210 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK was to be sent as a result of the American proposal of November 26 and that instructions concerning the time of presentation to the United States would be provided in a separate message. [262] (2) The 14-part memorandum, message No. 902 (transmitted in English) to be presented to the Government of the United States. The first thirteen parts were intercepted on December 6 and the fourteenth part on the morning of December 7. [263] (3) The message, No. 907, intercepted on December 7, directing the Japanese Ambassador to submit the 14-part memorandum to the United States at 1 p. m., December 7, Washington time. [264] (4) Message No. 910, intercepted on December 7, directing that the remaining cipher machine (in the Japanese Washington Embassy) be destroyed along with all code machines and that similar disposition be made of secret documents. [265] Considering the time that has elapsed there has been an understandable amount of discrepancy with respect to the recollection of the participants as to the exact time of handling the foregoing messages in Washington. However, as subsequently will appear, composite consideration of all the testimony tends to present a reasonably satisfactory picture. It is to be recalled that in December of 1941 the Army and Navy cryptographic units were dividing the work incident to decoding and translating Japanese diplomatic messages, the Magic, with the Army generally assuming responsibility for messages bearing even dates of the month and the Navy, the odd dates. [266] Immediately upon decoding and translating messages both the War and Navy Departments each received copies. It was the responsibility of the Army to make distribution of Magic within the War Department and to the Secretary of State, while the Navy was responsible for distribution within the Navy Department and to the White House. THE PILOT MESSAGE At 6:56 a. m. on December 6 there was filed in Tokyo and between 7:15 and 7:20 a. m. intercepted by a Navy monitoring station [267] a dispatch that has come to be known as the "Pilot Message": [268] "1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English). "2. This separate message is a very long one. *I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being*. "3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions." A teletype sheet containing this message in Japanese code was received by the Army from the Navy at 12:05 p. m., December 6. [269] There is no documentary evidence available as to the exact time of decoding, translating, and typing of the pilot message by the Army [262] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 238, 239 [263] Id., at pp. 239-245. [264] Id., at p. 248. [265] Id., at p. 249. [266] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 122. [267] See committee exhibit No. 41. [268] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 238, 239. [269] Id., No. 41. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 211 apart from the fact that these operations were completed on December Capt. Alwyn D. Kramer was primarily responsible for distribution of Magic on behalf of the Navy. He initially testified before the committee that he was quite certain the pilot message was contained in the folder also containing the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum which were distributed by him during the evening of December 6. [270] Captain Kramer subsequently modified this testimony, based on a study of records available in the Navy Department relating to the Magic materials. He testified: [271] "Yesterday afternoon when being questioned concerning this so-called pilot message I made the statement that I believed that the pilot message had arrived sometime late Saturday afternoon, 6 December 1941, or Saturday evening, and that I believed it was distributed Saturday evening with the Japanese note and other papers. I find as a result of my study last night that *the pilot message was not disseminated, at least in the Navy, until Sunday morning subsequent to 10 o'clock*, at the time when the so-called hidden-word message and a number of other short messages, including the 1 o'clock message, were disseminated." It would seem in consequence, from the best testimony available, hat no distribution was made of the pilot message in the Navy Department or to the White House until the morning of December 7. However, it is to be noted that Admiral Wilkinson testified he saw the pilot message before leaving the Navy Department on December 6. [272] It appears on the other hand that distribution of the message in the War Department and to the State Department was made during the afternoon of December 6. Col. Rufus Bratton, who was responsible for distribution of Magic by the Army, testified: [273] "Distribution of the so-called pilot message was made that afternoon (December 6) about 3 o'clock. I do not now recall whether I did it in person or whether one of my assistants did it, but I do recall discussing the subject both with General Miles and General Gerow Saturday afternoon. [273a]" The military significance of the pilot message will be treated in connection with the discussion of the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum. THE 14-PART MEMORANDUM *First 13 Parts* The first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum were received in the Navy Department between 11:49 a. m. and 2:51 p. m. on December 6. [274] They had been decoded and typed in the Navy Department and were ready for distribution by approximately 9 p. m. on that late. Copies were thereupon delivered to the War Department. [275] Captain Kramer in making distribution of this material on behalf of the Navy arrived at the White House between 9:30 and 10 p. m., delivering the first 13 parts to Commander Schulz, [276] an assistant to Admiral Beardall, [277] the President's naval aide, with the request they be given the President at the earliest possible moment. Commander Schulz did thereafter deliver the messages to the President who along [270] Committee record, p. 10677. [271] Id., at p. 10739. [272] Id., at p. 4659. [273] Id., pp. 12049, 12050. [273a] The evidence tends to indicate some doubt, however, as to whether the "Pilot Message" was seen by General Marshall on December 6. See Committee record, p. 3472. [274] Committee exhibit No. 41. [275] See Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 152-171. [276] Lt. (now Commander) Lester Robert Schulz. [277] Admiral John R. Beardall. 212 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK with Mr. Harry Hopkins read their contents. Kramer then proceeded to the Wardman Park Hotel where delivery was made to Secretary Knox, who read the dispatches. He then went to the home of Admiral Wilkinson where a dinner party was in progress attended by Admiral Beardall, General Miles, and of course, Admiral Wilkinson, among others. The first 13 parts were read by these officers. [278] Kramer returned to the Navy Department at approximately 1 a. m. and thereafter retired upon seeing that the fourteenth part of the Japanese memorandum had not been received. [279] Copies of the first 13 parts were delivered on the evening of December 6 by an unidentified representative or representatives of the Navy Department to Admirals Ingersoll and Turner at their homes. [280] The testimony with respect to distribution of the 13 parts by the, Army is conflicting, the weight of the evidence indicating, however, that no distribution was made to authorized recipients in the War Department on December 6. The evidence is in dispute as to whether they were delivered to a watch officer at the State Department on the evening of that date. [280a] The evidence indicates that the first 13 parts were read on the evening of December 6, by, particularly, the President, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Secretary Knox, Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Beardall, General Miles, Captain Kramer, and Colonel Bratton [281] It is concluded from the evidence of record that the message was not seen by Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, or General Gerow [282] prior to the morning of December 7. *Analysts and Significance of First 13 Parts Proper* In view of the conflicting interpretations that have been placed o the first 13 parts of the 14-part memorandum, they are being set forth in their entirety: [283] [278] Committee record, pp. 4663-4666. [279] Id., at pp. 10451 et seq. [280] Id., at pp. 5097 11295. [280a] Colonel Bratton testified that the last of the 13 parts came into his office some time between 9 and 1 o'clock that night, and that he was in his office when the last of the 13 parts came in (committee record 12049). He further testified that he personally delivered the 13 parts to the night duty officer at the State Department some time after 10 o'clock that night, telling the duty officer that it was a "highly important message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned" and that it should be sent out to Secretary Hull's quarters, which he was assured would be done committee record 12052-12053). This testimony is directly contrary to the affidavit of Col. Clyde Dusenbury, then Colonel Bratton's chief assistant, in the Clausen investigation. In his affidavit, Colonel Dusenbury stated that he specifically recalled the intercepted message in question and that "it started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning *to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen parts and began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept* about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Col. Thomas D. Handy, who, upon reading it, said to me: "This means war," or words to that effect. *None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941* because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night" (Clausen Investigation committee exhibit No. 148, p. 50). Colonel Dusenbury's statements in his affidavit are in accord with the testimony of Gen. Sherman Miles, then Chief of the Military Intelligence Division and the superior officer of Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury, who stated that Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and the others on the War Department's "magic" distribution list received on December 6 all intercepted Japanese messages that were translated that day up to midnight "*except the first 13 parts of the 14-part message*" (committee record 4123-4124). [281] Captain McCollum is indicated to have seen the first 6 or 7 parts before leaving his office on December 6. Committee record, pp. 9232, 9233. [282] See committee record, p. 2741. [283] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 239-245. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 213 MEMORANDUM 1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area. The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views, concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months. 2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world. Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy. (Part 2 of 14) However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire. (Part 3 of 14) Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental (75 letters garbled) The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress. (Part 4 of 14) Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points: (1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo- China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area. 214 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need. (3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil. (4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China. (5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement. (Part 5 of 14) As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations. The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government. (Part 6 of 14) 4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual Practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation. (Part 7 of 14) It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government. On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points: 1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 215 (Part 8 of 14) Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption. Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia. The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government. (Part 9 of 14) The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged. On the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means. 3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure. (Part 10 of 14) 4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr (45 letters garbled or missing) been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world. (Part 11 of 14) The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries, Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,-excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n (50 letters missed) sible for the present predicament of East Asia. (Part 12 of 14) 5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding 216 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chunking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chunking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia. (Part 13 of 14) 5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. *Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation*. 6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed, with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chunking, ANDND* (probably "and as") presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** (probably "China, can but") be concluded that. All these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position. The foregoing message is a long and argumentative rehash of the Japanese-American negotiations. The motives and proposals of the Japanese Empire are clothed in language of the most blathering terms whereas the purposes of the United States are assigned a base character. The language employed in the first 13 parts is much stronger than had theretofore been employed by Japan in her proposals. In the thirteenth part it is stated, "Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation." Taken from its context this statement would indicate that Japan is rejecting the November 26 note of our Government and would possibly suggest that the current negotiations were to be broken off at some time in the near future. But as pointed out by Admiral Wilkinson, "It is one thing to break off negotiations and another thing to break off diplomatic relations. The same negotiations, I believe, had been broken off earlier and then resumed." [284] Commander Schulz, who delivered the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to the President, testified that the President read the message and "Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them back to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in substance I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance, '*This means war*'. [285] Mr. Hopkins agreed and they discussed then for perhaps 5 minutes the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment." [286] [284] Committee record, p. 4668. [285] Asked what his action would have been had he known of the President's remark, General Marshall said: "I can't say. *I doubt if I would have sent anything on that statement of the President at that time*." Committee record, p. 13804. Admiral Stark was asked: "* * * if you had known that the President did say something in substance 'This means war,' about the 13-part message, was there anything you would have done that night except to read the message? Is there anything you could now tell us you would have done, in the way of backsight or hindsight that you would have done that you did not do?" He replied: "It would not be backsight or hindsight, because when I read it on Sunday morning I saw nothing in it to cause me to take any further action on it," Committee record, pp. 13912, 13913. [286] Committee record, p. 12441. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 217 To the query as to whether he could recall what either the President or Mr. Hopkins said, Commander Schulz testified as follows: [287] "Commander SCHULZ. In substance I can. There are only a few words that I in definitely say I am sure of, but the substance of it was that I believe Mr. Hopkins mentioned it first, that since war was imminent, that the Japanese tended to strike when they were ready, at a moment when all was most opportune for them when all was most opportune for that. That is, when their forces were most properly deployed for their advantage. Indochina in particular was mentioned, because the Japanese forces had already landed there and there were implications of where they should move next. "The President mentioned a message that he had sent to the Japanese Emperor concerning the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina, in effect requesting their withdrawal. "Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to be at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could not strike e first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and said, effect, "No we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people. Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we a good record." "The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record, we would not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came. "During this discussion there was no mention of Pearl Harbor. The only geographic name I recall was Indochina. The time at which war might begin as not discussed, but from the manner of the discussion there was no indication at tomorrow was necessarily the day. I carried that impression away because it contributed to my personal surprise when the news did come. "COUNSEL. Was there anything said, Commander, with reference to the subject of notice or notification as a result of the papers that were being read? "Commander SCHULZ. There was no mention made of sending any further warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war going to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the telephone. It was then determined I do not recall exactly, but I believe the White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached at the National Theater. "COUNSEL. Now, that was from what was said there that you draw the conclusion that that was what the White House operator reported? "Commander SCHULZ. Yes, sir. I did not hear what the operator said, but the national Theater was mentioned in my presence and the President went on to state, in substance, that he would reach the Admiral later, that he did not want to cause public alarm by having the Admiral paged or otherwise when in theater where I believe the fact that he had a box reserved was mentioned and at if he had left suddenly he would surely have been seen because of the position which he held and undue alarm might be caused and the President did not wish that to happen because he could get him within perhaps another half an hour in any case. [287a]" In considering the remark [288] by the President to Mr. Hopkins that the first 13 parts meant war it is significant that there was no indication as to *when* or *where* war might be expected. [288a] The testimony of Commander Schulz should be considered with that of Admiral Beardall, to which reference will hereafter be made, in seeking to determine the reaction of the President to the full Japanese 14-part memorandum. [287] Id., at pp. 12441-12444. [287a] The evidence tends to indicate that following his return home after the theater, Admiral Stark was advised that the White House had called, and that he did thereupon call the White House. See testimony. Capt. H. D. Krick, U. S. Navy, before the committee. [288] Referring to the comment made by the President, General Marshall testified: "He didn't tell me, and didn't tell the Secretary of War. So he made a statement offhand on reading the thing" (13 parts). Committee record, p. 13803. [288a] In connection with the remark attributed to the President it is to be noted that at a meeting of the War Council on November 25, President Roosevelt warned that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as the following Monday, for the "Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning." See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390. 218 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The estimate given the first 13 parts by witnesses before the committee who reviewed them on the night of December 6 follows: [289] "Admiral TURNER. However, when I saw the 13 parts, which I believe was about 11:30 on the night of December 6, I inquired from the officer who showed it to me and brought it to my house as to who had seen that dispatch, and he informed me that Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll and Secretary Knox had all seen it before it had been shown to me. I considered the dispatch very important, but as long as those officers had seen it, I did not believe it was my function to take any action." * * * * * "Admiral INGERSOLL. [290] * * * when I read the 13 parts there was nothing on which the Navy Department as such could that night take action. The gist of the 13 parts was a restatement of the Japanese position we had known, of course, all along." * * * * * "Admiral WILKINSON. [291] * * * both General Miles and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a diplomatic message; it was a message that indicated, or that resembled the diplomatic white papers, of which we had often seen examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position. "The strain was largely in the 14th part which we discussed the next morning. * * * * * Admiral Wilkinson agreed that he, General Miles, and Admiral Beardall discussed the first 13 parts and referred to it as more or less a "white paper" or diplomatic communication "A justification for the Japanese position". [292] "General MILES. [293] I called him for the purpose of finding out what had been done, what was going to be done with these first 13 parts, but I wish to call your attention, Senator, to the fact that the first 13 parts as such was not of great military significance. We had already discounted through many days the fact that in all probability the Japanese reply to our note of November 26 would be unfavorable and that was all that the first 13 parts told us. When we got the fourteenth part we saw quite a different picture, when we got the 1 p. m. message we saw quite a different picture, but there was no reason for alerting or waking up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Secretary Hull, on the night of December 6 that I could see. "Captain KRAMER. [294] I have stated that the first part I recollect seeing is part 8. If you will refer to that you will see that there is nothing in that part in fact, the last half of that part quotes the United States note that was materially different than the general tenor of previous notes back and forth between the United States and Japan. "When the first 13 parts were complete I did however, have that distinct impression, that this note was far and appreciably stronger language than earlier notes had been and that it indicated a strong probability that the Japanese were concluding any further negotiations. * * * * * "Colonel BRATTON [295] * * * I considered the presence of the 13 parts in Washington relatively unimportant militarily that evening. "I did so consider it upon their receipt and I still consider it now. They contributed no information, they contributed no additional information to the matters that we already had from magic and other sources as to the impending crisis with Japan. "The message was incomplete. It ended on the note, in the thirteenth part: "Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation " "This was primarily of interest, immediate interest to the Secretary of State, not to the Secretary of War or the Chief of General Staff for it was not an ulti- [289] Committee record, p. 5097. [290] Id., at p. 11377. [291] Id., at p. 4665. [292] Id., at p. 4667. [293] Id., at pp. 2482, 2483. [294] Id., at pp. 10445, 10446. [295] Id., at pp. 12057, 12058. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 219 latum, it was not a declaration of war, nor was it a severance of diplomatic relations." The committee has noted the emphasis, publicity and speculation concerning the whereabouts of General Marshall, the Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, on the evening of December 6. General Marshall has testified that while he could not recall his whereabouts with certainty he presumed he was at home. Admiral Stark could not recall his whereabouts, but the evidence establishes that he was at the National Theater seeing *The Student Prince*. [295a] Similar emphasis has been placed on the fact that the Chief of Staff was horseback riding on the morning of December 7, as was his Sunday-morning custom. The first 13 parts were neither delivered to nor read by either General Marshall or Admiral Stark on the evening of December 6. In any event, the question of their whereabouts on Saturday evening, December 6, is by any construction unimportant inasmuch as both officers saw nothing in the first 13 parts to serve as basis for additional warnings o our outposts when they read them on the morning of December 7. [295b] In this connection, it is to be noted that the evidence conclusively establishes that no conferences were held at the White House or elsewhere with respect to the Pacific situation by ranking military and executive officials on the evening of December 6, 1941. The consensus of testimony by officers of the War and Navy Departments is to the effect that the first 13 parts, as such, of the 14-part message bore little or no military significance. [296] While they revealed a position assumed by Japan to which our Government could not subscribe there was no statement that negotiations were to be ruptured and certainly no intimation of the treacherous attack to be delivered at Pearl Harbor the following morning. From the "pilot message" it was clear that a fourteenth part was to be transmitted and that it would probably be received on December 7. Considering this fact and the further fact that the first 13 parts gave no indication of immediate military action by Japan, there was no occasion on the evening of December 6 to dispatch additional warnings to outposts, already regarded as alerted, on the basis of a message that was manifestly not complete. It is clear there was no intelligence contained in the message itself which had not been known for some time. *Military Significance of "Pilot" and 14-Part Messages Apart from Messages Proper* An intercepted dispatch of November 28, 1941, from Tokyo to its Washington ambassadors had stated, referring to Mr. Hull's note of November 26: [297] "Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Govern- [295a] See note 287a, supra. [295b] General Marshall said: "* * * the first 13 parts were not of the nature of a vital threat as the 14th part. That was a message of direct importance to the Secretary of State and of related importance, of course, to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy who had been collaborating with him in his relationship in the dealings with Japan." Committee record, p. 3095. For Admiral Stark's estimate of the first 13 parts see Note 296, infra. [296] Admiral Stark stated that he regarded the first 13 parts, when he saw them on the morning of December 7, as routine, a rehashing of the attitude of the Japanese towards the situation which had been accumulating over a period of weeks or months. In other words, that the 13 parts by themselves carried no implication other than indicated; that it was a rehashing, a restatement of their attitude. Committee record, p. 13722. [297] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195.