190 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the berthings of ships in Pearl Harbor from similar or other requests for information concerning other points. War with Japan was admittedly probable for months before it actually occurred. Many of our highest military and naval authorities considered it all but inevitable. As the imminence of war increased so increased the importance of our Pacific Fleet, the home base of which was Pearl Harbor, for in the broad picture of the Pacific, the fleet was our strong arm of defense. Safety and fitness of the Pacific Fleet was of prime importance, and any communication or information bearing thereon should have been given prompt and full consideration by competent authority. We realize the exceedingly great demands upon the intelligence divisions of the War and Navy Departments occasioned by reason of the great flood of intelligence coming in from all parts of the world in the days before Pearl Harbor. Nor do we overlook the Japanese policy of acquiring detailed information of every kind from many points. It may be fair to attribute to this and other considerations the failure to see anything of unusual significance in the request of September 24 for detailed information as to the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor; but it is difficult to escape the feeling that, when the message of November 15 was translated on December 3 referring to the critical relations between Japan and the United States and requesting that the "ships in harbor report" be made irregularly but at least twice a week and directing that extra care be taken to maintain secrecy, it should have raised in someone's mind the thought that this intelligence was highly important because it dealt with that which was most vital to our safety in the Pacific the Pacific Fleet. The message of November 20, translated December 4, directing a comprehensive investigation of "the fleet (garble) bases" in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation should not have lessened such interest. [175] It cannot be forgotten that a surprise attack by air on Pearl Harbor had been listed and understood, both in Washington and Hawaii, as the greatest danger to that base. We must assume that military men realized that in order to execute successfully such an attack the Japanese would necessarily need detailed information as to dispositions at the point of attack. It would seem to be a natural consequence that if Japan undertook an attack on Pearl Harbor she would seek to acquire such detailed information and in point of time as nearly as possible to the hour of such attempt. We are unable to conclude that the berthing plan and related dispatches pointed directly to an attack on Pearl Harbor, nor are we able to conclude that the plan was a "bomb plot" in view of the evidence indicating it was not such. [176] We are of the opinion, however, that the berthing plan and related dispatches should have received careful consideration and created a serious question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department for their assistance, along with other information and intelligence available to them, in making their estimate of the situation. [175] It may be argued that the fact that a "war warning" had been sent the Fleet on November 27 along with the code destruction intelligence before these latter messages were translated had a bearing on or possibly conditioned the failure to attach significance to them. [176] Admiral Kimmel said: "These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor." Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780. General Short said: "* * * such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack on Hawaii." Committee record, p. 7989. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 191 THE "WINDS CODE" [177] On November 19, 1941, Tokyo set up a code designed to be employed in daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts or general intelligence broadcasts in the event ordinary commercial channels of communication were no longer available. Two circular [178] dispatches Nos. 2353 and 2354 were translated by the Navy Department: [179] "From: Tokyo "To: Washington 9 November 1941 Circular #2353 " "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added n the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast. "(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. [1] "(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITA NO KAZE KUMORI. [2] "(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE. [3] "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. "Forward as urgent intelligence." [1] East wind rain. [2] North wind cloudy. [3] West wind clear. "From: Tokyo "To: Washington "19 November 1941 "Circular #2354 "When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: "(1) If it is Japan-U. S. Relations, "HIGASHI" "(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA" "(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and N. E. I.), "NISHI". "The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. "Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco." These intercepts were confirmed by a dispatch from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Office of Naval Operations dated November 28, 1941; [180] a message directed to the State Department from its diplomatic representative in Batavia dated December 4, 1941; [181] and a dispatch from the Army's military representative in Batavia, reading as follows: [182] "Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain, United States. North wind cloudy, Russia. West wind clear, England with attack on Thailand, Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text." The foregoing message was sent "deferred" by naval communications for General Miles of the War Department and was not decoded until the morning of December 5, 1941. Both the War and Navy Departments extended themselves in an effort to monitor for a message in execution of the winds code. Exten- [177] A detailed record study of the winds code will be found set forth as Appendix E to this report. [178] The circular dispatches were designed for Japanese diplomatic establishments generally. [179] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 154, 155. [180] Id,, No. 142. [181] Id. [182] Id. 192 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK sive evidence has been taken concerning the matter, the preponderate weight of which indicates that no genuine execute message was intercepted by or received in the War and Navy Departments prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Investigation conducted in Japan strongly indicates no execute message was dispatched before the attack and the British and Dutch, who were also monitoring for an execute message, have advised that no such message was intercepted. [183] A reasonable construction of the code is that it was designed for use in the event ordinary commercial channels of communication were no longer available to Japan, a contemplation which did not materialize prior to Pearl Harbor. The fact that a message "West wind clear," applying to England, was broadcast after the attack tends to confirm this conclusion. [184] Inasmuch as the question of the winds code has been one of the few disputed factual issues in the Pearl Harbor case, there has been set forth in Appendix E to this report a detailed study of the matter. *Based on the evidence it is concluded that no genuine "winds" message in execution of the code and applying to the United States was received by the War or Navy Departments prior to the attack on December 7, 1941*. It appears, however, that messages were received which were initially thought possibly to be in execution of the code but were determined not to be execute messages. Granting for purposes of discussion that a genuine execute message applying to the winds code was intercepted before December 7, we believe that such fact would have added nothing to what was already known concerning the critical character of our relations with the Empire of Japan. "HIDDEN WORD" CODE In addition to the winds code the Japanese in a dispatch on November 27 established another emergency system of communications that has been familiarly referred to as the "hidden word" code. [185] The dispatch establishing this code, which was sent as a circular to all diplomatic establishments, stated: "With international relations becoming more strained, the following system of dispatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect" and further "in order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word STOP will be added at the end as an indicator." Thereafter, a number of code words, apparently arbitrarily chosen, were set forth with the meaning of each word placed opposite thereto. Among the code words were: HATTORI meaning "Relations between Japan and * * * (blank) are not in accordance with expectation"; KOYANAGI meaning "England"; and MINAMI meaning "U. S. A." On the morning of December 7 a circular telegram from Tokyo was intercepted reading: [186] "URGENT 92494 *KOYANAGI* RIJIYORI SEIRINOTUGOO ARUNITUKI *HATTORI MINAMI* KINENBUNKO SETURITU KIKINO KYOKAINGAKU SIKYUU DENPOO ARITASS STOP TOGO. [183] Id. [184] Id. [185] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 186-188. The original code was supplemented by a dispatch of December 2 from from Tokyo to Singapore which was translated after the attack. Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 216-219. [186] Committee exhibit No. 142-B. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 193 The translation as made by the Navy of the foregoing hidden-word message was distributed in Washington to authorized recipients of, Magic at 11 a. m. on December 7 in the following form: [187] "Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation." This was not the complete message, which should have been translated: "Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectation: England, United States." [188] The reason for the message having been distributed on the morning December 7 with the words *United States* omitted is explained by the fact that Captain Kramer in his haste occasioned by the necessity delivering other messages, including the "one o'clock message" overlooked the code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation." He indicated that later discovered the error and telephoned at "a quarter of one or 1 o'clock" the correction to his superior and an officer of Military Intelligence. [189] It is clear that the hidden-word message as literally translated [190] contained no information of any import not already greatly overshadowed, as will hereinafter appear, by other intelligence available on the morning of December 7 even had the words *United States* been included at the time of distribution. THE "DEADLINE MESSAGES" The following message, No. 736, from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, relating to the then current Japanese United States negotiations, was intercepted on November 5, 1941: [191] "Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month*. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. Relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. "This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only." On November 11, 1941 another message from Tokyo to Washington, o. 762, was intercepted, referring to the deadline set in the message November 5: [192] "Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications at the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736** is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead line and therefore is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time*. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on [the following day?]) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing climax, and that time is indeed becoming short. "I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power [188] The Army translation of the message supplied in March 1944 read as follows "Relations between Japan and _______ are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger): England, United States." Committee exhibit No. 142-B. [189] Hewitt Inquiry record, pp. 133-136. [190] Id, at pp. 579-581. [191] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100. [192] Id., at pp. 116, 117. 194 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. *At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal*. "We would appreciate being advised of your opinion on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A." The deadline was again referred to in a dispatch of November 15 from Tokyo to Washington, stating: [193] "It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature. "Whatever the case may be, *the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one*. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date." Referring to a dispatch from its Washington Ambassador, the following message from Tokyo was intercepted on November 16: [194] "I have read your #1090, [195] and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but *the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days*, so please fight harder than you ever did before. "What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. [196] Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the dead line for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution." Responding to requests of its Ambassadors, [197] in an intercepted message of November 22, 1941, Tokyo extended the deadline date from November 25 to November 29 in the following terms: [198] "To both you Ambassadors. "It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; *if the signing can be completed by the 29th*, (let me write it out for you twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, *we have decided to wait until that date*. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. *After that things are automatically going to happen*. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone." As a follow-up to the foregoing message, Tokyo on November 24, 1941, advised its Ambassadors that the time limit set in the message of November 22 was in Tokyo time. [199] It is clear from the foregoing messages that "things are automatically going to happen" after November 29, Tokyo time. It is equally clear from information now available that the happening was to be the contemplated departure of the Japanese task force to attack [193] Id., at p. 130. [194] Id., at pp. 137, 138. [195] See committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 127-129. [196] Id., at pp. 92-94. [197] Id., at p, 159. [198] Id., at p. 165. [199] Id., at p. 173. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 195 Pearl Harbor. But the question is not what the deadline messages are en now to mean but what they reasonably conveyed to officials in Washington in the days before December 7. Tokyo had indicated the extreme importance of time as the dead line approached: [200] "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days." But does this importance and the fact of the deadline indicate an attack at Pearl Harbor or, for that matter, an attack on the United States elsewhere? It must be recalled that on August 17, following the Atlantic Conference, President Roosevelt advised the Government of Japan that if she took any further steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward insuring the security of the United States. [201] It is not unreasonable to conclude that, failing to secure a satisfaction of her demands by November 29, Japan had determined to launch a program of aggression which she felt would involve her in war against the United States. The extensive employment of her forces to the south after November 29, it would reasonably appear, was regarded as the action to be taken upon expiration of the deadline date. Washington had expressed this estimate to Admiral Kimmel on November 27: [202] "The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo." One of the factors considered in dispatching the "war warning" to Admiral Kimmel on November 27 was that of alerting the Fleet before the cut-off date of November 29. [203] We believe that the dispatch of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel beginning, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning" and the dispatch to General Short of the same date advising that "hostile action possible at any moment" was the equivalent of and in fact was of greater significance than the so-called "deadline messages" merely informing that things would automatically happen after November 29. Based on what is now known concerning the plan of the Japanese attack, it is believed that in contemplation of the future intelligence such as the deadline messages could well be supplied field commanders as an item of information for their assistance along with dispatches designed to alert and to supply them with an estimate of the situation. DISPATCHES INDICATING FRAUDULENT NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS AFTER NOVEMBER 28, 1941 The following message (No. 844) from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, intercepted on November 28, 1941, indicated that negotiations thereafter were to be a sham and fraud: [204] "Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts, but in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. *Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send [201] See Part I, supra "Diplomatic Background of the Pearl Harbor Attack". [202] Committee exhibit No. 37, p. 36. [203] See testimony of Admiral Turner. It also appears that the November 24 warning to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was sent with a view to the deadline date of November 25. [204] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195. 196 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off*. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the pinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me about in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances that you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can". In the light of hindsight, an intercepted dispatch of November 29 (translated November 30) portrayed the extent of Japanese guile in perpetrating the fraud: [205] "Re my #844. "We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines: The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides. "However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions n East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government. "With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what as become of the basic objectives that the U S. Government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government. "(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)" It is to be noted in passing that the foregoing dispatch, without benefit of retrospection, conceivably suggested at the time of its interception, the possibility that Japan was putting out a "feeler" with a view to our withdrawing from the position assumed in Secretary Hull's note of November 26. In an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to its Washington Ambassador on December 1 it was observed that the deadline date of November 9 had come and gone with the situation continuing to be increasingly critical, however, "to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though here are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)" [206] During a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Yamamoto in Tokyo and Kurusu on November 27 (translated November 28) instructions were issued to Kurusu: "Regarding negotiations, don't break them off." [207] The following significant trans-Pacific conversation was had between Kurusu and Yamamoto on November 30: [208] "KURUSU. It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one (i. e., telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.) "YAMAMOTO. Yes. I see. "KURUSU. The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home. "Y. Is there any special significance to this? "K. The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here. [205] Id., at p. 199. [206] Id., at p. 208. [207] Id., at pp. 188-191. [208] Id., at pp. 206-207. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 197 "Y. Is that so. "K. Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving. "(Pause.) "Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements Please tell Mr. Tani. "Y. We are being careful. "K. We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged up. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this. (i. e. Premier's speech.) "(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.) "K. What about the internal situation? (In Japan.) "Y. No particular _____ (one or two words faded out) "K. Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue? "Y. Yes. "K. *You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches*! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion. "Y. When will you see them. The 2nd? "K. Let's see this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here. "(Pause.) "Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you? "Y. Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back? "K. I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime. "Y. Well then Goodbye." Admiral Kimmel in testifying before the joint committee said: [209] "The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show that on and after November 29, a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect; that the plan was such importance that it involved the fate of the empire; and that Japan urgently wanted the United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan. "What was this plan? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch out negations as a pretext to hide the operation of this plan? Anyone reading the Japanese intercepted messages would face this question. "Certainly the concealed Japanese plans which automatically went into effect on November 29 would hardly be the Japanese movement in Indo- China * * * "No effort was made to mask the movements or presence of the naval forces moving southward, because physical observations of that movement were unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces would provide a desirable semblance of normalcy" (Testimony of Admiral Inglis, Committee Transcript, page 453.) The troop movements to southern Indo- China were the subject of formal diplomatic exchanges between the two governments of Japan and the United States. * * * * * "Thus, it was apparent to the Japanese government from this formal representation of the United States that our government was aware of the movement in do-China. The United States expressed its concern about potential Japanese action against the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand. There was therefore, very little reason for Japan to keep up a pretext of negotiations for the purpose of disguising these objectives. "Consequently, as time went on after November 29, and as Japan insisted to her envoys upon the continuance of negotiations as a pretext to divert the suspicion the United States, it must have been apparent to a careful student of the intercepted dispatches that Japan on a deadline date of November 29 had put into effect an operation, which was to consume a substantial time interval before its results were apparent to this government, and which appeared susceptible of effective concealment in its initial phases." [209] Committee record, pp. 6791-6793. 198 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The observations of Admiral Kimmel are well taken, however, they are colored by knowledge of subsequent events. He has stated that on or after November 29 "A Japanese *plan* of action automatically went into effect" whereas the Japanese had stated that after that date "things are automatically going to happen." He comments that "negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan" whereas it is only after the event that this ruse could be apparent. He refers to the "concealed Japanese plans" and observes that Japan's open move to the South could not be the "automatic move." This premise presupposes that the "automatic move" was to be concealed, a fact which was not and could not be known until after the attack. Admiral Kimmel makes reference to the intensification of Japanese activity to the south about November 29 [210] but fails to consider that this activity was subject to the reasonable construction that the "automatic move" was the move to the South and the desire to "stretch out" negotiations was a natural step in seeking to prevent a thwarting of Japanese plans in that direction before she was fully poised for attack. That the Japanese movement to the South effectively diverted attention from other points and effectively disguised the strike against Pearl Harbor is indisputable. But this is known only after the attack. With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to attach to the fraudulent character of Japanese negotiations after November 28 the greatest significance to see that it clothed a Japanese action fraught with typical treachery. But it is clear from the evidence that the salient questions in the minds of responsible officials in Washington in the few days before Pearl Harbor was not *Would the Japanese attack*? but *when* and *where* would she attack? The fact that an attack would come was the considered judgment of our military. The Tokyo dispatch of November 28 did not supply the highly essential information which was desired. Neither the intercepted dispatches from Tokyo indicating the fraudulent nature of negotiations after November 28 nor the deadline messages supplied the *when* or *where* of the attack. We do not believe that this intelligence, if taken together, would have predicted Pearl Harbor as a likely place of attack. To have advised Admiral Kimmel and General Short on November 28 that negotiations thereafter were a Japanese fraud could not have suggested itself strongly to officials in Washington who had only the day before told these commanders: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days"; and "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment." STATUS OF DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ARMY DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27 It is to be recalled that the "war warning" dispatch of November 27 from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel related, with respect to the status of our diplomatic relations with the Japanese, "Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of condi- [210] Id. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 199 tions in the Pacific *have ceased* * * *." The message from the War Department to General Short, on the other hand, stated "Negations with Japan appear to be terminated to *all practical purposes with only the *barest possibilities* that the Japanese might come back and offer to continue." The statement has been made that the estimate of the diplomatic situation given General Short was not accurate and left the impression ere was still a possibility of the negotiations continuing whereas we were in reality at "sword's point" with Japan. [211] The message stated negotiations appeared to be terminated to *all practical purposes* with *only the barest possibilities* that the Japanese might offer to continue. To be sure Secretary Hull had advised the Secretary of War on the morning of November 27 that he had "broken the whole matter off" had abandoned the idea of a modus vivendi and that he had washed his hands of it and "it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy." [212] But this was precisely the duty of the Secretary of State *to advise the Army and Navy when the probabilities were that negotiations had passed beyond the diplomatic age and were in the hands of the military*. Secretary Hull was indicating that he had given up the idea of a temporary diplomatic truce with Japan and was expressing his personal and official feeling that the Japanese Government would not respond to our Government's note of November 26 in such manner as to permit further negotiations. Mr. Hull did not *know* that Japan would not possibly reply with a counter proposal nor did anyone in our Government in Washington at the time the November 27 dispatch was prepared. In recounting the circumstances attending the November 27 dispatch to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department (as well as to Panama, the Western Defense Command, and the Philippines) Secretary Stimson stated that he telephoned the President on the morning of November 27 suggesting that a final alert be sent pointing out that commanders be on the qui vive for any attack and explaining the exact situation. He stated the President approved his idea. As related by Mr. Stimson: [213] "Ordinarily, of course, there would be no reason for me to participate in the sending of any such message which was the normal function of the military staff. [214] As the President himself, however, had now actually directed the sending the the message, and as I wanted the message clearly to apprise the commanding officers in the various areas as to exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate in the forming of this message myself. In order that it should be strictly accurate, I called up Mr. Hull myself on the telephone and got his exact statement as to the status of the negotiations, which was then incorporated in the first sentence of the messages." [211] See committee exhibit No. 167. The comment of the Army Pearl Harbor Board was: "This statement on Japanese information is inadequate. It did not convey to Short the full import of the information concerning the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War Department. It was misleading in that it stated that there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which carried with it the implication that such resumption would influence the Japanese-American relations, i. e., that war might not come. The War Department was convinced that war would come." [212] See Part I, supra, section "Diplomatic and Military Liaison in Washington." [213] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14395. [214] General Marshall who ordinarily would have prepared such a dispatch was in North Carolina on November 27 incident to troop maneuvers. It appears that prior to his departure from Washington he had discussed generally with General Gerow the matter of sending a warning message to our outpost commanders. The message was finally prepared by Secretary Stimson in collaboration with General Gerow, among others. See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, pp. 14394, 14395.