240 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK materials of war consistent with the overwhelming demands and requirements from many quarters, and of performing the innumerable functions of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations in a democracy that was all too slowly preparing itself against the inevitable day of war. [370] Such diversity and magnitude of responsibilities is to be distinguished from that of the outpost commander with his singleness of purpose and well-defined sphere of activity. It was the duty of General Marshall and Admiral Stark to alert our military and naval garrisons which they attempted to do and felt assured they had done. To superimpose the administrative burden of supervising details would be to enmesh them in such a confusing and bewildering network of detail as to defeat the very purpose for which the positions of Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations were created. UNITY 0F COMMAND The evidence adduced in the course of the various Pearl Harbor investigations reveals the complete inadequacy of command by *mutual cooperation* where decisive action is of the essence. Both the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii failed to coordinate and integrate their combined facilities for defense in the crucial days between November 27 and December 7, 1941. While they had been able over a period of time to conceive admirable plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consistent with the system of mutual cooperation, when the time came for the implementation of these plans they remained hollow and empty contracts that were never executed. Had the responsible commanders conferred together in such manner as to reach joint decisions consonant with their plans, the system of mutual cooperation would have proved adequate. It is clear, however, that this system presents unnecessary and inevitable opportunities for personal failures and shortcomings. The ubiquitous tendency to "let George do it," to assume the other fellow will take care of the situation, is an inseparable part of command by mutual cooperation. The tragic assumptions made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short concerning what the other was doing are a manifestation of this fact. Each was the victim of the natural human reluctance to pry into what is regarded as another's business. [370a] The commander in chief assumed that the Army would be on a full alert the antiaircraft, the aircraft warning service, and the interceptor command yet he [370] Mr. Stimson said: "Our General Staff officers were working under a terrific pressure in the face of a global war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of the offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems incredible. * * * The officers of the Army were then trying to do their duty in the deadening, if not actually hostile, atmosphere of a nation that was not awake to its danger. We are now engaged in passing judgment upon their actions in the wholly different atmosphere of a nation which has suffered some of the horrors of the greatest and most malignant war in history. In my opinion, it would be highly unjust to them if this complete difference of atmosphere was not given the weight which it deserves." Statement of Mr. Stimson to the Committee. Committee record, pp. 14410, 14411. [370a] See testimony of General Short, Committee record, pp. 8122, 8123. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 241 did not inquire to determine whether this was the case, apparently because it might not "sit very well" with General Short. [371] The, commanding general assumed that the Navy would be conducting reconnaissance which would afford him adequate warning in order properly to alert his command. Yet he did not inquire as to whether, the Navy was conducting the reconnaissance upon which he was relying or his protection, presumably because he felt such an inquiry might be "resented" by Admiral Kimmel. [372] The conduct of operations in this state of joint oblivion was possible n a command by *mutual cooperation*; but none of these false and unwarranted assumptions could have obtained under *unity of command*. Under the latter system a single commander would have been charged with complete responsibility; all of the warnings, intelligence, and orders would have been his to interpret, estimate, and implement; it would have been his duty only to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realities of the situation. Conceivably, a single commander might have arrived at the same estimate as did Admiral Kimmel and General Short; namely, that Hawaii would not be attacked. But such a decision would have been clear-cut and devoid f all the anomalous and incompatible assumptions that are in strange contradiction of the estimate made by the Hawaiian commanders that their outpost was safe. He would not have arrived at a conclusion concerning the defensive measures required on a fallacious assumption with respect to the decisions and defensive measures of someone else, nor could he have interpreted the same order at once in two different and inconsistent ways. Furthermore, in a command by mutual cooperation there is the unfailing likelihood of conflicting and overlapping prerogatives. In the case of the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, it was the joint mission of the Army and Navy to hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, each being specifically charged with supporting the other. It was necessary that the local commanders jointly agree upon the existence of the appropriate emergency as a condition precedent to the detailed allocation of specific missions as between the two services. The Navy was primarily responsible for distant reconnaissance and long-range attacks against hostile vessels, while the Army was charged with short- range defense. In the case of each of these defensive measures, one service was charged with supporting the forces of the other service having primary responsibility; and particularly, in the case of air operations, the service having the primary responsibility was to control the available planes of the other service. This was a sliding and shifting arrangement with respect to primary responsibility depending on the nature of the attack. The mutual agreement required by such operations would necessarily be forth- [371] See Roberts Commission record, p. 631. [372] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 363. 242 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK coming only when a particular type of attack was sufficiently imminent as to suggest the advisability of the Army or the Navy, as the case might be, assuming primary responsibility to meet the attack. [373] *The completely ineffective liaison between the Army and the Navy in Hawaii at a time when the fullest exchange of intelligence was absolutely imperative dictates that military and naval intelligence, particularly, must be consolidated*. [374] The extraordinarily anomalous situation of the one hand not knowing what the other hand knew or was doing should never be permitted to exist again. Invocation of unity of command was within the scope of the authority of the responsible commanders in Hawaii, upon agreement as to the service that should exercise command, [374a] or of the Secretaries of War and Navy, acting jointly. [375] Inasmuch as there was a complete failure of the system of mutual cooperation on December 7, 1941, and unity of command had not been effected by or imposed upon the Hawaiian commanders, it is proper to inquire as to the reason for unity of command not having been invoked at least as soon as it was known that hostilities were possible at any moment. The evidence reflects that during the period from November 27 to December 7 the leading subject of conferences between Admiral Kimmel and General Short was the question and near-dispute as to whether the Army or the Navy should exercise command over the islands of Wake and Midway after the Marines on these islands were relieved by Army troops. [376] No agreement was concluded in this regard before the outbreak of war. If neither would agree to the [373] See section, supra, concerning plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Part III this report. [374] *General Marshall said he thought unity of consolidation (sic) or centralization of military and naval intelligence was very necessary*. Committee record, p. 2966. [374a] Admiral Kimmel testified that he never had any discussions with the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of putting unity of command into effect. He said he would not have effected unity of command, or accepted responsibility for the Army actions, without reference to the Navy Department. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 296, 297. [375] See committee exhibit No. 44. General Gerow said: "A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordination under the principle of mutual cooperation is that although the major operation is being conducted under that principle, *joint operations subordinate thereto may still be conducted under the principle of unity of command if so agreed to by the Army and Navy commanders concerned*. This method is particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat characteristics, such as the air forces of the two services." See memorandum prepared by General Gerow for Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 48. [376] Admiral W. W. Smith testified: "He (Admiral Kimmel) had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the marines off the outlying islands, and replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain their for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to be taken off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion on this with General Short and his staff, the commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans officer, the Operations Officers and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, 'We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore.' That was a shock all of us and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, 'Then, they will be no damn good to me.' The exchange was never made because the war broke before-hand. *The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, 'If I have the man these islands, I shall have to command them.' Admiral Kimmel replied, 'No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports,' or words to that effect, and General Short said, 'Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them.' That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out*," Hart inquiry record, pp. 40, 41. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 243 other's commanding Wake or Midway, it is not in the least surprising unexpected that neither one of the commanders would have agreed to subordinate himself and his entire command to the other. In the case of Washington, the matter of establishing unity of command at our outposts was under consideration and discussion by le War and Navy Departments throughout the year 1941 and especially during the few weeks prior to December 7. [377] No decision, however, was reached concerning unity of command at Hawaii or at any of our outposts until the responsible officials were confronted by war with powerful adversaries on two fronts and the barrier of departmental prerogative had been severely jolted by the Pearl [arbor disaster. The Joint Board of the Army and Navy during 1941 ad considered specific proposals for unity of command as made by each of the services but prior to December 7 no effective agreement was reached as to which service should exercise command at a particular outpost. It generally appears, however, that it was agreed le system of mutual cooperation in the Caribbean, at Panama and t Hawaii should be replaced by unity of command. The Navy proposed that command in the Caribbean be vested in the Navy; at 'Panama in the Army, except when major naval forces were based ere; and at Hawaii in the Navy, except when no major naval forces ere based there. [378] The Army, on the other hand, proposed unity of command in all coastal frontiers, command to rest in the Army except hen a major portion of the fleet was operating against comparable hostile forces within the range of possible support by Army aviation and when the Army and Navy commanders should agree to transfer command from one to the other. [379] In view of these conflicting proposals following virtually a year of discussion, General Gerow, chief of War Plans in the War Department, recommended to the Chief of Staff on November 17, 1941, that the system of command in the outposts remain by mutual cooperation, thereby suggesting abandonment of the idea of unity of command. [380] In testifying before the committee, General Gerow explained his action by stating he thought the only way to have effective unity of command was for the heads of the Army and Navy to say that "So and so is in command, and he is in command from now on." He observed that [381] "You cannot vary that command [377] See committee record pp. 2749-2761, also 2963 et seq. [378] Committee record pp. 2750-2757 see also committee exhibit No 48. [379] Id. [380] Id. General Gerow recommended: "That coordination of joint operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is approved such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the Joint Planning Committee." See memorandum prepared by General Gerow for Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941. Committee exhibit No. 48. Referring to this memorandum, General Marshall stated in a memorandum for General Gerow dated December 5, 1941: "I would like this matter of Coordination of Command discussed with the Naval section of the Joint Planning committee. However I think it is important that a general policy, or what might be called an explanation, should first be decided on, expressed in carefully considered sentences as to the *application* of unity of command. "A discussion of this runs through a series of paragraphs on your memorandum and you have covered it orally to me, but no where is it presented in a concise form." Committee exhibit No. 48A. [381] Committee record, p. 2757. 244 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK: from day to day depending on what the operation is. One man must be responsible for preparing that place for operation, and he must be responsible for commanding it after he has prepared it." He pointed out that the joint Army-Navy planning committee had contemplated an arrangement whereby command would shift back and forth from the Army to the Navy and from the Navy to the Army depending on the nature of attack or defense. [382] General Gerow said that he thought the system of mutual cooperation would be better than such a continual switching of command. [383] He commented: "I did not think either the Army or Navy Planning Group would agree to say wholeheartedly 'You take everything and it will be agreeable to us'. Neither would agree to that." [384] He agreed that it would be necessary that "somebody at the top had to knock their heads together and tell them what to do." [385] General Marshall epitomized the essentially human proclivities characterizing the situation: [386] "I have said this before: I will repeat it again. *It is a very simple thing to have unity of command if you give it to the other man*. But that also applied in all of our dealings with the British and among ourselves and always will continue to be so." The ultimate result was that no agreement was reached between the War and Navy Departments before Pearl Harbor for the establishment of unity of command in our military and naval outposts. The factors and considerations attending eventual invocation of unity of command were expressed by the Chief of Staff in a letter dated December 20, 1941, to General Short's successor, Gen. Delos C. Emmons: [387] "Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days ago assigning units of command to the Navy in Hawaii. At the same time unity of command was assigned to the Army in Panama. "For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions have been unavailing. *All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives and similar matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say at the same time that some off the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections to Naval control*. Both Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with Allies. "I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding. [382] Id. [383] Id., at p. 2758. [384] Id. [385] Id. [386] Committee record pp. 2962, 2963. [387] See committee exhibit No. 48; also committee record pp. 2759- 2761. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 245 "Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. *These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency*. "This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with him is morning, You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support you." The foregoing considerations evince more than mere reluctance and procrastination toward effecting action by command rather than by joint agreement; they reveal that inherent in our system of separate services there exists the basic deficiency of conflicting interests which precipitate serious and unnecessary obstacles to the solution of pressing military problems. It is to be necessarily noted, however, that while considering the advisability of unity of command, Washington was assuming that the system of mutual cooperation was working within its limitations and that local commanders were fully discharging their responsibilities. It was only in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster at the inherent and intolerable weaknesses of command by mutual cooperation were exposed. [388] As earlier indicated, the failure to integrate and coordinate Army-Navy efforts in Hawaii appears to have been attributable to a feeling n the part of each commander that he would intrude upon the prerogatives of the other and thereby invite similar intrusion if he inquired as to what the sister service was doing. In Washington, the failure to impose unity of command was occasioned by the inability of the Army and the Navy as entities to agree upon a basis for unified command. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS THE "WYMAN MATTER" The Committee has carefully reviewed the investigation conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board with respect to the activities of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., while district engineer in the Hawaiian Department, insofar as his activities may have relationship to the Pearl Harbor disaster. [389] The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded from the evidence that Wyman performed the duties of district engineer in a wholly unsatisfactory manner. Under his administration, engineering and construction work in the Hawaiian Department was defective and was characterized by delays. The activities of Wyman and his associates were not fully inquired into by the Committee inasmuch as they did not appear to have contributed in any material or proximate manner to the disaster for [388] In the course of counsel's examination, General Marshall was asked: "Without asking you any questions about the unity of command, complete unity of command generally in the Army and Navy Departments, limiting it to the question of posts like Hawaii, or Panama, for instance, do you want to express any views as to the wisdom of maintaining such unity of command in peacetime as compared with war?" The Chief of Staff replied "*I think it is an imperative necessity*." [389] See in this regard the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Committee Exhibit No. 157. 246 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK reasons heretofore set forth. [390] It is recommended, however, that the Wyman matter be investigated by an appropriate committee of the Senate or the House of Representatives. THE PHILIPPINE ATTACK The Committee has considered in the course of its proceedings the Japanese attack on the Philippines on December 7, 1941, and has concluded that this attack bears no relevant relationship to the disaster at Pearl Harbor. In consequence, the Philippine attack was not made the subject of detailed inquiry although the reader will find an account of this attack in the committee's record. [391] PRIOR INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK We have not presumed to pass judgment on the nature of or charges of unfairness [392] with respect to seven prior inquiries and investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack, feeling that by conducting a full and impartial hearing our report to the Congress along with the Committee's record would present to the American people the material and relevant facts of the disaster. The Committee does desire to observe, however, that charges to the effect that the original report of the Roberts Commission was abridged, modified, or amended, or portions deleted were found to be without foundation in fact. [393] Prior investigations were conducted during the course of the most devasta- [390] As has been seen the disaster was the failure, with attendant increase in personnel and material losses of the Army and Navy in Hawaii to institute measures designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese. [391] See in this regard, Committee record, pp., 14133-14173, [392] In referring to the inquiry conducted by the Roberts Commission, Admiral Kimmel has stated (Committee record, pp. 6809-6811): (1) That he was told he was not on trial (Roberts Commission record, p. 581); (2) That he was not permitted to be present at the testimony of other witnesses or to examine or cross-examine them; (3) That the Roberts Commission was informed of or impressed with the fact that Hawaii was given all of the information available to the Navy Department (referring in this regard to committee record, pp. 4893- 5022); (4) That it appeared the so-called Magic was freely discussed before the Commission and in consequence the latter likely received the impression that the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were either forwarded by Washington by Admiral Kimmel or available to him in Hawaii. Testifying before the committee, Justice Roberts stated: (1) That the Commission's investigation was not intended to be a trial. "This seemed to me a preliminary investigation, like a grand jury investigation, and I did not think, for our report, that was to be taken as precluding every one of the men mentioned in it from a defense before his peers. In other words, you would not conduct a proceeding without cross-examination and without publicity and call it a trial. *It was not a trial. * * * It was an investigation and it was the formation of a judgment to be handed the President*." (Committee record, pp. 8801, 8802). (2) That, as indicated, one would not conduct a proceeding without cross-examination and without publicity and call it a trial. He observed the proceedings were closed and every witness asked to observe secrecy for the reason "that there were questions of broken codes. We were informed that the Army and Navy were getting invaluable information every day, that the Japanese did not realize that their codes were broken, and indeed the Navy was rather chary about even telling us about the thing for fear there might be some leak from our Commission. Of course, if we held open hearings there was a chance we might do a great damage to our forces, our military program" (id., at pp. 8788, 8789). (3) That the Roberts Commission knew outposts were not getting the Magic. "We knew the commanders weren't given what was taken off the breaking of the code" (id., at p. 8813). (4) That "*We were never shown one of the Magic messages*" nor the substance thereof (id., at pp. 8828, 8829) although the Commission did know codes were being broken and generally what was obtained from the traffic (id., at p. 8829; also pp. 8836, 8846). [393] See testimony of Mr. Justice Roberts before the Committee. Committee record, pp. 8779-8908. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 247 ing war in history and within the necessary limitations of secrecy imposed by war and the national security. Public hearings concerning he disaster were properly deferred until the cessation of hostilities; to have done otherwise would have been to imperil the entire war effort. Parties in interest during previous inquiries, who for necessary security reasons did not have the full and ready access to information throughout the war that may have been desired, did have such information available for consideration before the Committee. Admiral Kimmel and General Short, as well as others, have attested to the full, fair, and impartial hearing which they were afforded by the Committee. It is believed that with the additional evidence developed since VJ-Day and the greater accessibility of witnesses, together with the greater scope of inquiry conducted, we are in a much better position to form proper estimates and conclusions concerning responsibilities elating to the disaster than has heretofore been possible because of the proper and necessary restrictions within which other inquiries: and investigations were conducted during wartime. Shortly after the disaster both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were retired from active duty. Consideration was thereafter given by the War and Navy Departments to the question of whether the errors made in Hawaii justified proceedings by court martial. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were requested in the interest of the nation's war effort to waive their rights to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial by general court martial for the duration of the war and 6 months thereafter. [394] Both these officers properly and commendably did so waive their rights. It was the duty of the offices of the Judge Advocate General of the Army and the Navy to consider the facts of the disaster as relating to the responsibilities of he Hawaiian commanders, even though after inquiry and deliberation it was determined that the errors were errors of judgment and of derelictions of duty. On the morning of December 7, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short were catapulted by the Empire of Japan into the principal roles in one of the most publicized tragedies of all time. That improper and incorrect deductions were drawn by some members of the public, with consequent suffering and mental anguish to both officers, cannot e questioned, just as erroneous conclusions were made by others with respect to the extent and nature of responsibility in Washington. But this is the result of the magnitude of public interest and speculation inspired by the disaster and not the result of mistreatment of anyone. The situation prevailing at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7 in the wake of the Japanese attack cast everyone, whether immediately or remotely concerned, beneath the white light of world scrutiny. [394] See Committee exhibits Nos. 170,171. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 248 [Blank]