220            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. *Therefore, 
with a report of the views of the Imperial (Government on this American 
proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations 
will be de facto ruptured*. This is inevitable. 

In the foregoing dispatch the Japanese Government stated it would send a 
reply to Nomura and Kurusu within 2 or 3 days. This presupposes the 
presence and *availability* in Washington of these ambassadors to 
receive the reply. Clearly, therefore, war between Japan and the United 
States was not to eventuate *until* the reply had been received in 
Washington, otherwise the Japanese ambassadors would not be available 
for the purpose of receiving such reply. By the same token war would not 
eventuate until the ambassadors had an opportunity to *deliver* the 
reply, otherwise little or no purpose would be served in sending it 
whatever. 

Knowledge of this fact should have intensified alertness in the War and 
Navy Departments to such a point that from the moment the 14-part reply 
started coming in, all hands should have been on the qui vive and 
additionally an adequate number of responsible officers should have been 
actually at their stations with full authority to act in any emergency 
throughout the night of December 6-7. This statement is of course 
subject to the observation that Japan had indicated in the pilot message 
that the full reply would not be received until the following day, 
Sunday, December 7, and even that was not certain; that instructions 
would be sent in a separate dispatch with respect to the time of 
presentation and "the situation is extremely delicate, and when you 
receive it (the reply) I want you to please *keep it secret for the time 
being*." Further, it is clear from the evidence that the receipt of the 
pilot message and portions of the first 13 parts of the 14-part 
memorandum served as basis for special measures taken by the War and 
Navy Departments to insure prompt handling, decoding, and distribution 
of this magic material on the evening of December 6. The naval officers 
who received the first 13 parts on the evening of December 6 appear to 
have regarded them as requiring no action during the evening. Within the 
Army the first 13 parts were seen by the Chief of the Military 
Intelligence Division, who in view of the fact that the fourteenth part 
had not been received and the further fact that this message appeared to 
him to be of interest primarily to the State Department, decided that it 
required no further distribution within the Army that evening but should 
be delivered to the State Department. [297a] But the fact that the 
message was being received removed the last *known* barrier to Japan's 
taking military action. [298] 

In consequence, it is not believed the War and Navy establishments in 
Washington were sufficiently alerted on the evening of December 6 

[297] As has been indicated, the evidence is in dispute as to whether 
the first 13 parts were in reality delivered to a watch officer at the 
State Department on the evening of December 6. See Note 280a, supra. 
[298] However, it should be noted that Ambassador Nomura in a dispatch 
to Tokyo of November 26, 1941, stated: "The United States is using the 
excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent 
countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are 
continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our 
expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, 
deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger 
that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast 
upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have 
considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French 
Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a 
rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent 
operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as 
counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing 
insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing 
as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; 
consequently, *I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of 
course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations 
be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to 
the American Embassy in Tokyo or by declaration for internal and 
external* consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to 
make representations here at the same time." Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 
183.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             221

with a view to receiving the Japanese reply. As events turned out, 
however, there was nothing contained in the first 13-parts to have 
served as basis for additional warnings to outposts already regarded 
adequately alerted. The information contained in the first 13-parts of 
the 14-part message did not add to the sum total of information already 
supplied the commanders in Hawaii who had been warned of war and advised 
"hostile action possible at any moment." It did not point to Hawaii. It 
did not provide the essential *where* or, with any degree of 
definitiveness, the *when* of the attack. There is no intelligence 
contained in the first 13-parts which this Committee can conclude could 
reasonably be expected to have changed the decisions already made in 
Hawaii.

*The Fourteenth Part*

At 2:38 a. m., December 7, there was filed in Tokyo and intercepted by a 
Navy monitoring station between 3:05 and 3:10 a. m. the fourteenth and 
final part of Japan's reply to Secretary Hull's note of November 26. 
[299] This message as subsequently decoded by the Navy read as follows: 
[300]

"(Part 14 of 14)

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire 
with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts 
toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in 
East Asia, and especially to reserve Anglo-American rights and interests 
by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed 
clearly during the course of the present: negotiations. Thus, the 
earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American 
relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific rough 
cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"*The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American 
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it 
cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through 
further negotiations.*"

The fourteenth part was available in the Navy Department for 
distribution at some time between 7:30 and 8:00 a. m. [301] Captain 
Kramer made delivery within the Navy Department shortly after a. m. The 
delivery to the White House and to Secretary Knox, who was at the State 
Department for a 10 a. m. meeting with Secretaries Hull and Stimson, was 
made shortly before 10 a. m. Distribution of the fourteenth part within 
the War Department was begun at 9 a. m. with subsequent delivery to the 
State Department. 

It is to be noted there is no statement that Japan intended to declare 
war on the United States nor, indeed, that formal diplomatic relations 
were to be broken merely that the current negotiations cannot produce an 
agreement. The fourteenth part is much less severe than the strongly 
worded first 13 parts would have indicated. Admiral Beardall testified 
as follows with respect to delivery of the fourteenth part o the 
President: [302]

"As I recollect it, I went into his room, early, about 10:00 o'clock on 
Sunday morning, with a message or messages, which I presume, to the best 
of my recollection, was the 14th part of this 13-part message that came 
in the night before, which delivered to him. 

[299] Committee exhibit No. 41.
[300] Id., No. 1, p. 245. As forwarding instructions to the radio 
station handling the fourteenth part there appeared at the beginning the 
plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT".
[301] Committee record, pp. 10461-10463.
[302] Id,, at pp. 14010, 14011.

222            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Asked if there was any discussion or conversation with the President 
when he made the delivery, Admiral Beardall testified: [303]

"No discussion. We never discussed magic. I do recollect him saying 
though, which marks this in my mind, that *it looked as though the Japs 
are going to sever negotiations, break off negotiations*."

Admiral Beardall further testified that at the time of delivering the 
fourteenth part to the President there was nothing in the manner of the 
President which would indicate he was expecting an attack within a 
period of hours; that there "was no alarm, or no mention of this, 
mention of war, or of any actions on his part that would indicate that 
he was expecting an attack." [304] 

As to the question whether termination of negotiations would indicate 
certain war it is significant to note that the Japanese Ambassadors 
themselves stated in a message to Tokyo dated November 26, 1941: [305]

"We suppose that *the rupture of the present negotiations does not 
necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States*, but after we 
break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is 
to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack 
them and a clash with them would be inevitable * * *."

From a review of the fourteenth part it is clear that nothing is added 
to what was already known with respect to Japan's reaction to Secretary 
Hull's note. To be sure it is observed that the "hope * * * to preserve 
and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the 
American Government has finally been lost" and "in view of the attitude 
of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible 
to reach an agreement through further negotiations." But these facts had 
already been known for several days and the only paramount 
considerations at this time were *when* and *where* Japan would strike. 
A thorough consideration of the fourteen-part message, when viewed in 
the light of all other intelligence already available in Washington, 
reflects no added information, particularly of a military character, 
which would serve further to alert outpost commanders who had already 
been supplied a "war warning" and informed that "hostile action possible 
at any moment." [305] This conclusion is partially modified to the 
extent that actual delivery of the fourteen part message to the American 
Government might be construed as removing the last diplomatic obstacle, 
in the minds of the Japanese, to launching an attack. 

"ONE O'CLOCK" AND FINAL CODE DESTRUCTION MESSAGES

Two messages intercepted on the morning of December 7 have received 
paramount consideration the celebrated "one o'clock" message specifying 
the time for delivery of the Japanese 14-part memorandum to the 
Government of the United States and the message setting forth final 
instructions to the Japanese Embassy concerning 

[303] Id. 
[304] Committee record, p. 14047. 
[305] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181. 
[306] General Marshall stated: "* * * the particular part which affected 
me and caused me to act was not the 14 parts. It was the one o'clock, 
which, unfortunately, they put on the bottom of the pile and I read 
through everything before I came to that." committee record, p. 13805. 

Referring to the Japanese 14-part memorandum, Admiral Turner said: "I 
did not consider that that message and the fact that it appeared to be 
an ultimatum changed the over-all situation in the least degree, because 
I was certain in my mind that there was going to be war immediately 
between the United states and Japan, and this was merely confirmatory. 
The full orders, and what I felt was the full picture Of the situation 
had been given to the fleet commanders in the dispatch of November 27, 
and confirmed definitely by the later dispatches regarding the 
destruction of the Japanese codes and the Navy Department's orders for 
our people to destroy codes in exposed positions." Committee record, p. 
5099. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             223

the destruction of codes and secret papers. The latter was as follows: 
[307]

"After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, [308] #908, [309] 
and #909, [310] please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and 
all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents."

This message was intercepted shortly after the one o'clock message but 
from the evidence it appears that both these intercepts were distributed 
at approximately the same time. The "one o'clock" message read as 
follows: [311] 

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if 
possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 
1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time." 

This dispatch was filed by the Japanese at 4.18 a. m. December 7 and 
intercepted by a Navy monitoring station at 4:37 a. m. [312] It was 
decrypted and available in the Navy Department at approximately 7 a. m. 
thereupon being sent to the Army for translation inasmuch as there was 
no translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. Translated 
copies of the "one o'clock" message appear to have been returned to the 
Navy at approximately 9 a. m. Captain Kramer testified [313] that upon 
his return to the Navy Department at 10:20 a. m. he found the "one 
o'clock" message and thereafter, between 10:30 and 10:35 a. m., 
delivered it to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, where a 
meeting was in progress. Delivery was then made within approximately 10 
minutes to an aide to Secretary Hull at the State Department and 
thereafter within roughly another 10 minutes, to a Presidential aide at 
the White House. In the course of delivery to the office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations and to Secretary Hull's aide mention was made of the 
fact that 1 p. m. Washington time, was about dawn at Honolulu and about 
the middle of the night in the Far East. *No mention was made that the 
time indicated an attack at Pearl Harbor*. [314] 

Delivery of the "one o'clock" message within the War Department was made 
at some time between 9 and 10 a. m. General Marshall after being advised 
at his quarters that an important message had been received, arrived at 
his office at some time between 11:15 and 11:30 a. m. where he saw for 
the first time the 14-part memorandum, General Gerow, General Miles, and 
Colonel Bratton, among others, being present. After completion of his 
reading of the memorandum General Marshall came to the "one o'clock" 
message and appears to have attached immediate significance to it. He 
testified that he and the officers present in his office were certain 
the hour fixed in the "one o'clock" message had "some definite 
significance;" that "something was going to happen at 1 o'clock;" that 
"when they specified a day, 

[307] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 249.
[308] The dispatch set forth, infra, concerning delivery at 1 p. m., 
December 7, of the 14-part memorandum.
[309] No. 908, dated December 7, read: "All concerned regret very much 
that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters 
have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two 
Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer 
my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well 
as for what all the members of the Embassy have done." Committee exhibit 
No. 1., p. 248. 
[310] No. 909, dated December 7, read: "(From Bureau Chief Yamamoto to 
Commerical Attache Iguchi and his staff as well as to Secretary Yuki) I, 
together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily 
thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many 
months in behalf of our country despite all difficulities in coping with 
the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good 
health."  Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.
[311] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 248.
[312] Id., No. 41.
[313] Committee record, pp. 10470-10479.
[314] See testimony of Captain Kramer before the committee; also Captain 
McCollum, committee record, p. 9275.

224            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

that of course had significance, but not comparable to an hour;" and, 
again, that it was "a new item of information of a peculiar character." 
[315] At 11:30 or 11:40 a. m. General Marshall telephoned Admiral Stark 
[316] and, upon learning the latter had read the message, proposed that 
a warning be sent immediately to all theaters concerned. It should be 
noted that the exact time of Admiral Stark's arrival at the Navy 
Department is not definitely established although it is known that he 
was there by 10:30 a. m. on the morning of December 7, at the very 
latest. [317] Admiral Stark hesitated because he regarded the theater 
commanders as already alerted and he was afraid of confusing them 
further. [318] General Marshall nevertheless wrote in longhand the draft 
of a warning message to the Western Defense Command, the Panama Command, 
the Hawaiian Command, and the Philippine Command, as follows: [319]

"The Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time, today, 
what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy 
their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may 
have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly."

He instructed Colonel Bratton to take the foregoing message immediately 
to the message center to be dispatched by radio but as Colonel Bratton 
was leaving the room, Admiral Stark called to request that there be 
placed on the dispatch the "usual expression to inform the naval 
officer". The following was therefore added in handwriting, by General 
Marshall, "Inform naval authorities of this communication" [320]

EVENTS ATTENDING TRANSMITTAL OF THE DECEMBER 7 DISPATCH

By 11:50 a. m. the handwritten warning had been delivered by Colonel 
Bratton to Colonel French, [321] in charge of the message center. When 
Colonel Bratton returned, General Marshall inquired as to how much time 
would be required to encipher and dispatch the message. Not 
understanding the explanation, he instructed both Colonels Bratton and 
Bundy to obtain a clearer picture from the message center. These two 
officers upon returning advised that the message would be in the hands 
of the recipients within thirty minutes. Still not being satisfied, 
General Marshall is indicated to have sent the 

[315] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Report, pp. 7, 8; committee 
record, p. 13806. 
[316] See committee exhibit No. 58. 
[317] See committee record, p. 5813. The testimony of some witnesses 
indicates Admiral Stark arrived at the Navy Department as early as 9 a. 
m. 
[318] See Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 7, 8. Admiral 
Stark said: "During the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, we had 
information to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador was to present 
his Government's reply to the 10-point note to the Secretary of State at 
1 p. m. that same day. I was discussing this note and the time of its 
presentation with the head of the Central Division (Captain Schuirmann) 
when General Marshall called me on the phone to ask if I knew of it. I 
told him I did, and he asked me what I thought about sending the 
information concerning the time of presentation on to the various 
commanders in the Pacific. *My first answer to him was that we had sent 
them so much already that I hesitated to send more*. I hung up the 
phone, and not more than a minute or two later I called him back, 
stating that there might be some peculiar significance in the Japanese 
Ambassador calling on Mr. Hull at 1 p. m. and that I would go along with 
him in sending the information to the Pacific. I asked him if his 
communications were such that he could get it out quickly because our 
communications were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it. He 
replied that he felt they could get it through very quickly. I then 
asked him to include in the dispatch instructions to his people to 
inform their naval opposites" Committee record, p. 5676. 
[319] Committee exhibit No. 32, p. 21. 
[320] Id. 
[321] Col Edward F. French.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            225

Two officers back again and their report upon returning was regarded as 
satisfactory; that is, he felt assured from what he was told that the 
warning would be received by the pertinent commanders before 1:00 p. m. 
[322]

After receiving the message Colonel French personally took charge of its 
dispatch. Learning that the War Department radio had been out of contact 
with Honolulu since approximately 10:20 a. m. he hereupon immediately 
decided that the most expeditious manner of getting the message to 
Hawaii was by commercial facilities; that is, Western Union to San 
Francisco, thence by commercial radio to Honolulu. The message was filed 
at the Army signal center at 12:01 a. m. (6:31 a. m., Hawaii); teletype 
transmission to Western Union completed at 12:17 p. m. (6:47 a. m., 
Hawaii); received by RCA Honolulu 1:03 p. m. (7:33 a. m., Hawaii); 
received by signal office, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, at approximately 5:15 
p. m. (11:45 a. m., Hawaii) after the attack. It appears that the 
teletype arrangement between RCA in Honolulu and Fort Shafter was not 
operating at the particular hour the message was received with the 
result that it was dispatched by a messenger on a bicycle who was 
diverted from completing delivery by the first bombing.

CHOICE OF FACILITIES

Colonel French testified that important messages to be transmitted 
immediately had previously been sent by commercial means when there was 
interference on the Army circuit between Honolulu and the War 
Department; that on the morning of December 7 Honolulu appeared to be in 
touch with San Francisco; that he had a teletype connection from his 
office to the Western Union office in Washington and knew Western Union 
had a tube connecting with RCA across the street in San Francisco; that 
RCA had 40 kilowatts of power whereas his set had 10 kilowatts; and that 
he concluded the fastest means of transmission would be via Western 
Union and RCA. He stated that he acted within his authority in deciding 
to send the message by commercial means and did not tell General 
Marshall how the message was going. [323]

Colonel French stated further that he had not considered using the 
telephone; that the telephone was never used by the signal center; that 
it was unsuitable for a classified message, and that, in any event "if 
they wanted to use the telephone that was up to the individuals 
themselves, Chief of Staff, or whoever the individual concerned." [324]

According to General Marshall, the telephone was not considered as a 
means of transmission, or that it may have been considered but would not 
have been used, he was quite certain, certainly not to Hawaii first; 
that if he had thought he could put a telephone call through, he would 
have called General MacArthur first, and then would have called 

[322] Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 8-10,14. There is some 
testimony indicating only two trip were made by Colonel Bratton to the 
message center.
[323] Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, pp. 188, 195; Roberts Commission 
Record, pp. 1843, 1844, 1846.
[324] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pp. 189-205. 

226              PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the Panama Canal. He observed that it was important to send the message 
in code because it was not known what "one o'clock meant" and that it 
might have meant only a termination of diplomatic relations or some 
action in southeast Asia. General Marshall pointed out that there was no 
secrecy in the telephone and that he was trying to gain time and yet had 
to be careful not to "precipitate the whole business" or do anything 
which could be construed as an act of war; that it was important not to 
disclose to the Japanese our reading of their codes. [325] 

With respect to the matter of using Navy radio facilities, Colonel 
French stated that the Navy used more power than did the Army and 
occasionally the Army asked the Navy to communicate messages but that in 
practice they did not use the Navy for expediting traffic to Honolulu. 
He considered the possible use of Navy transmission of the warning 
message but decided against it since it would have required time to 
determine whether the Navy was also having trouble getting through to 
Hawaii and the message would have had to be delivered from the Navy at 
Pearl Harbor to Fort Shafter. [326] 

General Marshall had no knowledge on the morning of December 7 that the 
Army radio could not establish contact with Hawaii nor that the Navy had 
a more powerful radio to Honolulu. [327] It is to be noted that the 
message got through to addressees other than Hawaii prior to the attack. 

After the event it is easy to find other means of communication which 
General Marshall might have employed. This will always be the case. It 
is clear from the record, however, that he selected a secure means 
dictated by the contents of the message and was assured after two or 
three requests for verification that the message would get through in 
adequate time. It did not reach Hawaii because of a failure in 
communications concerning which he could not have known and concerning 
which he was not advised. It was the failure of communications and not 
the selection of an improper channel that occasioned the delay. 

While it is not regarded as contributing to the disaster, for reasons 
hereinafter to appear, it is considered extremely regrettable that 
Colonel French did not advise the Chief of Staff upon his inability to 
employ the Army's radio, the anticipated means of communication, 
particularly when he realized the great importance of the message and 
the-personal concern of the Chief of Staff for its expeditious 
transmittal. 

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "ONE O'CLOCK" AND CODE DESTRUCTION MESSAGES

No one knew or presumed to know definitely just what the time "one 
o'clock" meant. [328] Indeed, the warning sent by the Chief of

[325] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) Record, pp. 10-14. See also 
Roberts Commission record, p. 1803.
[326] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, pp. 203, 204. Roberts Commission 
record, p. 1844.
[327] Roberts Commission record, p. 1801.
[328] Admiral Stark observed: "My first reaction was that we had sent so 
much out that and as there was no deduction from the message, as to what 
it meant, at least we had made none at that time, that it would be just 
as well not to send it. A few days previous, when we had a discussion 
whether to send out anything more, the question came up, be careful not 
to send too much, it might create the story of 'wolf'." Committee 
Record, page 5815. In this regard it is to be noted that Admiral Smith, 
Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel said that he thought there had been too 
much "crying wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only 
during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral 
Richardson. See Hart Inquiry Record, page 64.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK             227

Staff stated "*just what significance the hour set may have we do not 
know*." Despite this fact the Hawaiian commanders have asserted or 
implied that if they had received this information at the earliest 
possible moment on the morning of December 7, they would have 
anticipated a surprise air attack upon Pearl Harbor and have instituted 
appropriate defensive measures accordingly. [329] It is to be noted, 
however, that one of the asserted justifications by Admiral Kimmel and 
General Short for their not having taken the necessary defensive 
measures prior to December 7 was the fact that the warnings they had 
received, while indicating that war was imminent, pointed to southeast 
Asia and not to Hawaii as the likely point of attack. 

There was nothing in the fact that the Japanese ambassadors were to 
present their Government's reply to the American note of November 26 at 
1 p. m., December 7, pointing any more to an attack on Hawaii than to 
any other point to which General Marshall directed is dispatch: Panama, 
the west coast, the Philippines. The intelligence contained in the "one 
o'clock" intercept indicated no more than the distinct possibility that 
*some* Japanese military action would take place *somewhere* at 1 p. m.

What Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have done upon receiving 
this intelligence or the Marshall dispatch before the attack necessarily 
speculative. 

Testifying before the Roberts Commission concerning that portion of the 
December 7 warning pointing out that instructions had been issued for 
the Japanese Embassy to destroy its code machine immediately, General 
Short was asked whether his dispositions would have been changed if the 
message had reached him, say three hours before he attack. He replied: 
[330]

"General SHORT. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either to 
at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone 
against a complete attack, because it looked so significant. 
"The CHAIRMAN. Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would 
have stirred you up? 
"General SHORT. The thing that would have affected me more than the 
other matter was the fact that they had ordered the code machines 
destroyed, because to us that means just one thing; that they are going 
into an entirely new phase, and that they want to be perfectly sure that 
the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of 3 or 4 days. That 
would have been extremely significant to me, the code machine, much more 
significant than just the ultimatum."

It is to be noted that when appearing before the Roberts Commission, 
General Short insisted he had no knowledge concerning the destruction by 
Japanese diplomatic representatives of codes and confidential papers, 
prior to December 7. As has been seen, the evidence before this 
committee reflects that he received substantially this information on 
December 6. 

Admiral Kimmel has likewise suggested that the fact the Japanese 
Washington Embassy had been ordered to destroy its code machine would 
have been of greater significance to him than information received on 
December 3 that the Embassy, among others, had been ordered to destroy 
"most of its codes." [331] With respect to the latter 

[329] General Short said: "This message (the one o'clock message) 
definitely pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor at 1 p. m., Washington 
time." Committee Record, page 7992.
[330] Roberts Commission record, pp. 1619, 1620.
[331] Committee record, pp. 7476, 7477.

228            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

intelligence Admiral Kimmel has testified: [332] "I didn't consider that 
of any vital importance when I received it * * *" Significantly, 
however, on December 6 the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District 
advised the Navy Department: "believe local consul has destroyed all but 
one system * * *" [333]

It is concluded that the information contained in the Japanese intercept 
of December 7 instructing the Washington Embassy to destroy its 
remaining code machine, added little if any information to that already 
possessed by Admiral Kimmel concerning Japanese destruction of codes and 
confidential matter; and that if the intelligence supplied him in this 
regard on December 3 did not serve to warn of the immediate imminence of 
war the information concerning the destruction of the Japanese code 
machine on the morning of December 7 would not have effectively modified 
the situation. In the case of General Short, as elsewhere pointed out, 
it appears that while Admiral Kimmel did not supply him with the 
intelligence he had received concerning the destruction of codes, the 
Commanding General none-the-less received information of an equivalent 
character.

We believe, however, that the "one o'clock" intercept should have been 
recognized as indicating the distinct possibility that some Japanese 
military action would occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December 7 Washington 
time. If properly appreciated, this intercept should have suggested a 
dispatch to *all* Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, 
as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it. 

SIGNIFICANT MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER THE ATTACK

INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING HAWAIIAN DEFENSES

One of the most unfortunate circumstances attending the handling of 
Magic is the fact that several very significant messages were not 
translated until after the attack. After December 7, 13 messages [334] 
between Tokyo and Honolulu from November 24 to December 6 were 
translated, several of these differing markedly from any of the messages 
between these points translated prior to December 7. Three of the 13 
messages were from Tokyo, two of which related to instructions and 
interest concerning fleet locations and movements [335] with the third, 
however, containing for the first time an inquiry from Tokyo concern-

[332] Id., at P. 7477.
[333] The extreme importance of codes being destroyed in the consulates 
was expressed by Admiral Ingersoll in his testimony: 

"I considered that the information which we received regarding the 
destruction of the codes and which was sent out to the fleets as one of 
the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval 
Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one 
being the dispatch stating that, 'this is a war warning' in effect and 
that all hope of negotiations had broken off . .  .

"The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes 
is this: If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily 
have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up 
their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture 
diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The 
consuls stay on. 

"Now in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their 
diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes but they told 
their consuls in Manila, in Hongkong, Singapore, and Batavia to burn 
their codes and that did not mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations, 
*it  meant war, and that information was sent out to the fleet as soon 
as we got it* * * *" Committee record, pp. 11286, 11287. 
[334] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 16-29. 
[335] Id., at pp. 18, 26.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            229

ing the defenses of the fleet in port. The latter message dated December 
2 (translated December 30) read: [336] 

"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, 
airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to 
the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case 
whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or 
if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me 
whether or not the warships are provided with antimine nets."

The messages translated after December 7 from Honolulu to Tokyo so 
reflect for the first time that information relating to the defenses at 
Pearl Harbor was being collected and supplied to Japan. In a message of 
November 24, Tokyo was advised that on the preceding night five mine 
layers had conducted mine-laying operations outside the harbor. [337] A 
November 28 message reported, "there are eight 'B-17' planes at Midway 
and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?)"; 
that "12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops 
in Honolulu during December or January"; and that "there has usually 
been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl 
Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor." [338] 

Of extreme significance are two messages of December 6 (both translated 
December 8) one of which reads as follows: [339]

"Re the last part of your #123. [340]

"1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage 
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered 
four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are 
considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and 
Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been 
made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring 
equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, 
there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons 
is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage 
balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they 
have actually any. However, even though they have actually made 
preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land 
runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, 
and Ewa, there are limits in the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. *I 
imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left 
to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places*." 

"2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details 
are not known. I will report the results of my investigation."

The other message of December 6 from Honolulu to Tokyo reported, among 
other things, "it appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted 
by the fleet air arm." [341]

Also of particular interest is a message from Honolulu on December 3 
[342] establishing a "number code" to indicate whether warships of a 
given category were preparing to sortie or had departed. A system 

[336] Id., at p. 21. This message was transmitted from Hawaii and was 
translated by the Army in Washington, the translation bearing the 
notation, "This message was received on December 23."
[337] Translated December 16, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No. 
2, p 17.
[338] Translated December 8, 1941, by the Army. Committee exhibit No. 2, 
p. 19.
[339] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 27, 28. Army translation. *The record 
indicates that this information was taken from matrial published in 
newspapers*.
[340] See committee exhibit No 2, p. 21.
[341] Id., p. 29. Army translation.