PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 157 PART IV RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON 158 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK [Blank] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 159 PART IV. RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON BASING THE PACIFIC FLEET AT HAWAII Beginning in May of 1940 the entire American Pacific Fleet operated in the Hawaiian theater with Pearl Harbor as its base. [1] Prior to that time the fleet had been based on the west coast with certain contingents operating from time to time in the Hawaiian area. Admiral James O. Richardson, who was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in 1940, stated that while the fleet was in Hawaii incident to exercises during the summer of 1940 he received instructions to announce to the press that "at his request" the fleet would continue at Hawaii for the purpose of carrying out further exercises. [2] It was his understanding that the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was with a view to its providing a restraining influence on Japan. [3] At the time of original contemplation it appears that the fleet was to remain at Hawaii on a relatively temporary basis. [4] Admiral Richardson did not concur in the decision to station the fleet there and so informed the Chief of Naval Operations. [5] He testified with respect to his objections as follows: [6] "My objections for remaining there were, primarily, that you only had one port, secure port, and very crowded, no recreation facilities for the men, a long distance from Pearl Harbor to the city of Honolulu, inadequate transportation inadequate airfields. "A carrier cannot conduct all training for her planes from the carrier deck. In order to launch her planes she must be underway at substantial speed, using up large amounts of fuel. So that wherever carriers are training their squadrons there must be flying fields available, so that while the ship herself is undergoing overhaul, or repair, or upkeep, the planes may conduct training, flying from the flying fields "There were inadequate and restricted areas for anchorages of the fleet; to take them in and out of Pearl Harbor wasted time. "Another reason, which was a substantial one: Americans are perfectly willing to go anywhere, stay anywhere, do anything when there is a job to be done and they can see the reason for their being there, but to keep the fleet, during what the men considered normal peacetimes, away from the coast and away from their families, away from recreation, rendered it difficult to maintain a high state of morale that is essential to successful training. "For those reasons, and because I believed that the fleet could be better prepared for war on a normal basis on the west coast, I wanted to return to the west coast." As a result of a visit to Washington in July of 1940, Admiral Richardson stated he gained three distinct impressions: [7] "*First*. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action; "*Second*. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan; "*Third*. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of [1] See committee exhibit No. 9 for file of correspondence between Admirals Stark and Richardson concerning, among other things, the matter of basing the fleet at Hawaii. For a description of the base at Pearl Harbor see appendix F to this report. [2] Committee record, p. 669. [3] See committee record, p. 682, also Navy Court of Inquiry, pp. 1057, 1058. [4] Committee record, p 668. [5] See committee exhibit No. 9. [6] Committee record, pp. 674, 675. [7] See memorandum dated October 22 1940 from Admiral Richardson to the Chief of Naval Operations. Committee exhibit No. 160 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaii area." In a memorandum for the Secretary of Navy dated September 12, 1940, Admiral Richardson pointed out several disadvantages from a Navy point of view of retaining the fleet in the Hawaiian area and stated: [8] "If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific coast bases?" During October of 1940 while in Washington he talked with President Roosevelt at which time the President informed him that the Pacific Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining influence on the actions of Japan. Admiral Richardson testified: [9] "I stated that in my opinion the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. Therefore, the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii could not exercise a restraining influence on Japanese action. I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations." He stated that the President's comment to the foregoing was in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now having a restraining influence on the actions of Japan." [10] Admiral Richardson testified that he replied that he still did not believe this to be the case and that he knew the Pacific Fleet was disadvantageously disposed to prepare for or to initiate war operations, whereupon the President said: [11] "I can be convinced of the desirability of returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the west coast we are not stepping backward." It is clear from consideration of the evidence that Admiral Richardson's position was based on the feeling that the fleet could be better prepared for war if based on the west coast and not because he feared for the security of the fleet at Pearl Harbor. [12] In a letter to Admiral Stark on November 28 concerning the matter of the security of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area he said : [13] "*This feature of the problem [8] Committee exhibit No. 9. [9] Committee record pp. 682, 683. [10] Committee record, p. 683. [11] See, however, in this connection the testimony of Mr. Sumner Welles, committee record, pp. 1124,1125. [12] Committee exhibit No. 9. This comment was made by Admiral Richardson pursuant to a letter from Admiral Stark dated November 22, 1940, in which the latter had stated, among other things: "Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of the Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of the units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 161 does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for.*" Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Richardson did not raise any question concerning the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor as a reason for bringing it back to the west coast. [14] Referring to the decision to base the fleet at Hawaii Admiral Kimmel stated: [15] "When I assumed command, the decision to base the Fleet in the Hawaiian area was an historical fact. The target and base facilities required to train the Fleet for war were in the process of being moved from the West Coast to Hawaii. The Fleet had been practically without gunnery practice for nearly a year due to the previous uncertainty as to the location of its base. Any further uncertainty would have delayed the availability of the mobile facilities to maintain, repair and train the Fleet. The resulting loss of time in starting intensive training would have been disastrous. This was my view when I took command. My appointment was in no wise contingent upon any acquiescence on my part in a decision already made months before to keep the Fleet in Hawaiian waters." Admiral Kimmel stated that during his visit to Washington in June of 1941, he told the President and Admiral Stark of certain dangers to the fleet at Pearl Harbor, including air attack, blocking of the harbor and similar matters. He said that generally he felt the fleet should not remain at Pearl Harbor but he made no protests and submitted no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or carriers. [16] Regardless of the position taken by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet during 1940 with respect to basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor, extensive measures were taken thereafter and long before the outbreak of war to improve the fleet's security at Hawaii. [17] The Secretary of State, as well as our Ambassador to Japan were satisfied that the presence of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor did in fact prove a deterrent to Japanese action as did the Chief of Naval Operations. [18] Referring to the presence of our fleet at Hawaii, the Japanese Foreign Minister in June of 1940 stated to Ambassador Grew that "the continued stay of our fleet in those waters (Hawaiian) constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas * * *." [19] As Secretary Hull stated, [20] "The worst bandit * * * doesn't like for the most innocent citizen to point an unloaded pistol or an unloaded gun at him at * *. They will take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on the high seas, whether fully equipped or not." The degree to which the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters influenced Japanese action necessarily cannot be precisely determined but the fact is the Japanese did not strike at the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay barrier for more than a year and a half after it was contemplated she would make such a move. The wisdom and merit of the decision to base the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii cannot be divorced from the high Government policy of which that decision was a part. As has elsewhere been observed, the traditional interest of the United States in the Pacific and our determination [14] committee record, p. 5687. [15] committee record, pp. 6661, 6662. [16] Navy court of inquiry record, p. 367. [17] See section, infra, "Defensive Facilities Available in Hawaii."' [18] See testimony of secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1203-1205, 1452, 1464, 1603, 1608; testimony of Mr. Grew, committee record, pp. 1570, 1738, 1919, 1969. In a letter of April 3, 1941, to the commanders in chief, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Stark expressed the feeling that beyond question the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. See committee exhibit No. 106. [19] See "Foreign Relations," vol. II, p. 69. [20] Committee record, p. 1603. 162 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to aid the valiant Chinese fighting under insuperable odds the Juggernaut of Japanese aggression made imperative our taking every reasonable step which would assist in deterring the insatiable Japanese ambition for conquest and at the same time bolster flagging Chinese morale. Basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor was but one of the steps taken in this direction. [21] The fact that it had been decided to make Hawaii the base of the fleet did not require that all of the battleships and other substantial fleet units should be *in* Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 after the responsible commander had been warned of war and ordered to execute an appropriate *defensive deployment*. [22] The very words defensive deployment could have meant nothing if not that the fleet should be moved and stationed in such manner as to afford maximum defensive security not only to the fleet itself but to the Hawaiian Islands, the west coast, and the Panama Canal as well. This order required the deploying of vessels in the Hawaiian waters; which afforded the commander in chief a vast scope of operations, and it was left to his judgment and discretion as to what specific action was required consistent with his responsibilities. It has certainly never been suggested that because a particular harbor has been designated as the base for a fleet its vessels are thereby restricted to that harbor, particularly after an order has been issued for their employment. It remains a debatable question as to whether the Pacific Fleet as exposed to any greater danger by reason of the fact that it was based at Hawaii. The 360 perimeter of the islands afforded unlimited avenues for operations and the maximum channels for escape in the event of attack by a hostile superior force. The west coast, on the other hand, afforded only a 180 scope of operation with no avenues for escape from a superior attacking force and left only the alternative of proceeding into the teeth of such a force. Nor does it appear that the fleet was exposed to any greater danger from the standpoint of espionage by reason of its being at Hawaii. [23] The evidence before this Committee reflects that Tokyo was receiving as much information, if not more information, from its diplomatic establishments which operated outside the restraining counterespionage efforts of our own Government, located in Panama, on the west coast, and in Manila as from the Honolulu consulate. [24] There is a strong possibility that Japan would have taken the Hawaiian Islands by amphibious operations as she did in the case of so many other outlying Pacific Islands had the fleet not been based at Pearl Harbor. [25] Fur- [21] See Part I, supra, "Diplomatic Background of the Pearl Harbor Attack." [22] In the course of counsel's examination, Admiral Turner was asked: "During this time after around November 27 to December 7, in all your discussions around the Navy with those in authority was any consideration given to the question of whether the fleet should be moved out of Pearl Harbor and sent to sea?" Admiral TURNER. "No, there was not that I recall. I assumed that most or all of it would be at sea." Question. "Well, why did you assume that?" Admiral TURNER. "Well, that was the place for them under Admiral Kimmel's operating plan for their deployment." Committee record, pp. 5224, 5225. The evidence reflects that the Office of Naval Operations in Washington did not know the exact location of the various units of the Pacific Fleet. See committee record, p. 13956. [23] See section "The Role of Espionage in the Attack," Part III, this report. [24] In referring to Japanese espionage activity, Admiral Stark said: "We had felt that *not only in Hawaii* but at practically all our given posts the Japs knew everything we were doing." Committee record, p. 5707. [25] In the course of his testimony before the committee, General Short was asked whether he believed, assuming that the fleet had been withdrawn to the west coast and conditions at Pearl Harbor were other wise the same, the Japanese could have made a landing with the striking air forces that they had and brought the planes down as they did. He replied: "It would have been thoroughly possible. If they had sent as large a force as they sent against the Philippines they could have made the landing." Committee record pp. 8293, 8294. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 163 thermore, had the fleet been based on the west coast a raid on our west coast cities and the Panama Canal could not have been entirely repulsed. For it is agreed as a military proposition that even with the most effective resistance to an enemy air attack some units will inevitably get through the screen of defense and carry home the attack. In this connection, the opinion has been expressed by several naval witnesses that it was their belief Japan would attack our Pacific Fleet *wherever it might be* at the very outset of hostilities with a view to immobilizing it, temporarily at least, as a restraining and deterring influence on Japanese sea-borne operations in Pacific Far Eastern waters. [26] Under this view, which has the weight of logic and the experience of December 7, the fact the fleet was based at Hawaii bore no conclusive relationship to nor conditioned the Japanese decision to attack our Pacific Fleet. As has been indicated, the basing of the fleet at Hawaii is inseparable from the global plan of operations in which the Pacific Fleet was to perform only one phase. It was an integral part of our policy and action in the Atlantic and can only be questioned save as one presumes to challenge the policies of the United States Government from 1937 to 1941 and our determination to aid the impoverished free peoples of the world striving in desperation to stem the overpowering tide of Axis aggression and world conquest. DEFENSIVE FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN HAWAII There can be no question that Hawaii was regarded as the best equipped of our outposts and possessed the greatest potential for its own defense. [27] In this connection General Marshall testified: [28] "I will say as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, we felt that was a vital installation, but *we also felt that that was the only installation we had anywhere that was reasonably well equipped. Therefore, we were not worried about it. In our opinion, the commanders had been alerted. In our opinion, there was nothing more we could give them at the time for the purpose of defense. In our opinion, that was one place that had enough within itself to put up a reasonable defense*. "MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning to get something. His position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of complete flux, with the ships on the ocean en route out there and the planes half delivered and half still to go. "The Panama Canal was quite inadequate at that period, seriously inadequate in planes and, of course, of vast importance to anything in the Pacific. "*The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for that reason we had less concern about Hawaii because we had worked on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one point*. "Therefore we felt that it would be a great hazard for the Japanese to attack it." The correspondence between the Chief of Staff and General Short during 1941, [29] as well as that between the Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral Kimmel, [30] manifest clearly the mutual desire to improve [26] See section, supra, Part III, "The Role of Espionage in the Attack." [27] In the course of committee examination Admiral Turner was asked: "Did you consider the fleet in Hawaii prepared for that attack at the time it did come?" Admiral TURNER. "Yes, sir, within the limits of the material improvements program, I felt that the fleet was efficient and was ready for war." Question. "You felt confident that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ready for war on December 7, 1941?" Admiral TURNER. "Yes, sir, and further that the district was ready for war within the limits of the material that we had been able to provide. *We all had the utmost confidence in the command of the fleet and the command ashore*." Committee record, pp. 5253, 5254. [28] Committee record, pp. 13792, 13793. [29] See committee exhibit No. 53. [30] Id., No. 106. 164 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to the utmost the defensive facilities available to the Hawaiian commanders. But both General Marshall and Admiral Stark, in addition to their interest in Hawaii, had the enormous task and responsibility of allocating to many places, consistent with an ever-expanding global conflict, the military and naval equipment that was produced during the year 1941. [31] They had the obligation to spread the results of our productive efforts in those quarters where the needs and exigencies appeared in their best judgment to be most pressing. Our defensive facilities on the mainland were in great need of improvement Panama and the Philippines were in woeful need of additional equipment; the Nation had committed itself to aiding the Chinese who had been fighting Japanese aggression for 4 years with little more than sheer courage and the will to exist as a nation; we were determined that supplies being shipped under lend-lease should not be destroyed by German and Italian raiders before they reached their destination necessitating thereby the building up of our naval power in the Atlantic: we were determined to aid Britain and Russia to the extent of our capacity for our own self- protection before the overpowering might of the German war machine had destroyed the last vestige of resistance on the continent of Europe and we were left alone to stem the Axis thrust for world conquest all of these considerations were a part of the problem posed for the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations in making allocations of the materiel at hand. It should be noted that most of the lend-lease transfers effected prior to December 7, 1941, were in a category in which, by the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, it was provided that transfers to foreign governments could be made only after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy. The Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations personally approved these transfers. [32] The only justifiable allegation concerning the shortage of equipment at Hawaii relating to the failure to detect the Japanese task force was the fact that insufficient long-range patrol planes were available to conduct a 360 distant search from Oahu. As has been seen, however, adequate patrol planes were on hand to cover the vital and more dangerous sectors. [33] Referring to the lack of long-range planes, it is in order to determine the extent to which such planes were available and conceivably might have been sent to Hawaii. In the case of 210 B-17's and B-24's, Army heavy bombers adaptable for distant reconnaissance, delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, none were shipped under lend-lease and a total [31] In a letter of November 7,1941, Admiral Stark pointed out to Admiral Kimmel the difficulties experienced through shortage of material needs: "I note the great desirability of *many* things for the Pacific Fleet particularly destroyers and cruisers. We *just* haven't *any* destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles but he is up against it for DDs for escort and defense against raiders." (Admiral King at the time was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.) Committee record, p. 5575. [32] See letter from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissions, Department of State, concerning the organization of Lend-Lease. Committee record, p. 14095 et seq. [33] See Part III, supra. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 165 of 113 were sold for cash to foreign countries; 12 B-17's were shipped to Hawaii and 35 to the Philippines. [34] With respect to Navy planes, there were no lend-lease transfers of long- range patrol bombers or scout bombers during the same period. Of a total of 835 Navy planes of all types delivered during this period, February 1 to November 30, 582 were delivered to the Navy and 253 to foreign countries (Britain, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and Norway) under cash transactions. Of the 582 planes delivered to the Navy, 218 were sent to the Hawaiian area, 146 of the planes being assigned to carriers. [35] It appears that of 3,128 Army and Navy planes of various types delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, only 177 were shipped under lend-lease to foreign countries and none of these were capable of performing distant reconnaissance. The record is clear, therefore, that the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations did not prejudice our own defenses in approving excessive allocations to foreign governments. A brief review of the improvement effected in the Hawaiian situation during the year 1941 will serve to demonstrate the manner in which the exigencies and problems prevailing in the Pacific were recognized. The total number of Army planes in the Hawaiian Department was virtually doubled between January 31 and December 7, 1941, having been increased from 124 to 227 planes. The number of B-17 four-motored bombers was increased from none on January 31 to 21 as of May 31, 1941, this number subsequently being reduced to 12 by reason of the transfer of 9 B-17's to the Philippines in September. As of September 1, 1941, the United States possessed 109 13-17's [34] See enclosure to War Department memorandum to committee counsel dated March 20,1946, committee exhibit No. 172. In response to a request of the general counsel of the Committee, the War Department on March 20, 1946, transmitted a tabulation supplied by the Army Air Forces reflecting, among other things the total deliveries and types of American-produced planes delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, without any break-down as to months. This tabulation reflects a total of 579 planes delivered having a maximum range *without bombs* in excess of 1,600 miles. In addition to this figure, the tabulation shows 836 planes delivered having ranges of 2,000 and 1,120 miles with no break-down indicating how many planes were produced in a particular range category. The tabulation of plane deliveries was not introduced as an exhibit by the general counsel until May 23, 1946. General Marshall appeared before the committee for the second time on April 9, 1946, but he was asked no questions concerning the dispositions of these planes, it being noted that General Marshall had earlier testified that Hawaii had received priority consideration in the disposition of equipment. Although the tabulation delivered by the War Department on March 20 was available to the Committee counsel it was not available to the members of the committee for consideration and examination at the time General Marshall appeared on April 9. The committee has thus been placed in the position of not having inquired concerning the adaptability, design, and potentialities of these planes with ranges exceeding 1,600 miles; of not having determined where they may otherwise have been disposed and the exigencies requiring such dispositions; of not having determined whether there were crews available to man these planes, of not having determined whether ferrying facilities were available had they been directed to Hawaii; of not having determined exactly when the planes were delivered to determine whether they could have been sent to Hawaii before December 7, 1941; and of not having determined whether they would satisfy the distant reconnaissance requirements in Hawaii, among other things. In the latter connection, however, it is to be noted that General Martin, commanding general of the Hawaiian Air Forces, under date of August 20, 1941, recommended the War Department give consideration to the allotment of "B-17D type airplanes or *other four-engine* bombers with equal or better performance and operating range" for reconnaissance purposes, committee exhibit No. 13. It would appear that in the making of aircraft dispositions the indicated needs of the Hawaiian Department would be a controlling consideration. It appears from the evidence before the committee that only 210 of the Army-type planes delivered between February 1 and November 30, 1941, were four-engine bombers of a type adaptable to the type of long distance reconnaissance required by the plans and requirements of the Hawaiian commanders. It is to be noted that a tabulation of factory deliveries of bombers to foreign countries appearing on page 12991 of the Committee record is superseded by Committee exhibit No. 172. [35] See enclosure to Navy Department memorandum to committee counsel dated April 12, 1946. Committee exhibit No. 172. 166 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK disposed: 21 in Hawaii, 7 in Panama, and 81 in the continental United States. [36] The number of P-40 pursuit planes was increased from none in January to 99 as of November 30; and the number of P-36's from 19 to 39. [37] In the case of the Navy at Hawaii, during January of 1941 a squadron of 12 PBY-3's left the west coast for the Hawaiian area. In April a second squadron equipped with 12 PBY-3's also moved to Hawaii. In October and November of 1941, 3 squadrons of 12 planes each and 1 squadron of 6 planes, then in the Hawaiian area, returned to the west coast and exchanged their PBY-3's for PBY-5's after which they returned to Hawaii. During this same period the third squadron of Patrol Wing 1, equipped with 12 new PBY-5's left the west coast for Hawaii. This represents an over-all increase of 36 in the number of patrol planes between January 1 and November 30 1941. [38] During the period February 1 to November 30, 1941, 146 planes were assigned to carriers in the Pacific; and on May 13, 1941, 18 planes arrived at Ewa Field, Hawaii, being assigned to a marine scout bomber squadron. [39] The Committee did not inquire into the matter of allocations, generally, of Army and Navy planes or other equipment to points other than to Hawaii. There is no evidence before us that General Marshall and Admiral Stark made dispositions of the materiel available [40] inconsistent with their best judgment in the light of the situation as it could be viewed in the days before Pearl Harbor. [41] The question of whether Japan would have struck Hawaii had additional equipment been available there must be considered in light of the fact that in their estimates made in the fall of 1941, the Japanese placed the number of aircraft in Hawaii at roughly twice that of the actual air strength. Further, during the war games carried on at the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, 1941, it was assumed that the Pearl Harbor striking force would suffer the loss of one-third of its participating units. [41a] It was specifically assumed that one Akagi- class carrier and one Soryu-class carrier would be lost. It is clear that immediately after December 7 every effort was made to increase the materiel facilities in Hawaii as much as possible, [36] Memorandum from War Department dated December 13, 1945. See committee record p. 14595. A study contemplating 360 long-distance reconnaissance and attacks, submitted by the commander of the Army Air Forces in Hawaii on August 20, 1941, and endorsed by the Army commander, called for 180 Army 4- engine bombers, the B-17's. Committee exhibit No. 13. As of December 7, there were only 148 B-17's in the entire Army; 35 of these were in the Philippines, 12 at Hawaii, 8 in the Caribbean area, 6 at Atlantic bases, and 87 in the continental United States. Committee record, pp. 2865, 2866. [37] Army aircraft in Hawaiian Department as reflected by AAF monthly inventories. See also committee exhibit No. 5. [38] See enclosure to Navy memorandum for committee counsel dated April 12, 1946. Committee exhibit No. 172. [39] Id. [40] As expressed by Mr. Stimson "During those days in November 1941 we at the War Department had been informed and believed that Hawaii had been more generously equipped from the Nation's inadequate supplies of men and ammunitions than either of the other three important Pacific outposts, and we believed that with the fleet at hand there it was more capable of defense." Statement of Mr. Stimson to the committee. Committee record, p. 14,407. [41] Admiral Stark testified that he gave to Admiral Kimmel all that he could of what he had Committee record, pp. 5701-5704. He said: "We were not able to give the commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet all the ships and men he wanted but neither were we able to put in the Atlantic or in the Asiatic Fleet the strength we knew they wanted." Committee record, p. 5575. On November 25, Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel, in part; "We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two- ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy." Committee record, p. 5578. [41a] See War Department memorandum dated May 21, 1946, transmitting a letter of the same date from Commander Walter Wilds, Office of the Chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Committee record, p. 14626. See further, committee record, p. 457. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 167 necessarily at the expense of sacrificing the needs of other installations. The evidence reflects, however, that it was a very considerable period of time after the attack before the Nation's production of war materials was sufficient to approach satisfaction of all the Hawaiian requirements. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short had repeatedly requested more equipment, and that their needs and requests were not ignored [42] is made clear by the improved situation effected during 1941. [43] The same requests made by the Hawaiian commanders were coming from many other commanders and many other quarters. As virtually all witnesses have testified, alert commanders are always striving to improve and increase their equipment, facilities, and personnel; and it is doubtful if at any time even during the war any commander ever had all he wanted or thought he needed. [44] It is necessarily speculative as to how additional equipment in Hawaii might have altered the situation on December 7 inasmuch as the facilities which were available were not brought into the fight. [45] TRANSFER OF PACIFIC FLEET UNITS TO THE ATLANTIC In May of 1941 three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic. This shift was contemplated by the Navy basic war plan, WPL-46. [46] In a letter to Admiral Stark dated September 12, 1941, Admiral Kimmel expressed concern regarding possible further transfers from the Pacific to the Atlantic: [47] "The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan a weaker one may be an invitation. I cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the status quo out here is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must not be reduced and, in event of hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold offensive. [48]" [43] In an aide memoir concerning "Defense of Hawaii" submitted by the War Department to the President in May of 1941, the following observations were made: "*The Island of Oahu*, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world. "To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of approximately 35,000 men, manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 antiaircraft weapons, and more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach defense. Without air superiority this is an impossible task. "*Air Defense*. With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of approximately, 50 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when within 200 miles of the objective the enemy forces will be subject to attack by all types of bombardment closely supported by our most modern pursuit. "Hawaiian Air Defense. Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air. With this force available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable. "In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be high]y desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East." Committee exhibit No. 59. [43] As pointed out by Admiral Stark, "During 1940 and 1941, many of the shortcomings of Pearl Harbor as a base, disclosed by the long stay of the Pacific Fleet, were remedied." Committee record, p. 5587. See in this connection the Annual Report of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, for the year ending June 30, 1941. Committee record pp. 5587-5589. [44] See testimony of Admiral Turner committee record, p. 5254, concerning the insatiable desire of field commanders for materiel. He said: "* * * you never have enough, you always want more and you want things to be better." [45] Admiral Turner testified he believed that the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii was sufficient on December 7 1941, to have defeated or greatly reduced the effect of the Japanese raid on Hawaii if it had been fully alerted Committee record, pp. 5258, 5259. [46] See statement of Admiral Stark, committee record, p. 5591. [47] Committee exhibit No. 106. See testimony of Admiral Stark, committee record, p. 5591. [48] Admiral Kimmel commented in his prepared statement to the committee: "When I was in Washington in June 1941, it was seriously proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an additional detachment to consist of three battleships, four cruisers, two squadrons of destroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this strenuously. The transfer was not made." Committee record, p. 6680. 168 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Replying on September 23, Admiral Stark wrote the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet: [49] "We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year." The transfer of the Pacific Fleet units in May of 1941, it would appear, had as its immediate objective the possibility of their engaging in an expedition to take the Azores, [50] in order that these vital Portuguese possessions might not fall into German hands. The occasion for taking the Azores, however, did not materialize and, as stated by Admiral Stark, "it just went on diplomatically there". [51] The fleet units, formerly attached to the Pacific Fleet, were not returned to Pearl Harbor but were employed further to augment the Atlantic Fleet, particularly in the vicinity of Iceland. The record reflects that the transfer of a portion of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic in May of 1941 was in line with the basic war plans which recognized the Atlantic as the principal theater of operations and was designed to forestall the possibility of an indispensable strategic area falling into German hands. The transfer was an inextricable part of the over-all military policies prepared to meet the Axis threat. [52] "ABCD" UNDERSTANDING? A great deal of inquiry was made during the course of proceedings to determine whether the government of the United States had entered into an agreement with Great Britain and the Netherlands committing this Nation to war upon Japan in the event British or Dutch possessions were attacked by the Japanese. [52a] It is clear from evidence before the committee that no agreement was entered into in this regard. The President and his Cabinet, while momentarily expecting an attack by Japan, recognized and observed the constitutional mandate that this government could only be committed to war by a declaration of the Congress. Recognizing the inevitable Consequences of the Tripartite Pact, representatives of the War and Navy Departments participated during 1941 in a series of staff conversations with military and naval experts [49] Committee exhibit No. 106. [50] In a letter to Admiral Kimmel of May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark stated, among other things, "Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an overall limit of 30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly reinforced. The Army, of course, will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines will bear the brunt." Committee record, pp. 5607, 5608. [51] Committee record, pp. 13977, 13978. In the course of committee examination, Admiral Stark was asked: "How would you attack and take the Azores without a declaration of war on Portugal? She owned them." He replied: "I can tell you one way. Suppose the Germans had taken Portugal. Would we have to declare war on Portugal to take the Azores? I don't think we would have. * * * I always construed that situation, with regard to the Azores, as to have plans ready, and be ready if an emergency arose there." Committee record. p. 13979. [52] See Part I, pp. 10-13, supra, this report. It does not appear from the evidence that additional Fleet units would have assisted in detecting the approaching Japanese striking force, in view of the dispositions made by the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, or otherwise have materially aided in the defense against an air attack. As previously suggested, had the major Fleet units transferred to the Atlantic in May of 1941 been in Pearl Harbor on December 7 they, too, would in all probability have been destroyed. See in the latter connection, Part II, pp. 69 72, this report. [52] This inquiry appears to have been largely precipitated by a remark attributed to Prime Minister Churchill during an address before the House of Commons on January 27, 1942. He is quoted as having stated "On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectations had not been falsified by the events." See Committee record, p. 1286. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 169 of Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands. [53] The first of these meetings, initiated by the Chief of Naval Operations [54] and limited to American and British representatives, was held in Washington from January 29 to March 27, 1941. The official report of the conversations, referred to as "ABC-1," points out specifically that the discussions were held with a view "to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, *should the United States be compelled to resort to war*." [56] The report states clearly that the plans to accomplish this purpose, as embodied in the report, were subject to confirmation by the highest military authorities in the United States and Great Britain and by the governments of both countries as well. [56] This was in accord with the joint statement of the position the American representatives would take, made by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff on January 27 at the outset of the conversations. [57] "ABC-1" was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy and by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, [58] thereafter being submitted to the President on June 2, 1941. On June 7 the President returned "ABC-1" without formal approval; pointing out that since the plan had not been finally approved by the British Government, he would not approve it at that time but that in case of war the report should be returned to him for approval. [59] Shortly after the staff conversations in Washington military and naval representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands conferred in April of 1941 at Singapore in order to draft a plan for the conduct of operations in the Far East based on "ABC-1." In the instructions sent the commander in chief of our Asiatic Fleet [60] prior to the Singapore conversations it was emphatically pointed out that the results of such conversations were likewise subject to ratification by the governments concerned and were to involve no political commitment by the United States. [61] The report of the conversations, [62] referred to as "ADB", explicitly recognized that no political commitments were implied. [63] Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff withheld their approval feeling that [53] Admiral Stark said: "In our planning, we assumed that if the United States was drawn into war, it would be alined with Great Britain and against the Axis Powers. We also knew that while our most immediate concern was with the war then in progress in the Atlantic and in Europe, we might also be faced perhaps concurrently with a war in the Pacific. With these thoughts in mind, we held extensive staff conversations with the British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversations was embodied in a document known as ABC-1, dated March 27, 1941." Committee record, p 5572. [54] Admiral Stark was asked; "* * * it was in 1940, the fall of 1940 that you communicated with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound of the British Navy, requesting that he send his naval experts to the United States to discuss collaboration between the two navies?" Admiral STARK: "That is correct, in case of war." Question: "Upon whose responsibility was that message sent?" Admiral STARK: "My own." Question: "Did you discuss the subject with the President?" Admiral STARK; "I sent that on my own, and I did not notify the President until later I had done it." [55] See committee exhibit No. 49 for a full report of the staff conversations. [56] Committee exhibit No. 49. [57] Id. [58] See committee record, p. 2617. [59] Id., at pp. 2619, 2620. [60] Id,, at p. 6320. [61] Id., at p. 5123. [62] For the report of the Singapore conversations, see committee exhibit No. 50. [63] In testifying concerning the Singapore conversations, Admiral Turner said: "In none of these papers was there ever a political commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of action, or these were plans of action based on assumptions that should the United States enter the war, then these papers would be effective, provided they were approved by the proper authorities. "None of the ADB papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War or the President, although all of those officers as well as the Secretary of State were aware that these conversations were being held from time to time." Committee record. p. 5122.