PART V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor was an unprovoked act of 
aggression by the Empire of Japan. The treacherous attack was planned 
and launched while Japanese ambassadors, instructed with characteristic 
duplicity, were carrying of the pretense negotiations with the 
Government of the United States with a view to an amicable settlement of 
differences in the Pacific. 

2. The ultimate responsibility for the attack and its results rests on 
Japan, an attack that was well planned and skillfully executed. 
contributing to the effectiveness of the attack was a powerful striking 
force, much more powerful than it had been thought the Japanese were 
able to employ in a single tactical venture at such distance and under 
such circumstances. 

3. The diplomatic policies and actions of the United States provided no 
justifiable provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on this Nation. 
The Secretary of State fully informed both the War and Navy Departments 
of diplomatic developments and, in a timely and forceful manner, clearly 
pointed out to these Departments that relations between the United 
States and Japan had passed beyond the age of diplomacy and were in the 
hands of the military. 

4. The committee has found no evidence to support the charges, made 
before and during the hearings, that the President, the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of Navy tricked, provoked, 
incited, cajoled, or coerced Japan into attacking this Nation in order 
that a declaration of war might be more easily obtained from the 
Congress. On the contrary, all evidence conclusively points to the fact 
that they discharged their responsibilities with distinction, ability, 
and foresight and in keeping with the highest traditions of our 
fundamental foreign policy.

5. The President, the Secretary of State, and high Government officials 
made every possible effort, without sacrificing our national honor and 
endangering our security, to avert war with Japan. 

6. The disaster of Pearl Harbor was the failure, with attendant increase 
in personnel and material losses, of the Army and the Navy institute 
measures designed to detect an approaching hostile force, to effect a 
state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at 
hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the 
Japanese. 

7. Virtually everyone was surprised that Japan struck the Fleet at Pearl 
Harbor at the time that she did. Yet officers, both in Washington and 
Hawaii, were fully conscious of the danger from air attack; they 
realized this form of attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan was at least a 
possibility; and they were adequately informed of the imminence of war. 

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8. Specifically, the Hawaiian commands failed  

(a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light of the warnings 
received from Washington, other information possessed by them, and the 
principle of command by mutual cooperation. 
(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and to 
alert properly the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaii particularly 
in the light of the warnings and intelligence available to them during 
the period November 27 to December 7, 1941. 
(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them with 
the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint 
security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence 
(d) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the limits of 
their equipment. 
(e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and Navy 
establishments designed to meet all possible attacks. 
(f) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their command, 
which were adequate at least to have greatly minimized the effects of 
the attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.
(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information 
available to them. 

9. The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of judgment and 
not derelictions of duty. 

10. The War Plans Division of the War Department failed to discharge its 
direct responsibility to advise the commanding general he had not 
properly alerted the Hawaiian Department when the latter, pursuant to 
instructions, had reported action taken in a message that was not 
satisfactorily responsive to the original directive. 

11. The Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy 
Departments failed: 

(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted 
messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, November 15, and 
November 20 (the harbor berthing plan and related dispatches) and to 
raise a question as to their significance. Since they indicated a 
particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base this intelligence should 
have been appreciated and supplied the Hawaiian commanders for their 
assistance, along with other information available to them, in making 
their estimate of the situation. 
(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the "one o'clock" 
intercept and to recognize in the message the fact that some Japanese 
military action would very possibly occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December 
7. If properly appreciated, this intelligence should have suggested a 
dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, 
as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it. 

12. Notwithstanding the fact that there were officers on twenty-four 
hour watch, the Committee believes that under all of the evidence the 
War and Navy Departments were not sufficiently alerted on December 6 and 
7, 1941, in view of the imminence of war. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the evidence in the Committee's record, the following 
recommendations are respectfully submitted: 

That immediate action be taken to insure that unity of command is 
imposed at all military and naval outposts. 

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That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence 
agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which 
experience has made so abundantly apparent; that upon effecting a 
unified intelligence, officers be selected for intelligence work who 
possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work; and that 
they be maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order 
that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of 
their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating 
material received. The assignment of an officer having an aptitude for 
such work should not impede his progress nor affect his promotions. 
Efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace 
as in war, and this branch of our armed services must always be accorded 
the important role which it deserves. 

That effective steps be taken to insure that statutory or other 
restrictions do not operate to the benefit of an enemy or other forces 
inimical to the Nation's security and to the handicap of our own 
intelligence agencies. With this in mind, the Congress should give 
serious study to, among other things, the Communications Act of 1934; to 
suspension in proper instances of the statute of limitations during war 
(it was impossible during the war to prosecute violations relating to 
the "Magic" without giving the secret to the enemy); to legislation 
designed to prevent unauthorized sketching, photographing, and mapping 
of military and naval reservations in peacetime; and to legislation 
fully protecting the security of classified matter.

That the activities of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., while district engineer 
in the Hawaiian Department, as developed by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
be investigated by an appropriate committee of the Senate or the House 
of Representatives.

That the military and naval branches of our Government give serious 
consideration to the 25 supervisory, administrative, and organizational 
principles hereafter set forth. 

SUPERVISORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEFICIENCIES IN OUR 
MILITARY AND NAVAL ESTABLISHMENTS REVEALED BY THE PEARL HARBOR 
INVESTIGATION 

The Committee has been intrigued throughout the Pearl Harbor proceedings 
by one enigmatical and paramount question: *Why, with one of the finest 
intelligence available in our history, with the almost certain knowledge 
that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the precise type of 
attack that was executed by Japan on the morning of December 7 Why was 
it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur*? The answer to this question 
and the causative considerations regarded as having any reasonably 
proximate bearing on the disaster have been set forth in the body of 
this report. Fundamentally, these considerations reflect supervisory, 
administrative, and organizational deficiencies which existed in our 
Military and Naval establishments in the days before Pearl Harbor. In 
the course of the Committee's investigation still other deficiencies, 
not regarded as having a direct bearing on the disaster have presented 
themselves. Otherwise stated, all of these 

254            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

deficiencies reduce themselves to principles which are set forth, not 
for their novelty or profundity but for the reason that, by their very 
self-evident simplicity, it is difficult to believe they were ignored.

It is recognized that many of the deficiencies revealed by our 
investigation may very probably have already been corrected as a result 
of the experiences of the war. We desire, however, to submit these 
principles, which are grounded in the evidence adduced by the Committee, 
for the consideration of our Army and Navy establishments in the earnest 
hope that something constructive may be accomplished that will aid our 
national defense and preclude a repetition of the disaster of December 
7, 1941. We do this after careful and long consideration of the evidence 
developed through one of the most important investigations in the 
history of the Congress. 

1. Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of 
authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility

Reviewing the testimony of the Director of War Plans and the Director of 
Naval Intelligence, the conclusion is inescapable that the proper 
demarcation of responsibility between these two divisions of the Navy 
Department did not exist. War Plans appears to have insisted that since 
it had the duty of issuing operational orders it must arrogate the 
prerogative of evaluating intelligence; Naval Intelligence, on the other 
hand, seems to have regarded the matter of evaluation as properly its 
function. It is clear that this intradepartmental misunderstanding and 
near conflict was not resolved before December 7 and beyond question it 
prejudiced the effectiveness of Naval Intelligence. 

In Hawaii, there as such a marked failure to allocate responsibility in 
the case of the Fourteenth Naval District that Admiral Bloch testified 
he did not know whom the commander in chief would hold responsible in 
the event of shortcomings with respect to the condition and readiness of 
aircraft. [1] The position of Admiral Bellinger was a wholly anomalous 
one. He appears to have been responsible to everyone and to no one. The 
pyramiding of superstructures of organization cannot be conducive to 
efficiency and endangers the very function of our military and naval 
services. 

2. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the 
alerting of subordinates

The testimony of many crucial witnesses in the Pearl Harbor 
investigation contains an identical note: "I thought he was alerted"; "I 
took for granted he would understand"; "I thought he would be doing 
that." It is the same story each responsible official seeking to justify 
his position by reliance upon the fallacious premise that he was 
entitled to rely upon the assumption that a certain task was being 
performed or to take for granted that subordinates would be properly 
vigilant. This tragic theme was particularly marked in Hawaii. 

The foregoing was well illustrated in Admiral Kimmel's failure to 
appreciate the significance of dispatches between December 3 and 6, 
advising him that Japanese embassies and consulates, including the 

[1] See Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 1522. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            255

Embassy in Washington, were destroying their codes. Navy Department 
officials have almost unanimously testified that instructions to burn 
codes mean "war in any man's language" and that in supplying Admiral 
Kimmel this information they were entitled to believe he could attach 
the proper significance to this intelligence. Yet the commander in chief 
of the Pacific Fleet testified that he did not interpret these 
dispatches to mean that Japan contemplated immediate war on the United 
States. That the Navy Department was entitled to rely upon the feeling 
that Admiral Kimmel, as a responsible intelligent commander, should have 
known what the burning of codes meant appears reasonable; but this is 
beside the point in determining standards for the future. The simple 
fact is that the dispatches were not properly interpreted. Had the Navy 
Department not taken for granted that Kimmel would be alerted by them 
but instead have given him the benefit of its interpretation, there 
could now be no argument as to what the state of alertness should have 
been based on such dispatches. With Pearl Harbor as a sad experience, 
crucial intelligence should in the future be supplied commanders 
accompanied by the best estimate of its significance. 

3. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should 
always be resolved in favor of supplying the information

Admiral Stark hesitated about sending the "one o clock" intelligence to 
the Pacific outposts for the reason that he regarded them as adequately 
alerted and he did not want to confuse them. As has been seen, he was 
properly entitled to believe that naval establishments were adequately 
alert, but the fact is that one Hawaii was not in a state of readiness. 
This one exception is proof of the principle that any question as to 
whether information should be supplied the field should always be 
resolved in favor of transmitting it. 

4. The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders entails the 
duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly 
exercised 

Perhaps the most signal shortcoming of administration, both at 
Washington and in Hawaii, was the failure to follow up orders and 
instructions to insure that they were carried out. The record of all 
Pearl Harbor proceedings is replete with evidence of this fundamental 
deficiency in administration. A few illustrations should clearly 
demonstrate this fact. 

In the dispatch of November 27, 1941, which was to be considered "war 
warning," Admiral Kimmel was instructed to "execute an appropriate 
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in 
WPL-46." Very little was done pursuant to this order with a view to a 
*defensive* deployment; the Navy Department did nothing to determine 
what had been done in execution of the order. Yet virtually every 
responsible Navy Department official has testified as to what he 
"assumed" Kimmel would do upon receipt of this dispatch. While it 
appears to have been the policy to leave the implementation of orders to 
the local commander, as a matter of future practice it would seem a 
safer policy to recognize as implicit in the delegation of authority or 
the issuance of orders the responsibility of inspecting and supervising 
to determine that the delegated authority is properly administered and 
the orders carried out. 

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The story of Admiral Kimmel's administration of the Pacific Fleet and 
supervision of the Fourteenth Naval District as well as General Short's 
administration of the Hawaiian Department in the critical days before 
December 7 is the epitome of worthy plans and purposes which were never 
implemented. The job of an administrator is only half completed upon the 
issuance of an order; it is discharged when he determines the order has 
been executed. 

5. The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest 
supervision

In the November 27 warning sent General Short he was ordered "to 
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary" 
and to "report measures taken." The commanding general reported: "Re 
your 472. Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy." 
This message from General Short was not clearly responsive to the order. 
Yet during the 9 days before Pearl Harbor not one responsible officer in 
the War Plans Division of the War Department pointed out to the 
commanding general his failure to alert the Hawaiian Department 
consistent with instructions As a matter of fact, it does not 
affirmatively appear that anyone upon receipt of General Short's reply 
"burdened" himself sufficiently to call for message No. 472 in order to 
determine to what the report was responsive. 

6. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured 
through repetition

It has been suggested, in explaining why additional warnings were not 
sent to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, that it was desired to avoid 
crying "wolf" too often lest the department commanders become impervious 
to the significance of messages designed to alert them. The McCollum 
message, for example, was not dispatched for the reason that overseas 
garrisons were regarded as fully alerted. Admiral Noyes is alleged to 
have referred to the proposed dispatch as an insult to the intelligence 
of the commander in chief inasmuch as he felt Admiral Kimmel had 
received adequate information Although the exact provisions of the 
McCollum dispatch are unknown, it would seem to have been a safer 
practice to have sent this additional warning to intensify and insure 
alertness over a period of time through repetition, particularly under 
the critical circumstances prevailing between November 27 and December 
7, 1941. 

No consideration appears to have been given to the thought that since 
nothing occurred for 9 days after the warnings of November 27 there 
would be a lessening of vigilance by reason of the simple fact that 
*nothing did occur for several days* following such warnings. Of course, 
this observation has little or no application to the Hawaiian situation; 
for had Japan struck on November 28, the next day after the warnings, 
the same lack of readiness would substantially have prevailed as existed 
on the morning of December 7. There could have been no lessening of 
alertness there for the reason that the Hawaiian commands were at no 
time properly alert.

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7. Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and 
decisive action are of the essence

Beyond serious question Army and Navy officials both in Hawaii and in 
Washington were beset by a lassitude born of 20 years of peace. Admiral 
Kimmel admitted he was affected by the "peace psychology" just like 
"everybody else." As expressed by Admiral McMorris, "We were a bit too 
complacent there." The manner in which capable officers were affected is 
to a degree understandable, but the Army and the Navy are the watchdogs 
of the Nation's security and they must be on the alert at all times, no 
matter how many the years of peace. 

As indicated in the body of this report, there was a failure in the War 
and Navy Departments during the night of December 6-7 to be properly on 
the qui vive consistent with the knowledge that the Japanese reply to 
our Government's note of November 26 was being received. The failure of 
subordinate officials to contact the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval 
Operations on the evening of December 6 concerning the first 13 parts of 
the 14-part memorandum is indicative of the "business as usual" 
attitude. Some prominent military and naval officials were entertaining 
and, along with other officers, apparently failed to read into the 13 
parts the importance of and necessity of greater alertness. 

Of a similar tenor is the remark of Admiral Kimmel with respect to the 
"lost" Japanese carriers "Do you mean to say that they could be rounding 
Diamond Head * * *?" Or the observation attributed to General Short with 
respect to the transcript of the "Mori" conversation that it looked 
quite in order and was nothing to be excited about. 

The people are entitled to expect greater vigilance and alertness from 
their Army and Navy whether in war or in peace. 

8. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of 
stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of 
responsibility in competent officials 

On occasion witnesses have echoed the sentiment that the Pearl Harbor 
debacle was made possible, not by the egregious errors or poor judgment 
of any individual or individuals but rather by reason of the 
imperfection and deficiencies of the system whereby Army and Navy 
intelligence was coordinated and evaluated. Only partial credence, 
however, can be extended this conclusion inasmuch as no amount of 
coordination and no system could be effected to compensate for lack of 
alertness and imagination. Nevertheless, there is substantial basis, 
from a review of the Pearl Harbor investigation in its entirety, to 
conclude that the system of handling intelligence was seriously at fault 
and that the security of the Nation can be insured only through 
continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in those 
charged with handling intelligence. *And the assignment of an officer 
having an aptitude for such work over an extended period of time should 
not impede his progress nor affect his promotions*.

The professional character of intelligence work does not appear to have 
been properly appreciated in either the War or Navy Departments. It 
seems to have been regarded as just another tour of duty, 

258            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

as reflected by limitations imposed on the period of assignment to such 
work, among other things. The committee has received the distinct 
impression that there was a tendency, whether realized or not, to 
relegate intelligence to a role of secondary importance. 

As an integrated picture, the Pearl Harbor investigations graphically 
portray the imperative necessity, in the War and Navy Departments (1) 
for selection of men for intelligence work who possess the back ground, 
capacity, and penchant for such work; (2) for maintaining them in the 
work over an extended period of time in order that they may become 
steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ 
this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating data received; and (3) for the 
centralization of responsibility for handling intelligence to avoid all 
of the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so 
abundantly apparent. 

9. The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal; there 
should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of 
instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt

Despite the fact that the record of testimony in the Pearl Harbor 
proceedings is filled with various interpretations as to what War and 
Navy Department dispatches meant, in not one instance does it appear 
that a subordinate requested a clarification. General Short was ordered 
to undertake reconnaissance, yet he apparently ignored the order 
assuming that the man who prepared it did not know of his special 
agreement-with the Navy in Hawaii whereby the latter was to conduct 
distant reconnaissance. He chose to implement an order which manifestly 
he did not understand, without the presumption that the man who prepared 
it did not know what he was doing, rather than request clarifying 
instructions. On November 27 Admiral Kimmel received a message beginning 
with the words: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." Every 
naval officer who has testified on the subject has stated that never 
before in his naval experience had he ever seen a dispatch containing 
the words "war warning"; Admiral Kimmel testified that never before in 
his some 40 years as a naval officer had he seen these words employed in 
an official dispatch. In the same message there was another term, 
"defensive deployment," which the commander in chief manifestly did not 
clearly understand. In spite of his apparent uncertainty as to the 
meaning of the message, Admiral Kimmel, it can be presumed, chose to 
endeavor to implement it without seeking advice from the Navy 
Department. 

While there is an understandable disposition of a subordinate to avoid 
consulting his superior for advice except where absolutely necessary in 
order that he may demonstrate his self-reliance, the persistent failure 
without exception of Army and Navy officers, as revealed by the 
investigation, to seek amplifying and clarifying instructions from their 
superiors is strongly suggestive of just one thing: That the military 
and naval services failed to instill in their personnel the wholesome 
disposition to consult freely with their superiors for the mutual good 
and success of both superior and subordinate. One witness, upon being 
asked why an explanation was not requested replied, in effect: "Well, I 
have found the asking is usually the other way"; that is, the superior 
asking the subordinate Such a situation is not desirable, and the 
services should not be prejudiced by walls of "brass." 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              259

10. There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the 
part of supervisory and intelligence officials

As reflected by an examination of the situation in Hawaii, there was 
failure to employ the necessary imagination with respect to the 
intelligence which was at hand.

Washington, like Hawaii, possessed unusually significant and vital 
intelligence. Had greater imagination and a keener awareness of the 
significance of intelligence existed, concentrating and applying it to 
particular situations, it is proper to suggest that someone should have 
concluded that Pearl Harbor was a likely point of Japanese attack.

The committee feels that the failure to demonstrate the highest 
imagination with respect to the intelligence which was available in 
Hawaii and in Washington is traceable, at least in part, to the failure 
accord to intelligence work the important and significant role which it 
deserves.

11. Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and 
appropriateness

The evidence before the Committee reflects an unusual number of 
instances where military officers in high positions of responsibility 
interpreted orders, intelligence, and other information and arrived 
opposite conclusions at a time when it was imperative for them to 
estimate the situation and to arrive at identical conclusions.

Admiral Kimmel was ordered to execute an *appropriate defensive  
deployment*. Everyone in Washington in testifying before the committee 
seems reasonably certain as to just what this meant; Admiral Kimmel did 
not feel that it required his doing anything greatly beyond what he had 
already done, even though he knew that Washington knew what he had 
previously done. In using the words "this dispatch is to be considered a 
war warning" everyone in Washington felt the commander in chief would be 
sharply, incisively, and emphatically warned of war; Admiral Kimmel said 
he had construed the messages he had received previously as war 
warnings. Everyone in Washington felt that upon advising Hawaii the 
Japanese were destroying their codes it would be understood as meaning 
"war in any man's language"; Admiral Kimmel said that he did not 
consider this intelligence of any vital importance when he received it.

The War Department warned General Short that hostilities were possible 
at any moment, meaning armed hostilities; General Short felt that 
sabotage was one form of hostilities and instituted an alert against 
sabotage only. Washington ordered the commanding general undertake 
reconnaissance; the latter took for granted that the war Department had 
made a mistake and proceeded in effect to ignore the order on the basis 
of this assumption. General Short was instructed to report the measures 
taken by him pursuant to departmental orders. He replied that his 
department was alerted against sabotage and that he had effected liaison 
with the Navy; the Director of War Plans saw the reply and took for 
granted the commanding general was replying to a different warning 
concerning subversive activities, at the same time suggesting that some 
of his subordinates may have interpreted the reply to mean that, in 
effecting liaison with