soon in a military sense after the "war warning" of November 27. Admiral Kimmel received this intelligence less than 4 days before the attack; it gave him an opportunity to correct his mistake in failing to institute distant reconnaissance and effect a state of readiness commensurate with the likelihood of hostilities after the November 27 war warning. Nothing was done General Short was not even informed. On December 4 the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was advised for information of orders instructing Guam to destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes, and to be prepared to destroy instantly, in event of emergency, all classified matter. [260] This intelligence was of the greatest significance. It meant that not only was war almost immediately at hand but that a landing operation by Japan against Guam was regarded as a possibility. Nothing was done. On December 6 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel advising, for action, that in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands he was authorized to order destruction in such outlying islands secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency." [261] This dispatch suggested the possibility of landing operations against our outlying islands including Wake and Midway. GENERAL SHORT'S KNOWLEDGE OF DESTRUCTION OF CONFIDENTIAL MATTER BY JAPANESE CONSULATE The evidence reflects that although Admiral Kimmel received significant information on four different occasions between December 3 and 6 concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic establishments as well as in our own outlying possessions, he failed to convey this information to General Short. Despite this fact it appears that the commanding general obtained adequate information concerning the destruction of confidential matter by Japanese diplomatic establishments. Col. George W. Bicknell, assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, stated that he learned from Navy sources in Hawaii about December 3 that diplomatic representatives of Japan in Washington, [259] see Part IV, infra re code destruction. [260] Committee exhibit No .37, p. 44. [261] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 45. A memorandum submitted by the Navy Department concerning this dispatch under date of January 29, 1946 stated OpNav dispatch 061743 was transmitted to Radio Honolulu at 5:54 p. m. December 6, 1941 Washington local time" (committee record, p.11441). It is to be noted that during committee examination Admiral Kimmel was asked whether he had testified as to when he had received the message of December 6, 1941, authorizing the destruction of confidential papers referred to in the preceding paragraph Admiral Kimmel said "I will look at it. I couldn't tell you when that was received but to the best of my recollection I never saw it until after the attack. It is an even bet as to whether I saw it before or after the attack. I think I didn't get it until after the attack. * * * I have no record upon which I can definitely state that. I can only state my recollection." Going on, Admiral Kimmel said "*At any rate, if I did receive this before the attack, it was no more than I would have expected under the circumstances. * * * And that (referring to the message) was not particularly alarming*," see committee record pp. 7649,7650. 132 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere were destroying their codes and papers. He further stated that about the same time he learned from the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI that the latter had intercepted a telephone "message from the Japanese consulate Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese consul general was burning and destroying all his important papers." Colonel Bicknell said: [262] "In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere." General Fielder stated that he was present at the staff conference and that on December 6 he gave to General Short the information that the Japanese consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. [263] Colonel Phillips also stated that this information was given by him to General Short. The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI stated that on December 3 the district intelligence officer of the Navy asked him if he could verify information that the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers; that about 2 hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone conversation between the cook of the Japanese consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu in the course of which the cook stated that the consul general was "burning and destroying all his important papers." He stated that he immediately gave this information to the district intelligence officer of the Navy and the assistant G-2 of the Army; and thereupon sent a dispatch to Director J. Edgar Hoover in Washington: "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers." [264] In testifying before the Roberts Commission General Short stated that he received no information from his intelligence officer until after the attack that the consular records were being burned. He stated: [265] "As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had really burned anything until the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th; they interrupted the burning. I wasn't cognizant of the fact that they had burned the previous day." Before the committee, however, General Short corrected his former testimony, stating that he had been advised on the morning of December 6 that the Honolulu consul was burning his papers. [266] While the evidence would indicate that General Short was advised on December 6 that the Japanese consul was burning his *codes* and *papers*, a point has been made by the commanding general that his information was limited to the fact that the consul was burning his papers without reference to *codes*. Even conceding this to be true, the fact that the consul was burning his papers after General Short had been informed hostilities were possible at any moment was of adequate import to impress the commanding general with the fact that our relations with Japan were extraordinarily critical. It is [262] See affidavit. Dated February 25, 1945, of Colonel Bicknell before Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148. [263] See affidavit of Colonel (now General) Kendall J. Fielder dated May 11, 1945, before Major Clausen. [264] See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers dated April 10, 1945, before Major Clausen. [265] Roberts Commission record, p. 1620. [266] Committee record, pp. 8398, 8399. concluded that General Short received prior to the attack substantially the intelligence concerning the destruction of codes and confidential papers *by Japanese diplomatic representatives*, although he was not informed by Admiral Kimmel of the very significant fact that the Navy Department had issued orders for the destruction of codes *in certain of our own outlying possessions*. THE "LOST" JAPANESE CARRIERS RADIO INTELLIGENCE AT HAWAII Perhaps the most vital intelligence available to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet indicating Pearl Harbor as a possible point of attack was that gathered from his own Radio Intelligence Unit at Hawaii. This unit was engaged in "traffic analyses"; that is, identifying, locating, and determining the movements of Japanese warships through their call signals. The location of vessels was effected through radio- direction methods. [267] Information of a similar type was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington. Fortnightly intelligence bulletins incorporating information received from the radio intelligence units in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence. These bulletins were made available to Admiral Kimmel. Because of conflicting reports that had been received concerning Japanese naval movements and the further fact that reports received from the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District (Philippines) were considered the most reliable, the Chief of Naval Operations on, November 24 advised the commanders in chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, among others, that other reports should be carefully evaluated and sent to the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District for action and to the Office of Naval Operations for information. After combining all incoming reports the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District was to direct dispatches to the Office of Naval Operations with copies to Admiral Kimmel for information setting forth his evaluation and best possible continuity. The commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on November 26 advised the Office of Naval Operations and the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District in summary form of information with respect to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. This dispatch expressed the belief that a strong concentration of Japanese submarines and air groups, including at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier) and probably one-third of the submarine fleet were located in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. The estimate of the situation was to the effect that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia, while some units might operate from Paleo and the Marshalls. On the same day, the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines advised, among others, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Office of Naval Operations, in commenting on the November 26 dispatch from Hawaii, that traffic analysis for the past few days indicated that the commander in chief of the Second Fleet (Japanese) was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two [267] See testimony of Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 182-292. 134 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK sections, the first of which was expected to operate in the south China area, the second, in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included Carrier Division 3 "Ryujo, and one Maru." This dispatch further pointed out that the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandated Islands and that his best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. The opinion was expressed that this evaluation was regarded as reliable. Periodically after November 27, 1941, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet as well as from other observers confirming the movement of important Japanese naval forces southward from Japan. These reports, however, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, did not indicate the movement of any Japanese carriers. The Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice after November 27 of preparing daily summaries of the information received through its traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications. [268] These summaries were submitted each day to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Layton, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. On November 28, an intelligence summary, reviewed by Admiral Kimmel, stated there was no further information concerning the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day he received the November 28 summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon United States Naval Communications and "is getting results." There was no information set forth in the summary with respect to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29, indicating that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the commander in chief, Second Fleet. On December 1, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated with respect to carriers that the presence of a unit of "plane guard" destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed. The Fortnightly Intelligence Summary dated December 1 [269] received by Admiral Kimmel from the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington stated, among other things, with respect to the Japanese naval situation that " * * * the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." This summary related to information obtained during the 2 weeks preceding its date of December 1 and the Washington estimate of the situation was necessarily based on radio intelligence information received largely from the Philippines and Hawaii before the sudden and unexplained change in the call signals of Japanese vessels on December 1. The December 1 summary, which Admiral Kimmel received from Captain Layton stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on December 1; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of 6 months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated: "*The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale*." [268] For these summaries, see committee exhibits Nos. 115 and 115a. [269] Committee exhibit No. 80. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 135 This statement was underlined by Admiral Kimmel. The summary also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and that as to carriers there was "no change." On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1 at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, concerning the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako- Takao area Carrier Division 3 and Carrier Division 4, which included four carriers, and the Kasuga Maru (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "*Koryu* (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate, the reason being that Layton considered the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts. [270] On December 2, 1941, according to Captain Layton, he and Admiral Kimmel had the following conversation: [271] "Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said "What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I replied, "No sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location." Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?" or words to that effect. My reply was that, "I hope they would be sighted before now," or words to that effect." Captain Layton observed that the incident was impressed on his mind and that Admiral Kimmel was pointing out to him his complete ignorance as to the location of the Japanese carrier divisions. However, the very reference by Admiral Kimmel to the carriers rounding "Diamond Head" was recognition by him of this possibility and his complete lack of knowledge as to where they might be. Admiral Kimmel and Captain Layton discussed "radio intelligence, its faults and its promises, its inexactities and yet the over-all picture that it will produce. *Whether then or at other times, we discussed the fact that a force can take sealed orders, proceed under radio silence and never be detected by visual or other sighting*. [272]" The December 2 radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3, read as follows: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." The Radio Intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4 stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5 contained no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6 stated "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either." Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only way by which Admiral Kimmel would have obtained in- [270] See Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 212. [271] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 212, 213. [272] Testimony of Captain Layton, Hewitt Inquiry record, p. 215. 136 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK formation as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by distant air reconnaissance. Knowledge of the location of Japanese carriers was vital to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Two carrier divisions very definitely could not be located. The service calls of Japanese vessels were changed on December 1, a most unusual procedure inasmuch as they had been changed only a month previously on November 1. Admiral Kimmel fully appreciated the significance of this change and actually underscored the statement submitted to him: "*The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale*." It would appear Admiral Kimmel regarded the preparation to be in anticipation of a Japanese movement to South East Asia. The presumption was made that inasmuch as the Japanese carriers could not be located they were in home waters. It was fully known, however, that the missing carriers of Japan were not engaged in a movement to the south since such an operation would be open to visual observation by our forces in the Philippines as well as by friendly powers. In consequence, only two reasonable alternatives remained either the carriers were in home waters or they were engaged in an operation under radio silence in some direction other than to the south. It was Admiral Kimmel's duty to be prepared for the alternative most dangerous to him. Had he concluded that the unusual change in service signals on December 1 clothed a Japanese major operation, perhaps to the eastward at Hawaii, he could have predicted within reasonably narrow limits of time as to when such an attack would come. [273] Admiral Kimmel has referred to the lack of exactitude of radio intelligence and the fact that this was not the first instance in which his staff had been unable to get a line on the location of Japanese vessels. [273a] Recognizing all of the vagaries of radio intelligence analysis, however, it was still not in keeping with his responsibility as commander in chief of the Fleet for Admiral Kimmel to ignore the sinister implications of the information supplied through the Radio Intelligence Unit after he had been warned of war. In many respects the picture presented by radio intelligence was among the most significant information relating to when and, to a degree, where the Japanese would possibly attack. [273] Secretary of the Navy Forrestal observed: "I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the 'war warning' and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits." See "Fourth Endorsement" to report of Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157. And again: "The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack." Id. [273a] In this regard, Admiral Kimmel stated, among other things: "The failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and after December first when the call signs changed, was not an unusual condition. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there were seven periods of eight to fourteen days each, in which there was a similar uncertainty about the location of the Japanese battleships. During the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of positive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the Japanese First Fleet, and eight periods of ten to twenty days each, in which the location of the greater number of cruisers of the Japanese Second Fleet was uncertain. As to the Japanese carriers, during the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, there existed a total of one hundred and thirty- four days in twelve separate periods each ranging from nine to twenty- two days, when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio traffic analysis was uncertain." Committee record, pp. 6727, 6728. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 137 THE "MORI CALL" The Federal Bureau of Investigation on December 6 delivered to responsible Army and Navy intelligence officers at Hawaii a transcript of an intercepted trans-Pacific radiotelephone conversation [274] between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" [275] and an individual in Japan. The transcript of this conversation indicated, among other things, that the individual in Japan was interested in the daily flights of airplanes, particularly large planes, from Honolulu; whether searchlights were being used; and the number of ships present at Pearl Harbor. Reference was made during the conversation to various flowers, [276] the significance of which was not known, but which conceivably could have been an open code employed to convey information concerning the presence or absence of fleet vessels to the approaching Japanese attack force, which could have listened in on the conversation. Instead of taking action on the basis of the conversation, the office of the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy decided that it should be studied further by a Japanese linguist. This was not done until after the attack and in consequence the transcript of the conversation was not seen by Admiral Kimmel before December 7. The transcript was delivered to General Short and his G-2 on the evening of December 6 by Colonel Bicknell, his assistant G-2, the latter attaching great significance to the matters discussed. Colonel Bicknell stated that the special agent in charge of the FBI was alarmed at what he considered the military implications of the Mori conversation with respect to Pearl Harbor and that he, Bicknell, concurred in this view, considering the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. He stated, however, that "both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too 'intelligence conscious' and that to them the message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about." [277] No action whatever was taken by General Short. Regardless of what use the Japanese made of the "Mori call," the conversation should have been, on its very face, of the greatest significance to the responsible commanders in Hawaii. Members of the Mori family were the subject of investigation by the FBI, a fact known to the intelligence offices of both the Army and Navy. An interest by Japan in the daily flights of "large airplanes" and whether searchlights were employed could have but one meaning to alert Commanders who were properly vigilant and should have been prepared for the worst in the knowledge that hostilities were imminent a desire to know whether air reconnaissance was being conducted and whether searchlights were employed for defense against air attack. The undecipherable and suspicious reference to flowers should have intensified alertness by reason of the very fact that the true meaning could not be gathered. *The Mori call pointed directly at Hawaii*. The decision of the District intelligence Office of the Navy to place the matter aside for further study was inexcusable and reflects the apathetic state of alertness throughout the Navy command. [274] See committee exhibit No. 84 for complete transcript of the conversation. [275] The Mori family included Dr. Motokazu Mori, his wife Mrs. Ishiko Mori, his father Dr. Iga Mori, and his son Victor Motojiro Mori. The family was the subject of security investigations in Hawaii. [276] In the course of the conversation the question was asked, "What kind of dowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The reply was: "Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now." [277] See affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell dated February 25, 1945, before Major Clausen. Committee exhibit No. 148. 138 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK DETECTION OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE ON MORNING OF DECEMBER The U. S. S. Condor, a minesweeper, at 3:42 a. m. (Honolulu time) December 7, reported sighting a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor in a defensive area where American submarines had been restricted from operating while submerged. The Condor by visual signal reported this sighting to the U. S. S. Ward, a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol between 3:50 and 3:58 a. m. After receiving this information the Ward searched for the submarine for approximately one and one-half hours without results. It thereupon contacted the Condor, inquiring as to the distance and course of the submarine that was sighted. At 5:20 a. m. the Condor replied but the Ward was unable to effect the submarine's location on the basis of this information. The commander of the Ward thought the Condor had been mistaken in concluding that it had seen a submarine and made no report to higher authority. [278] The radio conversation between the Ward and the Condor was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point Oahu, a radio station under the jurisdiction of the Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District. Inasmuch as the conversation was solely between the ships, was not addressed to the Section Base, and no request was made that it be relayed, the radio station did not report it to higher authority. At 6:30 a. m. The U. S. S. Antares, arriving off Pearl Harbor with a barge in tow, sighted a suspicious object which appeared to be a small submarine. The Antares notified the Ward, asking it to investigate, and at approximately 6:33 a. m. observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two "smoke pots" near the object. At 6:40 the Ward sighted an unidentified submarine apparently following the Antares. The Ward opened fire at 6:45 and the Antares, observing the fire of the Ward, noted about the same time that a Navy patrol plane appeared to drop depth charges or bombs on the submarine. When the submarine keeled over and started to sink, the Ward ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. At 6:51 the Ward radioed the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District: "We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area." The captain of the Ward followed this dispatch with a supplemental message at 6:53: "We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area." This information was received by the Chief of Staff to Admiral Bloch at 7:12 and by the Duty Officer of Admiral Kimmel at 7:15. Admiral Kimmel stated he received this information between 7:30 and 7:40 a. m. Admiral Bloch, according to his testimony, was informed by his Chief of Staff, but in view of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the Ward had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the Ward and the relief duty destroyer could take care of the situation; that Admiral Kimmel to whom the information had been referred had the power to take any action which might be desired. [279] Admiral Kimmel testified: [280] "Between 7:30 and 7:40, I received information from the Staff Duty Officer of the Ward's report, the dispatch of the ready-duty destroyer to assist the Ward, [278] See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 87-92; 428, 429. [279] Id., at pages 414 416; 452-469. For further details concerning this incident, see Hewitt inquiry exhibits Nos. 18, 73, 75, and 76. [280] Committee record, p. 6760-6770. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 139 and the efforts then underway to obtain a verification of the Ward's report. I was awaiting such verification at the time of the attack. In my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper preliminary to more drastic action in view of the number of such contacts which had not been been verified in the past." It is to be noted, however, that in Admiral Kimmel's own statement he refers to only two reports concerning possible submarine contacts after November 3 in addition to the Ward incident. He stated: [281] "* * * On November 28, 1941, the U. S. S. Helena reported that a radar operator without knowledge of my orders directing an alert against submarines was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area. A search by a task group with three destroyers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During the night of December 2, 1941, the U. S. S. Gamble reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158- 23. An investigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced no conclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine." The reported sighting of a submarine periscope at 3:42 a. m. on the morning of December 7, in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, even though not verified, should have put the entire Navy command on the qui vive and when at 6:40 a. m. The presence of a submarine was definitely established, the entire Navy command should have been on a full alert. In the Martin-Bellinger estimate annexed to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan it was pointed out that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. Admiral Kimmel in his letter to the Fleet, 2CL-41 (Revised), *dated October 14, 1941*, made this identical statement and followed it with the words: [282] "The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant *in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means*." The evidence does not reflect that the sighting and sinking of a submarine, particularly in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, was of such frequent occurrence as to justify the failure to attach significance to the events of the morning of December 7. This is especially true when it is realized that a war warning had been received and Admiral Kimmel's own estimates indicated the extreme significance of submarine activity. As a matter of fact the Condor and Ward incidents appear to be the *first* instance of reported sighting and sinking of a submarine since the critical turn in our negotiations with Japan. The reported sighting was at 3:42 a. m., *over 4 hours before the Japanese air force struck*. Appearing before the Roberts Commission, General Short commented as follows with respect to the Ward incident: [283] "That would under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack." [281] Id, at p. 6769. [282] Hewitt inquiry exhibit No. 8; committee exhibit No. 44. [282] Roberts Commission record, p. 311.