260            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the Navy, General Short had necessarily carried out the order to conduct 
reconnaissance. 

General Short said he thought the order given Admiral Kimmel to execute 
a defensive deployment necessarily required distant reconnaissance; the 
commander in chief did not so interpret the order Admiral Kimmel saw the 
warning General Short received and took for granted the Army would be on 
a full alert designed to protect the fleet base.

As has been seen, an objective consideration of the warnings received by 
the Hawaiian commanders indicates they were adequate. But on the basis 
of the disaster, in the future *adequacy* cannot be regarded as 
sufficient. Dispatches must be unmistakably clear, forth right, and 
devoid of any conceivable ambiguity. 

The committee feels that the practice, indulged by the Navy, of sending 
to several commanders an identical dispatch for action, even though the 
addressees may be located in decidedly different situations is 
distinctly dangerous. In the preparation of messages to outposts the 
dispatch to a particular officer should be applicable to his peculiar 
situation. What may well be characterized as the "lazy" practice of 
preparing a single dispatch should be replaced by a more industrious and 
effective system whereby a separate "individualized" dispatch is sent to 
each commander whose particular situation varies greatly from that of 
another commander or there may be reason for him because of distance or 
other factors to believe so. 

It is believed that brevity of messages was carried to the point of 
being a fetish rather than a virtue. Dispatches must be characterized by 
sufficient amplitude to be meaningful not only to the sender but beyond 
reasonable doubt, to the addressee as well. 

12. There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received 
and every effort should be made to inquire that the paraphrased material 
reflects the true meaning and significance of the original

To preserve the security of their own codes the War and Navy Departments 
followed the natural and proper practice of paraphrasing messages 
received. From a review of several messages as paraphrased the committee 
is of the opinion that the utmost caution and care should be employed in 
preserving the original meaning of material. One classic example will 
serve to illustrate this point. 

In replying to the War Department's directive of November 27, 1941, 
General Short said: 

"Re your 472. Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with 
Navy."

As paraphrased upon receipt at the War Department, this message read: 

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy re your 472."

It is to be recalled that the Army and Navy had entered into a special 
agreement at Hawaii whereby the Navy assumed responsibility for long-
range reconnaissance. Therefore, having ordered General Short to 
undertake reconnaissance, a reasonable construction of his message as 
paraphrased would be that the commanding general, through liaison with 
the Navy, had made the necessary arrangements for reconnaissance as 
instructed in the War Department's warning of November 27. The message 
which Short actually

PEARL, HARBOR ATTACK          261

sent however, cannot so easily be afforded this construction. The 
seriousness of this matter lies in the fact that failure to conduct 
long-range reconnaissance at Hawaii was the prime factor responsible for 
the Army and Navy having been caught flat-footed. Conceivably, had the 
message as paraphrased not been misleading, the War Department might 
well have followed up on General Short's message, pointing out that he 
had failed to take the necessary action to alert his command.

13. Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of 
unusual situations

Reviewing the Pearl Harbor evidence there are, in both the War and Navy 
establishments, several illustrations of inflexible procedures that 
could not be or at least were not subjected to sufficient alteration to 
satisfy the exigencies of the situation. Everything seems perforce to 
have followed a grooved pattern regardless of the demands for 
distinctive action. The idea of proceeding "through channels" was 
carried to an extreme. 

Among the best illustrations of this fact was the failure of Admiral 
Kimmel to advise Admiral Newton that the "war warning" had been 
received. Admiral Newton was departing from Pearl Harbor with some of 
the most vital units of the Pacific Fleet, yet because the table of 
organization indicated Admiral Brown to be Newton's superior, the 
commander in chief did not take it upon himself to insure that Newton 
was fully informed as to the critical situation between the United 
States and Japan, and relied upon the usual procedure whereby Brown 
would keep Newton advised of developments. 

14. Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number 
of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point 
of prejudicing the work of the organization. 

The Magic intelligence was preeminently important and the necessity for 
keeping it confidential cannot be overemphasized. However, so closely 
held and top secret was this intelligence that it appears the fact the 
Japanese codes had been broken was regarded as of more importance than 
the *information* obtained from decoded traffic. The result of this 
rather specious premise was to leave large numbers of policy-making and 
enforcement officials in Washington completely oblivious of the most 
pertinent information concerning Japan.    

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, was charged with 
combating espionage, sabotage, and un-American activities within the 
United States. On February 15, 1941, Tokyo dispatched to Washington a 
detailed outline as to the type of espionage information desired from 
this country. [2] The FBI was never informed of this vitals information 
necessary to the success of its work, despite the fact that the closest 
liaison was supposed to exist among the FBI, Naval Intelligence, and 
Military Intelligence.

Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, who was in charge of the intelligence branch of G-
2, has testified that he at no time was permitted to avail himself of 
the Magic. And this despite the fact that to effectively perform

[2] Committee exhibit No. 2, pp. 117, 118.

262            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

his work he should have known of this intelligence and one of his 
subordinates, Colonel Bratton, was "loaned" to General Miles to 
distribute magic materials to authorized recipients. 

While, as previously indicated, it is appreciated that promiscuous 
distribution of highly confidential material is dangerous, it 
nevertheless should be made available to all those whose responsibility 
cannot adequately and intelligently be discharged without knowledge of 
such confidential data. It would seem that through sufficient paraphrase 
of the original material the source of the information could have been 
adequately protected. Certainly as great confidence could be placed in 
ranking officials of various departments and bureaus of the Government 
as in the numerous technicians, cryptographers, translators, and clerks 
required for the interception and processing of the Magic. 

15. There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident

Virtually every witness has testified he was surprised at the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor. This was essentially the result of the fact that 
just about everybody was blinded or rendered myopic by what seemed to be 
the self-evident purpose of Japan to attack toward the south Thailand, 
Malaysia, the Kra Peninsula, and perhaps the Philippines and Guam. Japan 
had massed ships and amphibious forces, had deployed them to the south, 
and had conducted reconnaissance in that direction. So completely did 
everything point to the south that it appears everyone was blinded to 
significant, albeit some what disguised, handwriting on the wall 
suggesting an attack on us elsewhere. 

The advice of the Army lieutenant to the radar operators to "forget it" 
when they informed him of the approach of a large number of planes 
appears to have been based on the self-evident assumption that the 
planes were Army or Navy craft on patrol or the expected B-17's due to 
arrive from the west coast. 

16. Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of 
significant information

Before the committee Admiral Turner testified that he regarded an attack 
on Pearl Harbor as a 50-50 possibility. Assuming this to be correct, 
there can be little doubt, considering the position he held as Director 
of War Plans in the Navy Department, that he could have given the 
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet the benefit of his conclusion 
had he been disposed to do so. As a matter of fact Admiral Turner had 
the principal hand in preparing the November 27 "war warning. 

As has been seen, the orders contained in the war warning necessarily 
carried the implication of an attack from without; however, the dispatch 
did not reflect the likelihood of an attack upon the fleet with the 
degree of likelihood manifested by Admiral Turner in indicating to the 
committee his estimate of the situation. Admiral Turner's position would 
be indefensible were his estimate based on any information or 
intelligence he may have possessed. It appears, on the other hand, that 
his conclusion was predicated on a rather long-standing impression in 
the Navy that an attack on our Pacific Fleet by Japan could be expected 
at one time or another. It is regarded as 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            263

unfortunate, however, that Admiral Turner did not see fit to give to he 
Pacific Fleet the benefit of his conclusions outlined, with benefit of 
retrospection, in such detail before the committee. 

17. An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his 
organization should forfeit his responsibility

It would seem that War and Navy Department officials both in Washington 
and Hawaii were so obsessed by an executive complex hat they could not 
besmirch their dignities by "stooping" to determine what was going on, 
or more especially what was not going on, in their organizations. 
Examples should illustrate this observation.

Admirals Stark and Turner both have testified they "thought" the 
commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was receiving the Magic 
intelligence. Yet in a period of over 6 months, with relations between 
the United States and Japan mounting in tenseness and approaching a 
crisis, neither of these ranking officers determined for a fact whether 
the fleet was receiving this information. 

In the case of Hawaii, the evidence indicates failures on the part of 
the commanding general and the commander in chief to actually determine 
what was going on in their organizations. Additionally, in a command by 
mutual cooperation it was as important that Admiral Kimmel know what 
General Short was doing, and vice versa, as that he know what the fleet 
itself was doing. But, as has been heretofore pointed out, neither of 
these officers really verified whether his assumptions concerning what 
the other was doing were correct. 

18. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any 
eventuality

The record tends to indicate that appraisal of likely enemy movements 
was divided into *probabilities* and *possibilities*. Everyone has 
admitted that an attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor was regarded as at east 
a possibility. It was felt, however, that a Japanese movement toward the 
south was a probability. The over-all result was to look for the 
probable move and to take little or no effective precautions to guard 
against the contingency of the possible action. 

While it appears satisfactorily established that it is the basic 
responsibility of an outpost commander to prepare for the worst 
contingency, it is believed that this premise has been applied more in 
theory than in practice. The military and naval branches of the 
government must be continuously impressed by, and imbue their personnel 
with, the realization that failure can be avoided over an extended 
period of time only by preparation for any eventuality, at east when 
hostilities are expected. 

19. Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official 
instruction

On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the commander 
in chief of the Pacific Fleet a dispatch concerning the resignation of 
the Japanese Cabinet, pointing out, among other things, that "since the 
U. S. And Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present 
desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan 

264            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

may attack these two powers." But on October 17, referring to this 
dispatch, Admiral Stark, in a letter to Admiral Kimmel, said: "Things 
have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our 
dispatches you know about all that we do. *Personally I do not believe 
the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely 
stated the 'possibility'; in fact, I tempered the message handed to me 
considerably*. 

It appears to have been a generally accepted practice in the Navy for 
the Chief of Naval Operations to supplement official dispatches by 
correspondence of a quasi-personal nature. [3] Despite this fact, it is 
regarded as an extremely dangerous practice for the Chief of Naval 
Operations to express an opinion on a personal basis to an outpost 
commander which has the inevitable effect of tempering the import of an 
official dispatch. Were it not for the fact that Admiral Stark supplied 
the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet highly pertinent and 
significant information after his letter of October 17 and before 
December 7, the manner in which he emasculated the October 16 dispatch 
would be inexcusable. However, as has been seen in this report, some of 
the most vital intelligence and orders relating to Japan were supplied 
Hawaii during November and December of 1941. 

20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization

This principle is the result of the general impression obtained by the 
committee concerning the relationship between the Army and the Navy as 
well as concerning certain intra-organizational situations which 
existed. The relationship, understanding, and coordination between the 
War Plans Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence were wholly 
unsatisfactory. The War Plans Division, particularly, appears to have 
had an overzealous disposition to preserve and enhance its prerogatives. 

The whole story of discussions during 1941 with respect to unity of 
command is a picture of jealous adherence to departmental prerogatives 
and unwillingness to make concessions in the interest of both the Army 
and Navy. The same comment is applicable to the near dispute between 
Admiral Kimmel and General Short as to which of them should command Wake 
and Midway when the marines were replaced by soldiers. It is proper to 
suggest that, had both the commanding officers in Hawaii been less 
concerned between November 27 and December 7 about preserving their 
individual prerogatives with respect to Wake and Midway and more 
concerned about working together to defend the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier 
in the light of the warnings they had received, the defensive situation 
confronting the Japanese on the morning of December 7 might well have 
been entirely different. 

21. Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu 
of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the 
proper functioning of two or more agencies

One of the more "human" aspects of the testimony of both Admiral Kimmel 
and General Short is the manner in which each sought to bring out their 
personal friendship for the purpose of demonstrating 

[3] Admiral Stark said: "I might point out, in passing, that there was 
nothing unusual in this so-called 'personal' correspondence between the 
Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders in Chief it was a long-
established custom when I took office." Committee record, p. 5594. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK            265

the close relationship that existed between them. They played golf 
together; they dined together but they did not get together on official 
business in such manner as to insure that each possessed the same 
knowledge of the situation as the other and to effect coordination and 
integration of their efforts. 

22. No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to 
perform a fundamental task 

Both the commanding officers in Hawaii have offered as explanation and 
excuse for failure to perform various supervisory and administrative 
responsibilities in their commands the fact that they had countless and 
manifold duties in their respective positions as commander in chief of 
the Pacific Fleet and commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. 
Additionally, Admiral Kimmel has referred to the extraordinarily 
competent staff which he had in Hawaii. The most fundamental 
responsibility that both commanders had under the circumstances, 
however, was to make certain beyond any reasonable doubt that there was 
an integrated and coordinated employment of defensive facilities 
consistent with the principle of command by mutual cooperation. No 
excuse or explanation can justify or temper the failure to discharge 
this responsibility which superseded and surpassed all others. 

23. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately 
informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors 
informed 

In Washington, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, and 
Captain McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of that Division, 
were not adequately and currently informed as to the nature of the 
dispatches being sent to our outposts emanating from the War Plans 
Division. Subordinate officials in both the War and Navy Departments 
failed to appreciate the importance and necessity of getting to both 
General Marshall and Admiral Stark the first 13 parts of the Japanese 
14-part memorandum immediately on the evening of December 6. Colonel 
French did not inform the Chief of Staff that he had been unable to 
raise the Army radio in Hawaii on the morning of December 7. In Hawaii, 
Admiral Kimmel failed to insure that Admiral Bellinger, who was 
responsible for Navy patrol planes, knew of the war warning of November 
27. Admiral Newton, as previously pointed out, was permitted to leave 
Pearl Harbor with a task force completely oblivious of any of the 
warning messages. General Short, construing the caution to disseminate 
the information in the warning of November 27 to "minimum essential 
officers" in a too-narrow manner, failed to inform the essential and 
necessary officers of his command of the acute situation in order that 
the proper alertness might pervade the Hawaiian Department. 

2. The administrative organization of any establishment must be 
designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility

The committee has been very much concerned about the fact that there was 
no way in which it could be determined definitely that any individual 
saw a particular message among the Magic materials. It 

266            PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

does not appear that any record system was established for initialing 
the messages or otherwise fixing responsibility. The system existing 
left subordinate officers charged with the duty of disseminating the 
Magic at the complete mercy of superior officers with respect to any 
question as to whether a particular message had been delivered to or 
seen by them. 

25. In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of 
responsibility and authority

Witnesses have testified rather fully as to what their responsibilities 
were, both in Washington and at Hawaii. However, it does not appear that 
any of them, except the highest ranking officers, possessed any real 
authority to act in order decisively to discharge their 
responsibilities. It cannot be presumed that it will be possible to meet 
the exigencies of an emergency if the officer charged with the duty of 
acting at the time the emergency arises does not possess the necessary 
authority to follow through on the situation. There should be a close 
correlation between responsibility and authority; to vest a man with 
responsibility with no corresponding authority is an unfair, 
ineffective, and unsatisfactory arrangement. 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Chairman.
JERE COOPER, Vice Chairman. 
WALTER F. GEORGE. 
SCOTT W. LUCAS. 
J. BAYARD CLARK. 
JOHN W. MURPHY. 
BERTRAND W. GEARHART.
FRANK B. KEEFE (with additional views).
(Senators Brewster and Ferguson are filing minority views.) 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. KEEFE

INTRODUCTION

The committee report is divided into five parts. Part I deals with the 
diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack. Part II describes the 
actual attack and its aftermath. Part III discusses responsibilities in 
Hawaii. Part IV discusses responsibilities in Washington, and Part V 
includes certain recommendations of the committee. Scattered throughout 
the entire five sections of the committee report are conclusions with 
respect to individuals in charge of carrying out our diplomatic, 
military, and naval obligations prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I 
find myself in agreement with most of these conclusions and 
recommendations. The voluminous facts contained in the committee report 
have been accurately assembled from the enormous record compiled by the 
committee. Any criticism which I may have toward the marshaling of facts 
in the committee report is directed to the manner in which such facts 
have been used to sustain the various arguments and conclusions indulged 
in in the committee report. 

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK          266-A

It correctly states that both Washington and Hawaii were surprised at 
the attack upon Pearl Harbor. It is apparently agreed that both 
Washington and Hawaii expected the initial attack to come in the Asiatic 
area. What was done in Washington as well as what was done in Hawaii was 
admittedly done in the light of the universal military belief that 
Hawaii was not in danger from an initial attack by Japan. If this belief 
was unjustified, as I believe it was, then the mistake lies on the 
Washington doorstep just as much as it does upon that of Hawaii. 
Throughout the long and arduous sessions of the committee in the 
preparation of the committee report, I continuously insisted that 
whatever "yardstick" was agreed upon as a basis for determining 
responsibilities in Hawaii should be applied to the high command at 
Washington. This indicates in a general way my fundamental objection to 
the committee report. I feel that facts have been martialed [sic], 
perhaps unintentionally, with the idea of conferring blame upon Hawaii 
and minimizing the blame that should properly be assessed at Washington. 

A careful reading of the committee report would indicate that the 
analysis of orders and dispatches is so made as to permit criticism of 
our commands in Hawaii while at the same time proposing a construction 
which would minimize the possibility of criticism of those in charge at 
Washington. 

I think it is true that none of the military chiefs at Washington or 
Hawaii thought the attack would come at Pearl Harbor. I conclude hat 
they all thought it would come first in the Far East. Obviously this was 
a fatal mistake, and I agree that the mistake was without proper 
justification and that neither Hawaii nor Washington should be excused 
from criticism for having made it. I think that the facts in this record 
clearly demonstrate that Hawaii was always the No. 1 point of danger and 
that both Washington and Hawaii should have known it at all times and 
acted accordingly. Consequently I agree hat the high command in Hawaii 
was subject to criticism for concluding that Hawaii was not in danger. 
However, I must insist that the same criticism with the same force and 
scope should apply to the high command in Washington. It is in this 
respect that I think the tenor of the committee report may be subject to 
some criticism. 

I fully agree with the doctrine relating to the placing of 
responsibility in military officers in the field and their resulting 
duty under such responsibilities. I agree that they must properly 
sustain this burden in line with the high and peculiar abilities which 
originally gave them their assignments. 

In the execution of their vitally important duties, however, the 
officers at the front in the field are fairly entitled to all aids and 
help lad all information which can reasonably be sent to them from the 
all-powerful high staff command in Washington. If both commands are in 
error, both should be blamed for what each should have done and what 
each failed to do respectively. The committee report, I feel, does not 
with exactitude apply the same yardstick in measuring responsibilities 
at Washington as has been applied to the Hawaiian commanders. I cannot 
suppress the feeling that the committee report endeavors to throw as 
soft a light as possible on the Washington scene. 

In order to clearly appraise the contentions herein expressed, I feel 
compelled to restate some of the basic military aspects of the Pearl 
Harbor disaster as shown by the evidence.
 
266-B          PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER

During the year 1941 the United States Pacific Fleet was based in Pearl 
Harbor in the Hawaiian island of Oahu. It had proceeded to the Hawaiian 
area for Fleet exercises in the spring of 1940. Its scheduled return to 
its regular bases on the west coast was delayed from time to time. From 
these delays there gradually emerged evidence of the President's 
decision to retain the Fleet in the Hawaiian area, to deter Japan from 
aggression in the Far East. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Admiral 
J. O. Richardson, protested this decision with a vigor which caused him 
to be relieved of command He believed that the readiness of men and 
ships of the Fleet for war operations would impress Japan rather than 
its presence in Hawaii, where facilities to render it ready for war were 
greatly inferior to those available on the west coast. Richardson was 
succeeded in command by Admiral H. E. Kimmel in February 1941. The 
appointment of Kimmel was made on his record as a capable officer. There 
was no political or other favoritism involved. At this time the decision 
to base the Fleet in Hawaii was an established fact. Pearl Harbor was 
the only anchorage in the Hawaiian area offering any security. It was 
then, however, an extremely deficient Fleet base. Its exposed position 
rendered concealment of Fleet movements practically impossible in an 
area filled with Japanese agents. The Army's equipment for antiaircraft 
defense was meager. The local Army-Navy defense forces did not have 
sufficient long-range patrol planes to perform effective distant 
reconnaissance, even if the patrol planes of the fleet were made 
available to augment the handful of Army reconnaissance planes. 

Under these circumstances, the position of the Fleet in the Hawaiian 
area was inherently untenable and dangerous. The Fleet would sacrifice 
its preparations for war, and its potential mobility in war, if it 
concentrated its resources on the defense of its base. Moreover, with 
only four tankers suitable for fueling ships at sea, ships of the Fleet 
had to come into Pearl Harbor for refueling, to say nothing of 
maintenance and repair, and the necessary rest and relaxation of crews. 
Once the ships were in Pearl Harbor, with its single channel, they were 
a target for any successfully launched air attack from carrier-borne 
planes. The severity of the attack might be mitigated, but damage to the 
ships found in port was inevitable. To prevent a hostile carrier from 
successfully launching planes required that it be first discovered and 
attacked. Discovery, other than by lucky accident. Required air 
reconnaissance of the perimeter of a circle of 800-mile radius from 
Oahu. The Fleet did not at any time have patrol planes sufficient in 
number to carry out such reconnaissance. The Japanese task force which 
raided Oahu on December 7, 1941, was composed of six carriers. The 
Pacific Fleet had on that date three carriers, one of which was on the 
Pacific coast for repair, leaving only two immediately available in the 
area of a prospective sea engagement. An engagement at sea would have 
found the preponderant strength with Japan. 

Although the Fleet was placed by the President in the Hawaiian area in 
1940 as an implement of diplomacy and as a deterrent to Japan, its 
strength was appreciably reduced in April and May of 1941. At that time, 
one aircraft carrier, three battleships, four cruisers and eighteen 
destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and trans

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK          266-C

ferred to the Atlantic. The President directed the Chief of Naval 
Operations to consult the British Chiefs of Staff on the proposal to 
effect this transfer. They gave their opinion "that the consequential 
reduction in the strength of the United States Pacific Fleet would not 
unduly encourage Japan" (exhibit 158, letter from Admiral Danckwerts to 
Admiral Turner, April 28, 1941). The transfer to the Atlantic was then 
carried out. The Commander in Chief of the United States pacific Fleet 
was not asked for his opinion. The Chief of Naval Operations wrote him 
about the proposed transfer stating "I am telling you, not arguing with 
you" (exhibit 106, letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, dated 
April 19, 1941). 

The primary mission assigned the Pacific Fleet under existing Navy War 
Plans was the making of raids on the Marshalls. These were to divert 
Japanese strength from the so-called Malay barrier. No existing War Plan 
of the United States in 1941 contemplated that the Pacific Fleet would 
go to the rescue of the Philippines or resist Japanese naval forces 
attacking the Philippines. The Pacific Fleet was so inferior to the 
Japanese Navy in every category of fighting ship that such a mission was 
considered too suicidal to attempt. The American public in 1941 was 
deluded about the fighting strength of our Fleet in the Pacific, by 
irresponsible utterances from men in authority. Japan was under no such 
misconception. Her consular agents in the Hawaiian islands needed only 
their eyesight, and possibly binoculars to appraise correctly the 
strength of the Fleet.

An inferior Fleet, under enemy surveillance in an exposed naval base 
without resources to protect it could only avert disaster by. Receiving 
the best possible evidence of the intentions of its potential enemy. The 
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet in 1941 recognized that information was 
essential to his making appropriate dispositions to meet any crisis. He 
formally requested the Chief of Naval Operations that he "be immediately 
informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest 
secure means available"(exhibit 106, Official Letter CINCPAC to CNO, 
dated May 26, 1941).

The best evidence of Japanese intentions in the year 1941, available to 
the United States Government, were messages exchanged; between the 
Government of Japan and her diplomatic consular agents abroad. These 
were intercepted by the Army and Navy. These were decoded and translated 
in Washington. The President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, 
the Chief of Staff, and Chief o Naval Operations regularly received 
these intercepted messages.

The President and the other officials receiving the intercepted messages 
in Washington prior to December 7, 1941, considered it likely that Japan 
would attack the United States. At a meeting of the President and his 
so-called War Council on November 25, 1941, according to Mr. Stimson's 
notes the President stated: "that we were likely to be attacked perhaps 
(as soon as) next Monday" (Stimson Statement, page 47). There was 
abundant evidence in the intercepted messages that Japan intended to 
attack the United States, Japan had fixed a deadline date of November 
25, extended to November 29, for reaching a diplomatic agreement with 
the United States. There were at least six Japanese messages emphasizing 
this deadline. If the deadline date passed without agreement, the 
Japanese government advised her Ambassadors in Washington: "Things are 
auto-