140 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The supposed sighting of a submarine at 3:42 a. m. And the attack upon a submarine at 6:45 a. m., December 7, should have been recognized as immediate basis for an all-out alert to meet all military contingencies. [284] RADAR DETECTION OF JAPANESE RAIDING FORCE The army radar was scheduled for operation on Sunday morning, December 7 from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. [284a] The normal operation for training purposes after 7 a. m. Was discontinued for this particular Sunday by reason of special authorization obtained from the control officer. At one of the more remote aircraft warning stations, Opana, Privates Joseph Lockard and George Elliott had been on duty from 4 to 7 a. m. Inasmuch as they were waiting for the army truck to return them to quarters for breakfast, it was decided to operate the radar after 7 a. m. in order that Private Lockard, who was skilled in the operation of the radar detector, might afford his partner additional instruction. As the machine was being adjusted, Private Lockard saw on the radar screen an unusual formation he had not previously seen in the machine. Inasmuch as the indicator reflected a large number of planes coming in and he was confident there was nothing like it in the air, he felt that the machine must be at fault. After additional checking he found, however, that the machine was operating properly and concluded at 7:02 a. m. that there was a large number of planes approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles from 3 east of north. [285] After some discussion concerning the advisability of informing the information center, Private Lockard called the center at 7:20 a. m. advising that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu from the direction indicated. It is to be noted that, as General Short stated, "At 7 a. m. all the men at the information center except the telephone operator had folded up their equipment and left." [286] The switchboard operator was unable to do anything about the call and accordingly, since the information center personnel had departed, referred it to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps whose tour of duty at the center was until 8 a. m. He was there solely for training and observation. Lieutenant Tyler, upon being advised of the approach of a large number of planes, told Private Lockard in substance and effect to "forget it." He assumed that the flight indicated was either a naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the mainland that were scheduled to arrive on December 7. [284] In the light of the known and declared significance to be attached to the presence of a Japanese submarine in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, this committee does not concur in the implications of the conclusion made by the Navy Court of Inquiry that: "There was nothing, however, in the presence of a single sub marine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent " See Navy Court of Inquiry report committee exhibit No. 157. [284a] In the course of examination by Counsel, General Short was asked it radar was put on the alert after the warning of November 27. General Short replied: " That was put into alert during. what I considered the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock a. m. daily." Asked if just putting the radar into operation as effective without an Information Center that worked with it, General Short said: " The information center was working with it." Committee record page 8054. The evidence reflects that installation of three permanent radar stations had not been completed. The mobile sets had been in operation, however, for some time prior to December 7 with very satisfactory results See in this regard Note 287, infra. [285] For complete discussion, see testimony of Joseph L. Lockard, Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 1014-1034; Navy Court of Inquiry record p. 628-343; testimony of George E. Elliott, Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 994-1014; Navy Court of Inquiry record, pages 644-659; and committee record, p. 13380-13499. [286] Committee record, p. 7976, PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 141 General Short stated: [287] "If he (Tyler) had alerted the interceptor command there would have been time if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air. * * *. It would have made a great difference in the loss * * *. It would have been a question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action." In testifying before the joint committee, General Short said: [288] "If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Japanese, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to warm up the engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler made no report of this matter to me and as far as I know did not report the incident to the control officer, Major Tyndall after the information center was manned about 8:30 a. m. This matter was not brought to my attention until the next day when it was too late to be of value. Had this incident been reported to the control officer at 8:30 a. m. on the 7th, he would have informed the Navy and it might have enabled them to locate the carriers." If the Army command at Hawaii had been adequately alerted, Lieutenant Tyler's position would be indefensible. He was at the information center for training and observation, had no knowledge on which to predicate any action, and accordingly should have consulted higher authority. His fatal estimate "Forget it" was empty assumption. The fact that Lieutenant Tyler took the step that he did, merely tends to demonstrate how thoroughly unprepared and how completely lacking in readiness the Army command really was on the morning of December 7. Further, the evidence reflects that Privates Lockard and Elliott debated the advisability of informing the Information Center concerning the approach of a large number of planes. It would appear that this unusual information concerning a large number of planes so unusual in fact that Private Lockard stated he had never before seen such a formation should have provided immediate and compelling reason for advising the Information Center had the necessary alert been ordered after the November 27 warning and the proper alertness pervaded the Army command. While it was not possible with the then state of radar development to distinguish friendly planes from hostile planes, this fact is of no application to the situation in Hawaii; for in a command adequately alerted to war any presumptions of the friendly or enemy character of approaching forces must be that they are enemy forces. It is to be noted General Short has stated that if Lieutenant Tyler had alerted the interceptor command there would have been time to disperse the planes and to have reduced the losses. The real reason, however, that the information developed by the radar was of no avail was the failure of the commanding general to [287] Roberts Commission record, pp. 312, 313. However, in a memorandum dated November 14, 1941, Lt. Col. C . A. Powell, Signal Corps, Hawaiian Department, stated: "In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. The exercise was started approximately 4:30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier. "As soon as the planes were assembled they proceeded toward Hawaii. *This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor* . . ." A copy of this memorandum was forwarded under date of November 19, 1941, to Mr. Harvey E. Bundy special assistant to the Secretary of War. See committee exhibit No. 136. [288] Committee record, p. 7977. 142 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK order an alert commensurate with the warning he had been given by the War Department that hostilities were possible at any moment. OTHER INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY ARMY AND NAVY IN HAWAII CHANNELS OF INTELLIGENCE Both the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii had responsible intelligence officers whose duty it was to coordinate and evaluate information from all sources and of all pertinent types for their superiors. The record reflects full exploitation of all sources for this purpose including the interview of passengers transiting Hawaii. The record also reflects that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in Hawaii were supplying Army and Navy intelligence officers with data available. [289] The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI at Honolulu, for example, stated that on or about November 28, 1941, he received a radio communication from Director J. Edgar Hoover to the effect "that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything could happen" and that, on the same day, he delivered this information to responsible Army and Navy intelligence officers in Hawaii. [290] THE "MANILA MESSAGE" Both the Army and Navy intelligence offices received about December 3, 1941, the following dispatch from a British source in Manila through a British representative in Honolulu: [291] "We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indochina: A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of airfields and railways. 2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks, and guns (75 mm). B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov 21 by American Military Intelligence here. C. *Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South*. You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu." The assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department stated he gave the foregoing intelligence to General Short. [292] THE HONOLULU PRESS The information available in the Hawaiian Islands from the press and the attendant state of the public mind in the days before Pearl Harbor can to a great extent be gathered from a recitation of the headlines appearing in Honolulu newspapers. Among the headlines were the following: [293] [288a] Illustrative of the insufficiency of the radar alert is the fact that although the charts plotting the Japanese force in and plotting the force as it retired were turned over to higher authority during the course of the attack, this information was not employed to assist in locating the Japanese task force and it appears no inquiries were made concerning it for a considerable period of time after the attack. [289] See testimony of Col. George W. Bicknell before the joint committee, committee record, pp. 13536-13620. [290] See affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, dated April 10, 1945, before Major Clausen; Clausen investigation, pp. 88-91. [291] See exhibits, Clausen investigation. [292] See supplemental affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell, dated August 14, 1945, before Clausen. [293] Committee record, p. 13622-13627. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 143 Honolulu Advertiser November 7, 1941 "Kurusu Carrying Special Note to F. D. R. From Premier Tojo Japan Ready to Act Unless Tension Eases." "Japan Waits Before Move in Far East-Aggression in Pacific Appears Shelved Until Kurusu's Mission has been Completed in U. S." "Invasion Held too Difficult by Officials Offensive May Start in Middle East Soon; Invasion of Continent Impracticable at Present." November 13, 1941 "Tokyo Radio Asserts War is Already on Any Military Moves Only Logical Result of Encirclement Policy, Japanese Staff Says." "Envoy Undismayed Carries Broad Powers to Act Kurusu Denies Taking Message, Implies Errand of Bigger Scope." November 14, 1941 "Japanese Confident of Naval Victory." November 26, 1941 "Americans Get Warning to Leave Japan, China." "Hull Reply to Japan Ready." November 27, 1941 "U.S.-Japan Talks Broken Off as Hull Rejects Appeasement Full Surrender Demanded in U. S. Statement." "Evacuation Speeded as Peace Fades." November 28, 1941 "Parris Island, S. C. This is the tail assembly of the captive barrage balloon at Parris Island, S. C., looking for all the world like an air monster. The wench controlling it is in the sandbagged structure protected there from bomb splinters. The helium sausage may be used to protect beachheads, bridgeheads and other strong points thereby differing from the British technique which keeps them flying over London. The marines encamped on Parris Island, S. C., have a special training school on these balloons." November 29, 1941 "U. S. Rejects Compromise in Far East-Washington Insists on Maintenance of Status Quo, Withdrawal from China by Japan Army." "U. S. Warplanes May Protect Burma Road Protective Force of 200 Planes, 500 Pilots Held Sufficient to Ward Off Attack by Japanese." November 30, 1941 "Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle Foreign Affairs Expert Attacks Tokyo Madness." 144 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "Leaders Call Troops Back in Singapore Hope Wanes as Nations Fail at Parleys; Nightly Blackouts Held in P. I.; Hawaii Troops alerted." December 1, 1941 "Japanese Press Warns Thailand." "Burma Troops Are Reinforced British, Indian Units Arrive Rangoon." "F. D. R. Hurries to Parleys on Orient Crisis." December 2, 1941 "Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S. Thailand Now in Allied Bloc, Press Charges." "Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations Prepares for Action in Event of Failure." "Malaya Forces Called to Full Mobilization." "Quezon Held to Blame in P. I. Defense Delay." December 3, 1941 "Huge Pincer attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted Pepper Visions Nations Acting as Nazi Pawns." "U S. Demands Explanation of Japan Moves Americans Prepare for Any Emergency; Navy Declared Ready." December 4, 1941 "Hawaii Martial Law Measure Killed for Present Session." "Japanese Pin Blame on U. S. Army Paper Charges Violation by F. D. R." December 5, 1941 "Probe of Japanese Activities Here Will Be Made by Senate-Spy Inquiry Rapidly Gets Tentative O. K. By State Department." "Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today." "Japan Calls in Nationals." "Japan Has Secret Shanghai Agents." December 6, 1941 "America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo China Hull May Ask Proof, Suggest Troop's Recall." "Japan Troops Concentrated on Thai Front Military Observers Say Few Units Have Been Posted in North." December 7, 194l "F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis-Japanese Deny Massing Troops for Thai War." "British Fear Tientsin Row, Call Up Guards May Isolate Concession to 'Prevent' Agitation over U. S.-Japan Rumors." "Hirohito Holds Power to Stop Japanese Army." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 145 Honolulu Star Bulletin November 10, 1941 "Navy Control for Honolulu Harbor." December 1, 1941 "U. S. Army Alerted in Manila Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows." "Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension." December 4, 1941 "Japan Spurns U. S. Program Press Holds Acceptance Not Possible." December 5, 1941 "Japan Parries Open U. S. Break." "Further Peace Efforts Urged Tokyo Claims Policy 'Misunderstood' in Washington as One of Force and Conquest." December 6,1941 "Singapore on War Footing Sudden Order Calls Troops to Positions State of Readiness is Completed; No Explanation Given." "New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo Joint Commission to Iron Out Deadlock with U. S. Proposed." It would seem difficult to imagine how anyone upon reading the newspapers alone [294] could have failed to appreciate the increasing tenseness of the international situation and the unmistakable signs of war.[295] THE ROLE OF ESPIONAGE IN THE ATTACK It has been suggested that Admiral Kimmel and General Short should be charged with knowledge that the Japanese were conducting extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and by reason thereof they should have exercised greater vigilance commensurate with the realization that Japan knew everything concerning the fleet, the fleet base and the defenses available thereto. Implicit in this suggestion is the assumption that superior intelligence possessed by Japan concerning Pearl Harbor conditioned her decision to strike there or, [294] Referring to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Secretary Stimson expressed this idea in the following terms: "Even without any such message (the War Department dispatch of November 7) the outpost commander should have been on the alert. If he did not know that the relations between Japan and the United States were strained and might be broken at any time, he must have been almost the only man in Hawaii who did not know it, for the radio and the newspapers were blazoning out those facts daily, and he had a chief of staff and an intelligence officer to tell him so. And if he did not know that the Japanese were likely to strike without warning, he could not have read his history of Japan or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in respect to such matters." Statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14408. [295] Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have made a point of the fact that after the warnings of November 27 they were dependent on the newspapers for information concerning the state of negotiations and from the press, gathered that the conversations were still continuing. It is to be recalled, however, that the "code destruction" intelligence was made available after November 27 and indicated with unmistakable clarity that effective negotiations were at an end. In any event it would appear anomalous that the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet would permit unofficial newspaper accounts to take precedence over official War and Navy Department dispatches, setting forth the break-down in negotiations. Admiral Kimmel, himself, admitted that he did not act on newspaper information in preference to official information supplied to him by the Navy Department, after having previously observed that he obtained a major portion of his "diplomatic information from the newspapers." See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 306, 307. 146 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK otherwise stated, that Japan would not have attacked Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 if she had not the benefit of unusual and superior intelligence. Virtually every report that has been heretofore prepared concerning the disaster has referred to the probability of supposed extensive espionage activity in Hawaii and the peculiar vulnerability of the fleet base to such activity by reason of the surrounding mountainous terrain. [296] There is evidence before the committee, however, which reveals several salient considerations indicating that Japanese Hawaiian espionage was not particularly effective and that from this standpoint there was nothing unusual about the Hawaiian situation. It is clear beyond reasonable doubt that superior Japanese intelligence had nothing whatever to do with the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Among the considerations giving rise to this conclusion are the following: 1. Radar equipment was available on Oahu for use in detecting approaching planes. That Japan knew of radar and its capabilities would seem clear if for no other reason than on November 22 her consul in Panama advised her that the United States had set up airplane detector bases and "some of these detectors are said to be able to discover a plane 200 miles away." [297] The attacking force was actually detected through radar over 130 miles from Oahu. Had Japanese espionage developed the fact that radar was in use at Hawaii and so advised Tokyo of that fact, it would seem unlikely that the attacking planes would have come in for the raid at high altitude but, on the other hand, would have flown a few feet above the water in order to take advantage of the radar electrical horizon presupposing of course that Japan possessed at least an elementary working knowledge of radar and its potentialities. 2. Perhaps the greatest single item of damage which the attacking force could have inflicted on Oahu and our potential for effectively prosecuting the war would have been to bomb the oil-storage tanks around Pearl Harbor. [298] These tanks were exposed and visible from the air. Had they been hit, inexplicable damage would have resulted. Considering the nature of installations that were struck during the attack, it is questionable whether Japanese espionage had developed fully the extraordinary vulnerability of the oil storage to bombing and its peculiar and indispensable importance to the fleet. 3. The evidence before the Committee reflects that other Japanese consulates were supplying Tokyo as much information as the Honolulu consulate. [299] Information supplied by the Manila and Panama consuls was detailed in character and related meticulously to defenses available and those in process of development. It appears that it was not until a few days before December 7 that the Honolulu consul supplied his Japanese superiors any significant information concerning the defenses of Oahu, and [296] See reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Court of Inquiry, committee exhibit No. 157. [297] Committee exhibit No. 2, p. 49. [298] Admiral Bloch pointed out that, had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the dry-dock repair shop, barracks, and other facilities instead of the airfields and the ships of the fleet, the United States would have suffered more insofar as the prosecution of the war was concerned. See Hart inquiry record, p. 94. It is, of course, known that the Japanese knew generally as to the location of the oil-storage tanks as reflected by a map recovered after the attack. See Hewitt inquiry, exhibit No. 30. [299] From evidence before the Committee it appears that the Manila and Panama consuls were supplying Tokyo more information and of a type far more indicative of an attack than that received concerning Hawaii. See section "Ships in Harbor Reports," Part IV, infra, this report. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 147 at a time when the attacking force was already on its way to Pearl Harbor. [300] 4. The Japanese task force left Hitokappu Bay on November 25 with December 7 set as the time for the attack. This departure, it would seem clear, was in anticipation of the failure to secure concessions from the United States through further negotiations. The date December 7 had been recognized as suitable for the attack in discussions prior to November 7. It is hardly credible that superior intelligence should have precipitated or otherwise conditioned the attack when the decision to strike on December 7 was made many days earlier and, manifestly, in the interim between the decision and the attack date the entire defensive situation at Hawaii could have changed. [301] As a matter of fact two of our task forces left Pearl Harbor while the raiders were en route for the attack. 5. It is apparent from the evidence obtained through Japanese sources since VJ-day that the decision to attack on December 7 was made on the basis of the general assumption that units of the fleet ordinarily came into Pearl Harbor on Friday and remained over the week end. [302] With this realization providing adequate odds that substantial units of the Pacific Fleet would-be in Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7, that date was selected. 6. In February of 1941 Admiral Yamamoto is reported to have stated, "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed. [303]" This statement is clearly in line with the premise laid down by several witnesses before the committee that Japan would open her attack on us by hitting our Pacific Fleet wherever it might be whether at Pearl Harbor, Manila, Panama, or on the west coast in order to immobilize it as a threat to Japanese moves to the south. [304] The fleet happened to be based at Pearl Harbor and in consequence that was where Japan struck. 7. The "Mori call," to which reference has heretofore been made, was on the evening of December 5. It would appear doubtful that Japan should have been seeking information just before the attacking the rather inexpert manner displayed in the call if she possessed any wealth of intelligence gleaned through espionage agents in Hawaii. 8. Investigation conducted in Japan since VJ-day indicates as a matter of fact, that espionage agents, apart from the consul and his staff, played no role whatever in the attack. [305] The sources of information employed, according to Japanese interviewed, were naval attaches to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, public newspapers in the United States, American radio broadcasts (public), crews and passengers on ships which put in at Honolulu, and general information. [306] [300] See committee exhibit No. 2. [301] Committee exhibit No. 8. [302] Id. [303] Committee exhibit No. 8D. [304] See testimony of Capt. Arthur McCollum, committee record, pp. 9115-9288; testimony of Capt. Ellis Zacharias, committee record, pp. 8709-8778, 8909 9044. [305] See committee exhibit No. 8. Also note 6, Part II, this report. [306] Id. 148 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 9. As late as December 2, Tokyo was solicitously asking its Honolulu consul "whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications they will be sent up. Also advise me whether the warships are provided with antimine nets. [307]" On December 6, the Honolulu Consul advised Tokyo: "In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation. [308]" The foregoing is hardly indicative of any superior sources or facilities for obtaining intelligence. It is reported that the decision to employ a horizontal-bombing attack on Pearl Harbor in conjunction with an air- torpedo attack was for the reason that Tokyo could not determine whether ships at Pearl Harbor were equipped with torpedo nets and the horizontal bombing could be depended upon to inflict some damage if the torpedo attack failed. [309] 10. In planning for the attack, Japan made elaborate precautions to protect the raiding task force which was of itself very formidable, probably more so as a striking force than the entire fleet based at Pearl Harbor. A large striking force was held in readiness in the Inland Sea to proceed to assist the raiding force if the latter were detected or attacked. [310] It is proper to suggest that such precautions would seem unlikely and misplaced if Japan had known through superior espionage information that there was no air or other reconnaissance from Oahu and the defenses were not properly alerted. The evidence reflects that the raiding task force probably determined the extent of reconnaissance through plotting in our plane positions with radio bearings. Further, the Japanese force followed the broadcasts from Honolulu commercial radio stations on the theory that if the stations were going along in their normal manner, the Hawaiian forces were still oblivious to developments. [311] 11. In moving in for the attack on December 7, the Japanese ran the risk of tipping over the apple cart by sending out scouting planes a considerable period of time ahead of the bombers. [312] They took the further risk of having several submarines in the operating sea areas around Pearl Harbor. If Japan had possessed extraordinary intelligence concerning the state of Hawaiian defenses or lack thereof, it would seem improbable that she would have invited disaster by taking such risks. 12. Reference has been made to the large number of semiofficial consular agents that were stationed in Hawaii, the implication being they were engaged in widespread espionage activity Yet the facts before the committee reflect no evidence that these agents committed a single act of espionage, except as it may be inferred from the information sent by the Honolulu consul to Tokyo, which as will be indicated was no more extensive than was being received from other consulates. [307] See committee exhibit No. 2, p. 21. [308] Id., at pp. 27, 28. [309] See committee exhibit No. 8. [310] Id. [311] See committee exhibit No. 8D. [312] Id. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 149 13. It would seem likely that Japan expected some of the most effective striking units of the Pacific Fleet, particularly the carriers, to be in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The raiders, for example, as testified by Admiral Kimmel, bombed a vessel with lumber on its upper deck, apparently thinking it was a carrier. In the light of retrospection and the experiences of the war, it is suggested that Japan would not have indulged the Pyrrhic victory of destroying our lumbering battleships if she had not also hoped to find the fast striking units of the fleet. 14. Japanese estimates in the late fall of 1941 as to the disposition of United States air strength in the Pacific were, with respect to Hawaii, as follows: Fighter planes, 200; small attack planes, 150; 4-engine planes, 40; 2-engine planes, 100; reconnaissance and patrol planes, 35; and flying boats, 110, for a total of 635 planes. [312a] This estimate is roughly twice that of the actual number of planes at Hawaii and reflects a thoroughly erroneous impression as to the ratio of planes in a particular category. The inability to make an approximation of enemy strength within more narrow limits of exactitude can hardly be credited as superior intelligence. 15. In the last analysis it is difficult to believe that Japanese espionage was actually able to develop satisfactorily the real strength of our Pacific Fleet. In December of 1941 the Japanese fleet was superior to our fleet in the Pacific. The latter would have been unable, based on the testimony of witnesses questioned on the subject, to have proceeded, for example, to the aid of General MacArthur in the Philippines even had Pearl Harbor not been attacked. Our war plan in the Pacific, particularly in the early stages, was essentially defensive in character, save for sporadic tactical raids. If the Japanese really knew the weakness of the Pacific Fleet they must also have known that it did not present a formidable deterrent to anything Japan desired to do in the Far East. As already suggested, the question presents itself: *Why, if Japanese espionage in Hawaii was superior, would Japan invite the unqualified wrath of the American people, weld disunited American public opinion, and render certain a declaration of war by the Congress through a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor when the only real weapon we had, our Pacific Fleet, presented itself no substantial obstacle to what Japan had in mind*? A logical answer would seem to be that Japan had not been able to determine and, in consequence, was not cognizant of our real naval weakness in the Pacific.[312b] The extremely large raiding force and the excessive number of attacking planes would appear to be further confirmation of this conclusion. [312a] See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a letter of the same date from Commander Walter Wilds, Office of the Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Committee record, p. 14626. [312b] When questioned as to the deterring effect the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 might have on Japanese aggressive action in the Far East, Admiral Ingersoll declared: "The Pacific Fleet had no train, it had no transports, it did not have sufficient oilers to leave the Hawaiian Islands on an offensive campaign and Japan knew it just as well as we did and she knew that she could make an attack in the area in which she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with impunity." Committee record, p. 11370. It appears that the statement by Admiral Ingersoll concerning his estimate of Japanese knowledge concerning the capacity of the Pacific Fleet is illogical and completely incompatible with the risks entailed by Japan in attacking Pearl Harbor. During the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, *it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor Striking Force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating units; it was specifically assumed that one AKAGI class carrier, and one SORYU class carrier would be lost*. See committee record, p. 457.