200            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It is to be noted that, according to Mr. Stimson's diary, after 
Secretary Hull had told him the matter was now in the hands of the Army 
and Navy, he called the President who gave him a little different view 
"He said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent 
statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards that this was not a 
reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular 
position." [215] It was later during the day, while in conference with 
the Secretary of Navy and General Gerow incident to preparing the 
warning dispatch, that Mr. Stimson called Mr. Hull [216] and "got the 
exact statement from him of what the situation was." [217] And from 
information available on November 27 there was *only the barest 
possibility*, precisely the statement in the warning, that Japan would 
accept or respond with a counter proposal to the note of November 26. 

It is to be noted that it was not until November 28 that a dispatch from 
Tokyo to Washington was intercepted stating in part: [218]

"* * * with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this 
American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the 
negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I 
do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken 
off."

While this message would indicate at the time and we now know it to be a 
fact that Japanese negotiations were thereafter a fraud, on the very 
next day, November 29, a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was 
intercepted stating, [219] "We wish you would make *one more attempt* 
verbally along the following lines," thereafter suggesting a line of 
approach in the discussions and concluding, "In carrying out this 
instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like 
a breaking off of negotiations." Here there is manifested more than a 
"bare possibility" that the Japanese would continue the negotiations and 
had this *Magic* message been supplied General Short there is no doubt 
he would have concluded the same thing even after November 27. Indeed, 
had Admiral Kimmel and General Short been supplied all of the diplomatic 
messages reviewed by this Committee it is concluded that their estimate 
of the diplomatic situation would not have gone beyond a belief that 
there was only the barest possibility that Japan would continue the 
negotiations; for the messages indicate throughout a conflicting and 
variable disposition by Japan. With respect to pursuance of the 
negotiations and her desire for peace. [220] 

*The message to General Short is regarded as more accurately stating the 
status of the diplomatic negotiations than did the Navy message advising 
flatly that negotiations had ceased*. The action taken by the Navy was 
with a view to making clear beyond question the seriousness [221] of the 
situation whereas the Army message, as stated by Secretary Stimson, 
sought to give General Short the *exact* diplomatic situation. It is to 
be noted that General Short had available the 

[215] Committee record, p. 14422.
[216] See testimony of Mr. Hull, committee record, p. 1188.
[217] See Mr. Stimson's diary committee record, p. 14423; see also pp. 
2686, 2687. 
[218] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195. 
[219] Id., at p. 199.
[220] See in this connection the testimony of Admiral Leigh Noyes, 
committee record, pp. 12720-12722 It should be noted that Captain 
McCollum said: "I discounted anything which showed that they were not 
going to jump on us. Everything I tried to say is that I felt that they 
were going to jump on us, that I was convinced that the situation 
between us and Japan was intensely acute. Had I not felt that way I 
certainly should not have put my office on a 24-hour basis early in 
November." Committee record, p. 9268.
[221] See testimony of Admiral Turner, committee record, p. 5163.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK:            201

Navy estimate of the situation inasmuch as he saw the "war warning" of 
November 27 just as Admiral Kimmel, in turn, saw the War Department 
warning of the same date. 

Even conceding for purposes of discussion that the dispatch to General 
Short should have contained the same statement as did the Navy message; 
that is, "negotiations * * * have ceased", such does not in any way 
alter the responsibilities in the case. Certainly in any situation no 
commanding officer will determine his course of action on the basis of 
the bare possibility that negotiations may be continued. How much more 
is this true when in the same message he is told that hostilities are 
possible at any moment and is given orders indicating the necessity for 
defense against an attack from without! 

It is in fact believed that had the message been otherwise worded, 
stating only that there was a *possibility the negotiations would be 
ruptured* and carrying the same orders, it was the duty of the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to gird his defense 
against the implications of that possibility. General Short was advised 
there was only the barest possibility that negotiations were *not 
already ruptured*. 

FAILURE TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE SHORT REPLY OF NOVEMBER 28 

It is to be recalled that General Short's reply to the warning message 
of November 27 signed "Marshall," [222] read: [223]

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad 
our seven two twenty seventh."

The evidence reflects that it was the responsibility of the War Plans 
Division of the War Department to prepare the warning and the orders it 
contained for approval by the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War. 
[224] Having instructed the commanding general in Hawaii to report 
measures taken, it was the responsibility of the War Plans Division to 
review the report and to advise the Hawaiian commander in the event the 
action taken by him was not in keeping with the desires of the War 
Department. The brief report of action taken, as sent by General Short, 
was initialed by General Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division and by 
the Secretary of War. [225] The evidence is not clear as to whether the 
report was seen by General Marshall inasmuch as it was not initialed by 
him although he did initial other reports from overseas garrisons to 
which the Short report may have been attached. [226]

[222] For reference convenience, this dispatch was as follows: 

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical 
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government 
might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action 
unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities 
cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first 
overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as 
restricting as you to a course of action that might jeopardize your 
defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake 
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these 
measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil 
population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities 
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as 
they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret 
information to minimum essential officers." (Committee exhibit No. 32, 
p. 7)
[223] See exhibit No. 32, p. 12. This is the form of the message as 
paraphrased and reviewed in the War Department. The message as sent 
read: "Reurad four seven two 27th. Report Department alerted to prevent 
sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Short." It was addressed to the *Chief 
of Staff*. 
[224] See testimony of General Gerow, committee record, p. 2687 et seq. 
[225] Id. 
[226] Id. 

202            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

General Marshall testified: [227]

"I do not remember whether or not I saw General Short's reply, but the 
presumption must be that I did. In any event that was my opportunity to 
intervene which I did not do."

General Gerow testified that when the reply from General Short came 
through he assumed it was in answer to the G-2 message that was sent by 
General Miles to the Hawaiian Department [228] concerning the likelihood 
of subversive activities. [229] He stated that after seeing the reply he 
sent it to Colonel Bundy (now deceased) [229a] who headed the "plans 
group" and that "it is reasonable to assume that he may possibly have 
interpreted the message to mean, or the part of the message which said 
'liaison with the Navy,' that the commanding general out there had 
instituted protective measures against sabotage and was working with the 
Navy to arrange for other defensive measures, including reconnaissance." 
[230] It should be noted that General Gerow did not discuss the matter 
with Colonel Bundy but merely suggested this as a reasonable assumption 
from the way the message was worded General Gerow said: "I think my 
executive officer, or the chief of any plans group, might possibly have 
interpreted the message that way, and that is why it was not brought 
back to me and my attention invited to the fact that it did not 
explicitly cover the operation." [231] He observed that the reference to 
a "No. 472" meant nothing to him at the time since this number was put 
on the outgoing message by the Signal Corps and was not the number 
assigned the document by the War Plans Division. [232] 

General Gerow admitted that no inquiry was sent to General Short with 
respect to his report of action taken and that in the light of 
subsequent events he felt "it might have been desirable to send such an 
inquiry, and had such an inquiry been sent it would probably have 
developed the fact that the commanding general in Hawaii was not at that 
time carrying out the directive in the message signed 'Marshall'." [233] 
He remarked that "if that had been done, there would have been an 
opportunity to correct the situation" but that he did not believe "the 
message could necessarily be interpreted as meaning that sabotage 
measures only were being taken." [234] After stating that he interpreted 
the report of General Short to be in reply to the Miles message 
concerning subversive activities and noting that such an interpretation 
left him without any reply whatever from the Hawaiian Department with 
respect to the November 27 warning, 

[227] Committee record, p. 3010. See also in this connection. Committee 
Record, pp. 2899 and 3088. 
[228] This message, addressed to G-2 Hawaiian Department, read: 
"Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may 
ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commander General 
and Chief of Staff only." Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 10. 
[229] Committee record, p. 2714
[229a] Col. Charles W. Bundy was killed in a plane crash shortly after 
the attack while en route to Pearl Harbor.
[230] Id, at pp. 2713, 2714. In this connection Secretary Stimson said:    
he (General Short) then sent a reply message to Washington which gave no 
adequate notice of what he had failed to do and which was susceptible of 
being taken, and was taken, as a general compliance with the main 
warning from Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my 
desk, and in spite of my keen interest in the situation it certainly 
gave me no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was 
not being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was 
alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being 'alerted to prevent 
sabotage' was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert 
against an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a 
fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the 
commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's statement in his 
message that liaisons was being carried out with the Navy, coupled with 
the fact that our message of November 27 had specifically directed 
reconnaissance, naturally gave the impression that the various 
reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which the cooperation of 
the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way and a proper alert 
was in effect." See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, pp. 
14408, 14409. 
[231] Committee record, pp. 2716, 2717.
[232] Id., at p. 2715. 
[236] Id., at p. 2716.
[234] Id.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             203

General Gerow explained: "I was handling a great many papers at that 
time, and it was the responsibility of the officers in my division to 
check the messages and correspondence and bring to my attention anything 
of importance that required action on my part." [235] He further 
observed that it did not occur to him that General Short would not take 
some reconnaissance and other defensive measures after receiving the 
November 27 message "he was an experienced commander and it never 
entered my mind that he would not take such action." [236] In the course 
of counsel's examination reference was made to the following comments by 
Secretary Stimson with respect to the investigation conducted by the 
Army of the Pearl Harbor disaster: [237]

"Again, as I have pointed out, General Short, in response to a message 
which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and 
a request for a report of actions, had sent a message to the War 
Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on 
the alert against sabotage only, and not on the alert against an air 
raid or other hostile action. 

"While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the 
wording of his message, nevertheless, a keener sense of analysis and a 
more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged, would have invited 
further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short and his 
failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered. 

"The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a 
report of he measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General 
Short's reply was brought to the attention of the chief of the division. 
A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not 
done, and a more efficient functioning of the division would have 
demanded that careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's 
message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted."

General Gerow was asked if he felt the foregoing was a fair statement of 
the situation. He replied: [238]

"Yes, sir; I do, and if there was any responsibility to be attached to 
the War Department for any failure to send an inquiry to General Short, 
the responsibility must rest on War Plans Division, and *I accept that 
responsibility as Chief of War Plans Division*."

Upon being asked if it were not the function of the Chief of Staff and 
the Secretary of War to follow up on General Short's report, General 
Gerow stated: [239]

"No, sir, I was a staff adviser to the Chief of Staff, and I had a group 
of 48 officers to assist me. It was my responsibility to see that those 
messages were checked, and if an inquiry was necessary, the War Plans 
Division should have drafted such an inquiry and presented it to the 
Chief of Staff for approval. As I said, I was chief of that division, 
and it was my responsibility."

[235] Committee record, p. 2717. 
[236] Id., at pp. 2719, 2720. 
[237] Id., at pp. 2727, 2728. See also committee exhibit No. 167. 
[238] Committee record pp. 2726-2729. In the course of Committee 
examination of General Marshall the following questions were propounded 
and answers were given:

Question: "Well, a large number of people saw it (the Short reply)?  
General Gerow saw it and General Gerow testified here that when he saw 
it he thought first that it was a response to a telegram sent out by G-2 
relating to sabotage and when his attention was called to the fact, when 
I asked counsel to ask him some further questions and his attention was 
called to the fact that this was a direct response to your telegram No. 
472 of the 27th and was addressed to the Chief of Staff, he then changed 
his position and said, 'I as Chief of Operations or Chief of War Plans 
assume full responsibility.'

"Now, I think it is only fair, General Marshall, in the conduct of this 
examination in ascertaining the facts to find out whether or not, just 
as General Gerow testified here, whether you assume the same 
responsibility that he did?"
Answer: "I said earlier in this hearing, Mr. Keefe, in relation to the 
very thing you are talking about, when I was questioned in regard to 
General Gerow's statement, that I thought there was a difference; that 
he had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility.  Is 
that an answer to your questions?"
Question: "He had a direct responsibility?"
Answer: "And I had the full responsibility."
Question: "And you had the full responsibility.  Well, just what do you 
mean by that?"
Answer: "His was in concern to the handling of the details of the matter 
and he had a responsibility there.  I am responsible for what the 
General Staff did or did not do."

See Committee Record, pp. 3727, 3728.

204            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

As earlier pointed out, the War Plans Division had the duty of issuing 
operational orders and directives; it directed an order to General Short 
on November 27, instructing him to report measures taken; it failed 
properly to supervise the report submitted by the commanding general 
pursuant to direction. General Gerow, the head of the War Plans 
Division, saw the report of measures taken in the Hawaiian Department 
and presumed it was in response to a dispatch from Military Intelligence 
warning of the likelihood of subversive activities. This is not a 
tenable premise, however, inasmuch as the report by General Short was 
addressed to the Chief of Staff and was therefore a reply to the warning 
of November 27, signed "Marshall"; a reply to the message concerning 
subversive activities would not have been addressed to the Chief of 
Staff unless the latter had signed the message, which was not the case. 
[240] Furthermore, the reference by General Short to the number of the 
message to which he was replying necessarily entailed calling from file 
the original outgoing dispatch in the event there was any doubt or 
presumptions necessary in gauging to what the commanding general's 
report was responsive. Knowing that a reply from General Short had been 
called for, it was incumbent upon the War Plans Division to follow 
closely the receipt of such reply and to insure that the action taken 
was in accordance with that desired. While the reply from General Short 
was ambiguous and misleading, it was nevertheless the duty of War Plans 
to require a clear and unequivocal response. By its sheer brevity and 
lack of detail alone, the report should have suggested the possibility 
that the official mandate had not been adequately implemented. 

The supervision by the War Plans Division in this instance was slipshod. 
General Gerow, as head of the Division, must bear his share of 
responsibility for this serious error, a responsibility which he has 
unhesitatingly assumed. The primary responsibility, however, rests with 
the appropriate subordinates of General Gerow who had the duty and 
responsibility for supervision of details. [241] 

THE "BERLIN MESSAGE"

An intercepted message from Tokyo to Berlin dated November 30, 1941 
(translated December 1) follows: [242]

"The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during 
the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere 
efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured broken. (I am 
sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986) In the 
face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with 
determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview 
Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially 
communicate to them a summary of the developments. *Say to them that 
lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, 
both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into 
various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter 
by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme 
danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations 
and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the 
breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams*."

[240] Id., at pp. 2721-2724. 
[241] See section "Nature of Responsibilities," infra. 
[242] Dispatch No. 985, committee exhibit No. 1, p. 204.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              205

Another message of the same date from Tokyo to Berlin read, in part: 
[243] 

"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we 
first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its 
traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, 
re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in 
the conversations carried on between the United States and England in 
the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was 
brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by 
Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, 
the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan 
was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of 
friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand 
they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency 
to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite 
Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. *That is to say that 
it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has 
become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could 
no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, 
too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental 
to our cause*."

And again: [244]

"The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this 
attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting 
clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into 
with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon 
the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the 
Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in 
case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese 
Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It 
is clearly a trick. *This clause alone, let alone others, makes it 
impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations*. 
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they 
conferred with England, Australia the Netherlands, and China they did so 
repeatedly. *Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in 
collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with 
Germany and Italy, as an enemy*."

This valuable intelligence added to the total of information pointing to 
the mounting tenseness of relations but does not materially add to that 
which was supplied our Hawaiian outpost in the warnings of November 27, 
insofar as the prime duties of the commanders there were concerned. 
These messages merely confirmed the conclusions already voiced three 
days earlier to the outpost commanders that war was imminent; that 
negotiations had ceased to all practical purposes; that hostile action 
was possible at any moment. 

CODE DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE

As has already been observed, Admiral Kimmel was advised by the Navy 
Department concerning the intercepted messages relating to the 
destruction of codes in various Japanese diplomatic establishments. 
[245] While Admiral Kimmel failed to supply General Short this 
intelligence it is apparent that the commanding general otherwise 
obtained substantially the equivalent of this information. He was not, 
however, supplied such information directly by the War Department. 

In explaining the reason for the Army's not sending the code destruction 
intelligence to Hawaii, General Miles testified: [246] 

"The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least 
the Navy was particularly strong on the point, that their code was much 
more secure 

[243] Dispatch No. 986, committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 205-206. 
[244] Id., at p. 206.
[245] See Part III, supra; also committee exhibit No. 37. For the 
original intercepted messages concerning destruction of codes see 
committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 209, 215, 216, 236, 249, among others. 
[246] Committee record, p. 2221. 

206            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security 
that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every 
reason to believe or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would 
be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there."

The reason advanced by General Miles is consistent with the general 
practice of the Army not to distribute Magic to field commanders for 
security reasons. [247] While it appears that in some instances the Navy 
in Hawaii was specifically advised to inform the Army of messages 
received, the failure to instruct Admiral Kimmel to so inform General 
Short concerning the Japanese destruction of codes did not by inference 
or otherwise indicate that this intelligence should not be supplied the 
Army. Considering that Hawaii was a command by mutual cooperation, the 
War Department was properly privileged to take for granted that there 
was a full exchange of information between the Army and Navy commanders, 
[248] particularly after General Short had specifically stated in his 
reply to the Department's warning of November 27 that he had established 
*liaison with the Navy*. 

The overwhelming preponderance of testimony by Army and Navy experts is 
to the effect that the destruction of codes and confidential documents 
under the circumstances prevailing in early December of 1941 meant war 
from a military standpoint. [249] It is clear that Washington adequately 
discharged its responsibility in transmitting this information to 
Hawaii. With the failure, however, of Admiral Kimmel to read into this 
intelligence what it is agreed should have been self-evident to him, it 
is believed that in contemplation of the future the intelligence as well 
as the departmental appraisal and estimate thereof should be supplied 
field commanders. [250] 

THE MCCOLLUM DISPATCH

The Navy Department in Washington had available substantially the 
information which was in the possession of Admiral Kimmel with respect 
to radio intelligence concerning the location and movements of Japanese 
vessels. It knew, as did Admiral Kimmel, that substantial carrier units 
of the Japanese Fleet could not be located. This information was 
carefully considered by the Office of Naval Intelligence. [251] Capt. 
Arthur McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, 
was particularly charged with handling radio intelligence material and 
it was he who drafted the dispatch of November 24, 

[247] See section "The 'Magic' ", supra.
[248] See committee record, pp. 2220-2224. Secretary Stimson stated: "It 
was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the 
Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to 
believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also 
available to General Short." See statement of Secretary Stimson with 
respect to Army Pearl Harbor Board's report, committee exhibit No. 157. 
[249] Admiral Turner, for example stated: " * * * the destruction of 
codes in that manner and in those places in my mind and experience is a 
definite and sure indication of war with the nations in whose capitals 
or other places those codes are destroyed. * * * It indicates war within 
two or three days."  Committee record, pp. 5294, 5295. 

It is to be noted that Washington did not minimize the significance of 
the code destruction intelligence despite the fact there were 
indications this move by Tokyo might be in anticipation of the 
possibility that the United States would close down her consulates. The 
following intercepted dispatch of December 3, 1941, from Washington to 
Tokyo is of pertinence in this regard: "*If we continue to increase our 
forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will 
close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to 
steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls*." 
Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 227.
[250] Before the Roberts Commission, Admiral Kimmel said: " * * * the 
Department sent me a message that these codes were being burned, and I 
feel, while that was good information, that they might very well have 
enlarged somewhat on what they believed it meant, I didn't draw the 
proper answer, I admit that. I admit that I was wrong. Nobody can 
gainsay the fact that if I had drawn different conclusion from what I 
got we might have changed things. Nevertheless, such a dispatch as that, 
with no amplification, was not near as valuable as it would have been if 
they had amplified and drawn the conclusions. See Roberts Commission 
record, p. 589.
[251] See committee record, pp. 9119, 9120.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            207

1941, [252] to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, a copy of 
which as sent Admiral Kimmel for information, instructing that the 
commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District serve in effect as a 
clearinghouse for data concerning Japanese naval movements inasmuch as 
the information obtainable in the Philippine area was considered Lost 
reliable. 

Captain McCollum prepared a memorandum dated December 1, 1941, pointing 
out that Japanese "service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 
0000, 1 December 1941". [253] He also prepared another memorandum 
bearing the same date summarizing the generally critical situation with 
respect to Japan. [254] At a meeting attended by Admirals Stark, 
Ingersoll, Turner and Wilkinson, among others, in the Navy Department on 
the morning of December 1, Captain McCollum personally read his 
memorandum last-mentioned, pointing out the imminence of war or rupture 
of diplomatic relations. He requested information as to whether the 
fleets in the Pacific had been adequately alerted and testified: "I was 
given a categorical assurance by both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner 
that dispatches fully alerting the fleets and placing them on a war 
basis had been sent." It is significant that at this time neither 
Admiral Wilkinson nor Captain McCollum had knowledge of the "war 
warning" message to Admiral Kimmel. [255] 

About December 4, 1941, Captain McCollum prepared a dispatch designed to 
alert naval outposts, based in part on his memorandum of December 1 
outlining the critical situation in the Far East. He testified: [256] 

"Captain McCollum. * * * I was put in the rather difficult position of 
not personally knowing what had been sent out to the fleet. Possibly it 
was none my business. As I pointed out to you, the basis of this 
memorandum the formation it was based on was actually as of about the 
28th of November. As time went on we had sent out dispatches to our 
naval attaches in Tokyo Peiping, Bangkok, and Shanghai to destroy all of 
their codes, and to report by the use of a code word, and those codes 
were destroyed. 

"We were getting reports from our observers of the Japanese task force 
which was moving down the Kra Peninsula. Our planes were sighting forces 
moving; our submarines were trailing them. We had some little 
information in addition. I still did not know what had been sent to the 
fleet. 

"I drafted a rather brief dispatch, outlining the information pretty 
much as is this memorandum, but greatly condensed. I went further and 
stated that we felt everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of 
hostilities between Japan and the United States. That dispatch was taken 
by me to my Chief, Captain Hurd, and together we went in to see Admiral 
Wilkinson. We did it in view of the fact at the function of evaluation 
of intelligence; that is, the drawing of inferences therefrom, had been 
transferred over to be a function of the War Plans Division. I was 
directed to take that dispatch and present it for the consideration of 
Admiral Turner, the Director of the War Plans Division, which I did. 

"Admiral Turner read the dispatch over. He then made a number of 
corrections in it, striking out all except the information parts of it, 
more or less, and then showed me for the first time the dispatch which 
he had sent on the 27th which I believe is referred to as the "war 
warning" dispatch, and the one which was sent, I believe, on the 24th 
wasn't it? 

"COUNSEL. That is right.

"Captain MCCOLLUM (continuing). Which preceded that dispatch, and said 
did not I think that was enough. I said, "Well, good gosh, you put in 
the words 'war warning'. I do not know what could be plainer than that, 
but, nevertheless I would like to see mine go too." 

[252] Dispatch No. 242239, committee exhibit No. 37, p. 33.
[253] Committee exhibit No. 85.
[254] Id., No. 81.
[255] See testimony of Captain McCollum, committee record, p. 9112-9123; 
also testimony of Admiral Wilkinson.
[256] Committee record, pp. 9130-9134. 

208                 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"He said, "Well, if you want to send it, you either send it the way I 
corrected it or take it back to Wilkinson and we will argue about it" or 
words to that effect 

"I cannot presume to remember precisely. 

"I took it back to Admiral Wilkinson and discussed it with him, and he 
said "Leave it here with me for a while," and that is all. 

"Now, I would like it understood that merely because this was prepared 
on a dispatch blank in no sense means it was an official dispatch. It 
was merely my recommendation to my superiors which they were privileged 
to throw in the wastebasket, I imagine. It was in no sense a part of the 
official file. It is nothing other than a recommendation for the 
dispatch officer. I have written dozens of dispatches for the admiral, 
and he could either throw them away, or use them. There is no record 
kept of that sort of thing."

Admiral Turner's testimony with respect to the foregoing incident is as 
follows: [257]

"COUNSEL. There is some evidence here that Captain McCollum sometime 
between the 1st of December and the 7th of December indicated or showed 
a view that some further warning ought to be sent to Pearl Harbor. Do 
you know anything about that? 

"Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, and I was here yesterday when Senator 
Ferguson read my testimony from the Navy Court of Inquiry, and I was a 
little confused in that. I had nothing to refer to, I had not received 
any warning of more than 2 or 3 days about the proceedings and since 
that time in going over it myself and thinking about it I arrived at 
what I believe is a correct statement on that subject. 

"From time to time Captain McCollum would come to me with drafts of 
memoranda to the CNO concerning the situation and we would discuss them. 
I think that he had such a memorandum about the 1st of December but I do 
not believe that it was intended to go out as a dispatch but merely for 
the information of the Chief of Naval Operations. Now, I have not seen 
such a memorandum but I have a recollection of that. 

"Now, about the 1st or 2d of December and this is sure, I am completely 
sure of this, I remember it very distinctly about the 1st or 2d of 
December Commander McCollum came into my office and handed me a proposed 
dispatch written on one sheet of paper and approximately the length of 
the dispatch of November 27 which he proposed that the Chief of Naval 
Operations send out to the fleets concerning the imminence of war. It 
covered the same ground approximately as the CNO dispatches of the 24th 
and 27th.

"Now, I know that Admiral Wilkinson and some other officers in ONI had 
seen those two dispatches and I asked McCollum if he had seen them. 

"COUNSEL. YOU mean seen the officers or seen the dispatches? 

"Admiral TURNER. If he had seen the two dispatches of the 24th and 27th, 
and he said "No." So I pulled the two dispatches out and handed them to 
him and said, "Well, read these over and then see if you think your 
dispatch ought to go." 

"He sat down and read them over and handed them back to me and he said, 
"No" and tore up his proposed dispatch. It had the same general coverage 
but was not as specific as these two messages.

"COUNSEL. Not as specific as those two that were sent? 

"Admiral TURNER. Not quite; no, sir. 

"COUNSEL. Can you give us any information from your recollection as to 
what his proposed dispatch contained? 

"Admiral TURNER. I agreed with it entirely, he and I agreed on the  
situation and he was afraid that a warning had not been sent out and he 
had prepared himself a dispatch which he wanted to send out to the 
commander in chief. I did not ask him not to send it but I just merely 
said, "See if you think it ought to go after you read these dispatches" 
and he read the two dispatches and he said, "No." He said, "That is 
enough." "

Admiral Wilkinson had no independent recollection of the event attending 
the McCollum dispatch. [258]

It is regarded as extremely regrettable that the proposed dispatch of 
Captain McCollum is not in existence in order that an objective estimate 
of its contents might be made. Captain Safford in testifying before 
Admiral Hart, stated: [259]

[257] Id., at pp. 5217-5219.
[258] Id., at pp. 4655-4658.
[259] Hart inquiry record, p. 360.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            209

"* * * On the 4th of December 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long 
warning message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific 
Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 
"Winds Message," and ending with the positive warning that war was 
imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with 
Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after 
Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, 
on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What do you think of the 
message?" Admiral Noyes replied "I think it is an insult to the 
intelligence of the Commander in Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, "I do 
not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy and had with a lot of 
things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and 
I do. I think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given 
this warning and I intend to see it if I can get it released by the 
front office." Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left, a few minutes 
later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought 
that this warning message had been sent, and did not realize until two 
years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that 
McCollum's message had not been sent."

The statement by Captain Safford that the proposed dispatch referred to 
an implementation of the "winds code" was contradicted by Captain 
McCollum who categorically testified that his dispatch contained no 
reference to a winds execute message and that, in fact, his knowledge no 
such message had been received. [260] As elsewhere pointed out, the 
conclusion is made from all of the evidence that no execution message 
based on the "winds code" was ever received in the War or Navy 
Departments prior to December 7. 

The fact that Admiral Kimmel already possessed the vital intelligence 
with respect to the "lost" Japanese carriers and the unusual change in 
service calls on December 1 would necessarily have conditioned any 
consideration of an additional warning to him based hereon. However, 
considering all of the significant intelligence available around 
December 1, Captain McCollum, not knowing of the warning dispatches, 
prepared at sometime between December 1 and 4 an alerting message which 
he felt should have been dispatched. Admiral Turner looked with disfavor 
on this message for the reason hat he felt it added nothing to what had 
already been supplied the fleet and the further fact that he regarded 
responsible commanders as adequately alerted, an attitude which 
prevailed throughout the War and Navy Departments. Captain McCollum, 
too, regarded the war warning" of November 27 as fully adequate but 
testified he would also "like" to see his warning transmitted. There is 
no evidence before the Committee indicating with any degree of accuracy 
the contents of the so-called McCollum dispatch to assist in determining 
whether it may have added anything to the warning dispatches of November 
27 to the Hawaiian commanders. [261] 

EVENTS OF DECEMBER 6 AND 7, 1941

An extensive amount of testimony has been taken concerning the events of 
December 6 and 7, 1941, attending the interception, distribution, and 
action taken with respect to four diplomatic dispatches from Japan to 
her Washington ambassadors. These four dispatches, each of which will 
elsewhere be discussed fully, were: 

(1) The so-called "Pilot Message," No. 901, on December 6 advising that 
a long 14-part memorandum for the United States

[260] Committee record, p. 9134.
[261] This same observation would apply with respect to a warning 
dispatch said to have been prepared a the War Department by Colonel Otis 
K. Sadtler which allegedly was not sent for the reason that military 
outposts were regarded as adequately alerted. The facts concerning the 
"Sadtler message" are seriously in doubt.