230            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

of houselights, newspaper want ads and bonfires, in addition to the use 
of a sail boat, was designed to indicate the code numbers. While I this 
system of communication did not relate to the defenses of Hawaii it was 
clearly in anticipation that the normal channels for transmitting 
information regarding the movements of the feet might be cut off and 
that a visual means of communication, probably to submarines offshore, 
was desired. It is also to be noted that no provision was made in the 
code for transmitting information concerning the departure of ships 
after December 6. 

This message was decrypted and translated in rough form on December 6 by 
a civilian translator in the Navy Department, it having been received 
from a radio intercept station of the Army at Fort Hunt, Va. While 
Captain Kramer testified he had no positive recollection of having seen 
the translation prior to the attack, the evidence tends to indicate that 
the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6 
but that on account of the pressure of work on other important 
diplomatic messages, including the first 13 parts of the Japanese 14-
part memorandum, no action was taken on the translation until December 
8. [343] It is to be noted that this intercept of December 3 was in a 
code system referred to as "PA-K2" whereas the important Japanese 14-
part reply which started coming in on the afternoon of December 6 was in 
the so-called Purple code system. The Purple was afforded first priority 
which, it appears, explains Captain Kramer's not giving undivided 
attention to the PA-K2 dispatch of December 3 together with the fact 
that this message was badly garbled and the civilian translator who 
handled it, while proficient in Japanese, had not as yet had adequate 
experience concerning the handling of the intercepted dispatches. [344] 

CONSIDERATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN TRANSLATIONS

Of the 13 messages between Tokyo and Honolulu intercepted before 
December 7 but not translated until after the attack, 5 were transmitted 
on or after December 4. The evidence shows that because of technical 
difficulties a delay of 3 days in transmitting, decoding, and 
translating such messages was not unusual or unreasonable. [345] 

[343] Id., pp. 22-24. 
[345] See Hewitt Inquiry Record, pp. 588, 589; also pp. 511-515. 

*Captain Safford stated that on the week end of December 6, 1941, his 
unit handled three times the normal traffic on a busy day *. Navy Court 
of Inquiry record, p. 756. 
[346] See testimony of Captain McCollum, committee record, pp. 9283, 
9284. The December 3 dispatch from the Honolulu consul was obtained by 
the district intelligence officer of the Navy in Hawaii and was turned 
over on December 5, 1941, to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption 
and translation, Being in the more simple PA-K2 system the unit in 
Hawaii while capable of breaking the message down did not decrypt and 
translate it until after the attack.
[345] In discussing the matter of delays in securing the translations of 
the Magic, General Miles stated: 

"* * * it was not only a question of personnel and facilities here in 
Washington for the decoding and translation of those messages, but also 
very definitely out in the field. Those messages had to be picked out of 
the air by intercepting stations. They were not all picked up by the 
same station. There was no one station that could have picked them up. 

"In fact, I understand now that the best intercepting station for the 
few messages emanating from Japan itself was Manila. 

"Now, some of those intercepting stations had teletype facilities by 
which they could promptly transmit the message intercepted to 
Washington. Some did not. Some of the messages were received in 
Washington by air mail. 

"So we had not only a question of personnel and facilities and a very 
rapidly growing traffic to handle it in Washington but also the actual 
intercepting of the message in the field and the transmission of those 
messages to Washington."  Committee record, pp. 2111, 2112.

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            231

The same difficulty partially explains the delays ranging from 5 to 9 
days in decoding and translating six of the eight messages transmitted 
prior to December 4. 

Of the remaining two messages, one dated November 24 was not translated 
until 20 days after it had been received in Washington. The key in which 
this message was transmitted was not recovered until about December 16. 
The other is the message from Tokyo, dated December 2, requesting 
information as to observation balloons and antimine nets at Pearl 
Harbor. A transmission of this message was intercepted by a Navy station 
on the west coast on December 2 and was received by the Navy on December 
6 by air mail. This version of the intercept text, however, was badly 
garbled and the actual decoding and translating was based on a copy 
obtained from the Honolulu office of a radio corporation after the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 

The two messages transmitted from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6, 
reporting the absence of barrage balloons, torpedo nets, and air 
reconnaissance, were intercepted by an Army station on the west coast at 
7:22 p. m. on December 6 and 12:42 a. m. on December 6, respectively 
(Washington time), but were not processed as rapidly as were the 
diplomatic messages transmitted from Tokyo to Washington on the same 
night. On the basis of experience as to the contents of messages over 
particular circuits and in particular codes, the very highest priority 
was given to messages between Tokyo and Washington transmitted in the 
most secure Japanese code, the so-called Purple, and the "pilot message" 
of December 6 had alerted the services to what was coming on the Tokyo-
Washington circuit. 

The messages from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6 were transmitted in 
the PA-K2 code system, a relatively insecure Japanese code and one past 
experience had shown was not ordinarily used for messages which Tokyo 
considered of the highest importance. The actual content of any message 
could not of course be known until it had been decoded and translated, 
and before the attack there was no reason to suspect that the two 
messages sent from Honolulu to Tokyo on December 6 would prove of 
unusual interest. It is to be noted, however, that the low-grade PA-K2 
system was virtually the only code available to the Honolulu consul 
after he had destroyed his major codes pursuant to instructions from 
Tokyo on December 2. [346] 

Despite the unfortunate fact that these messages were not processed 
prior to December 7, no basis exists for criticizing the system which 
was set up for decrypting and translating the intercepted Japanese 
messages and for determining the priorities in the processing of the 
various classes of messages. The evidence shows that throughout the 
period of tense relations between the United States and Japan in 1941, 
the important diplomatic messages were intercepted, transmitted to 
Washington, decoded and translated, and disseminated with utmost speed. 
Not infrequently they were in the hands of the authorized recipients of 
Magic in our Government as soon as they were in the 

[346] See exhibit No. 1, pp. 215, 216. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            232

hands of the Japanese addressees. Many of the civilian and military 
personnel engaged in handling the Magic worked long hours far in excess 
of those prescribed with no additional compensation nor special 
recognition. *The success achieved in reading the Japanese diplomatic 
codes merits the highest commendation and all witnesses familiar with 
Magic material throughout the war have testified that it contributed 
enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, and 
saved many thousands of lives*. [347] 

CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON WHICH 
WAS NOT SUPPLIED HAWAII

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have complained that they were 
wrongfully deprived of intelligence available to Washington through the 
Magic which would have altered completely their estimate of the 
situation and would have resulted, if it had been supplied them, in a 
proper alert and appropriate dispositions consistent with an adequate 
defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier. In a prepared statement, read 
before the committee, Admiral Kimmel said: [348]

"The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine: Would the 
receipt of this information have made a difference in the events of 
December 7? No man can now state as a fact that he would have taken a 
certain course of action four years ago had he known facts which were 
then unknown to him. All he can give is his present conviction on the 
subject, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible, 
and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors which then 
influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner. 

"Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor" messages on 
November 28th, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected 
the Navy Department's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Midway. I 
would have ordered the third carrier, the Saratoga, back from the West 
Coast. I would have gone to sea with the Fleet and endeavored to keep it 
in an intercepting position at sea. This would have permitted the 
disposal of the striking power of the Fleet to meet an attack in the 
Hawaiian area. The requirement of keeping the Fleet fueled, however, 
would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor from time to time 
of detachments of various units of the main body of the Fleet."

In the last analysis, however, there are only four messages or groups of 
messages which the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the 
commanding general of the Hawaiian Department contend pointed to Pearl 
Harbor as a likely place of attack; i. e., the harbor berthing plan and 
related dispatches, [349] the deadline messages, [350] the dispatches 
which indicated the fraudulent nature of Japanese negotiations after 
November 28, [350a] and the dispatch specifying 1 p. m., December 7, as 
the time for delivery of the Japanese memorandum to the Secretary of 
State. [350b] 

Referring to the berthing plan (and related dispatches) Admiral Kimmel 
said, [350c] "These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to 

[347] See note 113, supra.
[348] See committee record, pp. 6805, 6806.
[349] See section " 'Ships in Harbor' Reports," supra.
[350a] See section "Dispatches Indicating Fraudulent Nature of 
Negotiations after November 28, 1941," supra.
[350b] See section "Significance of the 'One o'clock' and Code 
Destruction Messages," supra.
[350c] Committee record, pp. 6779, 6780. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            233

an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor." Additionally, he has 
indicated that the dispatches concerning the deadlines and fraudulent 
negotiations [350d] pointed to Pearl Harbor. 

During the course of committee examination General Short was asked 
whether, "outside of the message carving up Pearl Harbor into five 
divisions," there was any information among the Magic intelligence which 
pointed to an attack upon Pearl Harbor any more than upon any other 
place. He replied: [350e] 

"That was the most definite thing, and then the fact that the delivery 
of the message was at 1 p. m. Washington time, which would be shortly 
after dawn in Honolulu, which I think was an indication."

At another point, referring to the "harbor berthing plan" and the so-
called "one o'clock" message, General Short said, [350f] "I think those 
two things are the really definite things that pointed to Pearl Harbor" 
and that the other intercepted messages related to the "more tense 
situation as it developed." 

As heretofore pointed out, we are unable to conclude that the berthing 
plan and related dispatches pointed directly to an attack on Pearl 
Harbor, nor are we able to conclude that the plan was a "bomb plot" in 
view of the evidence indicating it was not such. [350g] We are of the 
opinion, however, that the berthing plan and related dispatches should 
have received careful consideration and created a serious question as to 
their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the 
Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should have been appreciated and 
supplied the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the commanding 
general of the Hawaiian Department for their assistance, along with 
other information and intelligence available to them, in making their 
estimate of the situation. 

We believe that the deadline messages and the messages indicating 
fraudulent Japanese diplomacy after November 28 in themselves no more 
indicated Hawaii as a likely point of attack than any other point in the 
Pacific. The equivalent of this intelligence was supplied Admiral Kimmel 
in the dispatch of November 27 beginning, "This dispatch is to be 
considered a war warning" and advising, "negotiations with Japan looking 
toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an 
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." It was 
supplied General Short in the November 27 warning, stating, "Japanese 
future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment." 

The "one o'clock intercept", as previously indicated, was an unusual 
piece of intelligence suggesting the distinct possibility that some 

[350d] See committee record, pp. 6791-6793. 
[350e] Committee record, pp. 8126, 8127. At another point, when asked if 
his thought was that the Magic messages that were not sent Hawaii would 
have been more important than the messages he did receive, General Short 
said: "There were two that could hardly fail. The intercept which was 
the bombing plan of Pearl Harbor and the message stating that the 
ultimatum would be delivered at 1 p. m. which could have been sent to me 
4 hours before the attack, and reached me 7 hours after the attack. 
These two messages would have meant something to me." Committee record, 
p. 8201.
[360f] Id., at pp. 8126-8128.
[350g] See section " 'Ships in Harbor' Reports," supra.

234            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Japanese military action would take place *somewhere* at 1 p. m. but it 
did not reasonably point to Pearl Harbor any more than to any other 
place in the Pacific. This intelligence indicated the need for 
particular alertness at 1 p. m. to meet the dangers contemplated on the 
basis of estimates already made as to where a Japanese attack might 
come.

The burden of the statements of both Admiral Kimmel and General Short to 
the committee is that Washington withheld vital information from them. 
In fact, Admiral Kimmel has charged that the Navy Department's handling 
of Magic constituted an affirmative misrepresentation. On the basis of 
the evidence before the committee, this charge is without foundation in 
fact. 

Both Hawaiian commanders all but ignore the fact that they are properly 
chargeable with possessing far more vital intelligence indicating an 
attack on Hawaii than was in the hands of anyone in the War or Navy 
Departments. They had, among other things, correspondence with 
Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers of air attack, the 
warning dispatches, the code-destruction intelligence, radio 
intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers, the Mori call, the 
report of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese submarine in 
close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection of the Japanese 
raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the morning of December 7. 
General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance. 
Admiral Kimmel assumed that the Army would alert its aircraft warning 
service, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes. From these assumptions 
and the estimate and action taken on the basis of information available 
to them, it is problematical as to what steps would have been taken by 
the Hawaiian commanders had they received all of the intelligence which 
they contend was withheld from them. 

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN WASHINGTON

The evidence reflects that virtually everyone in Washington was 
surprised Japan struck Pearl Harbor at the time she did. Among the 
reasons for this conclusion was the apparent Japanese purpose to move 
toward the south the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula; and the 
feeling that Hawaii was a near-impregnable fortress that Japan would not 
incur the dangers of attacking. The latter consideration necessarily 
contemplated that Hawaii was alert and that the enemy would be met with 
the full weight of Army and Navy power provided for defense. It is 
apparent, however, that an attack on the fleet by Japan at some time was 
regarded as a distinct possibility. The warning messages sent the 
Hawaiian commanders contained orders requiring defensive measures 
against this possibility. Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans in the 
Navy Department, is the only officer in Washington in the higher 
echelons who indicated a strong belief that Hawaii would be attacked he 
testified that he 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              235

regarded such an attack as a "50-50 chance." [351] Asked if he had 
gained this impression around December 1 as a result of the Japanese; 
ship-location reports, [352] he testified: [353] 

"No. That had been the opinion all along, expressed by the Navy 
Department expressed in Hawaii, expressed by the War Department, 
expressed by everybody else, that there was a strong possibility that 
there would be an attack, a raid, that is, against Hawaii. That was 
merely following along the line the Navy officers and Army officers had 
been thinking about for 25 years or more. There was no change."

When asked why, around November 27, if the Navy felt in this way about 
the chances of an air raid on the fleet in Pearl Harbor some further 
message was not sent suggesting this possibility, Admiral Turner stated: 
[354]

"That had been in correspondence right along. The dispatch of November 
27 fully covers it, in my opinion. I think on the 5th, the afternoon of 
the 5th of December, after convassing [sic] the situation with officers 
in my Division, I went to Admiral Ingersoll's office and we talked for 
an hour as to what more the Navy Department could do to warn the forces 
in the field, the fleets, what ought to be done, should we send any more 
dispatches, or what. We came, both, to the conclusion that everything 
had been done covering the entire situation that ought to be done and we 
then proceeded into Admiral Stark's office, discussed the same question 
with him for 15 minutes, and *it was the unanimous decision that the 
orders that we had sent out for Admiral Kimmel to take a defensive 
deployment were were sufficient*.

"*What was he going to take a defensive deployment against Just one 
thing. That the meat of that dispatch. It is all in there."

The foregoing thoughts expressed by Admiral Turner characterized the 
feelings of all the ranking officers of the War and Navy Departments: 
*that the Hawaiian commanders had been adequately alerted to all 
contingencies*. Admiral Stark stated, "We considered we had fully 
alerted them (referring to the 'war warning' of November 27) with the 
directives which were given both by the Army and by ourselves * * * We 
felt we were fully alerted. Our plans were ready, if 

[351] It is to be noted that the record clearly indicates that Admiral 
Turner's estimate of a possible attack on Hawaii was not based on any 
intelligence which he possessed indicating such an attack but rather on 
his personal appraisal of possible Japanese action.

In this connection Captain McCollum said: "I was not surprised at the 
Japanese attack, sir. I was astonished at the success attained by that 
attack, sir. * * * I do not mean by that statement to imply that I had 
any knowledge that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor, and I 
wish to state categorically that there was no bit of intelligence that I 
had at my disposal that definitely to my mind indicated at the Japanese 
would attack Pearl Harbor, but I had * * * for many years felt that in 
the event an outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan 
that the Japanese would make a very finite attempt to strike the fleet 
at or near the commencement time of those hostilities." Committee 
record, pp. 9259, 9260.

The following committee examination reflects the feeling of Captain 
McCollum with respect to a possible Japanese attack on our fleet: 
Question: "And you always felt that if the Japs were going to strike 
with her fleets the place to start was by attacking our fleet?" 
Captain McCollum: "That is correct."
Question: "The place they would start would be by attacking the fleet." 
Captain McCollum: "They not only would do that, but that there was 
historical precedent, if the Japanese wished to start a war with us. 
Their war with China in 1895 was started that way; their war with Russia 
in 1907 was started that way; their war against Germany in Tsingtao in 
1914 was started in that way. * * * Attacking their fleet and timing a 
declaration of war on presentation of the final notes." Committee 
record, pp. 9275, 9276.
[352] Radio Intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers.
[353] Committee record, p. 5200.
[354] Id., at p 5201. 

236            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

war broke, in all theaters." [355] General Marshall said, "In our 
opinion the commanders had been alerted." [356] As expressed by Mr. 
Stimson: [357]

"We assumed that when he (General Short) had been warned that hostile 
action was possible at any moment, it would not be necessary to repeat 
that warning over and over again during the ensuing days. The fact was 
of course that General Short did receive, not only from Washington but 
from other sources, repeated intelligence of the impending crisis."

Captain McCollum, who had suggested (not knowing the "war warning" had 
been sent) an additional warning dispatch, stated in referring to the 
dispatch sent Admiral Kimmel on November 27: [358]

"It does not come in the life of most naval officers to receive or see a 
message containing such words and my personal feeling is that a message 
containing the information "This is a war warning," indicated clearly 
that the Department expected a war to break out there at any moment from 
then on. 

"* * * I think that a commander to whom such a message as that is 
addressed must assume that war is going to break out over his forces and 
take the steps necessary to cover it."

The consummate confidence that field commanders were adequately alert on 
the basis of dispatches sent them is manifested by the reluctance of 
Admiral Stark to dispatch a message based on the "one o'clock 
intercept." As stated by General Marshall: "I asked him if he had read 
the final message referring to one o'clock. He stated that he had, and I 
proposed an immediate message to all theaters concerned. *Admiral Stark 
hesitated, because he said (he) had alerted them all and he was afraid 
of confusing them further*." [359]

As indicated, the record reflects the judgment of responsible officers 
in both the War and Navy Departments that they had fully and I 
adequately alerted our military outposts before December 7. [360] We 
believe that Admiral Kimmel and General Short received sufficient 
information to justify the expectation that they would be fully alert to 
the implications of their military responsibilities in Hawaii. In this 
connection it is to be noted that all other outpost commanders, 
receiving the warning messages of November 27 in substantially the same 
form as did Admiral Kimmel and General Short, took full and ample 
measures to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the fact that 
war was imminent. Hawaii was the *only* outpost that failed to institute 
a proper alert. 

[355] Id., at pp. 13733, 13747.
[356] Id., at pp. 13792, 13793.
[357] see Mr. Stimson's statement, committee record p. 14398. 
[358] Committee record, pp. 9194, 9195, 9281, 9282. McCollum said: "I 
had been given to understand that they (the Fleet) had been thoroughly 
alerted * * * and on their toes." Committee record, p. 9156. 
[359] Army Pearl Harbor Board (top secret) record, pages 7, 8.
[360] General Miles said: "G-2 was charged with the dissemination of 
information. The essential information contained in the Chief of Staff's 
November 27 message, that hostilities might occur at any time on the 
initiative of the Japanese, held good right up to December 7. The 
information emphasized the increasing tension of the crisis. 

"But these things were known in Hawaii. *That Fortress, like a sentinel 
on post had been warned of the danger which was its sole reason for 
being. Anything else was considered to be redundant*." Committee record, 
p. 2216. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            237

NATURE OF RESPONSIBILITIES

In seeking to make an assessment of responsibilities for the Pearl 
Harbor disaster, apart from that which is forever Japan's, it is 
imperative that the duties and obligations existing in Hawaii be placed 
in the proper perspective with respect to those attaching to Washington. 
She responsibility of the commander in the field with his well-defined 
scope of activity is manifestly to be distinguished from that of the 
officer in Washington who is charged with directing the over-all 
operations of the military on a global basis. 

DUTIES IN HAWAII

It has been a cardinal principle of military theory to select capable 
commanders for our outposts, give them broad directives, [361] and leave 
to their discretion and good judgment the implementation of the 
Departmental mandate consonant with their more intimate and detailed 
familiarity with the peculiar problems existing in their particular 
commands. [362] Admiral Kimmel and General Short were selected because 
of their impeccable records for two of the most important field commands 
of the Navy and Army Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department these two officers were 
primarily and fundamentally responsible they were the men to whom 
Washington and the Nation were properly entitled to look for the defense 
of the Hawaiian Coastal frontier. 

With respect to Hawaii and the fleet, theirs were the obligations to 
plan for war, to train for war, and to be alerted for war when it came. 
The first two of these obligations they discharged in an exemplary 
[manner but in the case of the third, alertness for war, they failed. 
[363] All of the intelligence, thought, and energies of the field 
commander are to be devoted to his command. He is to apply all 
information and intelligence received to his particular situation. He is 
not privileged to think or contemplate that he will not be attacked. On 
the contrary, he is to assume and to expect that his particular post 
will be attacked. He cannot wholly assume that others will inform him 

[361] It is to be recalled, as heretofore pointed out, that Admiral 
Kimmel said: "* * * the Department itself is not too well informed as to 
the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current 
outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by *broad policy and 
objective rather than by categorical instructions*." Letter from Admiral 
Kimmel to Admiral Stark, dated May 26, 1941. See committee exhibit No. 
106. 
[361] Referring to the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal 
Frontier, Admiral Turner said: "After reading these splendid plans that 
had been sent in by the Commander in Chief, and by the Fourteenth Naval 
District, why, my feeling was that these people knew their business. 
They knew what to do about it, probably a lot more than I did, or the 
rest of us here, because they were the ones that were on the firing 
line." Committee record, p. 5211. See also testimony of General Gerow, 
committee record, p. 2719.
[362] In striking contrast with the failure to effect adequate readiness 
in Hawaii is the manner in which the Russians prepared to meet in June 
and July of 1941 the possibility of a Japanese thrust against the Soviet 
Union. An intercepted dispatch from Vladivostok to Tokyo on July 3, 
1941, stated: "Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval 
authorities here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval 
preparations by enforcing various exercises to meet *any eventuality*. 
However, naval exercises are limited to only one section of the force 
for there are many ships which are undergoing repairs. *Evidently the 
preparations are intended* for defense against Japan." Committee exhibit 
No. 2, p. 125. See also committee record pp. 7509-7512.

238            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

when and where the foe will strike. He is "like a sentinel on duty in 
the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and precise. It 
is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the 
possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of 
his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make 
the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons 
with which he has been supplied." [364]

The commanders in Hawaii were clearly and unmistakably warned of war 
with Japan. They were given orders and possessed information that the 
entire Pacific area was fraught with danger. They failed to carry out 
these orders and to discharge their basic and ultimate responsibilities. 
They failed to defend the fortress they commanded-their citadel was 
taken by surprise. Aside from any responsibilities that may appear to 
rest in Washington, the ultimate and direct responsibility for failure 
to engage the Japanese on the morning of December 7 with every weapon at 
their disposal rests essentially and properly with the Army and Navy 
commands in Hawaii whose duty it was to meet the enemy against which 
they had been warned. 

DUTIES IN Washington

The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations of the 
Navy had the over-all responsibility for supervision of our military and 
naval operations and establishments everywhere, including Hawaii. Theirs 
was the obligation of determining that all of the equipment available 
was supplied the field commander which would assist him in discharging 
his responsibilities. [365] In supplying equipment it was their duty to 
consider the demands for material from many quarters in the light of the 
commitments and interests of the United States to estimate where the 
most dangerous and likely point of enemy attack might be and then to 
effect dispositions which in their best judgment most nearly satisfied 
the exigencies of the hour. They discharged this duty to the best of 
their ability. 

They had the duty of alerting our outposts in view of the critical 
situation in our relations with Japan in the days before December 7 and 
of informing them of probable enemy action. [366] In the dispatch of 
November 27, sent Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart, the commander in 
chief of the Asiatic Fleet, there was outlined what at the time was 
regarded and appeared to be the major strategic effort of the enemy. The 
Japanese major effort did follow the course outlined in the dispatch. 
Pearl Harbor was not known to be a point of Japanese attack but it was 
known that such an attack was a possibility and both responsible 
commanders in Hawaii were accordingly ordered to take action 
contemplated to meet this possibility. 

[364] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14406. 
[365] See committee record, pp. 2764-2771; 5594, 5595. Also see 
committee exhibit No. 42. 
[366] Admiral Turner said "My function was to give the major strategic 
over all picture for the use of my superiors and disseminate that." 
Committee record, p. 5074. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK           239

The officers in the intelligence and war plans divisions of the War and 
Navy Departments handling matters in the Pacific had a *particular* 
responsibility with respect to the magic intelligence just as the 
Hawaiian commanders had a particular responsibility for the defense f 
the fleet and the Hawaiian coastal frontier. It was the duty of these 
officers to evaluate and disseminate the magic in the form of estimates, 
as originally obtained, or otherwise. This responsibility they failed to 
discharge with that his degree of skill and imagination which this 
intelligence warranted. [367] 

In the case of the War Plans Division of the War Department, once it had 
warned General Short of hostilities, issued order in contemplation of 
this contingency, and directed him to *report measures taken*, it 
thereby assumed responsibility for reviewing the report of action and 
advising the commanding general in the event the measures taken by him 
were not in accordance with those desired.

While the report submitted by General Short was ambiguous and 
disarmingly terse, it was the duty of the War Plans Division through the 
exercise of proper supervision to require a reply reflecting with 
clarity that there had been satisfactory compliance with the 
departmental orders. [368] 

Hawaii was but one of many points of concert to General Marshall, the 
Chief of Staff, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated 
by the Chief of Staff, "the only place we had any assurance about was 
Hawaii, and for that reason we had less concern about Hawaii because we 
had worked on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of 
correspondence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one 
point." [369] Theirs was the obligation of mapping the strategy of 
global war, of advising and counseling the President and others on 
military and naval matters, of following and encouraging the progress of 
preparation for defense in the event of war, of outlining and justifying 
to the Congress the manifold needs of the Army and Navy, of over-all 
responsibility for many military and naval outposts and interests, of 
disposing and allocating the scanty 

[367] As expressed by Mr. Stimson: "A keener and more imaginative 
appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy 
Departments of the significance of some of the information might have 
led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not 
think that certain officers in the War Department functioned in these 
respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, 
however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of 
hindsight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation 
and information with which the officers were required to deal at the 
time of the event." See statement of the Secretary of War with respect 
to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157. 
[368] In this connection, however, the marked distinction between the 
character of the responsibility resting on the War Plans Division and 
that reposing in General Short was expressed by Mr. Stimson: 

"It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941 the 
responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many 
theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely be 
threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities 
then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of 
the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to 
an attack in that direction, and they were exercising particular care 
with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an 
entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as 
General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and 
vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he 
has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed be 
distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which 
he is not responsible." See statement of the Secretary of War with 
respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board Committee exhibit 
No. 157.
[369] Committee record, p. 13793.