266-D PEARL HARBOR ATTACK matically going to happen." The necessity for agreement by the deadline date was stressed by Japan in these terms: "The fate of Our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days"; "We gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die" (exhibit 1, page 137, 93). On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced "deadline" date, the United States government delivered to Japan a diplomatic note which the intercepted messages revealed Japan considered to be a "humiliating proposal", impossible of acceptance (exhibit 1, p. 195). The intercepted diplomatic messages further revealed that Japan expected to "rupture" negotiations with the United States when she replied to the American note of November 26 (exhibit 1, p. 195). To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious Japan instructed her envoys in Washington to keep up a pretext of continuing negotiations until this Japanese reply was ready for delivery (exhibit 1, p. 208). A message from the Japanese government to its Ambassador in Berlin, sent on November 30, was intercepted and translated by the Navy in Washington on December 1 (exhibit 1, p. 204). In this message the Japanese Ambassador was instructed to "immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a summary of developments. * * * *Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams*. [Italics supplied.]" The President regarded this message as of such interest that he retained a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the intercepted messages (R. 10887). On December 2, 1941 elaborate instructions from Japan were intercepted dealing in precise detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the United States" (exhibit 1, p. 198). In the "bomb plot" or "ships in harbor" message of September 24 the Japanese government gave detailed instructions to its Consul-General in Hawaii as to the character of report it required concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor was to be divided into five sub areas. An alphabetical symbol was given each area. The Japanese government instructed the consul: "With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly.) If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf." This despatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 9, 1941 (exhibit 2, p. 12). On September 29, 1941, the Japanese Consul in Hawaii replied to his government. He established a system of symbols to be used in designating the location of vessels at key points in Pearl Harbor. This despatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 10, 1941. On November 15, 18, 20, and 29 the Japanese government urgently called for information about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor (exhibit 2, pp. 13 and 15). On November 15 the Japanese Consul in Honolulu was directed to make his "ships in harbor report" irregu- PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 266-E. lar but at the rate of twice a week (exhibit 2, p. 13). The reports were to give vessel locations in specific areas of the harbor, using the symbols established in September (exhibit 2, p. 15). The greatest secrecy was enjoined, because relations between Japan and the United States were described as "most critical." On November 18, the Japanese Consul General reported to Tokyo the locations of the ships in the various sub areas of Pearl Harbor, giving minute descriptions of the courses, speed and distances apart of destroyers entering the harbor (exhibit 2, p. 15). On November 29 reports were requested even though there were no movements of ships. These despatches were intercepted, decoded and translated in Washington on December 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1941. The "bomb plot" or "ships in harbor" message, and those messages relating to Pearl Harbor which followed it, meant that the ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor were marked for a Japanese attack. Of other American harbor was divided into sub areas by Japan. In no other area did Japan seek information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to this message Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to ascertain the general hereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in port. With this message Japan inaugurated a new policy directed to Pearl Harbor and to no other place, in which information was no longer sought merely as to the general whereabouts of the Fleet, but as to the presence of particular ships in particular areas of the harbor. In the period immediately preceding the attack Japan required such reports even when there was no movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor the reports which Japan thus sought and received had a useful purpose only in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. These reports were not just the work of enthusiastic local spies gathering meticulous details in an excess of zeal. They were the product of instructions emanating from the government of Japan in Tokyo. Officers of the high command in Washington have admitted before us that this message, if correctly evaluated, meant an attack on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor (R. 3036, 4014; 4874; 2100-2102; 1313-11314; 6390, 6094; 5378). Lt. Commander Kramer of Naval Intelligence in Washington promptly distributed the Pearl Harbor "bomb plot" message to the President, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval Communications, the Director of War Plans, and the Director of Naval Intelligence (R. 11209). It bore the notation "interesting message" (R. 11207). It was accompanied by a summary of its contents as follows: "Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations (R. 11207)." Military Intelligence through Colonel Bratton delivered the 'bomb plot' message to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division (R. 12083). The message was discussed several times by Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, with his opposite numbers in the Navy Department (R. 12105). They discussed possible significance of the message, as indicating a plan for an air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (R. 12105). In the course of these discussions Officers in Naval Intelligence stated that 266-F PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the Japanese were wasting their time in getting such meticulous detail about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor because the Fleet would not be in Pearl Harbor when the emergency arose (R. 12105). Despite the fact that the "bomb plot" message and related intercepts dealing with the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor were delivered to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, they testified before the Committee that they have no recollection of ever seeing them (R.2911-2912 5787-5792). No intimation of these messages was given to General Short or Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. On the contrary, Admiral Kimmel had been advised by the Navy Department on February 1, 1941: "* * * no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future (exhibit 15)." In the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, Japan made no effort to conceal the movements or presence of her naval forces in Southeast Asia (R. 453). The movements of her troops in Indo-China at that time were the subject of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Japan (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, p. 779). Yet, the intercepts showed that some Japanese plan went into effect automatically on November 29 from which Japan hoped to divert American suspicion by a pretext of continued negotiations. What was its nature? Only the President and his top advisers in Washington had this information. Despite the elaborate and labored arguments in the report and despite the statements of high ranking military and naval officers to the contrary, I must conclude that the intercepted messages received and distributed in Washington on the afternoon and evening of December 6 and the early hours of December 7, pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor: 1. The "Pilot Message". This was a message from Japan to her Ambassadors in Washington advising them that the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 was ready and being sent to them in fourteen parts; that it was to be treated with great secrecy pending instructions as to the time of its delivery, and that the time for its delivery was to be fixed in a separate message (exhibit 1, p. 238). 2. The first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply. This included all but the last paragraph of the Japanese note handed to the Secretary of State on December 7 (exhibit 1, pp. 239-244). 3. The fourteenth and last paragraph of the Japanese reply, and the message to the Japanese Ambassadors which fixed the time for delivery of the Japanese note as 1 p. M., Washington time, December 7 (exhibit 1, p. 248). The "Pilot Message" was filed in Tokyo at 6:56 A. M. Washington time December 6, it was intercepted by the Navy by 7:20 A. M. Washington time December 6 and forwarded to the Navy Department. It was sent by the Navy to the Army for decryption and translation about noon, Washington time, on December 6 (exhibit 41). It was decrypted, translated and distributed about 3 P. M. Washington time by the Army to Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, the Chief of the War Plans Division, General Gerow, and the Chief of Military Intelligence General Miles (R. 12050). In the Navy Department the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, received the so-called Pilot Message prior to 6 P. M. Washington time PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 266-G December 6 (R. 4658). He had previously told his subordinates to be on the lookout for the Japanese reply and felt sure that he gave instructions that the Pilot Message was to be delivered to Admiral Stark (R. 4661 4662). Admiral Turner, Chief of the War Plans Division in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, received the Pilot Message" in the evening of December 6 (R. 5440-5442). Admiral Stark and General Marshall each deny that on December 6 he had knowledge of the Pilot Message (R. 3473; 5813). We find on the testimony of General Miles and Colonel Bratton that the "Pilot Message" was delivered to General Marshall during the afternoon of December 6, 1941 (R. 3589-3590; 12049- 12050). This Pilot Message bid that Japan's reply to the American note of November 26 was about to be sent from Tokyo to Washington, and indicated that a rupture of diplomatic relations or war was a matter of hours. On the evening of December 6, between 9 P. M. and midnight Washington time, the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to the United States were delivered to the President, Mr. Knox, the office of the Secretary of State and the Chiefs of Army and Navy Intelligence (R. 10453-10455; 12052-12054). After reading this message the President stated "This means war" (R. 12441). He later telephoned Admiral Stark about the critical turn of events (R. 14757-14759). When Mr. Knox received the message he called Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull and arranged a conference with them for Sunday morning (R. 10675-10681). Mr. Stimson asked the Navy Department on Saturday evening to furnish him by 9 A. M. Sunday morning the following information: "Compilation of men of war in Far East, British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian; *also compilation of American men of war in the Pacific Fleet, without locations*, and a list of American men of war in the Atlantic without locations, [Italics supplied, R. 113988.]" Admirals Stark, Ingersoll and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted about this request. The Secretary of the Navy directed that the information be compiled and delivered prior to 10 o'clock Sunday December 7 (R. 13988). This was done. The compilation showed that practically all the ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor (exhibit 176). In the early morning of December 7, 1941, about 5 A. M. Washington time, the message fixing the hour for delivery of the Japanese note as 1 P. M. Washington time was available in the Navy Department in Washington (R. 10694-10701). This was eight and one-half hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark and his principal subordinates have testified before us that they had knowledge of this message about 10:30 A. M. (R. 4675, 9146-9148, 10469). This was five and one-half hours after it had been received in the Navy Department It was about three hours before the attack. The relation of P. M. Washington time to early morning in Hawaii was pointed out to Admiral Stark. (R. 9146-9148; 9154- 9156; 9236-9254; 4679; 585) Admiral Stark was urged by the Director of Naval Intelligence to send a warning to the Fleet (R. 4673). The chief intelligence officers of the Army had the "1 pm message" by 9 A. M. Washington time, immediately appreciated its significance, but did not succeed in bringing it to General Marshall's attention until nearly several hours later (R. 12077-12078; 12079-12081). Marshall was horseback riding 266-H PEARL HARBOR ATTACK in Virginia. No action was taken by the Army until he saw and read the 1 P. M. message and related intercepts, at which time he sent a message to General Short which went over commercial facilities and was received after the Pearl Harbor attack (R. 2935-2939; 8396) Admiral Stark took no action on this information except to agree to the inclusion in the belated Army message of instructions to General Short to advise Admiral Kimmel of its contents (R. 5814-5816). Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Mr. Knox had the 1 P. M. message at their conference about 10:30 A. M. Washington time December 7 (R. 10473). The relation of Washington time to time in Hawaii and the Philippines was brought to their attention (R. 10473-10475). Mr. Stimson's notes describing the Sunday morning conference state: "Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike (Stimson statement, p. 59)." The 1 P. M. message was delivered to the President about 10:30 A. M. (R. 10476). Why did the high command in Washington fail to disclose promptly to Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and other American commanders in the field the information available in Washington, Saturday night and early Sunday morning? In seeking the answer to this question we have encountered failures of memory and changes in sworn testimony. I am constrained to reach these conclusions: As a result of his conversation with the President late Saturday night December 6, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, did receive notice of a critical turn in Japanese-American relations (R. 14757-14759). Even if it be assumed that he had no inkling until that time of vital information which had been available to him for at least six hours, the call from the President should have provoked his active and immediate efforts to elicit from his subordinates the data which they possessed as to the immediacy of war. *He failed to make such efforts*. Sunday morning, when the Saturday messages are known to have come to his attention together with the 1 P. M. message, he again did not take action, despite the recommendations of the Chief of Naval Intelligence that a warning be sent to the Fleet. He failed to exercise the care and diligence which his position required. General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, had the "Pilot Message" available to him on the afternoon of Saturday, December 6. This placed on him an obligation to make sure he would promptly receive the subsequent information which the Pilot message indicated would be soon forthcoming. He did not do so. In placing himself outside of effective contact with his subordinates for several hours on Sunday morning, he failed to exercise the care and diligence which his position required. The alleged failure of the chief subordinates of Admiral Stark and General Marshall to furnish them promptly with the intercepted messages on Saturday night was unusual for two reasons. First, it was a departure from the usual routine for the distribution of intercepts. Second, these two were the only usual recipients of intercepts who testified that the messages were not brought to their attention on Saturday night. Neither Admiral Stark nor General Marshall made PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 266-I any effort thereafter to ascertain why such a colossal breakdown should occur in the functioning of their staffs on the eve of war (R. 3490- 3491; 6215). I have pointed out that during the critical period prior to the attack, the Administration in Washington made certain over-all policy decisions as to how to deal with the Japanese crisis. One decision was that Japan should commit the first overt act against the United States; and thus resolve the dilemma in which the Administration's secret diplomacy had placed it. The other was to be in instant readiness to strike at Japan to check her further aggression against the British and Dutch in Far East Asia. Certainly the information and orders sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel prior to the attack reflected the policy adopted in Washington. General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not informed about the most important diplomatic steps in 1941. They were not informed of the parallel action agreement at the Atlantic Conference or the warning to Japan which followed. They were not informed of the significant terms of the American note to Japan of November 26. They were not informed of the commitment made to Great Britain, as set forth in the Brooke-Popham telegram of December 6. They did not receive the vital intercepted Japanese messages or any condensation or summary of them. In response to Admiral Kimmel's request for information in his letter of May 26, 1941, he did receive, in July 1941 from the Navy Department the actual text of seven intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages (exhibit 37, pp. 6-12). In the week before the attack he received the text of another intercepted message describing the Japanese intrigue in Thailand. Kimmel testified that he believed that he was getting all pertinent information affecting the Pacific Fleet. This was the assurance Admiral Stark had given in response to the definite request in the letter of May 26, 1941. The Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, Captain Layton, wrote to Captain McCollum, his opposite number in Naval Intelligence in Washington, on March 11, 1941, to urge that intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic be sent to the Fleet. McCollum's reply satisfied Layton that the Fleet would receive diplomatic traffic which affected its actions (R. 12923). But the vital intercepts were not sent to Admiral Kimmel or General Short. The fact that a few intercepts were sent to Admiral Kimmel shows that the withholding of others was not attributable to fear of the security of Naval communications and consequent prejudice to the Secret of Magic. The "bomb plot" message and related intercepts would have been of incalculable value both to General Short and Admiral Kimmel. Yet they were given no intimation of their existence. The message of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel warned him of the threatened Japanese move in southeast Asia and ordered him to be ready to execute a Fleet offensive against the Marshalls required by War Plans. Readiness for an offensive at some distance from Hawaii precluded concentrating the limited resources of the Fleet; upon the defense of its base, which no despatch from the Navy Department mentioned as a point of attack. The offensive missions prescribed by the War Plans required the full use of the patrol planes of the Fleet. These planes were recently acquired and required alterations and maintenance work to put them in shape for war. The planes were too few for full distant searches from Hawaii. Partial 266-J PEARL HARBOR ATTACK searches were properly considered of doubtful value and involved the risk of making the planes useless for the reconnaissance required in the raids on the Marshalls at the time when they would be needed. Task forces at sea and patrol planes going to and from outlying islands carried out such distant reconnaissance as was feasible. As suggested by the Navy Department on November 27, the two carriers of the Pacific Fleet were sent on missions to outlying islands. Lacking air protection the battleships appeared better disposed in port than at sea. The fuel limitations and other logistic deficiencies of the Pacific Fleet were so acute that it was physically impossible to keep the whole Fleet or major portions of it, at sea for extended intervals The disposition of the ships and the use of patrol planes on and after November 27 were logical and reasonable in view of the message of that date. On the evening of December 6, in response to Secretary Stimson's request and at the direction of Secretary Knox, the Navy Department compiled from its records a summary showing that all the major ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor. At this time the information available in Washington showed that war was only hours away. Yet the two Secretaries and the high command made no effort to direct any change in the dispositions of the Fleet as shown in the Navy Department summary. They took no steps to furnish Admiral Kimmel the information which they possessed as to the imminence of war. Consequently they deprived him of any chance to alter his dispositions in the light of that information. I conclude that Secretaries Stimson and Knox and the high command in Washington knew that the major units of the Fleet were in Pearl Harbor on December 6-7, 1941, and were satisfied with that situation. The message of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel illustrates one feature of the pre-Pearl Harbor plan of action of the Administration. The Fleet was to be in readiness for offensive raids on the Marshalls to counter the Japanese advance in southeast Asia. The message sent to General Short by General Marshall on November 27, 1941 shows the other feature of the Administration's plan of action to make sure that the Japanese would strike first so that the offensive by the Fleet would be approved by the American public. The message to General Short stated: "If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as no, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent (exhibit 32 p. 7)." General Marshall testified that instructions about the "overt act" were put into the message on the personal order of the President (R 3443- 3447). In addition the War Department sent three other messages to the Army and Army Air Forces in Hawaii, on November 27 and 28, all of which were directed to sabotage and subversive activities. One of these messages from the War Department on November 28 stated: "Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm (exhibit 32, p. 13)." The Navy Department also cautioned Admiral Kimmel against committing the first overt act. On November 29 he received from the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 266-K Navy Department the substance of the Army's message to General Short with the additional directive "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act (exhibit 7, p. 38)." On November 27, 1941, General Short reported to General Marshall the measures he had taken in response to General Marshall's message. His reply specifically referred to General Marshall's message by its number: It stated: "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage, liaison with the Navy. Reurad four seven two twenty-seventh" (exhibit 32, p. 12). The Chief of the War Plans Division of the Army, General Leonard T. Gerow, saw General Short's reply, noted and initialed it (exhibit 46). This reply was routed by General Gerow to General Marshall, Chief of Staff. Some question has arisen as to whether General Marshall in fact actually saw General Short's reply in order that the reader may have the exact facts, I desire to report the evidence, question and answer, beginning page 1420 of the printed record: "Mr. KEEFE. NOW with the country on the brink of war, General Marshall, you laving the then impression as you have stated it a few moments ago, that Japan was liable to precipitate war by attacking any time any place, it would be highly important to the Chief of Staff to see to it that the orders which he had given were carried out, would it not? "General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. Now when General Short's message came back the evidence indicates, somewhat inconclusively perhaps, that it was part of three or four papers, the top one being the reply of MacArthur, then Short, then a route sheet, the MacArthur message being on top and that bears your endorsement with your initials. "General MARSHALL Correct, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. Your initials do not appear on the Short message but they do show the initials of the Secretary of War and the War Plans Department, General Gerow. Now am I correct in the assumption from an understanding of your evidence on that point that you think you must have seen the Short message although you did not initial it, having initialed the top one? "General MARSHALL. That was my assumption, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. Well, is that a mere assumption or is it a fact? "General MARSHALL. I stated I did not recall, sir; that I must assume that I had seen it. "Mr. KEEFE. Well, if you saw that Short message, General Marshall, as Chief of Staff it imposed some responsibility upon you, did it not? "General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. It was addressed to you as Chief of Staff, was it not? "General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. And the very telegram itself indicates that it is in response to the command order which you had issued to him? "General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. And it was a message which attempted on the part of Short to convey to you as Chief of Staff the nature of the alert under which he was operating? "General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. That was his response to your order? "General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. Now, I have read the various statements, General Marshall, that you have made at various times in connection with this matter. You recall that when you were before the Army board first you were somewhat confused about those things because you thought that at some time in November there had been a change in alert numbers. Do you remember that? "General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. NOW, it is perfectly clear now that a reading of this message indicates that there isn't any alert number specified in Short's wire. "General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. SO that puts that out of the picture, doesn't it? 266-L PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. So we get down to the simple fact that here is a message from your commanding general in the bastion of defense in the Pacific to which all of our defenses, as you have testified, were tied, in which he tells you that he is alerted to prevent sabotage, liaison with Navy. Now in all fairness, General Marshall in the exercise of ordinary care as Chief of Staff ought you not to have proceeded to investigate further and give further orders to General Short when it appeared that he was only alerted against sabotage? "General MARSHALL. As I stated earlier, that was my opportunity to intervene and I did not do it. "Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you say that was your opportunity. That was your responsibility, was it not? "General MARSHALL. You can put it that way, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. Well, I don't want to put it that way. I am asking you. You used the words "that was your opportunity," I do not want an opportunity to arise in the future discussion of this matter to have a conflict of words and not to be able to understand just want you meant. Do I understand that your use of the word "opportunity" is synonymous with responsibility? "General MARSHALL. Mr. Keefe, I had an immense number of papers going over my desk every day informing me what was happening anywhere in the world. This was a matter of great importance. It had gone into the machine, it had been sent out, the acknowledgments had come back. They passed the important messages over my desk. I noted them and initialed them; those that I thought the Secretary of War ought specifically to see I put them out for him to see, to be sure that he would see it in case by any chance he did not see the same message. "I was not passing the responsibility on to the Secretary of War. I merely wanted him to know. "Now the same thing related to these orders of the War Department. I was responsible. I was responsible for the actions of the General Staff throughout on large matters and on the small matters. I was responsible for those, but I am not a bookkeeping machine and it is extremely difficult, it is an extremely difficult thing for me to take each thing in its turn and give it exactly the attention that it had merited. "Now in this particular case a very tragic thing occurred there is no question about that, there is no question in regard to my responsibility as Chief of Staff. I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed yourself. "Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, let me put it in another way. You have now stated it was your responsibility as Chief of Staff to see to it that General Short out there in Hawaii, which you have described as being your bastion of defense, to see that he was alerted, and if he misinterpreted your order to see that that order was carried out. "General MARSHALL. That is my responsibility, sir. "Mr. KEEFE. Now, I have stated it correctly, haven't I? "General MARSHALL. Yes, sir, you have." Subsequently, in the same examination (printed record pp. 1422-1423) General Marshall stated that General Gerow had a direct responsibility in this matter and that he had full responsibility as Chief of Staff. General Marshall was very fair. He admitted that a tragic mistake had been made, and while it was the direct responsibility of General Gerow, Chief of War Plans, to have "caught" General Short's reply and to have immediately advised his Chief of Staff, yet General Marshall as Chief of Staff did assume over-all responsibility for failure of the Washington headquarters to interpret and evaluate General Short's reply and to see to it that he was on an all-out alert in accordance with the command directive issued in the message from Marshall to Short on November 27. The Secretary of War saw, noted and initialed General Short's reply. (Exhibit 46). It was the responsibility of General Marshal] to see that Genera] Short was properly alerted (R. 3723). General Short, after being ordered to report his state of readiness to General Marshall, was entitled to assume that this state of readiness was satisfactory to the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 266-M Chief of Staff unless he heard to the contrary (R. 3443). Neither General Marshall, General Gerow nor Secretary of War Stimson made any criticism or suggestion to General Short about the condition of his alert in Hawaii in the ten-day period prior to the attack. Because of their silence General Short was led to believe that the Chief of Staff approved his alert against sabotage. I believe that Secretary Stimson, and Generals Marshall and Gerow, understood the nature of his alert which was plainly indicated in the reply itself, I further believe they were satisfied with General Short's alert until the blow fell on Hawaii. On June 17, 1940, General Marshall had placed the Hawaiian Department on all-out war alert by the following message (exhibit 52): "Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge." General Marshall followed up this alert with great care and received considerable detailed information about it. (Exhibit 52.) He described the information which caused the alert in 1940 in a letter to the Commanding General in Hawaii, General Herron, as follows: "You have no doubt wondered as to the alert instructions sent to you on the 17th. Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii. "Presumably such a raid would be in the interest of Germany and Italy, to force the United States to pull the Fleet back to Hawaii. "Whether the information or deductions were correct, I cannot say. Even if they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were by discouraging any overt act (exhibit 52, p. 13)." On November 27, 1941, the information which General Marshall had showed a far more severe crisis in Japanese-American relations than existed in June of 1940. As his letter to General Herron shows he felt that this all-out alert in Hawaii in 1940 may have discouraged. the Japanese from attacking that area. Yet he did not repeat on November 27, 1941, his message of June 17, 1940, to Hawaii with its clear-cut order: "*Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid*." He assigned as a reason for not doing so, the fact that in the message of November 27, 1941, "you had to include instructions of the President regarding overt acts" (R. 3975). Mr. Stimson describes the preparation of the Army message of November 27 to General Short as follows: "If there was to be war, moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan as first consideration. In Hawaii because of the large numbers of Japanese habitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning so that nothing would be done, unless necessary to defense, to alarm the civil population and thus possibly precipitate an incident and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act (Stimson statement, p. 21-22)." Again on December 7, Mr. Stimson noted in his diary: "When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would